his examination. He, however, admitted that he was an anarchist, but a peaceable' one. The Court of Appeals (2nd Cir.), however, does not believe in peaceable anarchists, for it has the following to say on this point: "A great deal was said at the argument of the distinction between philosophical anarchists and anarchist communists. The two represent very different schools of thought. There is a class of honest and law-abiding visionaries, who are convinced that the interest of society would be promoted by the abolition of all government whatsoever. Their propaganda is purely educational in character, and violence does not enter into it. They do not believe in force, or in war, or in the taking of human life. The relator evidently belongs to that class. But while the student of social science may discriminate between philosophical anarchists and other kinds of anarchists the act of Congress now under consideration does not; and no such discrimination is necessary, for the constitutional power to exclude or to deport does not depend upon whether the alien is or is not a criminal, or the advocate of lawless ideas.' "Lopez claimed that being a philosophical ' anarchist, his case came within the five-year limit, and since he had been here longer than that, he was not liable to deportation. On this point the court said: "Because he is a philosophical anarchist, and is opposed to the overthrow of government by force or violence, the relator claims he is not within the provisions of section 19 of the act of Congress, except in the 5 year class, and that, as he has been in this country for 15 years, he cannot be deported. From what has been said in an earlier part of this opinion, it appears that the relator's understanding of the statute differs from the understanding of this court. That section deals with a number of different classes of aliens, and provides that certain classes may be deported at any time within 5 years after entry, but does not so limit the time of deportation as respects certain other classes, as to whom it is declared they may be deported, irrespective of the time of their entry into the United States. An alien at the time of his entry may not be an anarchist, and therefore may be entitled to enter. But if at any time after his entry he is found advocating or teaching anarchy,' he may be deported. The relator's testimony, only a portion of which has been quoted, shows conclusively that he is an advocate and a teacher of anarchy, making speeches in its favour, organizing anarchist groups, and distributing anarchist literature. As he reads and writes Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, and English, he is a man of ability, who naturally has influence with his associates. That he is liable under the law to deportation admits of no doubt.' "See also recent case of Ex Parte Pettine, 259, Fed. 733, which announces the same rule. See also 194 U. S. 297, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 719." INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGES. Our Canadian public is decidedly not squeamish. The British public on the other hand has during the last hundred years developed a delicacy in the matter of its statesmen and judges which would not have been understood in the days of Pitt and Fox; or if understood would have been classed as odious hypocrisy. Take the matter of Nepotism. During the late war a small item appeared in the British Press that Lloyd George's son who was a captain was about to be made a Lieut.-Colonel. Immediately a growl, like unto the growl of a Kadiac bear, issued from every editor in Great Britain. Lloyd George's son was not made a Lieut.-Colonel. Again a small item appeared in the British press that Winston Churchill (who had been head of the Admiralty, who had seen several British Campaigns in India and Egypt and written valuable military books), and who was a Major in the Guards, was going to be given a brigade at the front. Immediately the British newspapers sang like the howl of our recent destructive storm amid the electric wires. Winston Churchill did not get the brigade. Now in Canada nobody would have spilled or did spill any ink if and when a Cabinet Minister's son, brother or brother-in-law, got a regiment, brigade or division. Not a query would be or was raised in the House of Commons nor would or did a thunderbolt leave the hand of an editor. In these matters we are still in the days of Pitt and Fox and our stomach is not squeamish. So in the matter of the dignity and independence of judges. Our progress in sentiment may be real, but it is imperceptible. Nay more, it is not a progress towards the front, but like that of the later German Communique's, it has been "a withdrawal in accordance with a strategical plan." We are worse off in this matter than 20 or 40 years ago. VOL. XXXIX. C.L.T.—47+ Sixteen years ago that iconoclast among Canadian publicists, Mr. John E. Ewart, K.C., wrote for this periodical a straight-hitting article entitled "Jobs for Judges." He particularizes on this. "(3) Jobs-as I choose to call them. Governments in this class of cases are authorized by statute to issue commissions in respect of a variety of subjects; to give the work to any judge they choose; and to pay him what they please." We have already expressed not our but the only opinion of commissions where governments by naming their judges can deal themselves cards from the bottom of the pack. In this old article of Mr. Ewart's he asks: "I take my stand upon this: I ask any practitioner of twenty-five, twenty, or even ten years' standing, "Does the Canadian judiciary occupy the same position in public estimation to-day as within your recollection? Now, do not answer 'Yes, in the minds of all reasonable people'; for a great many people (as you think) are very far from being reasonable, and yet it is important that they, too, should have a good opinion of the judges. Admittedly, then, there has been a serious change for the worse in this respect, and the question we have to consider and get a good reply to, at our peril, is 'What is the cause of the change?' My answer is, Jobs. If there be any better let us have it." This was in 1903. Ask the same question in 1919. We get the same answer plus à further reason, viz., the decay of salaried greatness. The salary of a judge sixteen years ago meant socially four times as much as when compared to-day with the swollen incomes of his rich-after-the war neighbours. But lately the House of Commons gently raised some of these salaries of judges and pried a burglar's jimmy under their independence by rendering them liable to taxation. Truly we are in the days of Pitt and Fox. SASK.] RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS. CASE THRESHING MACHINE Co. v. MITTEN. [OCTOBER 14TH, 1919. Bale-Principal and agent-Mitten contract-Evidence-Acceptance -Verbal representations-Warranty-Return of goods. nor " The respondent ordered from the appellant one 40-horse-power Case Gas Engine." The agreement provided that "the purchaser could claim "the return of moneys paid .. only. after he had returned the goods to the place where he had received them;" and that "no representations, warranty or conditions, expressed or implied, other than those herein contained, any agreement collateral hereto, be binding upon the vendor unless it is in writing." The engine was delivered to the respondent, accepted by him in May, 1915, and never returned to the appellant. A promissory note due in November, 1915, was paid by the respondent without any protest. The engine had two tanks, one labelled "Kerosene," and one "Gasoline." An agent of the appellant represented to the respondent that the engine would also operate on kerosene and promised to send experts; but it stopped whenever so operated. On an action by the appellant for the price of sale, the respondent alleged fraud and misrepresentation. Held, Idington, J., dissenting, that, upon the evidence, the engine delivered to and accepted by the respondent was the engine ordered in the written agreement of sale. Per Anglin, J.-The agreement contained no warranty that the engine would run on kerosene, breach of which would support a claim of damages. Schofield v. Emerson (57 Can. S. C. R. 203), distinguished. Per Brodeur, J.-By paying his promissory note without protest and, per Brodeur and Mignault, JJ., by not returning the engine to the appellant, the respondent waived any right he might have to rescission. Judgment of the Court of Appeal ([1919], 1 W. W. R. 101), reversed, Idington, J., dissenting. pére de famille "-Common wall" Pignon or gable-Arts. 522, 551, 560, C. C. The appellants are the owners of lot No. 694 of the City of Three Rivers, and the respondents are the owners of the adjoining lot |