vorce within the limits of a complete guarantee to society against the support of offspring," you do, according to him, "place the inducement to mutual fidelity no longer in the base legal bondage of the parties merely, but in their reciprocal inward sweetness or humanity."

In affirming all this, it seems to him the while that "he is saying as good a word for marriage as has ever been said beneath the stars." He indignantly repudiates all affiliation of his doctrines with the laxer kind of morality, or the systematic enlargement of marital privileges by certain religious sectarians, whom he scornfully pronounces destitute of common sense, for no better cause, so far as he enables us to discover, than that their views differ from his, and whom, he informs us, he, moved by the divine afflatus, lectured for their "disorderly lives." As Mr. James professes himself ready and apt to instruct the public, and desirous withal to forward "the good time coming" by reforming the abuses of the institution of marriage, I flatter myself that he cannot object to relieving a few doubts and honest difficulties which perplex my understanding of his doctrine upon the subject. These doubts and difficulties are stated in the following list of queries:

1. What does Mr. J. understand to be the essential and determining element of marriage, the kernel or sine qua non of the marriage institution, after the complete removal of the characteristic feature of "legal bondage" or "outward force," by the repeal of all laws sanctioning and enforcing it, and after the feature of necessary perpetuity is removed by the entire freedom to end the relation by the will of the parties at any instant? Noah Webster informs us that to marry is to "join a man and woman for life, and constitute them man and wife according to the laws and customs of a nation." Now, any constraint from custom is as much an outward force as a constraint by law, and, in case both these species of constraint are removed, – that is, if the man and woman are joined with no reference to either, but simply with regard to their mutual or individual choice and wishes, the union occurring not for life, but to be dissolved at the option of the parties, - both limbs of the definition are eliminated, reminding one of the oft-quoted expurgation of the tragedy of Hamlet. It seems to me, then, that I am quite in order to call for a new specification of the essentials of matrimony. But I am forgetting that Mr. J. still provides for the ghost of a legal tie, in the bond to be given as a guarantee to society against the support of offspring. This brings me to my second query.

2. Why - if the maintenance of the unswerving constancy of husband and wife can be safely intrusted to the guardianship of "their reciprocal inward sweetness or humanity," with no "base legal bondage" superadded- why may not the care and maintenance of offspring be, with equal safety, intrusted likewise to that same "inward sweetness or humanity," without the superaddition of a “base legal bondage" or "outward force"? If the first of these social relations may with safety not only, but with positive advantage, be discharged of accountability to the police office, why not the second? Why, indeed, be at the trouble and expense of main

taining a police office at all? Indeed, if I understand Mr. J. rightly, after imposing this limitation upon the absolute freedom of divorce, or, in other words, upon the extinction of legal marriage, ex gratia modestia, perhaps, lest the whole truth might not be fitting to be spoken openly, he again dispenses with the limitation itself, and delivers the parental relation over to the same securities to which he has previously consigned the conjugal; for I find in a subsequent paragraph of the same article the following sentence: "It is obvious to every honest mind that, if our conjugal, parental, and social ties generally can be safely discharged of the purely diabolic element of outward force, they must instantly become transfigured by their own inward divine and irresistible loveliness." Here it is not marriage only, but the maintenance of offspring also, which is to be intrusted to the "inward sweetness or humanity" of the individuals to whom the relation appeals, which seems to me much the more consistent view of the matter, inasmuch as, if the principle is good for anything in one case, it is certainly equally applicable in the other. But here, again, we come back to the point I have made above, —the query whether marriage, discharged of all law, custom, or necessary perpetuity, remains marriage at all? and if so, what is the essential and characteristic element of such marriage?-upon which point I crave further information.

3. If the inception and the dissolution of marriage is to be left to the option of the parties on such grounds as are stated by Mr. J., is the expansion or contraction of the relation also to be abandoned to the altogether private and individual judgment of the same parties in logical deference to the same principle? That is to say, if more than two parties are taken into the conjugal partnership, is that degree of license to be tolerated likewise? or are we still to retain a police office to provide against such cases? We are aware that men have differed in theory and practice in divers ages and nations, ― between monogamy and polygamy, for example,—and with all restraints, both of custom and of law, removed, possibly they may differ in like manner again. What, then, is to happen under the new régime? Who is to be the standard of proprieties? Is Mr. James's definition of a "disorderly life" to be my definition because it is his? If not Mr. James's definition, whose then? What is the limit up to which Man, simply in virtue of being Man, is entitled, of right, to the exercise of his freedom, without the interference of society, or which is the same thing—of other individuals? This last, it seems to me, is about the most weighty question concerning human society ever asked, and one which a man who, like Mr. James, attempts to lead the way in the solution of social difficulties, should be prepared to answer by some broader generalization than any which relates to a single one of the social ties, and by some principle more susceptible of definition than a general reference to humanitary sentiment. There are some acts which the individual is authorized to do or not to do, at his own option, and in relation to which other individuals have no right to interfere to determine for him whether he shall or shall not do them; as, for example, whether he shall go personally to the post

office or send a boy. There are certain other acts, on the other hand, which the individual cannot do without directly authorizing interference, resistance, or constraint, on the part of others. If a man plant his fist in the features of another, or tweak his nose, I take that to be such an act. What, now, is the clear and definable line which social science, as understood by Mr. James, reveals, as running between these two classes of acts? If that can be discovered, perchance it may settle the marriage question, not singly and alone, but along with every other question of human freedom. Hoping that Mr. J. will consent to enlighten me and others by any knowledge he may have upon the subject, I submit my interrogatories.

STEPHEN PEARL ANDREWS.

III.

MR. GREELEY'S COMMENTS.

Having given place to the essays on Marriage and Divorce by Mr. Henry James, in reply to attacks upon him in the "Observer," we have concluded to extend like hospitality to the queries of Mr. S. P. Andrews, suggested by and relating to the essays of Mr. James. Our own views differ very radically from those of both these gentlemen; but we court rather than decline discussion on the subject, and are satisfied that the temper and tendencies of our times render such discussion eminently desirable, if not vitally necessary. Let us now briefly set forth our own idea of the matter.

This is preeminently an age of Individualism (it would hardly be polite to say Egotism), wherein "the Sovereignty of the Individual” — that is, the right of every one to do pretty nearly as he pleases-is already generally popular, and visibly gaining ground daily. "Why should not A. B., living on our side of the St. Lawrence, and making hats, exchange them freely with C. D., living on the Canada side, and growing wheat, without paying a heavy impost or violating a law?" "Why should not E. F. lend his money at ten or twenty per cent. to G. H., if the latter is willing to pay that rate, and sees how he can make more by it?" "Why may not I. J. educate his own children, if he sees fit, and decline paying any School Tax?". "And why should not John Nokes and Lydia Nokes be at liberty to dissolve their own marriage, if they have no children, or have provided for such as they have, and believe that they may secure happiness in new relations which is unattainable in the present?" These questions all belong to the same school, though the individuals who ask them may be of superficially different creeds or persuasions. They all find their basis and aliment in that idea of Individual Sovereignty which seems to us destructive alike of social and personal well-being. The general answer to these questions imports that the State does not exist for the advantage and profit of this or that individual, but to secure the highest good of all, not merely of the present, but of future generations also; and that an act which, in itself, and without reference to its influence as a precedent, might be

deemed innocent, is often rendered exceedingly hurtful and culpable by its relation to other acts externally undistinguishable from it. A hundred cases might be cited in which the happiness of all the parties immediately concerned would be promoted by liberty of divorce; and yet we have not a doubt that such liberty, if recognized and established, would lead to the most flagrant disorders and the most pervading calamities. We insist, then, that the question shall be considered from the social or general rather than the individual standpoint, and that the experience, the judgment, and the instincts of mankind shall be regarded in framing the decision.

Polygamy is not an experiment to be first tried in our day; it is some thousands of years old; its condemnation is inscribed on the tablets of Oriental history; it is manifest in the comparative debasement of Asia and Africa. The liberty of divorce has been recognized by great historians as one main cause of the corruption and downfall of the Roman Empire. The sentiment of chastity becomes ridiculous where a woman is transferred from husband to husband, as caprice or satiety may dictate.

Two persons desire to be joined in Marriage, and invoke the sanction of the State-in other words, the approbation and respect of the community — for their union. The State substantially asks them: "Is there no impediment to such union in the existing engagements of one or both of you?"—"No.". "Does your knowledge of and affection for each other warrant you in promising to love and cherish each other exclusively as husband and wife till death shall part you?" - "Yes.""Then we pronounce and consecrate you man and wife, and enjoin all persons to honor you as such." And this is marriage, “honorable in all," and always honored accordingly, because it recognizes and provides for the permanent claims of society in the preservation of moral purity and the due maintenance and education of children; while any sexual union unsanctified by the mutual pledge of perpetuity or continuance ever has been and ever must be esteemed ignoble and dishonoring when contrasted with this; for its aims are manifestly selfish and its character undistinguishable from the purely sensual and brutal connections of undisguised lewdness, where no pretence of affection or esteem is set up, and whose sole object is animal gratification. In other words, society, by the institution of indissoluble marriage, exacts of the married the strongest practical guarantee of the purity and truth of their affection, and thereupon draws the broadest possible line of demarcation between them and the vile crew whose aspirations are purely selfish, and whose unions are dissolved, renewed, and varied as versatility or satiety may dictate.

We have no doubt this wise law, while essential to the progress of the race in intelligence and virtue, is eminently conducive to the happiness of individuals. True, there are unhappy marriages, discordant marriages, unions sanctioned by law which lack the soul of marriage, but these occur, not through any inherent vice