agency (c). So, production of a writ purporting to be signed by the plaintiff's town agent, coupled with a receipt for the sum claimed, purporting also to be signed by such agent, has been received to prove a plea of payment (d).

The admissions of agents are receivable in criminal cases, but only to supply a link in the evidence. Thus, on Lord Melville's trial for embezzlement, evidence was received of a receipt of public money by an authorized agent, to show that the money was actually received. Lord Erskine said:"The first steps in the proof of the charge must advance by evidence applicable alike to civil and criminal cases; for a fact must be established by the same evidence, whether it is to be followed by a civil or criminal consequence; but it is a totally different question, in the consideration of criminal justice, as distinguished from civil, how the noble person now on trial may be affected by the fact, when so established. The receipt by the paymaster would in itself involve him civilly, but could, by no possibility, convict him of a crime" (e). Where the wife of a prisoner charged with receiving stolen goods had made out a list of goods and prices at his request, and subsequently handed it to the police in his presence, it was held that such list could be given in evidence against the prisoner (ƒ).

The instructions of a principal to his agent are not evidence in an action on a contract against a third party, unless it be shown that they were communicated to the latter (g). The admissions of an infant are generally not evidence against him (h); nor, generally, are the admissions of a guardian, or next friend, evidence against an infant who sues by him (i). But infants and their guardians and next friends are now compellable to make discovery of documents and to answer interrogatories in the same way as other litigants. (See Part III. Chapters VII. and VIII.)

(c) Watkins v. Vince, Stark. 368. (d) Weary v. Alderson, 2 M. & Rob. 127.

(e) 29 How. St. Tr. 746.

(f) R. v. Mallory, 13 Q. B. D. 33.

(g) Smethurst v. Taylor, 12 M. & W. 545.

(h) Holden v. Hearn, 1 Beav. 455. (i) Cowling v. Ely, 2 Stark. 366; s. v. James v. Hatfield, 1 Stra. 548.

Admissions by solicitors. A solicitor is presumed to have authority for whatever he may say or do on behalf of his client and his authority to make admissions in an action will be implied when he has been proved to be the solicitor on the record (). In Young v. Wright (1), Lord Ellenborough said:" If a fact is admitted by the attorney on the record with intent to obviate the necessity of proving it, he must be supposed to have authority for the purpose, and his client will be bound by the admission; but it is clear that whatever the attorney says in the course of conversation is not evidence in the cause (m).

Where an attorney on the record gave the following undertaking: "I hereby undertake to appear for A. and B., joint owners of the sloop Arundel," &c., this was held sufficient primâ facie evidence that A. and B. were such joint owners (»); but an admission before action by an attorney who afterwards appeared on the record, has been held insufficient, without proof that he was authorized at the time to make the admission (o). An admission by a solicitor's clerk or agent is as valid as an admission by the solicitor (p). Where the defendant's attorney, after a controversy had arisen, admitted in conversation with the plaintiff's attorney that his client's title was under B., and ended with B., and the plaintiff claimed as a remainderman after B., this was held to be a good admission of B.'s title (g). So, in an action on a bill, an admission by the defendant's attorney that the acceptance was in his client's handwriting is evidence of acceptance without production of the bill (r).

Admissions by counsel. It has been said that if the parties have a particular controversy, and it seems plain that a certain fact is admitted, the jury, as men of common sense, may

draw the same conclusion as to that fact as if it were formally proved before them (s); and therefore it has been suggested that if counsel opens statements which he does not prove, the opposite party may treat them as admissions; but this doctrine has been disputed in a later case (t).

Generally counsel have authority to make all admissions in civil cases, which they may think proper in the conduct of a case: and accordingly a special case signed by counsel on each side, at a former trial, has been held evidence of all the facts therein stated, at a subsequent trial (u); but ordinary and less formal admissions by counsel at a former trial are not evidence on a subsequent trial (). When counsel with the authority of their clients consent to an order the clients cannot arbitrarily withdraw such consent (y). In criminal cases it appears that solicitors have no authority to make admissions; and it seems that not even counsel have such authority (≈).

Admissions by a wife. A wife has no implied authority to make admissions in prejudice of her husband's rights, even though he may possess such rights jure uxoris (a); nor can her admission of a tort committed by her be given in evidence to affect her husband in an action in which he is liable for costs and damages (b). Where a wife was carrying on business at a distance from her husband, it was held that her admission as to the amount of rent, and the terms of tenancy, was not evidence of the facts against him, in replevin by him against his landlord. Alderson, B., said:"A wife cannot bind her husband by her admissions, unless they fall within the scope of the authority which she may be reasonably presumed to have derived from him; and where she is carrying on a trade, if it be necessary for that purpose that she should

(s) Per Alderson, B., Stracy v. Blake, 1 M. & W. 173.

(t) Duncombe v. Daniell, 8 C. & P. 222; sed cf. Machell v. Ellis, 1 C. & K.682; Darby v. Ouseley, 1 H. & N. 1.

(u) Van Wart v. Woolley, R. & M. 4; Swinfen v. Swinfen, 18 C. B. 485.

(x) Colledge v. Horn, 3 Bing. 119. (y) Harvey v. Croydon Rural Sanitary Authority, L. R., 25 C. D. 249. (2) R. v. Thornhill, 8 C. & P. 575. (a) Alban v. Pritchett, 6 T. R. 681. (b) Denn v. White, 7 T. R. 112.

have such a power, she may be his agent to make admissions with respect to matters connected with the trade. Here it could not be necessary, for the purpose of carrying on the business of the shop, that she should make admissions of an antecedent contract for the hire of the shop" (c). Whenever it can be inferred, from the antecedents of a case, that a wife had an express or implied authority, as an agent, to bind her husband, her admissions will affect him (d). Thus, in an action against a husband for goods supplied to his wife, the jury ought not only to be asked whether the goods were necessaries, but also whether the wife had authority to buy (e); for a wife has no original authority to pledge her husband's credit at all (). Where a business is such as is usually transacted by women, a wife's admission concerning it has been received against her husband (g); and, as regards her separate property, the admissions of a married woman are on the same footing as if she were unmarried.

Principal and surety. Admissions by a principal are not evidence against a surety, unless connected and contemporaneous with the original transaction. Thus, a surety by bond for the conduct of a clerk has been held not bound by the admissions of the clerk that he had embezzled money (); nor, on a guarantee to pay for goods, is the surety bound by the admission of his principal as to delivery (i). Receipts in the books of a deceased collector or clerk are evidence against a surety, as declarations in the course of business or against interest ().

Finally, it is to be observed that the whole of a statement, whether verbal or in writing, containing an admission is to be received together. But every part of the statement may (g) Anon., 1 Str. 527.

(c) Meredith v. Footner, 11 M. & W. 202.

(d) Manby v. Scott, 2 Sm. L. C.

(e) Reid v. Teakle, 13 C. B. 627; cf. Jolley v. Rees, 15 C. B., N. S. 628. (f) Reneaux v. Teakle, 8 Ex. 680.

(h) Smith v. Whittingham, 6 C. &

P. 78.

(i) Evans v. Beattie, 1 C. & P. 394. (k) Middleton v. Melton, 10 B. & C. 317; Whitmarsh v. George, 8 B. & C. 556.

Thus, in an action

not have the same legal operation. against a partnership firm for goods supplied between June, 1893, and February, 1894, the only evidence that one of the defendants had ever been a member of the firm at all was a letter written by him, on January 2nd, 1893, to the manager of a bank, with whom the firm had an account, in answer to an inquiry as to whether he claimed any interest in the balance standing to the credit of the firm at the bank, which letter was as follows: "I have not banked any money this last eight months, as I have dissolved partnership with my brother last April." It was contended, for the defendant, that the admission of the partnership could not be separated from the statement of the dissolution. This the County Court judge held, but on appeal the Divisional Court held otherwise. Wills, J., said—"the letter clearly contains an admission that William was a partner in Wren Brothers in April, 1892, and it must be presumed that the state of things so admitted to have existed at that date continued to exist, unless the contrary be proved. No doubt the statement that the partnership had been dissolved is evidence in the defendant's favour; but it is for the jury to say what weight is to be attached to it" (). The statement will not be inadmissible, because portions of it contain hearsay; but the fact will be matter of comment by the judge to a jury, and he will also remind them that it is their duty to consider the whole statement, although an omission in this respect will not vitiate a verdict, if it appear that the whole admission has been otherwise brought fairly before them.

A party against whom a deed is produced has a right to insist on the whole deed being read. But a mutilated document may nevertheless be given in evidence (m).

(1) Brown v. Wren Brothers, (1895) 1 Q. B. 390.

(m) Lord Trimlestown v. Kennis, 9 C. & F. 775.