Ord. 32, r. 2 of the R. S. C., 1875, and is also similar to the practice existing prior to 1875 under the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, and the Chancery Amendment Act, 1858. Under those Acts it was held that a party, by admitting a document, does not thereby in any way recognize its legal validity, but merely enables the opposite party to dispense with the usual evidence which would otherwise be necessary to bring it before the court. Thus, when a party admitted his signature to a bill of exchange, he was still allowed to object to the insufficiency of the stamp (≈); and an admission on notice of certain documents which were described as copies of, or extracts from, certain original documents, was held not to make such copies evidence, in the absence of sufficient reason for the non-production of the originals (a). An admission of a bill of exchange drawn by the plaintiff, directed to the defendants," and accepted by one H. B. for the defendant," was held to estop the defendants from disputing H. B.'s authority to accept (b); and it has been held that, after admission of a deed, no objection can be taken to an erasure or interlineation which may afterwards appear. In such a case, where the defendant objected at trial to an unexplained interlineation which had been admitted without objection, Coleridge, J., said:-"Before a party admits a deed it is produced to him for the very purpose of enabling him to inspect it, and say whether he objects to its admission in the form in which it appears to be written. Here it must be considered, either that the defendant really admitted that the deed was correct, and the interlineation no objection, or that the admission was made with the dishonest intention of entrapping the plaintiff; and as it must be presumed that the defendant acted upon the inspection of the deed upon which he had a right to act, I think the objection has been

(z) Vane v. Whittington, 2 Dowl., N. S. 757.

(a) Sharpe v. Lambe, 11 A. & E. 805.

(b) Wilkes v.

Hopkins, 1 C. B. 737.

waived under the notice to admit" (c). Where there is a variance in date between the document admitted and that which is produced, it will be immaterial, unless the opposite party has been misled by it (d); but it ought to be shown that the document admitted and that produced are the same (e).

The courts will not sanction any agreement for an admission by which any of the known principles of law are evaded. No effect, therefore, will be given to an agreement to waive an objection arising from a deed not having been stamped (ƒ).

Ord. 18, r. 4 of the County Court Rules, 1889, contains the following provision:-" Where a party desires to give in evidence any document, he may, not less than five clear days before the trial, give notice to any other party in the action who is competent to make admissions, requiring him to inspect and admit such document; and if such other party shall not, within three days after receiving such notice, make such admission, any expense of proving the same at the trial shall be paid by him, whatever be the result of the action, unless the court shall otherwise order, and no costs of proving any document shall be allowed unless such notice shall be given, except in cases where, in the opinion of the registrar, the omission to give such notice has been a saving of expense."

(c) Freeman v. Steggale, 14 Q. B.

202.

(d) Field v. Fleming, 5 Dowl. 450.

(e) Clay v. Thackrah, 9 C. & P. 47. (f) Owen v. Thomas, 3 M. & K. 357.

CHAPTER XVII.

CONFESSIONS.

As in civil controversies the admissions of parties are received against their makers, so in criminal trials the confession of a prisoner is held to be evidence against him of a high nature; but since a person charged with a crime may be induced by his situation either to criminate himself untruly, under the influence of excitement and terror, or trusting to a promise of forgiveness by a prosecutor, or other person who may be presumed to have a power of pardoning, it has long been the policy of the criminal law to reject evidence of every confession or statement by a prisoner, which has been made under the pressure of any species of physical or moral duress. Whenever, therefore, at a criminal trial, there appears to be ground of reasonable suspicion that a confession of guilt has been elicited from a prisoner by a threat of punishment, in the event of a refusal to confess, or by a promise of forgiveness, on condition of confessing, the court will inquire strictly into the antecedent circumstances of the statement which is to be tendered, and will not receive it unless it is proved to have been the free and voluntary declaration of the prisoner. The rule, as now recognized, is the following:

The statement of a prisoner as to the circumstances of a crime with which he is charged is evidence against himself, provided the Court is satisfied (a), that the statement be free and

P.

(a) R. v. Thompson, (1893) 2 Q. B. 12.

voluntary, and that it has not been extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence (6). This rule has been established by a series of decisions. In R. v. Baldry (c), Lord Campbell, C. J., said :-"The rule seems to be this :-If there be any worldly advantage held out to the accused to be obtained by confession, or any harm threatened to him if he refuses to confess, any statement made by him in consequence of any such inducement must be rejected. The reason for this rule I take to be, not that the law supposes that what is said after such inducement is false, but that the prisoner may have said something under a bias, and that it is not a purely voluntary confession." Pollock, C. B., in the same case, said:-"By the law of England every confession to be used against a prisoner must be a voluntary confession. Every inducement held out by a person in authority will render a confession inadmissible; and the cases have gone very far as to who are persons in authority."

On these grounds a confession will be inadmissible when it has been obtained by any threat or promise of favour held out by a prosecutor or his wife (d); by the prisoner's master or mistress when the crime has been committed against either of them, but not otherwise (e); by the attorney of such person in authority; by a constable, or anyone acting under a constable (ƒ); and especially by a magistrate (g). The mere presence of a constable, however, is not enough, if he does not interfere in giving the advice or holding out the inducement (h).

The inducement must be held out by a person who is in authority, and who has presumably power to forgive; and

(b) R. v. Fennell, 7 Q. B. D. p. 150. (c) 2 Den. 430.

(d) R. v. Spencer, 7 C. & P. 776. (e) R. v. Moore, 2 Den. 522.

(f) R. v. Enoch, 5 C. & P. 535. (g) R. v. Drew, 8 C. & P. 140. (h) R. v. Jarvis, L. R., 1 C. C. R. 96; R. v. Reeve, L. R., 1 C. C. R. 362.

therefore, where a maid-servant was indicted for child murder, a confession elicited from her by her mistress was held admissible, because the crime was in no way connected with the management of the house, and there was, therefore, no probability that the mistress or her husband would prosecute in it (i). So, too, when a confession is elicited by an inducement held out by a non-resident daughter of a prosecutor, it appears that she is not a person in authority competent to hold out an inducement, and that the confession is admissible (). If, however, the inducement is made in the presence of a person in authority, such as a prosecutor, or one who is likely to be a prosecutor, who stands by and does not object, his silence is treated as a tacit acquiescence in the inducement, and the confession will be rejected (1); but where one of two prisoners said to the other in the presence of the prosecutor and a policeman, "you had better tell him the truth," and neither the prosecutor nor the policeman spoke, a confession made by the prisoner so addressed was held admissible(); and so was a confession in the case where the mother of one of the prisoners (who were young boys) said to them, in the presence of a constable and of the mother of the other boy, "you had better, as good boys, tell the truth" ("). When the inducement is held out by a person who has no authority in the matter, a confession will be admissible. Thus, when a prisoner's neighbours, who were not connected with the prisoner, advised her to tell the truth for the sake of her family, the confession was received (0). When the inducement has been once held out by a person in authority, no subsequent confession to such person will be admissible, unless it appear clear that the impression which it was calculated to make has been removed from the mind of the

(i) R. v. Moore, 2 Den. 522.
(k) R. v. Sleeman, Dears. 269.
(1) R. v. Luckhurst, Dears. 245.
(m) R. v. Parker, L. & C. 42.

(n) R. v. Reeve, L. R., 1 C. C. R.

362.

(0) R. v. Rowe, R. & R. 153; R. v. Taylor, 8 C. & P. 733.