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allgemeinen alſo äußern Begriffe beide beruht beſonders Bewegung bilden Bildung c'est daber daher denken dieſe Dinge dürfen eben eigenen Eigenſchaften einander einfachen einzelnen Elemente Empfindung Entwidlung Erfahrung erkennen Erkenntniß erklären Erſcheinungen ewigen fann feine fich find findet finnlichen fittlichen folgen fönnen fönnte Freiheit ganze geben Gedanken Gefeße Geift Gewohnheit giebt Glauben Gott große Grund Grundfäße Gute hierin Hume Ideen indem innern iſt könnte Körper Kraft l'homme laſſen läßt Leben legt Lehre Leibniz liche liegt machen Macht Materie Meinung Menſchen möchte Monaden Moral muß müſſen mußte Natur neuern Nothwendigkeit Nouv Philoſophie praktiſchen Princip ſchon Seele ſehr ſei ſein ſeine ſelbſt Senſualismus ſich ſie ſind Sinne ſoll ſollen ſondern Streit Subſtanz Thätigkeit Theile Théod Unendliche unſerer Unterſuchungen Urſachen Urtheil Verbindung Vernunft vers viel wahre Wahrheit Weiſe weiter welde Welt wenig Weſen will Willen Wirkungen Wiſſenſchaft wohl wollte Zwede Zweifel zwiſchen
Page 319 - The idea of a substance as well as that of a mode, is nothing but a collection of simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have a particular name assigned them, by which we are able to recall, either to ourselves or others, that collection.
Page 334 - It seems evident that men are carried, by a natural instinct or prepossession, to repose faith in their senses ; and that, without any reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we always suppose an external universe which depends not on our perception, but would exist though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated.
Page 328 - When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion ; any quality which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find that the one does actually in fact follow the other.
Page 333 - Here, then, is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas; and though the powers and forces by which the former is governed be wholly unknown to us, yet our thoughts and conceptions have still, we find, gone on in the same train with the other works of nature.
Page 311 - As to those impressions which arise from the senses, their ultimate cause is, in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human reason, and 'twill always be impossible to decide with certainty whether they arise immediately from the object, or are produced by the creative power of the mind, or are derived from the Author of our being.
Page 321 - If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, thro' the whole course of our lives; since self is supposed to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable.
Page 333 - As nature has taught us the use of our limbs, without giving us the knowledge of the muscles and nerves, by which they are actuated; so has she implanted in us an instinct, which carries forward the thought in a correspondent course to that which she has established among external objects; though we are ignorant of those powers and forces, on which this regular course and succession of objects totally depends.
Page 263 - Colour, figure, motion, extension, and the like, considered only as so many sensations in the mind, are perfectly known, there being nothing in them which is not perceived. But if they are looked on as notes or images, referred to things or archetypes existing without the mind, then are we involved all in scepticism.
Page 329 - ... is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist. This connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion.