tive than the lawmakers, and have practically insisted that there should be monopoly, either in intent or to a certain degree at least in fact, before an industrial organization should be held illegal. It may be said therefore that, so far as State legislation is concerned at least, this destructive tendency in legislation has perhaps already accomplished its utmost, unless more power be granted the States. If Congress were to give to the States control over interstate traffic carried on within their borders, as has been advocated, possibly still more might be done in that direction.

So far as the industrial combinations are the result of special advantages granted to individuals or to corporations, whether by the State or by others, it is probable that in most instances the evil effects would be lessened, if not even completely removed, by the removal of such discriminating favors. If railroads are giving special rates to large shippers, and are thus building up monopolistic organizations, such discriminations, which are illegal now, should be stopped by the application of more effective remedies. It is probable that the hands of the Interstate Commerce Commission can be

by law materially strengthened, and thereby this evil materially lessened. If enacted into law by Congress, the recommendations of the Industrial Commission-that the Interstate Commerce Commission be given the power of audit of accounts of railroads, and that its decisions regarding freight rates go into force and remain in force until reversed by a decree of court on the appeal of the shipper, as well as the still further suggestion that penalties be fines against the corporation and not imprisonment of the official-it is probable, would materially lessen, at any rate, this evil of freight discriminations in favor of the combinations. The bill lately passed by the House of Representatives looks somewhat in the same direction, but possibly attempts to go further than is wise. It is well to be temperate in legislation which affects profoundly the whole industrial structure, and to "make haste slowly." The end will often be sooner reached.

Likewise, the monopoly that comes from the holding of patents, as in the case of wire fencing, or as has been the case with the telephone, can perhaps be removed by amendments to our patent laws. It has been suggested that instead of our

granting a legal monopoly to an inventor, the production of the invention should be left free to all who stand ready to pay him a royalty fixed by the law. He would thus be made surer of his reward, while the public would be benefited by cheaper patented goods instead of injured by the patent monopoly, as seems now at times to be the case. The details of such an amendment to the patent law may well afford a subject for careful study.

So far as the remedy of a removal or lessening of the tariff on products which are largely controlled by industrial combinations is concerned, that has already been discussed in Chapter II. It is in all probability true that by such removal of the tariff the evil effects of the higher price would, for the time being at any rate, be materially lessened, and the suggestion of this remedy is certainly good, provided the remedy were applied with reasonable discretion and a reasonable judgment regarding present industrial conditions. But, on the other hand, as has been said before, it must be perfectly evident that the removal of the tariff would not destroy in this country an industrial combination without first destroying its surviving rivals-while it might also very

readily be in many cases the one incentive needed toward bringing about a world-wide combination against which tariffs could not avail.

Amendments to the corporation laws which would hold officers and directors and promoters to more direct responsibility would be serviceable, and should be especially directed to the prevention of their activity in the stock market. That end can probably be attained by the next remedy suggested.

A remedy which would strike directly at the most crying evils of the industrial combinations is publicity, which has been so often advocated during the past year. Publicity regarding the organization of a business, which should compel promoters to show clearly to investors the basis on which a large corporation or a combination of corporations is organized, would certainly put careful investors into a position to protect themselves. Of course there would still be foolish people who would buy gambling stocks, credulous ones who, without investigation, would believe any story told in the papers. The State cannot well protect such, without destroying personal freedom. It is doing enough if it enables a careful man to protect himself.

More frequent reports regarding the condition of a business, carefully audited by persons working in the interests of the stockholders, and quite possibly under the supervision of the government, as has been lately advocated by Mr. Bird S. Coler, the Comptroller of the City of New York,* will still further protect stockholders against the corrupt practices of directors. Excellent, however, as is the general purpose of Mr. Coler's plan, and sound as are many of his arguments, he goes so far as, under our present conditions, to run the risk of exposing every sound conservative business to the danger of blackmail, and in one or two particulars at least to hamper unnecessarily a sound and beneficial business. There is decided objection to putting too much power in the hands of government inspectors with discretion, when the same end of government enforcement of publicity can be better accomplished in other ways. It is of course possible that if Mr. Coler were to put his views into a definite bill, some changes in them would be made, or his opinion would be more clearly understood.

The publicity also which should show with a * See Appendix C.