" because the course of

expression of the desert of our sin,' Providence since the crucifixion appears to us a contradiction to the hypothesis, that he suffered "the punishment due to us all." If God regarded the sufferings of Christ as a substitute for the penalty due to our offences, why have men been exposed to punishment since the Saviour suffered in their stead? They have certainly been threatened, and millions of them have suffered punishment, since that time as well as before. Prior to the crucifixion God was disposed to forgive the penitent, and it has been so from that day to this. Faith and reformation are now "counted for righteousness," and it was so in the time of Abraham. It is very certain, that the terms of pardon and acceptance have not been lowered since the Saviour suffered on the cross. If there has been any essential change in consequence of the sufferings of Christ, as to the conditions of acceptance with God, more is now required than was required under the former dispensation. As more light and more advantages are now given, more obedience is required. It hence appears, that the sufferings of Christ were neither designed to cancel any debt which men owed to God, nor to diminish their obligations to obey him. His sufferings were neither a substitute for punishment, nor a substitute for reformation and holy obedience.

7. There are other objections to speaking of the sufferings of Christ as "a fair expression of the desert of our sins," which seem not to have occurred to Mr. Barnes. "Even the death of the cross" is the strongest language used in the Bible to express the sufferings of Christ; the pains of crucifixion were all that were obvious to the spectators of that awful scene, and these sufferings appear to have been about six hours in duration. Will Mr. Barnes then admit that "the death of the cross" is the penalty of the divine law, or equivalent to the desert of our sins; and that six hours suffering is all to which the greatest sinner is exposed? If not, why does he teach that the sufferings of Christ are "a fair expression of the desert of our sin," and that "woes like these tell how much we ought to endure?"

By ascribing infinite dignity to the Messiah, and by estimating the evil of his sufferings, not according to their amount, but according to the supposed dignity of the suf

ferer, Mr. Barnes may imagine greater sufferings than those which produced "the death of the cross." But what is all this but imagination? Does the Bible mention any such mode of estimating the sufferings of the Messiah? If not, let us confine ourselves to the language of Scripture in making our estimates.

We should also take into view, that the advocates for the doctrine in question, not only ascribe infinite dignity to the sufferer, and infer that a less amount of real suffering was necessary on account of his infinite dignity; but on this ground they suppose that his sufferings were equivalent to the endless misery of all mankind. Let us then observe how impossible it is, that in the sufferings of Christ we should have "a fair expression of the desert of our sins," or even an expression of which we can form any definite conception. On the hypothesis that a less amount of sufferings was necessary on account of the dignity of the suf ferer, a ten thousandth part of what he endured in a second of the common sufferings of crucifixion might be estimated as equivalent to the everlasting misery of all our race. Then when we consider him as suffering a vicarious punishment, not for an individual only, but for the millions of millions of mankind, how can any individual see in that unknown, infinite, undefinable, and inconceivable mass of suffering "a fair expression of the desert of his sins"? As truly might we say that the immensity of space is "a fair expression" of the size and figure of a man.

8. We cannot admit, that in the sufferings of Christ we have "a fair expression of the desert of our sins," because we believe that the doctrine of substituted punishment involves the hypothesis that with God there is no forgiveness or pardoning mercy. A doctrine which involves this idea. may justly be regarded with horror; and we have no doubt that it will be denied that such is the fact in regard to the doctrine of a vicarious punishment. We shall therefore state the grounds of our belief.

Forgiveness relates either to some pecuniary debt, or to some penalty for a moral offence. In each of these senses the word is used in the Scriptures. If a benevolent creditor has cancelled a debt due to him, because the debtor was poor and unable to pay, we should be likely to say, he forgave him the whole debt. But if a surety or friend had paid

the poor man's debt, we should not call it forgiveness in the creditor, to give up the bond on receiving his pay. There is nothing of forgiveness in this case, any more than there would have been had the poor man paid the debt himself. Forgiveness of a moral offence implies a remission of the penalty threatened by the law. When the penalty is inflicted, it is not forgiven; and when it is forgiven, it is not inflicted. As forgiveness implies a remission of the penalty, so punishment excludes the idea of forgiveness. The same offence is not both punished and forgiven. If then there was occasion for vicarious punishment, it must have occurred on this ground, the want of forgiveness with God for the penitent. We do not perhaps hear people use this language in speaking on the subject; yet we may find that their reasoning implies all that we assert. How often have we heard and seen the supposed vicarious punishment accounted for and vindicated in the following manner:

"Under the perfect government of God, his honor and the honor of his law required, that the penalty of the law for every offence should be fully inflicted; and, as endless punishment is the penalty for every transgression, no sinner could ever have been saved, however penitent, had not the wisdom of God devised the plan of substituted punishment, that of inflicting on his Son, a person of infinite dignity, the penalty due for our offences, or such sufferings as were equivalent to that penalty."

It may now be asked, what possible occasion could there be for such a plan of vicarious punishment, if there was with God forgiveness for the penitent? None certainly. Besides, the very supposition that the penalty of the law must in all cases be inflicted, either on the sinner or an innocent substitute, implies that there is not in truth any forgiveness under the divine government. For surely a penalty inflicted is not a penalty forgiven. It is true that the penitent sinner is not supposed to suffer personally the penalty due to his offences. But why? Not because he has become a new creature, or a reformed man; but because his substitute has suffered in his stead, and thus paid the very last mite. What then was left to be forgiven? Nothing. Every one will admit, that there would have been no forgiveness on the part of God, had the sinner suffered the penalty himself. Why then is it not the same, as to forgiveness, if the penalty

has been suffered by a substitute? It certainly is the same, if it is a fact, that the sufferings of Christ are the only ground on which the sinner is saved from future punishment.

We know very well that the advocates for substituted punishment talk of the forgiving love of God, or his readiness to pardon all who repent; and they doubtless believe, that, in some sense of the terms, there is forgiveness with God. Still they teach, that God forgives only on the ground that the deserved punishment has been inflicted on the Messiah. But who, in any other case, ever heard or imagined, that punishment might be a proper ground of pardon?

We grant that forgiveness, as exercised by neighbours or brethren one towards another, implies things different from the remission of a debt or a penalty, such as approbation and joy on seeing an offender evince a humble and penitent mind, restoring him to favor and good standing, and various expressions of sympathy and kindness. But when we speak of forgiveness, as exercised by a ruler towards one who had by transgression exposed himself to the penalty of the law, forgiveness implies a remission of that penalty, and such other favors as may be properly shown to the person forgiven. But after a penalty has been inflicted, it can with no propriety be said to have been forgiven.

We have expressed the belief, that the doctrine of vicarious punishment is built on a false hypothesis. It is not a revealed principle of the divine government, that the honor of the law and the lawgiver requires that every transgression shall be punished, whether the sinner repent or not. God has clearly revealed the following facts:

But

That he has no pleasure in the death of the wicked; that he is longsuffering, not willing that any should perish; that his threatenings are so conditional, that if those who are threatened turn from their iniquities, and do that which is right, they shall live, and not die. He requires us to pray to him, "Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive those who trespass against us," assuring us that if we forgive, we shall be forgiven. He has abundantly made repentance the condition of forgiveness, and required us to imitate this example. Thus said his Son, "If thy brother trespass against thee, rebuke him; and if he repent, forgive him." these facts and many more go to prove, that God does not act on the principle that his honor requires that all his

All

threatenings shall be executed on the transgressor or his substitute, but that with him is forgiveness for all who repent. They also go to prove, that men have been under a great mistake in supposing that God's veracity requires him in all cases to execute his threatenings, however penitent men may be for their offences. Indeed vicarious punishment is itself a far more gross departure from the spirit of the divine threatening, than forgiveness on condition of repentance. The design of the divine threatening is to show us what we shall deserve, if we sin; and what we must suffer, if we sin, and do not repent. The same revelation which makes known the law and its penalty teaches us, that, if we repent of our sins, the penalty is not to be inflicted. But neither the law, nor any revelation accompanying it, makes any provision for vicarious punishment. We nowhere read, that if a man sin, his punishment may be inflicted on a substitute, and that this shall answer the demands of the law. But we do read, that if a wicked man turn from his iniquities and do that which is lawful and right, he shall surely live, he shall not die; and we are also informed, that "faith," which worketh by love, "is counted for righteousness.'

But how often has it been said, that in the sufferings of Christ we behold God's inflexible justice, his regard to his holy law, and his determination that no sin shall pass unpunished. How astonishing that intelligent men could ever reason in such a manner! If it be true, that the punishment due to our offences was inflicted on the Son of God as our substitute, and that men are saved only on this ground, it is equally true, that sin does pass unpunished, and that innocence and righteousness have been punished in its stead. For if Christ has suffered as a substitute for sinners, innocence and righteousness were made a substitute for sin, and as such punished in the person of the Messiah! But this thought demands a more distinct consideration, to which we shall now proceed.

9. We object to the opinion, that the sins of men were punished in the sufferings of Christ, because we believe that the hypothesis implies impossibilities, both natural and moral. In our opinion it is impossible that sin should be punished if the sinner escapes, or that it should be punished in any way but by the sufferings of the sinning agent. But, as the people of our country have been educated in the belief that