firm or of anyone proved or admitted to be a partner. (Order XLII., r. 8.)

Illustrations.

If one partner be libelled in his private capacity he cannot recover for any special damage which has occurred to the business of the firm. All the partners should sue for that jointly. They may now do so in the same action.

Solomons & others v. Medex, 1 Stark. 191.

Robinson v. Marchant, 7 Q. B. 918; 15 L. J. Q. B. 134; 10 Jur. 156.

Cook & another v. Batchellor, 3 Bos. & Pul. 150.

Maitland & others v. Goldney & another, 2 East, 426.

Similarly, if the firm be libelled as a body, they cannot jointly recover for any private injury to a single partner: though that partner may now recover his individual damages in the same action.

Haythorn v. Lawson, 3 C. & P. 196.

Le Fanu v. Malcolmson, 1 H. L. C. 637; 13 L. T. 61; 8 Ir. L. R. 418.

But if insolvency be imputed to one member of a firm, this is a reflection on the credit of the firm as well therefore either he, or the firm, or both may sue, each for their own damages.

Harrison v. Bevington, 8 C. & P. 708.

Foster & others v. Lawson, 3 Bing. 452; 11 Moore, 360.

10. Corporations and Companies.

A corporation may sue for any libel upon it, as distinct from a libel upon its individual members. It may also sue for a slander upon it in the way of its business or trade. If, however, the corporation be not engaged in any business, it would probably be necessary to prove special damage in any case of slander.

A corporation "could not sue in respect of an imputation of murder, or incest or adultery, because it could not commit those crimes. Nor could it sue in respect of a charge of corruption; for a corporation cannot be guilty of corruption, although the individuals composing it may be." (Per Pollock, C.B., 4 H. & N. 90.)

The law is the same with regard to unincorporated trading companies, which may sue for libel in the manner

directed by the special Act creating them, or any statute applicable to them. (Williams v. Beaumont, 10 Bing. 260; 3 M. & Scott, 705.)

Corporations and companies may maintain actions for slander of their title; whether the slander be uttered by one of their own members or by a stranger. (Metropolitan Omnibus Co. v. Hawkins, 4 H. & N. 87; 28 L. J. Ex. 201; 5 Jur. N. S. 226; 7 W. R. 265; 32 L. T. (Old S.), 281; Trenton Insurance Co. v. Perrine, 3 Zab. (New Jersey), 402.)

A corporation will not, it is submitted, be liable for any slander uttered by an officer, even though he be acting honestly for the benefit of the company and within the scope of his duties, unless it can be proved that the corporation expressly ordered and directed that officer to say those very words: for a slander is the voluntary and tortious act of the speaker.

A corporation will be liable to an action for a libel published by its servants or agents, whenever such publication comes within the scope of the general duties of such servants or agents, or whenever the corporation has expressly authorized or directed such publication; (see ante, Master and Servant, p. 360; Yarborough v. Bank of England, 16 East, 6; Latimer v. Western Morning News Co., 25 L. T. 44; Alexander v. N. E. Ry. Co., 6 B. & S. 340; 34 L. J. Q. B. 152; 11 Jur. N. S. 619; Lawless v. Anglo-Egyptian Cotton Co., L. R. 4 Q. B. 262; 10 B. & S. 226; 38 L. J. Q. B. 129; 17 W. R. 498. And in America, Aldrich v. Press Printing Co., 9 Min. 133.)

Whether a corporation can be guilty of express malice, so as to destroy a prima facie privilege arising from the occasion of publication has not yet been decided; but semble (per Lord Campbell, C.J., E. B. & E. 121; 27 L. J. Q. B. 231,) it can.

A corporation can be indicted for libel and fined. (Per Lord Blackburn in Pharmaceutical Society v. London and Provincial Supply Association, 5 App. Cas. 869, 870; 49 L. J. Q. B. 742; 28 W. R. 960; 43 L. T. 389; dissenting from the remarks of Bramwell, L.J., in the Court below, 5 Q. B. D. 313; 49 L. J. Q. B. 338; 28 W. R. 608; 42 L. T. 569.

Illustrations.

A joint-stock company incorporated under the 19 & 20 Vict. c. 47, may sue in its own corporate name for words imputing to it insolvency, dishonesty, and mismanagement of its affairs, and this although the defendant be one of its own shareholders.

Metropolitan Omnibus Co. v. Hawkins, 4 H. & N. 87; 28 L. J.

Ex. 201; 5 Jur. N. S. 226; 7 W. R. 265; 32 L. T. (Old S.)

281.

Where, before the 19 & 20 Vict. c. 47, a joint-stock insurance company though not incorporated, was authorised by statute to sue in the name of its chairman, it was held that the chairman might bring an action for a libel which attacked the mode in which the company carried on its business. Williams v. Beaumont, 10 Bing. 260; 3 M. & Scott, 705.

A railway company was held liable for transmitting a telegram to the effect that the plaintiff's bank had stopped payment.

Whitfield & others v. South Eastern Railway Co., E. B. & E. 115; 27 L. J. Q. B. 229; 4 Jur. N. S. 688.

11. Other Joint Plaintiffs.

"All persons may be joined as plaintiffs in whom the right to any relief claimed is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative. And judgment may be given for such one or more of the plaintiffs as may be found to be entitled to relief, for such relief as he or they may be entitled to, without any amendment. But the defendant, though unsuccessful, shall be entitled to his costs occasioned by so joining any person or persons who shall not be found entitled to relief, unless the Court in disposing of the costs of the action shall

BB

otherwise direct." Order XVI., r. 1. Cf. C. L. P. Act, 1860, s. 19.

By virtue of this rule, an action of libel or slander may now be brought by two or more persons jointly, although they are not in partnership or otherwise jointly interested. Barratt v. Collins, 10 Moo. 451, The damages in such an action ought to be claimed and assessed separately; but if they be assessed jointly, and the plaintiffs be content with such a verdict, the defendant cannot avail himself of the defect. (Booth and others v. Briscoe, 2 Q. B. D. 496; 25 W. R. 838.)

must be considered overruled.

The defendant may counter-claim separately against such joint plaintiffs, if the counter-claims can be conveniently disposed of in the same action with the plaintiff's claim. (Manchester, &c., Ry. Co. and L. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Brooks, 2 Ex. D. 243; 46 L. J. Ex. 244; 25 W. R. 413; 36 L. T. 103.)

Illustrations.

A charity near Wisbeach was managed by a body of trustees, eight in number. A libellous letter was published in the Wisbeach Chronicle, imputing to the trustees misconduct in the management of the funds of the charity. The eight trustees sued the proprietor of the paper in one joint action for the libel. Held, that they were empowered so to do by Order XVI. r. 1; although before the Judicature Act, it would never have been allowed. The jury having returned a single verdict for the plaintiffs, damages 40s., the Court of Appeal refused, on the motion of the defendant, to disturb the verdict.

Booth & others v. Briscoe, 2 Q. B. D. 496; 25 W. R. 838.

Two co-proprietors of a newspaper may sue jointly for a libel on their paper without proving special damage; and the jury may find the damages generally.

Russell and another v. Webster, 23 W. R. 59.

12. Joint Defendants.

"All persons may be joined as defendants against whom the right to any relief is alleged to exist,

whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative. And judgment may be given against such one or more of the defendants as may be found to be liable, according to their respective liabilities, without any amendment." Order XVI., r. 3.

"Where in any action, whether founded upon contract or otherwise, the plaintiff is in doubt as to the person from whom he is entitled to redress, he may join two or more defendants, to the intent that in such action the question as to which, if any, of the defendants is liable, and to what extent, may be determined as between all parties to the action." Order XVI., r. 6. Though here, of course, the plaintiff will have to pay the costs of the defendant who proves not liable, unless such defendant has colluded with the other defendant found to be liable, or has otherwise been guilty of misconduct.

"It shall not be necessary that every defendant to any action shall be interested as to all the relief thereby prayed for, or as to every cause of action included therein; but the Court or a Judge may make such order as may appear just to prevent any defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense by being required to attend any proceedings in such action in which he may have no interest." Order XVI., r. 4.

Under these rules a joint action can now be maintained against two or more persons for slander. For merly this was impossible. (Chamberlain v. White, Cro. Jac. 647; s. c. sub nomine Chamberlaine v. Willmore, Palm. 313.) Even if husband and wife uttered similar words simultaneously, there were two separate publi. cations, and an action had to be brought against the husband alone for what he said, against both husband and wife for her words. (Burcher v. Orchard et ux. (1652), Style, 349, ante, p. 351; Swithin et ux. v.