V.C. K.] Re BAGOT'S SETTLED ESTATES-LAMBERT v. THWAITES. under the transfer. The company were entitled to their costs. Solicitors: Edwards and Co.; W. M. Wilkinson. Thursday, Feb. 22. Re BAGOT'S SETTLED ESTATES. [V.C. K. By indenture dated in 1841, being a voluntary settlement made by Roger Williams, certain real estate in the county of Middlesex was conveyed and limited to the use of trustees upon trust to receive the rents, and pay the same to Roger Williams during his life; and, after his decease, to Jane Williams his wife during her life; and from and immediately after the decease of the survivor of Roger Williams and Jane Williams, upon trust to make sale of the estate, and divide the same amongst all and every the children of Roger Williams lawfully begotten, or to be begotten, in such shares and proportions, manner, and form, as should be directed and declared by any will or codicil then already, or at any time thereafter to be, duly executed by Roger Williams. Jurisdiction-Purchase-money-Costs-Conveyance. Where a fund standing to an account in one V. C's court was required to make up the purchase-money for a purchase authorised in a suit in another V. C's court, the V. C. in whose court the fund is standing can autherise payment thereof to the vendor upon his executing the conveyance, but can make no order as to payment of any part of the costs of the conveyance. Roger Williams had seven children, all of whom The London and North-Western Railway Com-liams, one of these children, died in 1856, having by attained the age of twenty-one years; Alfred Wilpany had purchased a portion of these estates, and his will, dated in 1855, given his real and residuary had paid into court the purchase-money, amounting personal estate to trustees for the benefit of his to 9004, now represented by 1013. Consolidated wife and children; Jane Williams, the wife of Roger Stock, standing in court to the account of the Williams, died in 1856; Roger Williams died in devisees under the will of the Rev. Walter 1862 without having executed the power of appointBagot. Two suits having reference to the same estates had been instituted in the Rolls Court, denture of 1841. ment by will or codicil, reserved to him by the inand a purchase for 62001. had been authorised in The question to be determined was, whether, in those suits. It was proposed that the sum of 10134. default of the execution of the power, the estate was Consols, over which Kindersley, V. C. had jurisdic-to be divided among the six children who survived tion, should be applied in part payment of that sum. their father, excluding Alfred Williams, or among A petition was accordingly presented, which asked the seven, including him. that this sum might be so applied and paid to the vendors upon certificate by the chief clerk of the execution of the conveyance, and that the railway company might be ordered to pay the costs of the investment in proportion to the amount of the fund in court now sought to be taken out. Kelly in support of the petition. Blundell, for the company, objected to the form of the application, contending that the fund ought to be transferred from the present account to the suits before the M. R. The VICE-CHANCELLOR.-I consider that the utmost order that can be asked is the payment over of the amount entitled in this matter to the vendor in the suit in the Rolls Court, upon his being duly certified as such vendor, and on his having executed the conveyance. But I cannot make any order as to payment of the costs of the conveyance; I can only give the costs of this application. Solicitor, J. B. Kelly. Feb. 28 and March 8. LAMBERT V. THWAITES. Poster of appointment-Non-exercise of power-Construction "All the children”—Implication-Default of appointment. Real estate was settled upon trust for the settlor for life, with remainder to his wife for life, with remainder after the death of the survivor upon trust for sale and division amongst all and every the children of the settlor lawfully begotten, or to be begotten, in such shares and proportions, manner, and form, as should be directed and declared by any will or codicil then already, or at any time thereafter to be, duly executed by the settlor. The settlor never exercised this power of appointment: Held, that all the children of the settlor, including one who died in his lifetime, took in equal shares, in default of appointment. Observations upon Woodcock v. Renneck, 4 Beav. 190, and Winn v. Fenwick, 11 Beav. 438. The suit was instituted by the trustees of Alfred Williams's will for a declaration that he was so entitled, and that the trusts of the deed of 1841 might be carried into effect under the direction of the court. The defts., who were the six children of Roger Williams, who survived him, or their representatives, alleged that the death of Alfred Williams in the lifetime of his father prevented his taking any interest in the property. The defts. demurred to the bill. Glasse, Q. C. and Lewin, for the defts., in support of the demurrer.-There is an implied gift to the objects of the power, who are those who survive the donee of the power, and those only can take who are capable of taking under the power. The donee has a duty to perform, and if he does not perform it, the court executes the power vicariously. Baily, Q. C. and Ellis, for the plts., maintained that Alfred Williams took a vested interest; there was a trust for all the children, with a power to vary the shares by appointment by will. Glasse, Q. C. in reply. Cases and authorities cited: Walsh v. Wallinger, 2 Russ. & M. 78; Woodcock v. Renneck, 4 Beav. 190; 1 Ph. 72; Re Caplin, 11 Jur. N. S. 383; 2 Dr. & Sm. 537; 12 Brown v. Higgs, 4 Ves. 707 a.; Re Theeds Settlement, 1 K. & J. 375; the facts, said :-In order to determine the question [V.C. K. notwithstanding the pendency of such a power; and give the property, but here it is given after the ever since the case of Doe v. Martin (4 Î. Rep. 39), decease of his wife to all their children in such in 1790, that has been the law. In some cases, proportions as his wife should appoint. It is difhowever, the power is so created as that in terms ferent in this respect also, that the wife was not nothing is given to a person or class of persons except limited to the execution of the power by will, but was through the execution of the power; and then the to be at liberty to execute it in any way she chose, by general principle is, that if you can only ascertain deed inter vivos, or by testamentary document. There from the terms of the power itself those who are in- were five children, and they all died before the tended to be benefited, you must hold that the wife, and there was not an execution of the power. persons who are to take in default of appointment | Sir William Grant determined that by the terms of are those who may take under the appointment. the gift, coupled with the power, it was a tenancy That principle is well established, but, of course, in common among the children in fifths, subject to does not apply where by the terms of the instrument the power of appointment. Of course we have here itself the settlor or testator himself declares whom an element which did not occur in the other cases, he means to take in default of appointment. Take viz., that the power might be exercised by instruthe case of Walsh v. Wallinger (supra); there ment inter vivos, and therefore it might be said that the testator bequeathed the residue of his the power would imply a gift to all the children from estate to his wife for her own use and benefit. that circumstance alone. But I refer to this case So far it was an absolute gift to her. Then for the purpose of showing that, so long as the he added, "trusting that she will at her decease power is not exercised, its non-exercise, by whatever give and bequeath the same to our children instrument it is capable of being exercised, does not in such manner as she shall appoint." There, in prevent the estate vesting. It vests in the children, terms, there is no gift by the testator to the chil- and of course, if the donee of the power has exerdren, nor any direction that they are to take incised it in any way, the effect would be to divest default of appointment, and therefore we have to the estates which were thus vested. If she had infer from the power itself who are to take in exercised it by deed, that would have divested it. default; and, inasmuch as the power could only be If she had never exercised it in her lifetime, but by exercised by will, and therefore could only be exer- her will had exercised it in favour of those who cised in favour of those children who should be survived her, that would have divested it. I now living at the wife's death, we are obliged to conclude refer to the case of Brown v. Pocock (supra), decided that the intention of the testator was that those by the V. C. of England. Leaving out the unnecesonly who survived the wife should take in default sary parts, and taking only the simple facts, it was a of appointment. That is, you give them an estate bequest of 21. a-week to A. for life, but to cease on by implication; you imply from the terms of the alienation. A sum was to be set apart to answer those power who are to take; but, as I have said, that is weekly payments, and after the death of A. there was in the absence of any gift to any particular class or power to A. to leave the sum to and for the benefit members of a class, and in the absence of any of his wife and children in such manner as he direction by the testator who is to take in default should by will appoint. Here we have a specimen of appointment. That case is an instance of one of there being no gift to the wife and children by kind of power, where there is nothing but the the testator himself, but a power to A. to appoint it power given, and no gift by the testator to the class amongst his wife and children, and he had power whom he intends to benefit. Take another instance, to appoint it only by will. The wife, who was one viz., Kennedy v. Kingston (supra); that was a bequest of the persons in whose favour the appointment of 500l. to Ann Rawlins for life, and at her death might be made, died before her husband, A., the to divide it in portions as she should choose among donee of the power; so there remained only the her children. She had four children, one of whom three children. There was no valid appointment died, and by her will she gave the fund in certain under the power; and the question therefore was, portions to the three survivors. One of these sur- to whom was the fund to go in default of apvivors died before their mother, and it was held pointment? Inasmuch as the testator had given it that the appointment of two-thirds to the two who to the wife and children as the husband should had survived her was good, and that there was a by will appoint, it was held that it was a gift by lapsed share which would go equally to those two, the testator to the wife and children as joint and for the reason that, first of all, there was only tenants by implication, they being the persons who a power to Mrs. Rawlins; there was no express were to benefit by the appointment, if the appointgift to the children, or any of them. It was a gift ment had; been made. Notwithstanding that the to her for her life, with a power to divide it in por- wife could not take by appointment, inasmuch as tions as she should choose for her children after she did not survive the donee of the power, and her decease. She might have bequeathed it to the therefore could not take under his will, she was two who survived her only, but she bequeathed still to take as in default of appointment by impliit to the three who were living when she made cation, and it was held that it was a vested interest her will, and one having died, the question was, in the wife and children, subject to be divested who was to take the whole fund. It was the by the execution of the power; and, as the donee same as if she had made no appointment at all, did not exercise the power, the property remained because, as you have no means of knowing what vested in the wife and children. The quesclass the testator intended to benefit except by the tion, then, in the present case, really is, whether terms of the power, you must imply from the terms it is a case in which the settlor has himself stated of the power that the persons to be benefited by whom it is that he means to benefit in case the power the execution of the power were in default of is not exercised. I think it is impossible to express appointment to be the persons to take. I will now in more definite and precise terms his intention take the case of Casterton v. Sutherland (supra), that every one of his children should be the perwhich was a devise to the testator's wife for her life, sons to take, subject only to the exercise of the and after her decease "unto and amongst all and power by will. There is no doubt that, supposing every our children in such manner and in such half of the children had predeceased him, and he proportions as my said wife shall either in her exercised the power in favour of the survivors, it lifetime or by her last will appoint." This is a would have been perfectly good; but if he does not specimen of a totally different form of power. In exercise the power the question is, in whom is the the two former we had no specification by the estate vested until the power is exercised? Is it testator, except by implication, to whom he meant to vested in anybody? I apprehend that it must V.C. K.] KNIGHT v. Knight. | [V.C. S. of the marriage, as the wife should by deed or will appoint, and if there should be no issue living at her decease, then a general power of appointment was given to her. The wife did not exercise the power, and she had children, some of whom died in her lifetime, and others survived her. It was admitted that the children took in default of appointment by implication, but the question was, what class was entitled? The M. R. said the rule was that none could take by implication upon the nonexecution of a power, who could not take under an execution of such power. That is a perfectly just rule if you apply it to a proper case; that is, if you have no other means of ascertaining who were intended to take but by the terms of the power. [The V. C. then referred to Lord Langdale's remarks.] It will be observed that the wife had a power to appoint by will. The M. R., however, came to the conclusion that those only who survived the wife were entitled to take in default of appointment. Now Lord St. Leonards observes upon that case struction gave effect to all the words of the settlement which the court intended to construe by implication, for the power clearly embraced all and every the children, and might have been exercised by deed in favour of all, though it would not have taken effect unless some one survived their mother. In this view, as some did survive, all might have been held to take by implication, in default of appointment:" (Sugden on Powers, 8th ed. 696.) I have referred to that case, not because it seems to tally with the others which I have mentioned, but because the M. R. took a view which seemed to militate against it; but when I find that Lord St. Leonards expressed his dissatisfaction with it, I do not think that it presents any difficulty whatever. I come to the conclusion that in the present case the settlor has made a distinct statement of the class whom he intended to take in default of execution of the power, or rather subject to the power. The deed gives it to all the children in such shares and proportions, manner, and form as the wife shall by will appoint, though it does not go on to say "in default of appointment, to all the children." That would have been an end of the question. settlor means that all the children who were then in existence, as well as those who should come into existence afterwards, were to take subject to the reservation to himself of the power of saying by will what shares they were to take. It appears to me that all the children, including Alfred, have equal shares, and that therefore the demurrer must be overruled. clearly vest in all the children, and if other children were born after the settlement they would take in equal shares with the others. It so happened there were no others. All of them, including Alfred, took, immediately on the execution of the instrument, vested shares liable to be divested upon the execution of the power. There was no doubt, although the power was not an exclusive one, that it did not authorise an exclusive appointment, it being to be exercised by will only, and as a will can only be made in favour of persons who survive the testator, it was of necessity a power to those only who survived, and the power could only be exercised in favour of the survivors of the donee of the power; but until execution and in default of execution of the power the estate remained vested in the persons to whom it was given. There are two cases to which I ought to refer, both of which were decided by Lord Langdale, and were cited by counsel in the course of the argument. One of them in particular, I think, seems to militate against this view, and that is Wood-"It may be considered doubtful whether this concock v. Renneck (supra). It was a bequest of 17007. stock in trust to pay the dividends to A. and his wife B. for their lives and the life of the survivor of them, and after the decease of the survivor to transfer and pay over (and some stress was laid by the M. R. upon these words), the stock to their children in such shares and proportions as the survivor of A. and B. should by will appoint. There was a gift to the children of A. and B. subject to the exercise of a power which was to be exercised by will by the survivor of the two. The husband was the survivor; there were three children, but only one of them survived the husband. The husband made his will, and appointed the whole to that one child. Now nobody can question that, as Lord Langdale decided, that was a good appointment. The power was to appoint by will, and could only, therefore, be exercised in favour of the survivor. But the M. R. unnecessarily, certainly, thought fit to look into another question, viz., who was to have taken in default of appointment, though, as there was an appointment, it was hardly necessary to have done so. Having regard to the words being only "their children," which, the M. R. said, although they prima facie meant "all children," still were a flexible term, and might mean "all the children living at the death;" and having regard to the fact that the power was given to appoint by will, he concluded that, in default of appointment, the surviving child alone would have taken. I am bound to say that I could hardly have come to that conclusion myself; but, supposing it to be right, it was a decision that the words "their children" ¡might mean "the children living at their death, and only the children living at their death." Assuming, however, that to be quite correct, it does not in the smallest degree touch the present case, where there is nothing to admit the construction that the children meant are only those which should survive, because it is not only "all and every the children,' which would be quite sufficient, but it is "all and every the children now lawfully begotten, or to be begotten." I think therefore that, assuming the M. R.'s view in Woodcock v. Renneck on the subject of the word "children" is correct, which I confess I should hesitate to admit, it seems to me not at all to govern the present case. There is also the case of Winny. Fenwick, 11 Beav. 438, which was decided by the same learned judge, which, although apparently not in accordance with the view that I have been taking in this case, is really otherwise, and, even as it stands, Lord St. Leonards expresses his dissatisfaction with the decision. A fund was settled only in the event of the wife dying in her husband's lifetime, and it was in that event only that there was any gift or any power upon trust for all and every the children Solicitor for the plt., C. Armstrong. V. C. STUART'S COURT. Reported by EDWARD WINSLOW, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Friday, March 16. The KNIGHT V. KNIGHT. On_the_refusal of a trustee to comply with an order This was an ex parte application on the part of the plt. in the above suit for a vesting order. It appeared that in 1862 a sum of money to which. the plt. Mrs. Esther Knight was entitled, for her sole and separate use, was advanced on a mortgage CM certain leasehold property assigned to the plt., and her husband, the deft. William Knight, and the survivor, and their executors, &c. Subsequently to this arrangement, on a petition by the plt., the marriage between Mr. and Mrs. Knight was dissolved. The plt. afterwards filed a bill for the purpose of securing the mortgaged property for her own benefit, and obtained an order requiring the deft. as her trustee to assign the premises to her forthwith. The deft., however, refused to comply with this order, and the plt. was under the necessity of moving the court to effect her purpose. There had been great difficulty in serving the deft. with notice of motion; this, however, was eventually accomplished, but on his not putting in an appearance an order was drawn up to the effect that in the event of his not executing the necessary deed of assignment within four days, a vesting order should be made. [V.C. W. distributable in four equal shares to the "heirs" of the parties named as persona designatæ. This was a bill filed for the purpose of obtaining the decision of the court upon the construction of the will of a testator, and that the rights of all parties thereunder might be ascertained and declared. The last will and testament of me John Mills, of Walcot place, in the parish of Lambeth, and county of Surrey, written with my own hand this 7th day of July A D. 1814, is as follows: First, I direct that I may be buried in the same manner and dear wife, should it be so convenient, and that all the expenses in the same grave wherein is deposited the remains of my attending the same be paid within one month after my decease from the ready cash Imay die possessed of. Secondly, I give and bequeath unto my daughter Nancy Mills and unto my daughter Sarah Mills 20007 stock in the Three per Cent Consols, viz., to each of them 10007. stock, the same as I have before given to my daughter Lydia and my son John on their The motion was ordered to stand over for twenty-settling in life when they left my family. And I likewise give eight days under the provisions of 15 & 16 Vict. 2000. Three per Cent. Consols, to be paid to them in equal to my said daughters Nancy and Sarah Mills the interest of c. 55, s. 2, which enacts, that shares for and during the term of their natural lives, if I die possessed of such stock; and if I should not, then I will that it may be purchased with the other property I die possessed of, and the said 20007 Three per Cent. Consols to be placed in the joint names of my executors which I hereby appoint, namely, my daughter Nancy Mills, my daughter Lydia Hensley (or Mr. Thos. Hensley acting for her), my son John Mills, and my daughter Sarah Mills, to be paid to them by equal half-yearly payments. The rest of my property, whether of money, goods, or houses, or of any other description which I may die possessed of, I give and bequeath unto my said children and executors in equal porportions share and share alike. This is my last and only will and testament, written with my own hand this 7th day of July A.D. 1814, and signed this 7th July 1814. JOHN MILLS In every case where any person is or shall be jointly or solely seised or possessed of any lands, or entitled to a contingent right therein upon any trust, and a demand shall have been made upon such trustee by a person entitled to require " conveyance or assignment of such lands, or a duly authorised agent of such last-mentioned person requiring such trustee to convey or assign the same, or to release such contingent right, it shall be lawful for the Court of Ch., if the said court shall be satisfied that such trustee has wilfully refused or neglected to convey or assign the said lands for the space of twenty-eight days after such demand, to make an order vesting such lands in such person, in such manner, and for such estate as the court shall direct, or restraining such contingent right in such manner as the court shall direct; and the said order shall have the same effect as if the trustee had duly executed a conveyance or assignment of the lands, or a release of such right, in the same manner and for the same estate. It is likewise my will that after the decease of my said daughters Nancy Mills or Sarah Mills, the property for which they are to receive during their lives the interest which is hereby to be for their sole and separate use, independent of R. W. E. Forster now asked that, as the twenty- any connections they may form, the said stock shall beeight days had expired, and the deft. still refused to execute the deed, an order might be made in accordance with the Act vesting the property in the plt. come the joint property of the lawful heirs of my said children and executors in equal proportions, viz, one-fourth part to the heirs of daughter Nancy Mills, one other fourth part to the heirs of my daughter Lydia Hensley, one other fourth part to the heirs of my John Mills, and one other fourth part to the heirs of my daughter Sarah Mills. N.B. The property in houses I am now possessed of is three small houses, situate in Meeting-house-court, Miles-lane, The VICE-CHANCELLOR.—I consider that the plt.annon-street, in the city of London (which I bought by is entitled to the order. Solicitors, Frazer and May. V. C. WOOD'S COURT. Reported by W. H. BENNET and R. T. BOULT, Esqrs, Barristers-at-Law. Jan. 26 and 27. HANSLEY V. WILLS. Will-Construction-Word "heirs"-Tenants in The testator, by his will, gave a legacy of 20001. stock to public auction), and which, although freehold, I have had John Mills, the son, died in 1837 without leaving any issue surviving, and leaving his three sisters his co-heiresses-at-law and sole next of kin. Lydia Hensley survived her husband, and died on the 3rd April 1862, leaving several children, of whom the plt. was the firstborn son, and her heirat-law. Nancy Mills died shortly after Lydia Hensley, in April 1862, having never been married, and leaving the plt. and Sarah Wills her co-heiresses-at-law. Sarah Mills, now Sarah Wills, widow, the survivor, claimed the interest of the whole of the 2000%. Consols. for her life. The plt. disputed that any, or at most no more than a moiety, of the interest of the 20007. Consols was payable to Sarah, and claimed, as heir-at-law of Lydia Hansley, one-fourth, and as one of the two co-heirs of Nancy Mills a moiety of another fourth of the same Consols, subject to Sarah Wills's lifeinterest, if any. of income is a tenancy in common. The word Giffard, Q. C. and Ramadge for the plt.—The gift "heir" as applied to personalty of late has been held to mean heir strictly, as persona designata. They cited V.C. W.] TATE v. WILLIAMSON. De Beauvoir v. De Beauvoir, 3 H. of L. Cas. 524; Cecil Russell (Rolt Q. C. with him) for Mrs. Wills. -The gift of income is a joint tenancy, and she is entitled to the whole income for her life. The words "after the decease of my daughter Nancy or Sarah Mills," relate only to the mode of payment. The disposition over is on the happening of a single event; that event must be the death of the survivor. They referred to McDermott v. Wallace, 5 Beav. 142; The VICE-CHANCELLOR, after stating the terms of the will and the events which had happened, said: The authorities showed that where a gift was to two persons in equal shares, it was a tenancy in common. If the gift over had been to the "heirs" of these two ladies only, it might have been otherwise, but it was given in fourths to the heirs of each of the children, including those two ladies. He considered the intention of the testator was, that each daughter should enjoy the interest of a moiety for her life, and then that it should go over in fourths to the persons answering the description of heirs of each child. Minutes of decree :-The 20007. Bank Three per Cent. Annuities to be transferred into the name of Attorney-General by a short day. Costs of plts. and deft., as between solicitor and client, to be paid out of a moiety of the dividends whereof Nancy Mills was entitled during her life. Declare that on the death of said Nancy Mills the aforesaid moiety of the 2000l. stock became distributable in four equal shares, and that one of such fourth shares became transferable to the plt. as heir of said testator's daughter Lydia Hansley, another fourth share became transferable in moieties to the plt. and deft. Sarah Mills, as coheirs of the said testator's daughter Nancy Mills; another of such fourth shares became transferable in equal thirds to the deft. Sarah Wills, as one of the co-heiresses, and to the respective personal representatives of the said Lydia Hansley and Nancy Mills, and the remaining two co-heiresses of the said testator's son John Mills; and that the remaining one fourth share is by said testator's will bequeathed to or for the benefit of such person or persons as shall be the heir or heirs of the deft. Sarah Wills at the time of her decease. Consequential directions as to those four shares. Decree accordingly. Feb. 12, 13, and 14. Vendor and purchaser-Setting aside sale-Confidential relation. Where confidence exists between two parties of such a nature as enables the person trusted to exercise influence over the other confiding in him, no transaction between them can be sustained unless there has been the fullest communication, on the part of the person trusted, of every particular known to him relating to the subject matter of the contract. This was a suit to set aside a sale of real estate on the following grounds: First, that the purchaser stood in a fiduciary position towards the vendor at the time of sale; secondly, that the purchaser took advantage of the youth and inexperience of the vendor, and concealed from him important informa [V.C. W. tion as to the value of the estate; thirdly, that the price given was grossly inadequate. The plt. was William James Tate, the father, heir-at-law, and personal representative of William Clowes Tate, who died on the 11th May 1860, at the age of twenty-three, intestate and unmarried; and the defts. were Robert Williamson and Hugh Henshall Williamson. The following were the material facts of the case: W. C. Tate, the only son of the plt., was born on the 6th July 1836. On the 5th Oct. 1856 he became entitled on the death of his mother to an equitable estate in fee in a moiety of an estate called the Whitfield Estate, situate in the county of Stafford, and which consisted of freehold and copyhold lands with the coal-mines thereunder. The entirety of the estate was vested in the deft. H. Henshall Williamson (who was great-uncle by marriage to the intestate), J. Rothwell and R. E. Payne, in fee, as joint tenants and trustees for the persons beneficially interested. It was, in fact, managed by the deft. H. H. Williamson alone, as he lived in the neighbourhood of the property and the other trustees at a distance from it. The trustees during the minority of the intestate applied a certain portion of the rents and profits of his moiety towards his maintenance and education, and the remainder was accumulated in accordance with the terms of a trust in that behalf. The intestate resided with his father at Manchester until his nineteenth year, when he went to the University of Oxford to complete his education. While there he contracted very extravagant habits, and considerably exceeded in his expenses the allowance made to him by the trustees. On the 5th July 1857, while still at Oxford, he attained his majority, and shortly afterwards, in Aug. 1857, the trustees assigned to him the accumulations of the rents, and conveyed to him the freehold and surrendered the copyhold portion of his moiety of the estate. The other moiety being still subject to certain trusts in favour of infants, the estate continued to be managed as before by the deft. H. H. Williamson, who transmitted a moiety of the rents to the intestate. The greater part of the accumulations received by the intestate in August, and which amounted to about 2000l., appeared to have been applied by him in liquidating the debts he incurred at Oxford, and between Nov. 1857 and April 1859, he raised the sum of 10007. on a mortgage of his moiety of the Whitfield estate to his trustee R. E. Payne, with the knowledge of the deft. H. H. Williamson, who was aware of his pecuniary difficulties, and had shortly before given him as a present the sum of 500l. to be applied in reduction of his debts. In June 1859, the intestate left the University, but having become estranged from his father, went to reside in lodgings at Plymouth. In Nov. 1858, the deft. H. H. Williamson, being obliged to leave Staffordshire on account of ill-health, associated his nephew, the deft. Robert Williamson, with himself in the receipt of the rents and profits of the Whitfield estate; and in a letter from the deft. H. H. Williamson to the intestate dated 16th Nov. 1858, he says: "I am obliged to go to a warmer climate, but my nephew, Mr. Robert Williamson, jun., will receive the rents, and after paying Mr. Payne will hand you an account, and inclose you the balance." Robert Williamson continued to receive the rents The intestate assented to the arrangement, and till the return of H. H. Williamson in May 1859, when, with the consent of the intestate, both defts. acted in the receipt of the rents; the accounts of the rents were kept principally by R. Williamson, though it was the practice to enter them in the name of H. H. Williamson alone. In July 1859 the intestate again became embarrassed in his affairs, and being greatly pressed by |