are merely accidental, and no more form a part of the mill than a carpet forms part of a house." That case is quite sustained by the ruling in Hellawell v. Eastwood, 6 Ex. 295; at p. 313, Parke, B. says: "They would not have passed by a demise of the mill; they never ceased to be goods and chattels." Other authorities in great number expound the same doctrine; and I think in this case, therefore, that the only title that the mortgagee has is a title by contract to these articles. The next proposition I have to regard in this decision is-were they liable to seizure under a fi. fa. Now Hellawell v. Eastwood is distinct on this point, except that it was not as against a mortgagee's title as it was as to a distress. Parke, B. says, "they never ceased to have the character of movable chattels, and were therefore liable to deft.'s distress," that is, as existing chattels. There seems to me no doubt that these could be taken under a fi. fa. and taken as chattels. The next proposition is, whether they are within the purview of this section 313. Now, I think it is greatly to be regretted that such a question should be open for argument. A fi. fa. is the writ for a creditor, enabling him to seize the goods and chattels of the debtor. This section gives a general right on behalf of all creditors to sell any goods or chattels, &c.; and thus in language as in object the two powers should be co-extensive. In Muirhall v. Lloyd, 2 M. & W. 459, Parke, B. says: "I assent to the doctrine laid down in Coombe v. Beaumont and Roydel v. M'Michael, that such fixtures are not goods and chattels within the bankrupt law, though they are goods and chattels when made such by the tenant's severance, or for the benefit of execution-creditors." There are several other cases on this subject; and, in M'Kebbin's case, the Chancellor seems to speak of this distinction at least without disapprobation. But I am of opinion that this distinction is not to be accepted as settled on a due consideration of the cases, and that the exception made for the benefit of trade and for the benefit of creditors, whereby removable fixtures which became changeable into the condition of chattels by the tenant himself are held to be chattels for his cre

ditors, will be held to apply for the benefit of his general creditors, as well as for the benefit of a particular creditor who has sued him to execution. If for the benefit of creditors they are chattels, surely they ought then to be held to be so within this section; and on this point I cite a passage from the case of Walmsley v. Milne, 7 C. B., N. S., 132. That was a case in which the articles were treated by the court as fixtures by permanent annexation; but I now only cite it for this passage in the judgment: "The whole of the plt.'s argument upon this head was founded upon the well-established exception to the general rule, that where a tenant puts up fixtures for the purpose of trade during his term, he may, before its expiration, without the consent of his landlord, disunite them from the freehold. The deft.'s counsel were quite ready to admit the validity of the numerous authorities supporting that proposition, and to concede to the plt. that if the bankrupt had been tenant to the mortgagee for a term, and the bankruptcy had happened before its expiration, the fixtures in question were such as would have passed to the assignees." I therefore think that before we establish a proposition distinguishing between goods seizable under a fi. fa. as trade fixtures, and those passing under this section as goods or chattels, the authorities require to be carefully and fully considered, and that we should not lightly establish any such distinction. But the question remains-are these things, or any of them, fixtures; that is, are they fixtures though capable of removal by a tenant; or have they ever lost their quality of chattels? Now, this is a matter of fact principally, and turns upon the evidence. My former

[BANK.

decision in Dill's case, 14 Ir. Jur. 123, has been cited, but its facts were not accurately referred to. Perhaps in some parts of my judgment I might be understood as laying down too largely as propositions what I only meant as inferences. In that case I had evidence of permanent annexation. The engine formed the very props that upheld the lofts; and therefore in that case I got what I supposed to be certainly a fixture, though it might be removable for the benefit of trade, or on other grounds of exception, if, indeed, it fell even in this class. Then taking the articles now claimed by the mortgageethey are three classes: 1. Those that are totally unannexed and stand by their own weight, but are worked by movable belts, put on to communicate motive power to them when worked. These are-4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, and 13, though there is a peculiarity as to 13 I will notice hereafter. These are, in my mind, chattels, and never ceased to be such. The belt is put on merely to communicate motion to the machine when required for working, but the machine remains unaltered. No case is cited going near to this, and all the cases seem to me to treat much à fortiori states of facts as not amounting to annexation, and therefore leaving the original chattel quality of the article unchanged. Davis v. Jones, 2 B. & Ald. 165, was a case between outgoing and incoming tenant, and therefore the question was merely whether the articles were chattels; and then the "jibs," the articles in dispute, were more attached than these articles. In Hellawell v. Eastwood the mules and other machinery used were held to have ceased being movable chattels; and Waterfall v. Penniston, 6 El. & Bl. 876, seems to me an à fortiori case on this point; and in Walmsley v. Milne, Willes, J. thought the articles there remained as chattels. The second class are those only differing by an iron being put on to allow the belt to be moved-Nos. 2, 7, 8, 10—the irons being placed so as to prevent the belt from being totally removed. This is a device with no view to permanently fixing the machine, but merely for ease in adjusting the belt, and, in my mind, does not alter the character of the machine from being a chattel. The article No. 1, taking Mr. Haig's evidence in conjunction with Mr. Lynam's, has no annexation, but is only secured for steadiness to work and not to fix it. Article No. 3 is wholly detached, but a projecting portion is put under the car of the wheel to place it for work; it had no annexation thereby. Article No. 13 has this peculiarity, that steam is introduced into it by a pipe that comes down inside the machine, and a cross-pipe exists screwed on at the end. This pipe is totally unconnected with the machine, and is no more than if a tub was put in under a cock placed in the piping. The lid and the mode by which the pipe passes through it seems to me not at all to alter the character of the article. As to article 12, the vices, having regard to their small value and modes of annexation, give them to the mortgagees. But as to all the rest I rule that they passed to the assignees under this section of the statute. I do not give costs against the mortgagees. assignees to have the costs out of estate.

The

Q. B.]

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. Reported by JOHN THOMPSON and T. W. SAUNDERS, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law.

Jan. 23 and 24.

[Q. B.

consideration among themselves have not agreed upon any verdict, and declare that they are unable to agree, and are unable to agree upon any verdict to be given upon the premises aforesaid, and because all other the business of the said session of gaol delivery is finished and completed, and because the Lord's-day is immediately at hand, and because the said justices of our said Lady the Queen are required by Her Letters Patent to proceed to and be in her county of

and LUSH, JJ.)

REG. v. CHARLOTTE WINSOR. Indictment-Discharge of jury without verdict· Second trial-Felony-Misdemeanor.

After the jury have retired to consider their verdict in a criminal case, whether felony or misdemeanor, and have remained in deliberation a full and sufficient time without being able to agree upon a verdict, it is in the discretion of the judge to discharge them if there is no reasonable prospect of their agreeing upon a verdict.

The exercise of such discretion by a judge cannot be reviewed by a Court of Error.

The maxim that a man cannot be put in peril twice for the same offence, means that a man cannot be tried again for an offence upon which a verdict of acquittal of conviction has been given, and not that a man cannot be tried again for the same offence where the first trial kas proved abortive and no verdict was given. Where two persons are jointly indicted, separate trials may be had, and the evidence of one of the persons charged be given against the other, although such person has not been acquitted, or tried, or pleaded guilty to the indictment.

Writ of error upon a judgment after conviction on an indictment for murder.

The record set forth that at the General Session of Oyer and Terminer, held at Exeter for the County of Devon, on the 13th March 1865, before Crompton J. and Channell B., the grand jury presented the following bill of indictment :

The jurors for our Lady the Queen, upon their oath, present that Charlotte Winsor and Mary Ann Harris, on the 14th Feb. A.D. 1565, at the parish of St. Mary Church, in the county of Devon, feloniously, wilfully, and of their malice aforethought, did kill and murder Thomas Edwin Gibson Harris, against the peace of our Lady the Queen, her crown and dignity; and the jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do farther present that the said Charlotte Winsor and Mary Ann Harris, on the same day in the year aforesaid, at the parish aforesaid, at the county aforesaid, feloniously, wilfully, and of their malice aforethought, did kill and murder a certain child

named Thomas Edwin Gibson, against the peace of our Lady

the Queen, her crown and dignity.

The record then set forth

That Charlotte Winsor and Mary Ann Harris, on Friday the 18th March 1865, were arraigned upon the said indictment, and pleaded not guilty, and that the jury were impanelled and sworn to try them; that proclamation was then made, "that if any one can inform our Lady the Queen's justices, &c., that they then come forth and they shall be heard for the prisoners at the bar, who now stand upon their deliverance, and all persons bound by recognisance," &c.; that the trial was proceeded with for several hours on that day, and duly adjourned at a late hour until the following day, Saturday the 18th March, when the trial of the said Charlotte Winsor and Mary Ann Harris was duly proceeded with. And after the case on the part of the Crown and of the said prisoners respectively has been duly concluded the said justices duly proceeded to charge, and do charge the jury aforesaid. And immediately after the conclusion of the said charge of the said justices to the said jury, the said jury, having been then kept together for the space of thirty-two hours or thereabouts during the said trial, do retire from the bar here to consult upon their verdict to be given upon the premises in the said indictment specifled, and afterwards and after the space of five hours-that is to say, at five minutes before midnight on the night of the said Saturday the 18th day of March, in the year aforesaid, and at five minutes before the Lord's-day, the said jurors return to the bar here, and being asked by the court here whether they have agreed upon their verdict, they say that they have not agreed, and unanimously declare that after a full consideration they are wholly unable to agree and cannot agree upon any verdict to be given by them on the premises aforesaid; and therefore, because it manifestly appears to the court here that the said jurors after five hours' deliberation and such

Letters Patent, and because it manifestly appears to the justices here that for the reasons and causes aforesaid it is necessary to discharge the said jury, the said justices do decide and adjudge that it is necessary to discharge the said jury, and they do on the ground of such necessity as aforesaid altogether discharge the said jurors from giving any verdict upon the premises, and they are accordingly discharged from giving their verdict upon the premises aforesaid. And the said Charlotte Winsor and Mary Ann Harris are by the said justices here forthwith committed to the custody of the said the said county, safely to be kept until they shall be thence sheriff of the said county of Devon, in the common gaol of delivered in due course of law; and thereupon the said sheriff is commanded that he have the bodies of the said Charlotte Winsor and Mary Ann Harris at the next General Session of General Gaol Delivery to be holden for the said county of Devon, to answer the promises in the said indictment above

specified and charged on them.

The record then set forth the next commission of general gaol delivery for the county of Devon, issued to Willes and Keating, JJ.:

And that then come as well the said Charlotte Winsor and

Mary Ann Harris in the custody of the sheriff, as the said Thos. Edwd. Chitty, clerk of the assize and clerk of the Crown for the said county of Devon, who prosecutes for our said Lady the Queen in this behalf. And the said Thomas Edward Chitty (Clerk of Assize) on behalf of our said Lady the Queen

prays of the court that the said Charlotte Winsor may be tried upon the said indictment separate and apart from the said Mary Ann Harris, and that the said Mary Ann Harris may be examined and give evidence on behalf of our said Lady the Queen upon the trial of the said Charlotte Winsor for the felony and murder aforesaid. And the court doth allow the said prayer of the said Thomas Edward Chitty; therefore, let the jury thereupon come, &c. Whereupon the counsel for the said Charlotte Winsor then and there objected, and submitted to the said justices that in consequence of the proceedings so had and taken upon the said indictment or inquisition at the then last Lent Assizes hereinbefore stated and set forth, the said Charlotte Winsor could not be legally tried before the said justices, and must be discharged from the said indictment and inquisition; and thereupon the said justices then overruled the said objection and ordered that the trial of the said Charlotte Winsor must proceed.

The record then stated that a jury were empanelled and sworn to try the said Charlotte Winsor:

And because it manifestly appears to the court here that the trial of the said Charlotte Winsor cannot be concluded on the 28th day of July, the same trial, &c., are by the court here duly adjourned until Saturday the 29th day of July, &c.

It was then stated that on Saturday, the 29th of July, the trial was proceeded with, and the record then proceeds thus:

And therefore afterwards, on the day and year last aforesaid, the jurors last aforesaid having been kept together for the space of thirty hours or thereabouts during the said trial, retire from the bar here to consult upon their verdict to be given upon the premises in the said indictment specified, and afterwards they return to the bar here, and being asked by the court here whether they the said jurors have agreed upon their verdict, upon their oaths say that the said Charlotte Winsor is guilty of the murder in the said indictment specifled. The record then concluded with stating That judgment of death was adjudged by the Court upon the said Charlotte Winsor for the felony and murder aforesaid. (Signed) THOMAS EDWARD CHITTY, Clerk of the Assize and Clerk of the Crown for the County of Devon. Grounds of error were assigned by the prisoner, which it is not necessary to set out, as they are sufficiently indicated by the points for argument. Joinder in error by the Crown.

The following were the points of argument on behalf of the prisoner:

1. That the indictment and trial had thereupon and verdict given, and judgment pronounced, and 2. That sentence passed, are each and all illegal. the discharge of the jury on the first trial before they had agreed upon a verdict was, under the circumstances, irregular and illegal. 3. That such

discharge being without the consent of either | prisoner or prosecutor, or of counsel on their behalf, and without motion or request of either of them, was irregular and illegal. 4 and 5. That such jury having been duly sworn to give a verdict in accordance with the evidence, and the prisoner having put herself upon that jury for good or ill, and all the evidence pro and con. having been duly given, and the jury then and there charged by the judge, and no fatality, illness, or misconduct of the prisoner or the said jury having occurred, nor any fatality or illness of the presiding judge, and the jury not being in anywise incapacitated from agreeing to and finding and delivering a verdict in accordance with the evidence, the discharge of such jury without verdict was irregular and illegal. 6. That no legal or sufficient necessity appears upon the record whereby to have authorised the discharge of the jury in the manner therein stated. 7, 8, and 9. That it appears by the record that the said jury unanimously declared that, after full consideration, they were wholly unable to agree, and could not agree, upon any verdict; the judge ought, therefore, to have directed the said jury to find a verdict of Not Guilty,' or, on discharging them without verdict, the prisoner, under the then existing circumstances, ought to have been discharged from further peril and vexation upon that indictment, or judgment should have been given for the prisoner that she be thereof acquitted, and go thereupon without delay. 10 and 11. That the prisoner was wrongfully deprived of her legal right to a verdict and deliverance in accordance with the evidence, and to a continuation and conclusion of her trial at the Spring Assizes. 12. That the trial and deliverance of the prisoner ought to have been, and could and might have been, continued and concluded before the said justices proceeded, or were required to proceed, to the next assize town. 13. That the said justices had no power or authority under the circumstances to postpone the trial and deliverance of the prisoner till the then next assizes, nor to require her to answer to the said indictment at such next assizes. 14. That at the Spring Assizes the proceedings against the prisoner were discontinued, and at the Summer Assizes they were miscontinued. 15. That the life of the prisoner was in peril upon her first trial, therefore her subsequent trial upon the same indictment for the same felony was irregular and illegal. 16 and 17. That the second trial was also irregular and illegal, because the prisoner Harris, who was jointly charged in the same indictment with the same felony, was admitted as an approver on the part of the Crown, and gave evidence against the said Charlotte Winsor notwithstanding that the said Harris had pleaded 'Not Guilty' to the same indictment, and had jointly with the said Charlotte Winsor put herself upon the said first jury for good or ill, and after all the evidence for and against the said two prisoners had been given, and after they had been jointly and severally given in charge to the said first jury, and such first jury duly charged by the said justices, and notwithstanding that such first jury had not agreed upon the verdict, and while the said Harris was still a prisoner in custody for the same felony. 18. That the said second trial was also irregular and illegal, because the said Harris was admitted to become an approver as aforesaid, although no verdict had been given or recorded either for or against the said Harris; and although the said Harris had not been discharged from the said indictment; and although no nolle prosequi had been entered on her behalf. 19. That the approver aforesaid had been and still stood jointly charged and indicted with the said Charlotte Winsor for the said felony, and having on the first trial pleaded" Not Guilty," and put herself upon the country for good or ill, and so stood upon her

[Q. B.

deliverance by the said first jury, and not having withdrawn her plea of "Not Guilty," and not having been acquitted or found guilty by the said first jury, the second trial of the said Charlotte Winsor was irregular and illegal. 20. That it appears by the record that the jury on the second trial of the said Charlotte Winsor were improperly sworn. 21, 22, and 23. That the second trial of the said Charlotte Winsor, the indictment and all and every the proceedings had thereupon, are irregular and illegal, and are not sufficient in law to warrant the judg ment given against the said Charlotte Winsor. 24. That the court before whom the said Charlotte Winsor was convicted had no authority or jurisdiction at law to try her upon the indictment. The following were the points of argument on the part of the Crown -1. That the indictment, trials, verdict, and judgment had, pronounced, and sentence passed upon the said Charlotte Winsor, are each and all of them in conformity with the law of the realm, and that there is no error therein. 2. That the discharge of the jury under the circumstances stated in the record was proper. 3. That the consent of the prisoner or prosecutor, or counsel for the prisoner or prosecutor, is not necessary in order to entitle the court to discharge the jury. 4. That it is not necessary that any fatality, illness, or misconduct of any of the jurors, or any one else, should occur in order to justify the court in discharging the jury, but that it is sufficient if the court deens that a necessity for such discharge has arisen. 3. That it is a matter in the discretion of the justices whether and when to discharge the jury. 6. That the discretion of the justices was legally exercised in this case. 7. That even if the discretion of the justices was not rightly exercised in this case, the discharge of the jury would not be error. 8. That even if the discharge of the jury was not proper, it did not entitle the prisoner to be discharged from further prosecution; but the prosecution was rightly proceeded with, and the second trial and the verdict and sentence thereon were regular. 9. That it does not appear upon the record that the prosecutor and witnesses were not bound over in recognisance or otherwise to appear and give evidence at the second trial of the said Charlotte Winsor, and even if it did so appear, it would be wholly immaterial. 10. That the evidence given by Mary Ann Harris at the second trial of the said Charlotte Winsor was rightly admitted. 11. That the said Mary Ann Harris did not give evidence for or against herself, within the meaning of the 3rd section of 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99. 12. That even if the evidence of the said Mary Ann Harris was improperly admitted, the improper admission of the same is no ground of error. 13. That it does not appear upon the record that the admission of the evidence of the said Mary Ann Harris was objected to at the trial. 14. That the jury were rightfully sworn in the usual mode, and that their oath is described in the record in the ordinary and proper manner.

Folkard (Collins with him) argued for the prisoner, in support of the writ of error.

Authorities referred to:
3 Inst. 110, 129;
1 Inst. 227 b.;

2 Hale's P. C. 294, 297, 313;
21 Ed., pl. 10, n.;

2 Hawk. P. C. 619; Black. Com. 360;

Chit. Crim. Law, 630, 634; 2 Reeves' Hist. Law, 267, 270; 21 Vin. Abr. "Trial" xv., p. 337; Carthew, 465;

Rex v. Ledgingham, 1 Vent. 97; 2 Roll. Abr. 712;

1 Salk. 201;

[COCKBURN, C. J.-Said that on reference to the book 41 Ass. pl. 11, on which many of the early text writers relied, the authority was obviously chiter dicta.]

Whitehead v. Bennett, 7 St. Tr. 79;
Lord Delamere's case, 11 St. Tr. 561;
Horne Tooke's case, 26 St. Tr. 1231;
Poolarood's case, 13 St. Tr. 173;
R. v. Heath Ld. Ray. 142;
Rez v. Perkins, Car. 465;
Kinloch's case, Foster C. C. 14;
Shield's case, 28 St. Tr. 646;

R. v. Kells, 1 C. & D. Ir. Rep. 151;
R. v. Calvert, 2 Leech C. C. 620;
R. v. Street, 2 C. & P. 413;
R. v. Stevenson, 2 Leech, 546;
R. v. Edwards, Russ. & Ry. 224;
R. v. Meadoncs, Foster;

Johns v. Abbott, Barnes' Notes;
Mozzy v. Davies, Car. & P. 427;
Mansell's case, Dears. & Bell, 404;
R. v. Wade, 1 Moo. C. C. 86;

R. v. Leary and Cook, 3 Craw. & Dick. 212;
R. v. Leckar, Ib. 174;

R. v. Lock, Ib. 393, 428;

Comocy v. The Queen, 7 Irish L. R. 149;
Reg. v. Darison, 2 Fos. & Fin. 250;
Reg. v. Newton, 13 Q. B. 716;

Reg. v. Charlesworth, 1 B. & S. 460;
Trials per Pais, "Proof," 164;
Rudd's case,

Doctor & Student, 135 a, 271;

3 Black. Com. 375;

Com. Dig. "Temps," B. 3;

2 Mad. History Ex. Ct. 5;

1 W. Black. 499;

Rv. Edwards, 3 Camp. 207;
Four's case;

R. v. Emden, 9 East, 437;

P. v. Shean, 2 C. & P. 634;

Campbell v. The Queen, 11 Q. B. 838;

R. v. Green, Dears. & Bell, 117;

R. v. Stewart, 1 Cox C. C. 174;

R. v. Archer, 3 Ib. 228;

R. v. O'Donnell, 7 Ib. 337;

6 & 7 Vict. c. 85;

14 & 15 Vict. c. 99;

2 Stark. on Evid. 11 et seq.

Folkard was heard in reply.

[Q. B.

COCKBURN, C. J.-The question involved in this case has been so recently before the court in the discussed in the argument during the last two days, case of Reg. v. Charlesworth, and has been so fully that I do not think we should gain anything by taking further time to consider our judgment, more especially as there is no doubt whatever in the mind of any one of the members of the court as to the judgment we ought to pronounce. I for one have no hesitation in expressing my opinion that it is within the province of a judge presiding on a criminal trial, in the exercise of his discretion, after the jury have retired to consider their verdict, and have remained in deliberation a full and sufficient time, if the jury are not agreed, and there is no chance or reasonable expectation of their coming to a unanimous decision as the result of a longer deliberation, in my judgment it is competent to the judge, in the exercise of his discretion, to discharge them. We are dealing here, not with one of those fundamental principles that lie at the foundation of our jurisprudence, such as the maxim that judges shall decide questions of law and juries shall decide questions of fact, or that the verdict of the jury, in order to be binding, must be unanimous; we are dealing with a matter of practice which has fluctuated at various times, and which even at the present day may perhaps not be considered as finally settled. The rule laid down by Lord Coke in the Institute, if it ever truly expressed the law, was certainly very speedily departed from in the administration of justice. In a generation or two, at least, after the time when Lord Coke wrote, we find from the statement of Lord Hale-I need not say an authority of the first eminence in such a matter-that the practice universally prevailed in the administration of criminal justice, where the proof turned out upon the trial to be defective, to discharge the jury in order that the prosecution might come on a future occasion better prepared, and we find that great and eminent lawyer, as well as most humane man, speaking with approbation of that practice as a practice essential to prevent the frustration of justice in cases where evidence might have been forthcoming, but happened to be temporarily vailed many years. Afterwards, in consequence of wanting. He speaks of that practice as having prethe way in which the practice was abused on political trials, and possibly in consideration of the great grievance and hardship that might fall upon defence on the first trial, might be wanting in the an accused person, who, coming prepared for his the judges appear to have adopted a different pracmeans of preparing for his defence on the second, tice; not that there appears to have been any judicial decision on the point, but the judges appear on consultation among themselves to have laid down a rule that in criminal trials-at all events, on a trial for felony-the jury should not be discharged at the discretion of the judge. But if that resolution was ever acted upon, it certainly was only acted upon for a limited time. In Kinloch's case, which occurred upon the trials which took place under the commission after the rebellion, we find the judges dissenting from that rule in the general terms in which it was laid down. In that case, the jury having been discharged with a view to putting the prisoner in a better state than he otherwise would have been, and to give him an opportunity of putting a plea on the record which had not up to that time was been pleaded, it afterwards objected that the jury having been

neces

The Solicitor-General (Hannen with him) appeared for the Crown, and contended, first, that the learned judge, in deciding that it was sary and proper to discharge the jury, decided a question of fact which cannot be reviewed by a court of error. Secondly, if it is competent to this court to review the exercise of his discretion, then, that the learned judge was right in discharging the jury. Thirdly, if he was wrong, even then the wrongful discharge of the jury would not be a ground of objection to a second trial. Fourthly, that the accomplice Harris was properly admitted

as a witness:

Doctor & Student, p. 272;

Mansell's case,

1 Anderson, 103;

R. v. Ferrars, Sir T. Raym. Rep. 84;

Hales P. C. 294;
Perkins's case, Carthew 464;
Kinloch's case, Fos. C. C. 16;
Shields case, 28 St. Tri. 647;
R. v. Cobbett, 3 Burn's J. 974;
Gray v. The Queen, 11 Cl. & Fin.
Reg. v. Newton, 13 Q. B. 716;

R. v. Davidson, 2 Fos. & Fin.

Comway and Lynch v. The Queen, 7 Ir. Rep.

R. v. For er, 4 B. & A. 273;

Keats's

case,

Skinner's Rep. 166;

Campbell v. The Queen, 11 Q. B. 799;

150;

6 & 7 Vict. c. 85, ss. 2, 3.

time on their trial, but in the opinion of all the judges upon that commission, except one, that