Aug. 11, 1866.] CHAN.] Re THE SUITORS' FEE FUND, ex parte THE CLERKS IN TAXING MASTERS' OFFICE. before me at this moment, but I looked at it very carefully yesterday, and it seemed to me to go a great deal farther, and to enable the directors to convert this company, which was put before the public for the purpose of working a particular mine, into a company for the purchase of land. If Í remember rightly, there is some clause in the articles of association to that effect. Now, any more substantial variation between a contract, on the footing of which this gentleman entered into this company, and the effect which is attempted to be given to that contract by the memorandum of association, could not, in my judgment, possibly be contemplated. Wednesday, July 18. [CHAN. (Before the LORD CHANCELLOR (Chelmsford.) 5 & 6 Vict. c. 103, and 15 & 16 Vict. c. 87-Salary Six additional clerks had been appointed in 1853, at a This question, therefore, reduces itself, as I thought from the commencement it would reduce itself, entirely to the point whether this gentleman's conduct has been such as to preclude him from applying for the relief which he asks by this notice of motion. I have felt a great deal of doubt upon that point, but in the result I have come to the conclusion that it has not been such as to preclude him. It is clear to my mind that there is no evidence whatever which can fix this gentleman with knowledge of the alterations which have been made between the terms of the prospectus and the terms of the memorandum of association. It is said that he attended a meeting of the company on the 13th Sept. 1865, at which a variation between the prospectus and the articles of association was pointed out. But that variation had nothing to do with the greater and more extensive variations which now appear upon an examination and comparison of the prospectus and the memorandum of association. I think we should be going too far in fixing upon this gentleman a knowledge of the alteration which had been effected by the memorandum of association. I remember in the great bankruptcy case of Fauntleroy, Lord Eldon intimated an opinion that every partner in a banking concern must be taken to know the contents of his own books. That question was afterwards sent to law, and the court of law repudiated that doctrine, Rolt, Q. C. and W. Pearson, for the petitioners, and held that partners were not necessarily bound by the contents of their own books. So here, I think, you cannot hold that this partner was bound to in- submitted that, under the strict legal construction of vestigate the books. If there had been evidence of the Acts, additional clerks were to have the same his receiving dividends, or doing acts of that de-authority as other clerks, and had a statutory right scription as a partner, I agree that he would be held to the salary of 350%. to be bound by them. But I cannot see my way to bind him unless it can be shown that he had knowledge of the alteration that was made. I take it, and I have very frequently had occasion to say so, that acquiescence is really founded upon knowledge. You cannot say that a man acquiesces in a transaction who is not proved to have had knowledge of it. I think that this is a doctrine which in all these cases of acquiescence requires to be attended to. J. H. Taylor for the Suitors' Fee Fund. The LORD CHANCELLOR.—The case depends entirely upon the construction of the Act, and the terms used in the Act are so plain that I wonder any doubt could have been entertained about them. as the L. C. By the 9th section of the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 103, a taxing master may appoint an additional clerk if necessary, and as many more shall order, and every such clerk shall be entitled to a salary of 250l. per annum under that Act. It Act as to exclude the assistant clerks. The 40th is not possible to put such a construction on the section of the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 87, raised the salary of every such clerk to 350l. per annum, and the question is whether a clerk appointed by the taxing master and the L. C. comes within the meaning The case has nothing of the words "every such? Solicitors for the company appealing, Newbon, to do with the nature of the duties performed. A statutory power must be strictly construed, and Evans, and Co. looking at the Act and the order of July 1865, I Solicitors for Mr. Stewart, the resp., Messrs. have no doubt that the petitioners are entitled to Harrison and Lewis. The argument having failed to satisfy me that we should be justified in holding this gentleman to be fixed with knowledge of the variation made between the prospectus and the memorandum of association, I think that that ground fails equally with the other grounds; and my opinion therefore is, that the order of the V. C. is right, and that the motion must be refused with costs. the full salary of 350l. per annum after that date. The costs will come out of the suitors' fund. Solicitors for the petitioners, Loftus, Vizard, and Co. Solicitor for the suitors, J. J. Johnson. ROLLS.] MULLINS v. HUSSEY-BRETT v. CARMICHAEL. ROLLS COURT. Reported by H. R. YOUNG, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Tuesday, July 24. MULLINS v. HUSSEY. Compromise of suit-Agreement for sale of property, the subject-matter of it-Defective title-Second suit, to enforce agreement, or to have it set aside. Where there are two parties to an agreement for the sale of an estate, and one of those parties is wrongfully in the possession of the estate, while the other is not, that other party is entitled either to have the agreement carried into effect, or, if that is opposed, to have it set aside altogether. A. filed a bill to set aside a conveyance. That suit was compromised; and one term of the compromise was that the property in question should be sold by the court. The property was accordingly sold, but it was then found that A. could not make a title to it; and the purchaser was discharged from his contract. A. then requested the defts. in the suit to concur in an application to the court for a re-sale of the property, with such conditions as would insure its being sold, but they refused their concurrence. A. then filed a second bill, praying a declaration that either the compromise of the first suit should be carried into effect, or set aside altogether; and for the same relief in other respects as he had sought by his first bill. The defts. to the second suit demurred to the bill in it: Held, that the demurrer must be overruled. [ROLLS. once set aside. In other respects the same relief was sought in this suit as in the former one. E. F. Smith, Q. C. and Druce appeared for the defts. Hussey and Kane, who were first mortgagees of the property, and whose incumbrances had been created by Pemberton, and supported their demurrer to the bill for want of equity. Jessel, Q. C. and Rawlinson, for another deft. Stephens, who was a second mortgagee, but who was in possession of the property, supported his demurrer. Baggallay, Q. C., Beales, and Downing Bruce appeared for the plt., but were not called upon. Lord ROMILLY.-Mr. Baggallay, I need not trouble you in this case. In my opinion, the bill which has been filed in this suit is not only a proper one, but it is one that was absolutely necessary for the relief which the plt. seeks here. It was one of the most, if not the most, essential of the ingredients in the compromise of the former suit that there should be a sale of the estate in question. But, as it turned out, no sale could be effected under the conditions framed in the former suit. The plt. therefore requested the defts. to concur with him in procuring an order for the re-sale of the estate, and accompanied with proper conditions of sale. That request, however, the defts. thought proper to decline. The plt. then filed his bill in this suit, and to that bill the defts., viz., Pemberton's mortgagees, have demurred for want of equity. But those parties are in this position: This cause came on to be heard upon two they got into possession of the estate, and have demurrers to the bill for want of equity. The facts of the case were shortly these:In 1862 the plt. instituted a suit against a Mr. Pemberton, a solicitor, to obtain a decree to set aside a conveyance of real estate executed by the plt.'s mother to Mr. Pemberton, who had acted as her solicitor. In that suit an agreement for a compromise of it was entered into. Some of the terms of that compromise were that the estate in question should be sold under the direction of the court; and that the plt. should concur in the sale and furnish the requisite evidence in support of his title. The plt. was the heir-at-law of his mother and of one Isaac Wood. It was also agreed that all further proceedings in the suit should be stayed. A decree to that effect was made, and the estate was duly put up for sale by auction in lots, and sold. The purchaser of the largest lot objected to the plt.'s title, and refused to complete his purchase. The Lords Justices, on an application being made to them in the suit, discharged the purchaser from his purchase, being of opinion that the title was a doubtful one, and could not therefore be forced upon an unwilling purchaser. When the sale was made the plt. was not aware of the existence of the objection which was afterwards successfully made to his title; and he had not, therefore, protected himself by the requisite conditions of sale. After the decision of the Lords Justices, by which the purchaser was discharged from his purchase, the plt. requested the defts., viz., Pemberton and those claiming under him, to concur in an application to the court for an order directing the estate in question to be put up again for sale, and with such conditions as might preclude any possibility of a similar objection to the title being again taken. The defts., however, refused to concur with the plt. as he desired, and insisted on their right to retain the estate. The plt. thereupon filed the bill in this suit, praying a declaration that either the original agreement for the compromise should be now carried into effect, or that it should be at remained in the possession of it, thereby getting the benefit of the contract respecting it. That being so, they refuse to acknowledge the plt.'s right under the compromise. But that is a state of thing which this court will not allow to continue. For where there are two parties to an agreement for the sale of an estate, and one of those parties is wrongfully in the possession of the estate while the other is not, that other party is entitled either to have the agree ment carried out, or if that is opposed, to have it set aside altogether. I think that in this case the plt. is quite at liberty to seek by his bill in this suit the same relief which he might have obtained in the former one if it had not been for the agreement as to the compromise. Solicitors for the plt., Walters and Moojen. Solicitors for the defts., Bannister and Fache; Wilsons. Monday, July 30. BRETT v. CARMICHAEL. Administration Decree-Distribution of estate- A suit was instituted here for the administration of a Aug. 11, 1866.] ROLLS.] BRETT v. CARMICHAEL. France against the executors and others interested in | Held, that the proper course was for the court to retain This suit was instituted for the administration of the estate of a Mr. John Watkins Brett. The testator, by his will, dated the 18th July 1856, desired that all his real and personal estate should be disposed of, and that one-tenth of the value should be appropriated to charitable purposes, with the earnest prayer that God might so guide the disposition of the same as might best tend to the present and eternal welfare of the testator's fellow-creatures. He then appointed his brother and sister, Francis Henry Brett and Caroline Jane Wileman, to an equal right to the disposal of such tenth part, it being the testator's wish that the Church and Moravian missions should receive two-thirds of such onetenth part, equally divided, and the town missions and Scripture readers' societies the remaining third of such tenth part equally divided. The testator then left his collection of pictures, with certain exceptions, works of art, curiosities, and plate, to be disposed of by sale at auction, as in his will was mentioned, one-tenth of the proceeds being reserved for disposal as aforesaid; and so in like manner with each portion of the property as realised. The furniture was to be disposed of as might be best approved; and he also desired that the shares in telegraph companies, and in railways or mines, should be disposed of by or under the advice of Mr. Isaac Braithwaite, to realise as might be best advised, one-tenth being set apart for disposal as aforesaid, and the remaining nine-tenths to be divided as follows: [ROLLS. interest to the said Jacob Brett, Thomas Watkins, The testator died on the 3rd Dec. 1863, and the The testator had no real estate; but at the time house, No. 2, Hanover-square, which was afterwards of his death he had an interest in a leasehold sold for 500l. and was possessed of some original and preference shares, debentures, bonds, stocks, or other securities, in the Atlantic Telegraph Company, the Mediterranean Extension Telegraph Company, the British and Irish Magnetic Telegraph Company, the New York and London Telegraph Company, and other companies of a similar nature, and in particular in the Mediterranean Submarine Electric Telegraph Company. In March 1865 the estimated value of all that species of property belonging to the testator was about 32,536l. 10s. He was also possessed of other personal estate of considerable value. Various deeds of arrangement and other transactions took place between the parties interested in the testator's estate; and ultimately this suit was instituted to administer it. The usual administration decree was made in the suit; after which the chief clerk certified that there existed certain claims against the estate, which he specified. A petition was afterwards presented praying an order to compromise the suit, and on the 21st July 1865 an order to that effect was duly made; and that the distribution of the estate by the executors should then be carried out, in accordance with the arrangement agreed upon between the parties. Before any distribution of the estate had been effected, it appeared that there were some claimants in France, the existence of whose demands was not known when the chief clerk made his certificate, and that two of those claimants had commenced suits in France against the executors and the other parties interested in the testator's estate in respect of their claims. They sought to recover a sum, in the whole of upwards of 80,000l., for alleged mismanagement and malversation by the testator, as gerant of the Mediterranean Submarine Electric Telegraph Company. It was stated, however, that the company had, at a general meeting, passed a pro-resolution by which they approved of the testator's conduct as gerant, and honourably acquitted him of any approach to impropriety. When the executors here ascertained the fact of the French claims being persisted in, they presented a petition praying that, notwithstanding the order of the 21st July 1865, the estate of the testator remaining undistributed might be retained, and the distribution thereof postponed until the final determination of the French suits, or until the further order of this court; and that all proper inquiries to the defence of the said French suits or otherwise might be ordered and directions given with reference in relation to the said claims, and for the indemnity of the executors; that if and so far as necessary the petition upon which the order of the 21st July 1865 was made might be reheard, and all proper directions given with respect to this suit, and the conduct or compromise thereof, to the administrator of the testator's estate, or that such other order might be made as the court should think proper. To Jacob Brett one remaining tenth of all such ceeds, and further all right and title to two pictures by Dalreffe, then in the possession of Mr. Cyrus Field at New York, U. S., and also an acquittance of all debts due to the testator from him, the said debts and pictures to be clear of all appropriation of the one-tenth set apart for charitable purposes. The testator then directed that the remaining eight- | tenths of his property should be divided into five parts, and he gave one-fifth of such parts to Francis Henry Brett, another fifth to Caroline Jane Wileman, another fifth to Isaac Brett, another fifth to Thomas Watkins Benjamin Brett, and the remaining fifth to Hester Brett and Elizabeth Brett, equally to be divided between them. The testator then expressed his desire that, if any of the British Submarine or other telegraphic shares could not be disposed of to advantage, after setting apart onetenth as aforesaid, the same should be deposited in the London and Westminster Bank in the joint names (of his executors), and that the interest and Accordingly, on the 10th March 1866, an order annual income thereof should be divided in the He then appointed Francis was made on that petition staying that of the 21st proportion named. Henry Brett and Henry Wileman to act conjointly July 1865 for the distribution of the estate. At under the trustees of his will in all such arrange- the same time the court directed that, besides the ments for securing the appropriation of the annual | usual advertisements, others should be inserted in the Paris Moniteur, stating that persons claiming against the testator's estate in France must come in with their claims by the first day of the then next ensuing term, otherwise the estate would be distributed. It subsequently appeared that M. Charpentier, the plt. in one of the two French suits, was unsuccessful in the first instance, and that an appeal of his from the adverse decision was compromised, and his costs paid. The other suit was still pending. The petition presented by the executors for the order to stay the distribution of the estate again came on to be considered, and an application was now made to the court by the petitioners for its advice and direction how they should act in the matter, having regard to the still pending French action, and to the indemnity against the result of it, and of any other similar claims to which they conceived that (as executors) they were clearly entitled. They also asked for an order directing that (subject as last aforesaid) the residue of the testator's estate might now be distributed among the legatees and other claimants entitled to it. Hemming appeared for the executors. | [V.C. S. against the deft. Mortimer Percy Drummond, under these circumstances:-In Oct. 1840 the plt. Jane Drummond, being then Jane Drummond Narine, intermarried in Scotland with the deft., who at that time was, as the plt. alleged, a domiciled Englishman. At the date of her marriage Jane Drummond was apparent or presumptive heiress of her mother, then living, to an estate called Gairdrum, in Scotland, recorded in the register of tailzies at Edinburgh. In 1850 the deft. and his then wife, Jane Drummond, at that time resident in Scotland, borrowed a sum of 6001. from the City of Glasgow Insurance Company, in consideration of which they gave a security on the Gairdrum estate for payment of 21751. in the event of Mrs. Drummond succeeding to that property. The security, which was framed in accordance with Scotch law, was in these terms: We, M. P. Drummond and Mrs. J. Drummond, spouses, considering tha I (the wife) am eldest daughter of and heiress of tailzie, next entitled to succeed to the lands of Ga'rdrum, have agreed to enter into a transaction with the city of Glasgow Insurance Company, whereby, on the one hand, the company have agreed to make to us a present payment of 6001, sterling, and on the other hand, we are bound Selwyn, Q. C., Baggallay, Q. C., Jessel, Q. C., Kay, to make payment to them of 21751. contingently upon the sucand Holmes for the other parties to the suit. Daly, Pearson, and O. Morgan for creditors and other incumbrancers who had come in and proved their debts. Lord ROMILLY.-The proper order to be made now is I think this: Assuming the validity of the compromise with M. Charpentier, upon the payment of his costs in the action in France, let such a sum of consols, forming part of the testator's estate, as will produce by the sale thereof a sum of (say 50007.) be retained in court to meet the claim, if established, in the French action which is now pending (called the second action), and let the residue of the estate be distributed under the order of the 21st July 1865. Liberty to apply must be also reserved. The executors must also have liberty to apply specially to this court, if necessary, on account of any claims which may be established against them in France, with respect to their indemnity, as against any persons, whether original legatees or other incumbrancers, who are now to be paid under the order for distribution of the 21st July 1865. Solicitors: Davies, Son, Campbell, and Reeve. = V. C. STUART'S COURT. Reported by EDWARD WINSLOW, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. June 7 and 20. DRUMMOND V. DRUMMOND. Practice-Service of process abroad-Jurisdiction General Order 33, 8th May 1845-Consolidated Order 10, r. 7. The General Orders of 1860 have an equal statutory force with those of 1845; and consequently the court has jurisdiction under Consolidated Order 10, r. 7, to direct service of its process abroad in cases not within Stats. 2 Will. 4, c. 33, and 4 and 5 Will. 4, c. 82. The decisions in Foley v. Maillardet and Cookney v. Anderson not followed. This was a motion to discharge an order made by his Honour, on the 26th March 1866, authorising the service of a copy of the bill and interrogatories upon the deft. at Bonn, where he was domiciled. The bill was filed on 17th Feb. 1866 by Thomas Charles Waddy Drummond and his wife Jane cession to the said estate of Gairdrum and others opening to me Jane Drummond through survivance of my mother. And now, seeing that the co npany have instantly made payment to us of 600, whereof we acknowledge the receipt, therefore, I, the said M. P. Drummond, for myself, and as taking on me for my said wife, ard I, the said Mrs. Jane Drummond, for myself, with the consent of my said husband, and we both with joint assent and consent, do hereby bind ourselves and our heirs, executors, and representatives, whomsoever, all conjointly and severally, and renouncing the benefit of discustheir assignees of the 'oresaid sum of 21754 at Edinburgh, on sion, to make payment to the trustees for the time being and the day of my succeeding, or being in any way entitled to succeed, to the entailed estate of Gairdrum. There was a further provision in the deed that the event upon which the said sum of 2175l. should become payable was the mere opening of the right of succession of Mrs. Drummond. In the year 1854 a further sum of 1000% was borrowed from the same company on the security of the same estate, and it was arranged that this sum was to be discharged by payment to the company of 39381. (or in the alternative an annuity of 3357. 19s. 9d.) in the event of Mrs. Drummond succeeding to the estate. Both of the deeds securing the above sums were registered in the General Register of Sasines in Scotland, whereby the estate of Gairdrum became charged with the above-mentioned sums. On the 6th June 1857 the deft. obtained a decree of divorce against Jane Drummond. There was no issue of the marriage. In Dec. 1857 the plts. Jane and T. C. W. Drummond intermarried. Mrs. Drummond, upon the death of her mother in Dec. 1865, succeeded to the Gairdrum estate. After the death of Mrs. Drummond's mother, the assurance company applied to Mrs. Drummond for payment of the sums charged upon her estate, whereupon these proceedings were instituted against Mrs. Drummond's former husband upon the ground that he was responsible for the debt, the plts. contending that, as the money was borrowed by him on the security of his wife's estate, she was entitled by the law of Scotland to consider her estate only as a surety for the debt, and to claim to be exonerated therefrom by the deft. The bill accordingly prayed that the deft. might be ordered to pay the company the said sums, and to procure the estate of Gairdrum to be released therefrom, and the securities to be delivered up to the plts. None of the property involved in the suit was in England. It appeared that both Mrs. Drummond and the deft., from the time of their marriage until their divorce, were domiciled in Scotland. V.C. S.] PEDLEY V. DODDS. DODDS v. PEDLEY. In compliance with the order of 26th March 1866, the deft. had been served with a copy of the bill and interrogatories, and he subsequently obtained leave to enter a conditional appearance. He now moved as above stated. Malins, Q. C. and W. Pearson, in support of the motion, contended that the court had no authority either to recognise the suit, or to direct service of its process abroad. The orders of 1845 had been repealed, and had now no statutory power. The statutes of 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 33, and 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 82, authorised service out of the jurisdiction, but that permission was limited to certain things mentioned in the Acts. By the General Orders of 1845 the jurisdiction was extended in respect of things not within the statutes of Will. 4, and by the language of 3 & 4 Vict. c. 94 those orders had obtained the like force and effect as if the provisions therein contained had been expressly enacted by Parliament;" but the orders of 1845 had been repealed by the orders of 1860, and in 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, the statute which authorised the repeal, the words used in 3 & 4 Vict. c. 94 had been, no doubt purposely, omitted. Thus inferentially it might be concluded that the orders of 1860 were not to have a similar power to those of 1845, but were intended again to confine the court's jurisdiction within the limits prescribed by the statutes of Will. 4. The decision of Lord Westbury in Cookney v. Anderson, 31 Beav. 452; 7 L. T. Rep. N. S. 491, confirmed on appeal, 1 De G. J. & S. 365; 8 L. T. Rep. N. S. 295; and the subsequent cases of Foley v. Maillardet, 1 De G. J. & S. 389; 9 L. T. Rep. N. S. 643; and Samuel v. Rogers, Ib. 396, had completely settled the law on the subject. They also referred to National Provident and Investment Association v. stairs, 11 W. R. 866; 8 L. T. Rep. N. S. 717; Norris v. Cotterill, 5 N. R. 215. | [V.C. S. Orders of 1860. It is clear that, if he had been aware that there was a subsequent statutory enlargement of the power given to the court, he would have decided in favour of the validity of that subsequent enlargement which had the authority of an Act of Parliament. He was not aware that the subsequent statute of 3 & 4 Vict. c. 94, in its 1st section, enacts that the general orders of the Court of Ch. made under its authority shall, unless objected to within a limited time by a vote of either House of Parliament, "be of like force and effect as if the provisions therein contained had been expressly enacted by Parliament." Thus the General Order of 1845, made under the authority of this statute, has the same statutory force and effect as if enacted by Parliament, and no decision by the L. C. or any other judge has any authority against it, although a subsequent general order having a like statutory authority may repeal or vary or re-enact it. When Lord Westbury said that the statute 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, ss. 63 and 64, did not authorise the full force of the General Order 1860, and that its full operation must be controlled and limited so as not to exceed the limits prescribed by the statutes of Will. 4, he could not have come to that conclusion if he had been aware that the General Order of 1845 had the force and effect of a statute. It has, however, been argued now that the General Order of 1860 repealed the General Order of 1845. But, unless the General Order of 1860 had the force and effect of an Act of Parliament, it could not repeal the General Order of 1845, which must in that view be still in force. But, in my opinion, the statute of 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, gave full power to repeal the General Order of 1845, and to re-enact it so as that, according to the Car-language of the statute of 3 & 4 Vict., it has now "the like force and effect as if the provisions therein contained had been expressly enacted by Act of Parliament." The principle of Lord Westbury's decision must be followed; and that principle is, that what has a statutory force and effect must prevail against the most authoritative decision of even the supreme judge in the Court of Ch. Upon the authority of that principle this motion must be Osborne, Q. C. and J. Pearson, for the plts., argued that it was a mistake to say that the orders of 1845 had no longer their original force; although repealed, they had been re-enacted under a statutory power, and by Consolidated Order 10, r. 7, the court, as under the old orders, was now enabled to serve in all cases out of its jurisdiction. Lord Westbury's decision was inconsistent with the practice and the decisions of other judges. As to the merits of the case, the deft. at the time he contracted the debts with the company was a domiciled Englishman, and that entitled the plts. to have the question decided by an English court. They therefore submitted that the motion ought to be refused with costs. They cited Whitmore v. Ryan, 4 Hare, 612; refused. Solicitors for the plts., Williams and James. June 11 and 12. Steele v. Stuart, 1 H. & M. 793; 9 L. T. Rep. N. S. Will-Specific devise-Words of description-Parcels. 644; June 20.-The VICE-CHANCELLOR.-In support of this motion counsel have properly relied entirely on the authority of the repeated decisions of the late L. C. His decisions in the cases of Cookney v. Anderson and Foley and Maillardet (supra) are entitled to all that paramount weight and authority to which the other judges of this court are bound to submit. The ground of these decisions is that the power of the Legislature is supreme, and that no general order of this court, and no decision of any of its judges, can be valid if it exceeds the bounds prescribed by the Legislature. Lord Westbury therefore held that the statutory power given to this court by the Acts of Parliament, 2 Will. 4, c. 33, and 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 82, had not been enlarged by any subsequent statute, and must therefore control the inferior effect and operation of the General B. purchased an estate called Arkley Hall, situate in the parish of Ridge, and subsequently purchased other lands in the adjoining parishes of Shenley and Barnet, occupying the whole property as one farm; by his will he devised (inter alia) all his freehold estates, consisting of "Arkley Hall Farm, in the parish of Ridge," upon certain trusts, with a devise over of his residuary real estates: Held, that the lands in the parishes of Shenley and Barnet passed under the residuary, and not under the specific devise. The first of these two bills was filed by a surviving trustee and executor, praying that the trusts of the testator's will might be performed under the direction of the court, and that the rights of all persons thereunder might be ascertained; and the second (a cross-bill) by persons claiming to be entitled under the trusts of the will to certain messuages, closes of land, and premises, situate in the parishes of Ridge, Shenley, and Barnet. |