"the advantage seems to be in favour of armour; and yet a target, representing the strongest portion of the armour of the Inflexible, was penetrated at 1,800 metres by a Krupp gun."

While we find an eminent French authority announcing that armour will shortly be laid aside, Admiral Porter, in his report, published in December, 1875, said that the aim of the United States should be, in making changes, to resist the shot from the 12-inch 35ton gun, which at 200 yards perforates 15 inches of solid wrought iron. He asked for twenty-four first class ships; but such vessels would represent, in his opinion, no decided power for offence or defence, unless they carried sufficient thickness of armour to resist the average rifled gun, and had speed to get within striking distance of the enemy. "Wooden vessels," he observed, "add nothing to the fighting force, just as, in former days, engagements fought with frigates never materially affected the result of a war."

In his essay, published in the present year, entitled La Guerre d'Escadre, M. Dislere somewhat modifies the opinion he had previously expressed. He says, "The aim has been, with the mastless ironclads, to produce a shipof-war unsinkable by the fire of the enemy, and capable of fighting its guns to the last. Everything has been sacrificed to that idea. Due regard has not been paid to the effect of the new weapons, the terrible effect of which was revealed during the American War of Secession, and at the battle of Lissa. Against the ram, and against the torpedo, the Colossus of the seas, of from ten to eleven thousand tons, loses the advantages so dearly purchased; and the ironclad ship, protected by armour of moderate thickness, resumes those advantages which, under a somewhat inconsiderate impulse of popular opinion, were too little appreciated."

The most competent authorities abroad are unanimous in the opinion that the first-class ironclads of the British navy are triumphs of naval architecture. Among the conspicuous

merits of our latest ships, we may mention their proved capability of keeping the sea in any weather, their abundant coal supply, and the powerful calibre of their artillery. It is not too much to say that, by the originality displayed in their design, and the skilful workmanship with which they have been constructed, the prestige of our country has been sustained, and, indeed, in a very high degree increased. If it were probable that the navy would be required to operate chiefly in ocean warfare, it might be the wiser course to continue to build ships of the Inflexible type, in preference to smaller vessels. But there is no immediate prospect of naval operations on the broad ocean. The principal maritime powers are directing their attention chiefly to warfare of another kind— to the attack and defence of forts and harbours; and for coast operations ocean-going ironclads are not adapted. In the United States, no new ironclads have been commenced since the close of the civil war. In his report for 1875, the Secretary of the United States Navy says, "Our circumstances do not require that we should take part in the rivalry between monster cannon and impenetrable armour, since few of our ports are accessible to vessels carrying either, and these may be better defended by attacking the vessel below her armour by sub-aqueous cannon and movable and stationary torpedoes." In Russia attention has of late been directed chiefly to the circular ironclads, the Popoffkas, which are intended solely for coast defence. In Germany it has been decided to lay down no more ironclads at present. In France the programme of shipbuilding was settled in 1872, when it was decided that sixteen first-class and twelve secondclass ironclads should be built. Financial considerations have prevented the execution of these plans within the period of ten years, originally contemplated, and, while the delay has caused deep regret to many members of the French legislature, with others, that

regret has been tempered by the conviction that, in a period of such rapid transition, it was impossible to spend large sums on shipbuilding, with any confidence that the ships, when built, would represent the latest ideas of naval constructors.

In his essay, La Marine d'Aujourd'hui, Admiral de la Gravière asks, but does not answer, the question, What kind of squadron will the admirals of 1882 be called upon to command? He appears so much in doubt as to future transformations of matériel, that his attention seems to be mainly directed to the effectual training of the personnel of the fleet.

On examining our shipbuilding programme of the present session, one salient feature will be at once noted. With a single exception, that of an armoured torpedo vessel, all the armoured vessels proposed are of large tonnage. The list includes the following ships :

It cannot be doubted that all the ships under construction will prove formidable additions to the navy. It is not contended that the construction of first-class vessels of war should be continued; but it is a subject for regret that, whereas, according to the Navy Estimates of the present session, it is proposed to build only 8,000 tons of iron-clad shipping, we have so largely and rapidly increased the dimensions of individual vessels, that the whole shipbuilding of the year is only sufficient to produce a single ship, and that ship liable to instant destruction by weapons of a comparatively inexpensive nature, which can be multiplied therefore in almost overwhelming numbers. Moreover, while the dimensions have been carried to the

furthest possible point, there yet remain some unquestionable defects. The armament of our most recent ironclads is unsatisfactory. Their guns, although of tremendous calibre, are too few in number. In the excitement of action we cannot rely on perfect accuracy of fire, even were the field of view unobstructed by the smoke, which must inevitably envelope the contending fleets. Of the uncertainty of artillery practice, no artillery practice, no more striking proof could be produced than that which was quoted by Captain Price, in the course of the discussion on Captain Scott's lecture, delivered at the Royal United Service Institution, on the maritime defence of England. Captain Price stated that the only practical test as yet applied to our large guns, in respect to accuracy of aim, was made in 1870, when our three largest ships, the Captain, the Monarch, and the Hercules were sent out from Vigo Bay to fire at a rock, distant about 1000 yards. The day was almost absolutely calm. The rock was 600 feet long, and 60 feet high, that is to say twice as long and four times as high as a ship. The Hercules, armed with 18-ton guns, fired 17 shots, of which 10 hit. The Captain, armed with 25-ton guns, fired 11 shots, and made 4 hits. The Monarch, also armed with 25-ton guns, fired 12 shots, and made 9 hits. Captain Price, arguing from these data, agreed in the opinion, previously expressed by Captain Columb, that the Monarch, which, in six minutes from the time of opening fire, would have fired 12 shots, could only expect to hit a sister vessel at a distance of 1000 yards, from twice to fifteen times out of every 100 shots. He further remarked that "as the size of our gun increases, so we must expect the accuracy of the gun to decrease."

Captain Scott lays it down that the armament of a first-class fighting ship should not be less than one gun to every thousand tons displacement. The Inflexible has only one gun to every 2000 tons displacement, and her armament, being mounted in pairs in

If a

two turrets, and loaded and trained by mechanism, a great portion of which is common to both guns, cannot be reckoned as having the same relative value as four independent guns. projectile were to penetrate a turret the pair of guns mounted therein would probably be disabled. Four guns, therefore, mounted in pairs, cannot be reckoned as equivalent to more than three guns mounted and worked independently. It is a weak point in the Inflexible class that they have no light armament with which to defend themselves against gunboats and torpedo vessels.

Again, the armour, in the latest designs, covers only a limited area of the sides of the ship; and the unprotected ends, even though filled with cork and coals, and subdivided into numerous cellular compartments, are alleged by Mr. Reed to be fraught with considerable danger to the armoured citadel. I am not competent to take any part in the controversy between Mr. Reed and Mr. Barnaby; but I venture to point to the present discussion as an argument of incontrovertible weight against the policy of building vessels of extreme dimensions and consequently excessive cost. If a new argument were needed, in order to show the desirability of distributing more widely the risks of naval war, and increasing the means of attackobjects which can be best attained by multiplying the number of our fighting ships-it would surely be found in the deplorable controversy which has arisen respecting the Inflexible. Having enlarged the dimensions of a single ship to 11,400 tons, and having expended upon its construction a sum which may be estimated at not less than half-a-million sterling, we have the mortification of hearing from a high authority that our enormous and costly ship is not fit to go into action.

There is reason to believe that other features in the most recent designs are not altogether satisfactory. The magazines are outside the citadel, with only a three-inch armoured deck over

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them. The weakness of the bow for ramming is a still more serious consideration. "Suppose," as it has been suggested by a distinguished flagofficer, a ship with unarmoured ends should be obliged to meet another, bow to bow, at full speed (a most likely occurrence); nothing could save her from immediate destruction, provided that her opponent were armoured, and therefore the stronger. If the Devastation or the Dreadnought, which are armoured round the bows, were to steer straight for the Inflexible, they would inevitably have the advantage over her weakly constructed bow. If the Inflexible were to endeavour to avoid the blow, she must expose her side to the enemy, which would be still more dangerous.'

June

It is disappointing to be informed of the existence of so many defects in our most ingenious and costly ships; and the British public will probably be disposed to concur in the opinion expressed by Mr. King, of the United States navy, in his description of the Inflexible, quoted in the Engineer of 22nd:-"Almost every conceivable precaution," he says, "has been taken to make her secure from the ram and the torpedo. If, however, she should be fairly struck by a solitary powerful fish-torpedo, it is quite possible that she would be crippled, water-logged, or possibly sunk." question, therefore, presented to us is whether two vessels of smaller dimensions, each carrying two 81-ton guns, instead of four, would not have been a a safer, and, in some respects, a better investment.

The

It was stated at the outset that it was not proposed to criticise the designs of our most recent ships of war, or to advocate any original views on naval architecture; but rather to ascertain the opinions of the most competent professional authorities, and to see how far the latest programme of shipbuilding was wisely framed for the purpose of carrying out their recommendations. The controversy as to the continued use of side armour