must naturally arouse the greatest anxiety in the country. It is said, that unless armour be strong enough to keep out shells, it is worse than useless and armour, more or less impenetrable, even when limited to vital places, such as the water-line, the engine-room, and the boiler-space, involves a large addition to the cost, and an increase of dimensions, tending to diminish that mobility which is of the last importance.

In considering this subject, it is essential to bear in mind that the increase in the tonnage of our most recent ships has been rendered necessary by the weight of their armour : that armour is a protection against artillery fire alone; and, that while the power of the guns may be indefinitely augmented, there is an inevitable limit to the thickness of armour. The argument against armour very ably summed up by Sir William Armstrong, in his letter to Lord Dufferin, Chairman of the last Committee on Naval Designs, from which the following extract is taken :

:

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"The foregoing considerations as to the present effects and probable future of guns, projectiles, and torpedoes, lead me to the conclusion that no practicable thickness of armour can be expected to secure invulnerability for any considerable length of time. At present it is only the most recent of our armour-clads that have any pretence to be considered invulnerable. All the earlier vessels, when built, had just as much claim to be so regarded as the strongest ships of the present day; yet they are now completely left behind, and are, in my opinion, much inferior to well-constructed, unarmoured ships. I venture to ask, what reason have we to suppose that the powers of attack will not continue quickly to overtake the increased powers of resistance, which we are applying at great increase of cost, and at great sacrifice of general efficiency? Every addition to the weight carried for defence must be attended with a diminution of armament and of speed, unless the size of the ship be increased in a very rapid proportion. A continual addition, therefore, to the thickness of the armour involves either a continual reduction of offensive power, or such an increase in the size of the vessel and its consequent cost as must limit the production of sea-going ships of war to a number inadequate for constituting an efficient navy."

Armstrong, as an artillerist, would naturally be impressed with the irresistible power of guns against armour; but when we turn to the official declarations of the constructors themselves, we find them substantially in accord with the view expressed in the foregoing extract. The papers relating to the design of the Inflexible, recently presented to Parliament, contain a well-balanced summary of the arguments for and against the continued use of armour :

"We do not see that any increase in the penetrating power of guns can make it desirable to dispense with hull armour, merely because it is penetrable to some guns within certain ranges. It will always remain impenetrable to all guns beyond certain ranges, and to many guns at all ranges, and must therefore be advantageous as a means of security to the vital parts of the ship.

"The limit to its thickness is to be found, we think, in the size and cost of the ship.

"So far as we have gone at present, fourteen inches of armour have been found to be consistent with high-speed, perfect-turning power, and moderate draught of water. No one of these conditions imposes a limit; but a single ship costs nearly half a million sterling, and it is exposed to many risks.

"The losses and casualties of a naval engagement would do much, there is no doubt, to bring out the imminence of these risks, would perhaps show that the large and costly ship is even more exposed to them than the smaller one.

"It may be that the limit of size and cost has been reached in the Fury, and that, with her bulk and cost, the maximum of advantages may be obtained.

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We are ourselves disposed to think that this is so, and that there may be retrogression in this respect as more experience is gained with the powers of the torpedo, the ram, and other submarine instruments of attack."

Let us now refer to another official statement, emanating from the Council of Construction at Whitehall. On the 6th of April of last year, Mr. Barnaby read a paper at the Institute of Naval Architects, in which the relative merits of very large ships, as compared with vessels of more moderate dimensions, were ably discussed. "The attack," he said, "of several fast unarmoured rams and torpedoboats upon a somewhat slower armoured ship, although involving the

probable destruction of some of the attacking vessels, would still expose the armoured ship to a risk which she ought never to encounter alone. The assailants ought to be brought to bay, before they could get within striking distance of the ironclad, by consorts, armed, like the attacking vessels, with the ram and the torpedo, which may take, like them, the chances of being sunk. In other words, I contend that the defence against the ram and the torpedo must be sought for, not in the construction of the ship alone or mainly, but also and chiefly in the proper grouping of the forces at the points of attack. Each costly ironclad ought to be a division defended against the torpedo and the ram by smaller numerous but less important parts of the general forces. If the foregoing considerations are correct, there is still place in naval warfare for costly ironclads with thick armour and powerful guns. There is place also for association with them of armoured vessels armed with the torpedo and manned by brave men."

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There was present among Mr. Barnaby's audience the ex-Controller of the Navy, Sir Spencer Robinson. In the course of the discussion on the paper just quoted, he gave his full approval to the proposal to provide a supplementary flotilla as necessary auxiliaries to a fleet of ironclads. “No suggestion," he said, “more valuable for the purposes of war has been made by any person within my knowledge than the able suggestion of Mr. Barnaby, that the true mode of defending our heavy ironclads from these attacks is by the counter-attack of torpedoes and rams. No fleet, therefore, can be considered a fleet, and, in my humble opinion, no ship like the Inflexible can be considered a ship of war. unless provided with attendant rams and torpedoes to meet those attacks to which she is sure to be subjected. I am quite satisfied also that Mr. Barnaby has hit upon the right plan of defending such ships from the attacks of torpedoes. It is

by counter-attack that you must sueceed, and not by piling mountains of iron upon the sides of your ships."

Though not a naval architect, Sir Samuel Baker has won a high reputation among his countrymen for distinguished success in another field of effort. Having directed his attention as an outsider to the subject of the present paper, he arrived at a conclusion almost identical with that expressed by Mr. Barnaby. Sir Samuel Baker's views were set forth in a letter to Mr. E. J. Reed, and were rightly deemed so sound a contribution to the discussion, that they were published as a note to Mr. Reed's speech, in the transactions of the Institute of Naval Architects. They were to the following effect:

"Accepting, as a matter of course, that the comparatively short handy ironclad must be the fighting giant of the present and future, instead of the long ships of the Minotaur class, it appears to me that every ironclad should possess two tenders that would absolutely be inseparable attendants. These tenders should be wooden vessels, with an immense speed, fitted as rams-tonnage about 2,500.

"Each accepted ironclad of the navy would thus be accompanied by two fast handy rams, which would never leave her, but would belong to her as entirely as the horses do to the field-gun.

"These rams would, in action, wait upon the ironclads. Each ram-tender would be provided with two torpedo steam-launches-thus in smooth weather a single ironclad (carrying herself two torpedo launches), would exhibit force as follows:

a degree of wisdom and forethought far in advance of the time when it was produced. Writing in 1861, he says:

"A marked pause must occur in the progress of ordnance before a fixed or definite conclusion can be reached as to the relative immunity obtainable by iron plates. Absolute immunity is out of the question.

"That progress has already produced the effect of restricting their application, in the case of sea-going vessels, to the more vitally exposed parts; and it is quite possible that it may finally establish the conviction that such plating for such vessels is really of no marked consequence.

"In the meantime the tendency of its effects must be to impress the value of rams.

"The protection of harbours nowadays does not lie in forts; it lies essentially in powerful steam-rams, aided, when necessary, by obstructions in passage-ways.

"Rams, intended purely for harbour defence, would be better without than with guns. They themselves are to be the projectiles, and the steam the powder.

"To fit the rams for guns would be to swell the item of cost largely, and thus abridge their multiplication.

"The essential points to be secured in these rams, each to a degree as consistently with all the rest as practicable, are great strength throughout every part of the hull, not overlooking the bottom by any manner of means; every protection that supportable plating can afford, a high velocity, an ample security of machinery, the utmost rapidity in turning, and a suitable bow."

The next great action, after the close of the civil war in America, was fought at Lissa. What did the officers in command give as the result of their tragical experiences on that occasion? Their views were quoted by Captain Scott in his lecture (to which reference has already been made) delivered last year at the Royal United Service Institution. "The ram," he said, "has been aptly termed the 'naval bayonet,' and is a weapon which, if handled with skill and pluck, will prove invincible. Its special fitness for British sailors was referred to in my last lecture, and the Chief of the Naval Constructive Department of the nation which used it with such effect off Lissa says of this weapon-when speaking of the reconstruction of three vessels of the Austrian Navy at the cost of one ironclad-That we, as the result of this

cheap conversion, now possess three rams, the most dangerous and secure weapons, I consider, and compared with which, the action and effect of the aggressive torpedo is, in my opinion, doubtful and insecure, and may easily endanger the ships of its own fleet.'"

Admiral Persano's memorandum on the battle of Lissa, also quoted by Captain Scott, would seem to imply that the experiences of the engagement had made the same impression on the vanquished as upon the victors. "As encounters between iron-clads will," he said, "be decided rather by the ram than by the fire of artillery, that fleet would undoubtedly win the battle which had the greatest number of ships fitted with double screws."

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Turning to the French Navy, we find that Admiral Jurien de la Gravière predicts that "ships will fight in the future with the rams alone. The captains will not dare to open fire, lest their view of the enemy should be obscured by the smoke from their own guns. When the two fleets have passed through one another, they will turn and renew the attack. the execution of this manœuvre the slowest ships will expose their broadsides to the enemy, and will inevitably be destroyed by the ram." Armour is valuable only as a protection against the fire of artillery; and the ram and the torpedo are now regarded by the highest naval authorities abroad as their most formidable weapons.

M. Dislere, in his latest publication, expresses an opinion that the difficulties in the use of the torpedo in action are not as yet surmounted. "But this fact," he says, "only lends the greater importance to the ram, and renders it the more necessary to reduce as much as possible the dimensions and the displacements of our fighting ships."

While the efficiency of the ram was signally manifested in the action off Lissa, the destructive powers of the torpedo have been exhibited on a very recent occasion in the terrible destruction of a Turkish monitor on

the Danube. In the United States great attention has been given to torpedo warfare. All the ships of the American Navy are provided with the spar torpedo, and efforts are continually being directed to the production of an efficient automatic sub-aqueous torpedo. The chances of attack by means of unarmoured steam launches have also been considered; and on this subject the views of the majority of naval officers are contained in an article in the United States Army and Navy Journal of June 2nd, from which the following is an extract :

"The steam launch is by no means so terrible an invention as is supposed. A single discharge of grape from a ship, attacked by the Thorneycroft launch, will destroy and almost instantly sink this supposed irresistible ironclad destroyer.

"Vessels intended to carry torpedoes to be exploded against ships armed with guns are practically worthless, unless capable of resisting shot.

"But, against an assailant possessing a torpedo boat with a flush impregnable deck and movable submerged torpedo, as described in our last issue, neither grape nor rifle shot will avail; the vessel attacked, whether a little monitor or a first-class ironclad ship, will certainly be destroyed, unless the position and other circumstances admit of rapid retreat."

In the Navy estimates for the current year provision is made for commencing the construction of a vessel of the type recommended in the American journal. It cannot be doubted that such vessels would prove extremely formidable in action.

The recent encounter between H.M.S. Shah and Amethyst and the Peruvian ironclad ship Huascar is full of interest, in relation to the question of retaining armour for the protection of ships of war. The results of the combat are obviously in favour of the retention of armour. Though the Huascar was struck 100 times, only one 9-inch shot penetrated three inches into the turret, and that without doing any material damage. The engagement was fought at distances varying from 200 to 3,000 yards, and lasted three hours. As the plates of the Huascar were only 41

inches in thickness, the armour would easily have been penetrated by the Shah's 9-inch and 7-inch guns, provided that the shot had struck at right angles. The experiences of the action show how rarely this is likely to occur in practice, and how immensely the power of destruction is reduced when the armour is struck obliquely.

The lessons to be learned from the engagement between the Shah and Huascar will doubtless be appreciated by the constructors at Whitehall. They will probably adopt in the future the system of inclined armour, so ably advocated by the editors of the Engineer. In an article which appeared in that paper on the 14th April, 1876, it was shown that, if the armour were inclined upwards at an angle of 45 degrees, a thickness of 12 inches would be sufficient to resist even the 81-ton gun, whereas, with armour on the vertical system, twice the thickness would be required. It was further shown that by the reduction in the breadth of the armoured deck over the central citadel, the top-weight would be considerably reduced, and that the armour protection on the sides of the ship might be proportionately extended. By the adoption of inclined armour a larger reserve of stability may be secured, and so the objections which have been raised by Mr. Reed to the Inflexible may be removed in future designs.

In conclusion, a few suggestions may be offered as to the shipbuilding policy most suitable for a period of rapid transition in the modes of naval war and naval architecture. It is not necessary to spend a larger sum than at present, nor is it proposed that the construction of ships of the best type for ocean warfare should be discontinued. It must be admitted by every English statesman that, so long as we retain our colonial empire, we must maintain a fleet, on which we can rely to guard our communications across the seas. It does not follow that any ships destined for this service need exceed a displacement of 8000 tons,

which is less by one-third than the tonnage of the Inflexible. With a view to a reduction of dimensions, it would probably be the wiser course to aim at making our ships unsinkable rather than impenetrable, to increase the strength of the structure below the water, and to diminish the armoured protection of the guns. If the guns should be disabled, the ram could still be relied upon, provided the vitals of the ship remained intact.

The most recent experiences with the ram and the torpedo point distinctly to the importance of numbers, to the unwisdom of placing too many eggs in one basket, and to the expediency of distributing the inevitable risks of naval warfare, by sending forth fleets, not only strong in the power of the individual ships of which they are composed, but strong in regard to numbers. To this view Mr. Reed himself has given his sanction in a recent debate in Parliament, when he said that the increased efficiency of the torpedo made smaller vessels desirable. It is most unwise to spend all the money devoted to the construction of vessels for the line of battle in building ships of the Inflexible or Agamemnon type. Let us appropriate one-third or onehalf from the vote for armoured ships to vessels, let us say, not exceeding from 2,000 to 3,000 tons. With these restricted dimensions we cannot have all the qualities which it has been attempted to combine in the Inflexible, but we can have vessels formidable either with the gun, the ram, or the torpedo; and, in proportion as we add to the number of our ships by reducing the dimensions of individual vessels, so the loss to a fleet of any single ship, disabled or destroyed in action, will be less disastrous.

The administration of the navy must never be degraded into a party or personal question. We are all united in one common object—that of creating and maintaining a powerful navy. The supplies necessary for such a purpose will always be cheerfully granted. The question we have to

consider is whether the money voted for the navy is effectively applied to the great national object in view.

The development of the means of defence has not kept, and cannot keep, pace with the increasing power of offensive naval weapons. Should it not therefore be the policy of our naval administration to expend a larger proportion of the ample resources at their disposal in so multiplying their means of attack, that no hostile fleet will venture to expose itself to inevitable destruction by engaging a British squadron ?

At the present moment the controversy as to the stability of the Inflexible has aroused a painful feeling of anxiety. The Government have been well advised in appointing a committee of inquiry, composed of men eminent for their scientific attainments, and holding independent professional positions. Neither Parliament nor the country would have been satisfied with an expression of confidence, emanating from Whitehall, and unsupported by other professional testimony. The controversy which has been raised is unprecedented in its character. A difference of opinion has been expressed between two authorities of exactly equal rank. The one has been, and other is, the Chief Constructor of the Navy. They differ on a question of fact, which can only be exhaustively investigated and decided by men of competent scientific attainments. It was merely throwing dust in the eyes of members of Parliament unskilled in the science of naval architecture to invite them to inspect a model, which might or might not be an exact model, and to observe the behaviour of that model in a trough, under conditions, which might or might not represent the conditions to which the ship would be exposed in action, or in navigating the