then, the term remains in the executor, who can dis- An infant may be appointed executor, but if sole executor, by the 38 Geo. III., c. 87, s. 6, he is altogether disqualified from executing his office during his minority, and administration, with the will annexed, is usually granted to the guardian of such infant, or to such other person as the Court shall think fit, until such infant attains twenty-one (j). A married woman may be appointed executrix, but her husband has a joint-interest with her in the effects of the testator. She can, therefore, do no act as executrix or administratrix without her husband's consent. The husband is enabled by law to assume the whole administration, and to act in it to all purposes without her consent (k). 12. TRUSTEES OF BANKRUPTS. Leases could formerly be made by assignees of Trustees of bankrupts, and may now be made by the trustees bankrupts. under the new Act (7). 13. PERSONS UNDER DISABILITY. A lease executed by a person of unsound mind, in Lunatics and the ordinary course of affairs, is binding on him and idiots. (i) Paramour v. Yardley, Plowd. 539; Young v. Holmes, 1 Stra. 70; Doe d. Lord Say and Sele v. Guy, 3 East. 120, 4 Esp. 154; Johnson v. Warwick, 17 C. B. 516; Fenton v. Clegg, 9 Exch. 680; Doe d. Sturgess v. Tatchell, 3 B. & Ad. 675; Doe d. Maberley v. Maberley, 6 C. & P. 126; 2 Wms. on Exors. 1275, 6th edition, (j) 1 Wms. on Exors. 222, 6th edition; Finch's case, 6 Co. Rep. 63; Prince's case, 5 Co. Rep. 29; Cro. Eliz. 718. (k) See post, Married Women, p. 26; Arnold v. Bidgwood, Cro. Jac. 318; Thrustout d. Levick v. Coppin, 2 Wm. Blac. 801. (7) See the 32 & 33 Vict. c. 71, s. 14, pl. 4, post, Part 4, c. 2, s. 4. 23 Persons in a state of intoxication. those who represent him, unless it can be shown that the lessee had notice of the lessor's state of mind. If it can be proved that the lessee knew, or ought to have known, of the lessor's incapacity, and took advantage of it, a lease executed under such circumstances is void (m). By the 16 & 17 Vict., c. 70, s. 129, the committee of a lunatic may make building and other leases; by sects. 130 and 131, he may make mining leases; by sect. 133, he may execute leasing powers of a lunatic having a limited estate; by sect. 134, he may renew leases (n). And by the 15 & 16 Vict., c. 48, committees of lunatics can direct repairs and improvements upon the land of lunatics, or make allowances to tenants executing the same. By the 36 sect. of the 19 & 20 Vict., c. 120, all powers (0) given by that Act, and all applications to the Court of Chancery, and consents to such applications, may be given by the committees on behalf of lunatics; but in case of a lunatic tenant in tail, no application to the Court, or consent to such application, is to be made or given by committees without the special direction of the Court. A lease made by a person when deprived of his reason by drink is void, if the lessee had notice of the lessor's incapacity (p). (m) Molton v. Camrour, 2 Ex. 487, in error, 4 Ex. 17; Elliot v. Ince, 7 De G. M. & G. 475, 487, 26 L. J. Ch. 821; Beavan v. M'Donnell, 10 Ex. 184, 23 L. J. Ex. 327. (n) As to disposing of undesirable leases, see sect. 127. (0) See ante, Tenants for Life p. 5. (p) Gore v. Gibson, 13 M. & W. 623. See Per Alderson, B., in Molton v. Camrour, 2 Ex. 491; Pitt v. Smith, 3 Camp. 33. duress. A lease made by a person under duress is voidable Persons under at the election of the party intimidated. Duress is defined to be where one is manifestly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty contrary to law, until he executes a deed or bond to another (q). outlawed. Real estate was not forfeited on conviction for trea- Persons atson or felony without attainder; and persons attainted tainted or of treason or felony might, before office found, lease their lands, except as against the Crown, or the lord of whom the land is held (r). And now, by the 33 & 34 Vict., c. 23, forfeitures for treason or felony are abolished, except forfeiture consequent upon outlawry. A convict (s), against whom judgment of death or penal servitude has been pronounced or recorded upon any charge of treason or felony, is, while subject to the Act, incapable of alienating or charging any property, or making any contract, except as thereinafter provided (t). By sects. 9 to 12, an administrator under the Act has absolute power to let, mortgage, &c., any part of the property of the convict which he shall think fit. By sect. 18, the property reverts to the convict, except so far as is necessary for the care of the property, upon completion of his sentence or pardon, or to his representatives upon his death. By 22 & 23 Vict., c. 21, s. 25, "When a right of entry upon lands or other hereditaments shall have accrued to Her Majesty or her successors, such right (q) Knight and Norton's case, 3 Leon. 239, 2 Inst. 482; Cumming v. Ince, 11 Q. B. 112. (r) Doe d. Evans v. Evans, 5 B. & C. 584; Doe d. Griffith v. Prit- (8) See sect. 6. (t) Sect. 8. See sect. 30, where the convict is lawfully at large. Married women. may be exercised or enforced without any inquisition being taken or office being found, or any actual reentry being made on the premises." It would seem that "such right must be exercised or enforced" before an attainted felon would become incapable of leasing his lands. A lease or assignment of the personal estate of a felon before a conviction, if bona fide and for good consideration, is valid even as against the Crown (u). A lease by a feme covert is void at common law, and no subsequent act of confirmation, after the removal of the disability, can render such a lease valid (v). For by marriage the free agency of the wife is suspended, and the husband acquires an immediate right to the rents and profits of her freehold estates (w). Without his consenting to and joining in the disposal of her lands, all conveyances by her are void at common law, and over her chattel interests (not being choses in action) the husband has the sole dominion during his life (x). By the Act for the abolition of fines and recoveries (y), married women, being tenants in fee, in tail, or for life, or for years, may make leases by deed for any term consistent with their estates, provided the husband concurs in the deed, and the wife acknowledges it before a judge, or before two perpetual commissioners, as directed by the Act (≈), or before a county court judge (a). (u) Morewood v. Wilks, 6 C. & V. A married woman, who has property settled to her separate use without any restraint on alienation, is deemed in equity to be a feme sole, and she may dispose of it accordingly (6). And property acquired by a married woman under the "Married Women's Property Act, 1870" (c), is deemed to be property held and settled to her separate use. A lease made by an infant (d) or person under the Infants. age of twenty-one years (e) is voidable (f). On his attaining full age, he, or his heir upon his death, can elect to ratify or avoid such a lease (9). To avoid a lease made by an infant, under which the lessee is in possession, some act of notoriety is necessary on the part of the infant upon attaining twenty-one; for instance, ejectment, entry, or demand of possession. The mere execution of a new lease to another lessee is not sufficient to divest the estate created by the first lease (h). The chief point to be attended to in considering what amounts to a confirmation is, whether the lease was for the benefit of the infant (i). Thus where a lease made by an infant manifestly imports a benefit to himself, he cannot upon attaining full age avoid the lease on the ground of infancy if he still retains the benefit, and, within a reasonable time after he comes of age, does not dis 4 Cruise, 74, s. 67; per Best, J., (g) Baylis v. Dineley, 3 M. & (h) Slater v. Trimble, 14 Ir. Com. L. R. 342 Q. B.; Slater v. Brady, ib. 66. (i) Zouch d. Abbot v. Parsons, 3 Burr. 1798; Ex parte Grace, 1 B. & P. 377. |