c. ccxiii. s. 164. 57 & 58 Vict. prohibiting navigation on their canal on Sundays, The Calder and Hebble Navigation Co. v. Pilling, 3 Railw. Ca. 735; 14 M. & W. 76; 14 L. J. Ex. 223; 9 Jur. 377. See also Brown v. Holyhead Local Board, 1 H. & C. 601; 32 L. J. Ex. 25; 7 L. T. (N.S.) 332; 27 J. P. 184; and Waite v. Garston Board of Health, L. R. 3 Q. B. 5; 37 L. J. M. C. 19; 17 L. T. (N.S.) 201; 16 W. R. 78. It is essential to the validity of a byelaw that it should be reasonable and just, Elwood v. Bullock, 13 L. J. Q. B. 330; 6 Q. B. 383; 8 Jur. 1044; Fielding v. Rhyl Improvement Commissioners and Heap v. Burnley Union, 12 Q. B. D. 617; 53 L. J. M. C. 76; 32 W. R. 728; 48 J. P. 359; but in considering whether or no a byelaw is reasonable, a Court will not lightly supersede the judgment of the local authority by whom it was framed, nor will it be rejected because it does not contain qualifications which commend themselves to the mind of the Court; and the fact, therefore, that a byelaw operates to take away private property without compensation is not, if the statute under which it was made shows an intention to override private rights, a sufficient ground for holding it to be ultra vires. Slattery v. Naylor, 13 App. Ca. 446; 57 L. J. P. C. 73; 59 L. T. (N.S.) 41; 36 W. R. 897, and see the remarks of North, J., in Hendon Local Board v. Pounce, ante, p. 52. A byelaw may be divisible, invalid because unreasonable as to part, but valid as to the rest if the parts are entire and distinct from one another: see Reg. v. Lundic, 31 L. J. M. C. 157; 5 L. T. (N.S.) 830; 10 W. R. 267 ; 8 Jur. (N.S.) 640, Rex v. Faversham, 8 T. R. 352. A byelaw which has been made ultra vires, or is otherwise invalid, does not become valid by being approved by the authority whose confirmation is essential to the validity of byelaws; see Reg. v. Wood, and the cases referred to sup. Expressions used in the byelaws are to have the same meanings as they have respectively in the Act; see the Interpretation Act (52 & 53 Vict. cap. 63), sect. 31. In addition to the power to make byelaws as to the foundations of buildings, provisions are contained in sect. 76 of 18 & 19 Vict. cap. 120, Appendix I., post, regulating the level at which they are to be laid for the purpose of drainage, and requiring seven days' notice to be given to the local authority before they are begun to be laid or dug. See also the powers to make byelaws contained in sect. 202 of 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, and in sect. 83 of 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102, in Appendix I., post. Amendment, &c., of byelaws.-The power to make byelaws is to be construed as including a power exercisable in the like manner, and subject to the like consent and conditions to rescind, revoke, amend, or vary the byelaws; see the Interpretation Act (52 & 53 Vict. cap. 63), sect. 32 (3). 'Local authority.'-This is defined by sect. 5 (42), ante, P. 39. Summary proceedings.'-See sect. 166 and the note thereto, post; and see the Instructional Letters of November 23, 1880, July 6 and December 15, 1894, in Appendix IV., post. Byelaws under repealed Acts.-Byelaws made under the Acts repealed by this Act are, so far as applicable for the purposes of the Act, to remain in force until varied or altered by byelaws duly made under the provisions of the Act; see sect. 216, post. The bye-laws of the Metropolitan Board of Works of December 1889 will be found in the Appendix, post. These byelaws, besides dealing with matters of procedure, provide for the regulation of the formation of new streets, the foundations and sites of buildings, the description and quality of the substance of walls, the duties of district surveyors, the fees to be paid to district surveyors, the deposit of plans and sections, the penalties for the breach of the provisions of the byelaws, and the dispensation with the observance of the provisions of the byelaws. 'Regulations. The Council has made regulations concerning applications for its sanction and consent, the matters to be observed in making plans and sections where such are required to be delivered, as well as requiring plans, sections, and elevations to be delivered in certain cases, the naming and numbering of streets, and the information to be afforded the Council by applicants for its permission to erect buildings on low-lying land. See the Regulations of January 1, 1895, in Appendix III., Part II., post. Regulations by the Building Acts Committee, dated January 1, 1895, containing directions to the officers of the Council, will also be found in Appendix III., Part II., post. 'Standing Orders.' The Standing Orders of the Council, dated January 1, 1895, relative to matters under the Act, will be found in Appendix III., Part I., post. These orders deal with-conditional sanctions by the Council-requirements by the Council with regard to applications to it in respect of the formation and widening of streets, and in respect of building in advance of the general line of buildings-matters as to the naming and numbering of streets-applications as to projections temporary buildings-the requirements of the Council in respect of hoardings on vacant lands-the procedure to be adopted in the case of dangerous and neglected structuresthe requirements of the Council as to buildings to be erected on low-lying lands-and the appointment of district surveyors and the amount of their fees. 'County Hall.'-By County Hall are meant the offices of the Council in Spring Gardens, S.W. See the Regulations of January 1, 1895, in Appendix III., Part II., post. 57 & 58 Vict. c. ccxiii. s. 165. 165. No byelaw in respect of any matter from which Saving for the City is exempted by this Act or by any Act hereby the City of repealed shall have any force or effect within the City. London. 57 & 58 Vict. c. ccxiii. s. 166. Summary for offences &c. and PART XV. LEGAL PROCEEDINGS. 166. All offences penalties costs and expenses under proceedings this Act or any byelaw made under this Act directed to be prosecuted or recovered in a summary manner or the prosecution or recovery of which is not otherwise provided for may be prosecuted and recovered in manner directed by the Summary Jurisdiction Acts. recovery of penalties. Summary Jurisdiction Acts.'-These Acts are the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. cap. 43), and the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. cap. 40), and any Act past or future amending those Acts or either of them; see the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, sect. 50, and the Interpretation Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. cap. 63), sect. 13. See also with regard to the application of the Summary Jurisdiction Acts to proceedings under this section, sect. 51 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879. 'Summary proceedings. The manner in which proceedings are commenced in a Court of Summary Jurisdiction is by the laying of an information before a justice of the peace in cases where the person proceeded against is alleged to have committed an offence or act for which he is liable by law upon summary conviction to be imprisoned or fined or otherwise punished, and by making a complaint to a justice of the peace in cases where a person is alleged to be liable by law to have made on him by justices an order to pay money or to do some act which he has refused or neglected to do; see the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. cap. 43), sect. 1. Sect. 8 of that Act provides that a complaint need not be in writing, and as the Summary Jurisdiction Acts contain no such provision with regard to informations, it is considered that an information must be in writing. Neither information nor complaint need be laid or made upon oath, but a justice cannot issue a warrant to apprehend an offender except upon information substantiated by the oath of the informant or some witness or witnesses on his behalf. An information or a complaint must be made in respect of one offence or one matter of complaint only, ib. sect. 2. An information having been laid or complaint made before a justice of the peace, he issues a summons directed to the alleged offender, stating shortly the matter of such information or complaint, and requiring him to appear at a certain time or place to answer to the information or complaint, ib. sect. 1. The summons is served by a constable or other peace officer, or 'other person to whom the same shall be delivered,' upon the person to whom it is directed by delivering the same to the party personally, or by leaving the same with some person for him at his last or most usual place of abode. In the case of Reg. v. Mead 57 & 58 Vict. (1894), 2 Q. B. 124; 70 L. T. (N.S.) 766, the Queen's Bench c. ccxiii. Division held that a summons to answer a complaint made by s. 166. a sanitary authority under the Public Health (London) Act, 1891, was a 'notice, order, or other document required or authorised to be served' under that Act, and might therefore be addressed to the 'owner' of the premises without naming any person. But the Public Health (London) Act, 1891, sect. 138, provides that any notice, order, or other document required or authorised to be served' under this Act, may be served in the manner therein directed, whereas sect. 188, post, of the present Act provides only for the service of notices, orders, or other documents, 'the service of which is not provided for by the Summary Jurisdiction Acts, the Lands Clauses Acts, or the Companies' Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845. A summons to appear before a Court of Summary Jurisdiction is therefore to be served in the manner provided for by the Summary Jurisdiction Acts. A summons may be served on a company incorporated under the Companies Acts by leaving the same, or sending it through the post in a prepaid letter addressed to the company at their registered office (Companies Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict. cap. 89, sect. 62), and any document to be served by post on a company must be posted in such time as to admit of its being delivered in the due course of delivery within the period (if any) prescribed for the service thereof; and in proving service of such document it is sufficient to prove that the document was properly directed, and that it was put as a prepaid letter into the post-office, ib. sect. 63. Service on a company not incorporated under the Companies Acts is provided for by the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, sect. 135; see note to sect. 188, post, p. 274. There may be some difficulty in dealing with companies whose registered office is in Scotland. A summons under the Summary Jurisdiction Acts, if not served personally on a defendant, is served by leaving it with some person for him at his last or most usual place of abode. As a corporation cannot 'dwell' personally anywhere, it must be taken to 'dwell' at the place where it carries on its business. See Brown v. London and North Western Railway Company, 4 B. & S. 326. And it has been held that a company 'dwells' at the place at which it carries on business, and not only at its registered office, Keynham Blue Lias Company v. Barker, 2 H. & C. 729, and at the place where the substantial business of the company is transacted, which place may or may not be its registered office; Aberystwith Promenade Pier Company v. Cooper, 12 Jur. (N.S.) 995. On the other hand, it has been held that a company having branch offices in England, but whose registered office is in Scotland, is not ordinarily resident' within the jurisdiction of the English Courts. See c. ccxiii. s. 166. 57 & 58 Vict. Jones v. the Scottish Accident Insurance Company, 17 Q. B. D. 421; 55 L. J. Q. B. 415; 55 L. T. (N.S.) 218; Watkins v. the Scottish Imperial Assurance Company, 23 Q. B. D. 285; 58 L. J. Q. B. 495; 60 L. T. (N.S.) 639; 37 W. R. 670; Wood v. Anderston Foundry Company, 36 W. R. 918. Service in Scotland of process issued by a Court of Summary Jurisdiction in England is provided for by the Summary Jurisdiction (Process) Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. cap. 24). It is, however, expressly provided by sect. 5 (4) of that Act that the Act is not to apply to process requiring the appearance of a person to answer a complaint if issued by an English Court of Summary Jurisdiction for the recovery of a sum of money which is a civil debt within the meaning of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879. Limitation of time for summary proceedings.-No time being prescribed by the Act, except in the cases provided for by sect. 193, post, within which proceedings instituted under it must be commenced, the limitation imposed by sect. II of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. cap. 43), which Act is commonly known as Jervis's Act, applies to summary proceedings instituted under this Act; see the London County Council v. Cross, 61 L. J. M. C. 160; 66 L. T. (N.s.) 731; Morant v. Taylor, 1 Ex. D. 188; 45 L. J. M. C. 73. By sect. 11 of the Act of 1848 it is enacted 'that in all cases where no time is already or shall hereafter be specially limited for making any such complaint or laying any such information' (ie. any complaint upon which a justice or justices of the peace is or are or shall be authorised by law to make an order, and every information for any offence or act punishable upon summary conviction, ib. sect. 10) 'in the Act or Acts of Parliament relating to each particular case, such complaint shall be made and such information shall be laid within six calendar months from the time when the matter of such complaint or information respectively arose.' Unless, then, the present Act in imposing a penalty for the doing of a thing or the commission of an act makes the retention of the thing or the continuance of the act in respect of which the penalty is imposed a continuing offence, summary proceedings in respect of such thing or act will be barred after the expiration of six months from its being done or committed; see Coggins v. Bennett, 2 C. P. D. 568. The exact time when the matter of a complaint or information arose is in some cases a question of difficulty. In the case of The London County Council v. Cross, ubi supra, the Court of Appeal held, reversing the decision of the Queen's Bench Division, when complaint was made that a defendant had erected a building beyond the general line of buildings without the consent of the Council, that the matter of the complaint arose as soon as the defendant had begun to erect his buildings beyond the general line of buildings, and that therefore the six months limited by Jervis's Act began to run as soon as the building was so far erected as to show that it would, |