PART IV. record. As to the word 'scamps' the plaintiffs themselves have given the meaning to it; for they allege in their CHAPTER VI. declaration that it is intended to be applied to them in the way of their aforesaid trade, business, and occupation,' that is, as vendors of the pills, the making and selling of which by the plaintiffs is the main imputation against them. And the word 'rascals' is associated with an epithet or adjunct which appears to confine its general abusive quality to a description and designation of the persons who have been occupied in administering the pills spoken of in the libel, of whom two have been convicted of manslaughter. We cannot, therefore, understand these words, however offensive, as containing any charge different and distinct from that of which the truth has been justified in the first plea; and we are not aware of any authority by which it is determined that the justification of the truth of the substantial imputation contained in a libel is not sufficient, unless it extends also to every epithet or term of general abuse which may be found in the description or statement of such imputation." In an action against the proprietor of the Times for publishing the following libel on the plaintiff, a dissenting minister:-"A serious misunderstanding has recently taken place amongst the Independent dissenters of Great Marlow and their pastor, in consequence of some personal invectives publicly thrown from the pulpit by the latter against a young lady of distinguished merit and spotless reputation. We understand that the matter is to be taken up seriously.Bucks. Chronicle," the defendant pleaded, as a justification, that the plaintiff, whilst officiating as minister, published from a part of a chapel assigned to him as minister for the delivery of a sermon, to and in the presence of his congregation, of and concerning Margaret Fair, a teacher of a certain Sunday school, the scandalous words following:"I have something to say which I have thought of saying for some time, namely, the improper conduct of one of the female teachers. Her name is Miss Fair; her conduct is a bad example and disgrace to the school, and if any of the children dare ask her to go home, she shall be turned out of the school, and never enter it again. Miss Fair does more harm than good;" and thereby gave great offence to divers of the dissenters, to wit, one I. W., &c., and occasioned a serious misunderstanding amongst the said dissenters in the declaration mentioned. Å verdict having been returned for the defendant upon this plea, the court, upon motion to enter a verdict for the plaintiff non obstante veredicto, held that the plea was a sufficient answer to the PART IV. CHAPTER VI. Slight inaccuracy libel charged. (a) It was urged on behalf of the plaintiff that the allegation that "the matter was about to be taken up seriously," implied that charges were about to be preferred against him by his congregation, and that the justification contained no answer to that part of the libel; but, said Gifford, C.J., "I do not see that the allegation necessarily conveys any such meaning; it is only alleged as that which naturally followed upon the plaintiff's conduct on the occasion in question; and the charge on the subject of his conduct is substantially met and answered in the justification." It was further objected that the libel alleged a misunderstanding to have arisen between the pastor and his congregation, while the justification alleged the misunderstanding to have existed only amongst the congregation; but the court were of opinion that in that respect the plea substantially supported the statements contained in the libel. "In such a case," said Burrough, J., "it is sufficient if the substance of the libellous statement be justified; it is unnecessary to repeat every word which might have been the subject of the original comment. As much must be justified as meets the sting of the charge, and if anything be contained in a charge which does not add to the sting of it, that need not be justified."(b) A slight inaccuracy will not necessarily make a publication libellous, which can be proved substantially true. Thus, where the libel complained of was a notice published by a railway company to the effect that the plaintiff had been convicted of riding in a train for which his ticket was not available, and fined a certain sum, with the alternative of three weeks' imprisonment in case of non-payment, whereas the period of imprisonment was a fortnight only, it was held that this inaccuracy did not necessarily make the notice libellous; it was a question for the jury whether the statement contained in it was not substantially true, or whether the inaccurate statement would have a different effect upon the public from that which the literal truth would produce.(c) Where a libel charged the plaintiff with having been a "great defaulter" in his office of guardian of the poor during the preceding year, and evidence tending to show that he had been a defaulter was given under a plea of justification, it was held to be a question for the jury whether the facts (a) Edwards v. Bell (1 Bing. 403). (b) Ib., 409. (c) Alexander v. North-Eastern Railway Company (34 L. J. 152, Q. B. ; 6 B. & S. 240). proved amounted to a sufficient justification of the charge of having been a "great" defaulter. (a) PART IV CHAPTER VI. Imputations of offences. In the following cases, where an action of slander has been held to lie, without proof of special damage, against the criminal utterer of the slanderous words, an action of libel would, à fortiori, lie, if the words were written or printed and published:-Saying that the plaintiff had done an act for which the defendant could transport him :(b) saying, "If you had your deserts, you had been hanged before now:"(c) saying that the plaintiff had murdered his first wife by administering improper medicines to her for a certain complaint:(d) using the words, "I am thoroughly convinced that you (the plaintiff) are guilty (innuendo of the death of D.), and rather than you should go without a hangman, I will hang you :"(e) saying that the plaintiff was "a returned convict:"(ƒ) that he had been "in gaol and tried for his life, and would have been hanged had it not been for L., for breaking open the granary of farmer A., and stealing his bacon:"(g) that he had been "in gaol and burnt in the hand for coining;" (h) though in none of the three last mentioned cases was there any imputation of present or future liability to punishment: imputing bigamy to the plaintiff's wife:() saying either that the plaintiff or his wife kept a bawdy house:(j)_saying any of the following things: "You robbed me, for I found the thing you have done it with ;"(k) "He (the plaintiff) is a thief, and robbed me of my bricks;"() "He robbed J. W.;" (m) "You are a rogue, and broke open a house at Oxford;"(n) "You are a rogue, and I will prove you a rogue, for you forged my name:(0) charging the plaintiff with having committed embezzlement, (p) or receiving goods, knowing them (a) Warman v. Hine (1 Jur. 820). (b) Curtis v. Curtis (10 Bing. 477). (c) Cro. Eliz. 62. (d) Ford v. Primrose (5 D. & R. 287). (e) Peake v. Oldham (Cowp. 275; 2 W. Bl. 960). See also Button v. Hayward (8 Mod. 24).` (f) Fowler v. Dowdney (2 M. & Rob. 119). (g) Carpenter v. Tarrant (Rep. Temp. Hardwicke, 339). (h) Gainford v. Tuke (Cro. Jac. 536). (i) Heming v. Power (10 M. & W. 564). See Delany v. Jones (4 Esp. 191). (j) Cro. Eliz. 643; 1 Roll. Ab. 44; 1 Buls. 138; Huckle v. Reynolds (7 C. B. N. S. 114). Cf. Brayne v. Cooper (5 M. & W. 249). (k) Rowcliffe v. Edmonds (7 M. & W. 12; 4 Jur. 684). Slowman v. Dutton (10 Bing, 402). See also Baker v. Pierce (Ld. Raym, 959; Holt, 654; 6 Mod. 23); Cro. Jac. 687. (m) Tomlinson v. Brittlebank (4 B. & Áld. 630; 1 N. & M. 455). (n) Somers v. House (Holt's Rep. 39). (0) Jones v. Herne (2 Wils. 87). (p) See Williams v. Stott (3 Tyr. 688; 1 C. & M. 675). PART IV. CHAPTER VL Imputation to be stolen :(a) calling him a "pickpocket:"(b) saying that the plaintiff was perjured, (c) or accusing him of subornation of perjury:() saying of the plaintiff, who was one of four Commissioners appointed by the Court of Chancery to examine witnesses and hear and determine a suit, "Sir G. M. (the plaintiff) is a corrupt man, and hath taken bribes of R. K." (one of the parties to the suit); "R. K. hath set Sir G. M. on horseback, with his bribes to pervert justice and equity," (e) bribery having been an offence at common law punishable by indictment or information: saying at a Parliamentary election of the plaintiff, who was one of the candidates, "These guineas are Mr. B.'s (the plaintiff's) money, and were given me to vote for him he has bought my vote, and he shall have it.”(ƒ) : To accuse a person of having committed fornication was also held to be actionable whilst the statute making it a temporal offence was in force; (g) and so it seems was saying, "Thou art a witch and a sorcerer," whilst the statutes against witchcraft remained in force. (h) The law is the same if the imputation be made, not directly, made indirectly. but by means of words of suspicion as (with reference to a crime of arson), "I cannot imagine who should do it but S." (i) or, "I do not doubt but within two days to arrest H. for suspicion of felony; (j) or, "I will call him in question for poisoning my aunt, and I make no doubt to prove it ;"(k) or by repeating a story heard from another as "A woman told me that she heard some one say that M., his wife, had poisoned G., her first husband, &c.;"(l) and though it should be only in alternative words as that "either the plaintiff or somebody else" committed the offence ;(m) or that "A. or B. did it."(n) (a) Alfred v. Farlow (8 Q. B. 854; 15 L. J. 260, Q. B). See Brigg's case (God. 157). (b) Stebbing v. Warner (11 Mod. 255, overruling 3 Salk. 326). Car. 509); Roberts v. Camden (9 East. 93). (e) Moor v. Foster (Cro. Jac. 65). (f) Bendish v. Lindsay (11 Mod. 194). See Purdy v. Stacey (Burr. 2699). (9) Anon. 2 Sid. 21. (h) Rogers v. Gravat (Cro. Eliz. 571). () Mo. 142; 1 Vin. Abr. 435. See also Smith v. Wisdome (Cro. Eliz. 348). Poph. 210; 3 Bulst. 262). (j) Hext v. Yeomans (4 Rep. 15; (m) Harrison v. Thornborough (10 Mod. 196). PART IV. Words imputing an attempt to commit a fel my, as "He sought to murder me, and I can prove it ;"() or a hiring CHAPTER VL or solicitation of another to commit a crime have also been held actionable. (b). The charge of a crime in the vulgar language is sufficient to ground an action. It is not necessary that the words should impute the crime in the technical terms known to the law; all that is requisite being that the intention to charge the plaintiff with its commission should plainly appear.(c) Whether defamatory words are uttered or printed, the ordinary sense of them is to be taken to be the meaning of the person who uses them. However, if anything can be shown to have taken place which may give a peculiar character to the expressions used, evidence of it may be given. (d) ور Where the slanderous words complained of—“ Thou art a thievish rogue, for thou hast stolen my faggots -were spoken by the defendant's wife, who, as a married woman, could not have possessed the property in the faggots, the court held the words to be actionable, understanding them, according to common intendment, to mean a charge of having stolen her husband's faggots.(e) contagious On the same footing as an imputation of an indictable Infectious or offence stands the imputation of being, at the time the impu- disease. tation is made, afflicted with an infectious or contagious disease which would cause the person who had it to be shunned by society, such as leprosy or the lues venerea.(f) Words spoken which would not otherwise be action- Libels affecting able, become so when they are, without justification, spoken fession, trade (a) Cro. Eliz. 308; Lewknor v. Cruchley (Cro. Car. 140). (b) Tibbott v. Haynes (Cro. Eliz. 191; 4 Coke, 16; Cro. Eliz. 747); Lady Cockaine's case (Cro. Eliz. 49; Cro. Eliz. 710). (c) See Coleman v. Goodwin (2 B. & Cr. 285, note) and Francis v. Roose (3 M. & W. 191). See also Hankinson v. Bilby (16 M. & W. 442), Woolnoth v. Meadows (5 East. 463). Cf Sweetapple v. Jesse (5 B. & Ald. 31). See also Hob. 126; Cro. Eliz. 250, 496; 1 Roll. Abr. 74; and 4 Rep. 13. (d) See per Pollock, C.B., Daines v. Hartley (3 Exch. 200; 18 L. J. 81, Ex.); and cf. Hankinson v. Bilby (ubi suprà), Tempest v. Chambers (1 Stark. 68), Tomlinson v. Brittlebank (4 B. & Ad. 630), Harvey v. French (1 C. & M. 17), Thompson v. Bernard (1 Camp. 48), Christie v. Powell (Peake's Cas. 4), 4 Rep. 13. (e) Stamp v. White (Cro. Jac. 600). See also Charnel's case (Cro. Eliz. 279). The doctrine as to repugnancy laid down in 7 Bac. Abr. 296, 1 Roll. Abr. 74, cannot now be considered law (see sect. 61 of the C. L. P. A. 1852). (ƒ) 7 Bac. Abr. 266; Holt. 653; Cro. Eliz. 214, 289, 648; Cro. Jac. 144, 430; 1 Vin. Abr. 488. Carslake v. Mapledorum (2 T. R. 473; Str. 1189; Bloodworth v. Gray (7 M. & G. 334) D D office, pro or calling. |