188. QUIETING TITLE · Recovery of Realty. — In an equitable action by a devisee to quiet title and obtain possession of real property, it was sought to recover the rental value of the land which had accrued previous to the revivor of the action in the name of such devisee. Whether or not the devisee under any cir cumstances would be entitled to such recovery of rent is not determined, because neither put in issue by the pleadings nor argued by counsel. THOMPSON V. THOMPSON, Neb., 73 N. W. Rep. 943.

189. QUO WARRANTO Judgment of Ouster. In quo warranto against a foreign insurance corporation for transacting business in the State without authority from the superintendent of insurance, defendant, hav. ing obtained leave, withdrew its original answer, and filed a supplemental answer, alleging that it had withdrawn from the State, and brought into court the costs of the action: Held, the proper order was, not dismis sal, but judgment for plaintiff, ousting defendant from the exercise of its corporate powers in the State until duly authorized by the superintendent of insurance.STATE V. MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK, Kan., 51 Pac. Rep. 881.

190. RAILROAD COMPANY-Contributory Negligence.Whether or not attempting to cross a railroad track on foot in front of an approaching train when the gates are down is negligence, is a question of fact, which the court cannot be required, by instructions, to take from the jury.-CHICAGO & W. I. R. Co. v. PTACEK, Ill., 49 N. E. Rep. 191.

191. RAILROAD COMPANY-Contributory Negligence.Act April 8, 1891, making a railroad liable for all damages resulting from nɩglect to keep a constant lookout on its trains for persons or property on the track, does not preclude the defense of contributory negligence.LITTLE ROCK & FT. S. RY. Co. v. SMITH, Ark., 43 S. W. Rep. 969.

192. RAILROAD COMPANY-Frightening Horses.-A rail. road company is liable for frightening horses by need. lessly blowing the locomotive whistle in the street of a populous city.-WEIL V. ST. LOUIS S. W. RY. Co., Ark., 43 S. W. Rep. 967.

193. RAILROAD COMPANY Liability to Employees Negligence. It is the duty of a railroad company, in order to protect their employees from injuries, to inspect the cars of other companies, used upon its road, as it would inspect its own cars; and if such cars are sealed, and if the exercise of ordinary care requires it, It is its duty to break the seals, remove the freight, and inspect the inside of the cars. — MISSOURI, K. & T. RY. CO. OF TEXAS V. CHAMBERS, Tex., 43 S. W. Rep. 1090.

Negligence

-

195. RAILROAD COMPANY Injuries. Plaintiff, while unloading a car, was struck by the car door, which was pushed shut by coming in contact with a scantling sticking out of a pile of lumber on the right of way. The lumber belonged to a lessee of the railroad company, who was joined with the company as a defendant, and who had an agreement with the company to pile no lumber nearer than 10 feet to the track: Held, that it was error to instruct that if the plaintiff's injuries resulted from the negligence of the railroad company or its employees, or the negligence of the lessee, or the negligence of both, the jury should find against the railroad company. HOUSTON & T. C. R. CO. V. KIMBELL, Tex., 43 S. W. Rep. 1049.

personal injuries said to have been caused by such violation, and the fact may be considered as evidence tending to establish negligence of the defendant.SMITHSON V. CHICAGO, ETC. RY. Co., Minn., 78 N. W. Rep. 853.

197. RAILROAD COMPANY-Power to Mortgage Income. -Authority to mortgage "a part or the whole of its entire property and franchise" does not empower a railroad company to mortgage its "income, rents, and profits."-GEORGIA, ETC. RY. Co. v. BARTON, Ga., 28 S. E. Rep. 842.

198. RAILROAD COMPANY-Receiverships-Damages.The owner of an animal killed by a train while the road was in a receiver's bands sued the railroad com. pany without joining the receiver as a defendant, but process was served only upon the receiver through an agent. The receiver's claim agent appeared and de fended the suit, which resulted in a judgment against the company: Held, that the judgment was valid, so as to bind the property in the receiver's hands.-STATE V. PORT ROYAL & A. RY. Co., U. 8. C. C., D. (S. Car.), 84 Fed. Rep. 67.

199. RAILROAD COMPANY - Receiverships-Preferred Claims.-Mileage due under a contract for the use of Pullman palace cars is not distinguishable from car rentals, and cannot be made a preferred claim on the appointment of a receiver for the railroad company.PULLMAN'S PALACE-CAR CO. V. AMERICAN LOAN & TRUST Co., U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 84 Fed. Rep. 18.

200. RAILROAD COMPANY-Street Railways-Contribu tory Negligence.-It is not negligence, as a matter of law, for one approaching a crossing of a street rail· way, in the business part of a city, to go on, though seeing an approaching car, where it is 250 feet away, and he, in order to cross the tracks, has to go not more than a tenth of that distance.-CALLAHAN V. PHILADEL PHIA TRACTION Co., Penn., 39 Atl. Rep. 222.

201. RAILROAD COMPANY Street Railway-Injury to Child. Where a child suddenly and unexpectedly ap pears near a street car track some distance from a crossing, under such circumstances that the driver of a car cannot discover its presence in time to avert the accident, the company is not liable for its injury.KIERZENKOWSKI V. PHILADELPHIA TRACTION CO., Penn., 39 Atl. Rep. 220.

202. REALTY-What Constitutes Petroleum.-Petroleum oil, as it is found in the cavities of the rock, is part of the realty, and embraced in the comprehen sive idea which the law attaches to the word "land." -WILSON V. YOUST, W. Va., 28 S. E. Rep. 781.

203. REAL ESTATE BROKER-Commissions.-Plaintiff, a real estate broker, was employed by the assignee of an insolvent estate to effect the sale of certain land be longing to it, at a certain sum, for the usual commis. sion. The assignee did not exempt himself, by the contract from personal liability. Plaintiff procured & purchaser at the price for which it was offered. Be fore the sale could be consummated, a preliminary in junction, enjoining the assignee from making the sale at that price, issued. Pending the action, defendant resigned as such assignee, and R was appointed in his place. While the preliminary injunction was still in force the purchaser withdrew his offer for the prop erty. At the hearing the preliminary injunction was dissolved, and the bill dismissed: Held, that defend ant was personally liable to plaintiff for his commis sions on the sale.-GIBSON V. GRAY, Tex., 43 S. W. Rep.

922.

204. RECEIVERS

Actions against.-An independent action against a receiver, appointed by the court un der the provisions of Gen. St. 1894, § 5900 et seq., to recover judgment upon a claim existing against the in solvent when the receivership proceedings were in stituted, or to establish or to have such claim allowed against the trust fund, cannot be maintained.-BUF FUM V. HALE, Minn., 78 N. W. Rep. 856.

205. RECEIVERS-Appointment.-If the property is in sufficient security for the payment of the debt, the

mortgagee may ask for a receiver to collect the rents and profits, or to operate the property during the year for redemption, either before or after an assignment for the benefit of creditors by the mortgagor.-SWEET & CLARK CO. V. UNION NAT. BANK OF TROY, N. Y., Ind., 49 N. E. Rep. 159.

206. RECEIVER-Breach of Contract.-Where a woman owning land through which a railroad company had built its road, without condemnation, deeded to the railway company the ground for its right of way and also for a depot, the deed containing a recital that the railway company binds itself and its assigns to the grantor forever "to construct and maintain a depot building for the passenger and freight traffic so long as the said railway remains in operation," her son (who, on her death, became the owner of the land) can sue the receiver of the railroad for damages for discontinuing the maintenance of said station, although such receiver was ordered to discontinue the station by the court having jurisdiction over him as receiver. -LEVY V. TATUM, Tex., 43 S. W. Rep. 941.

207. RECEIVERS - Grounds for Appointment.-Under Rev. St. 1894, § 1236 (Rev. St. 1881, § 1222), authorizing the appointment of a receiver when there is danger of ma. terial injury to the property in suit, when a corporation is insolvent or in danger thereof, or when, in the discretion of the court, it may be necessary to secure ample justice to the parties, a receiver may be ap pointed for property assigned by a corporation for the benefit of certain creditors, although there be no fraud in the deed.-GOSHEN WOOLEN MILLS CO. v. CITY NAT. BANK OF GOSHEN, Ind., 49 N. E. Rep. 154.

208. RECEIVERS Grounds for Appointment.—That there exists a feeling of ill-will or hostility, or a dis. agreement, between joint owners of property, is not sufficient to warrant a court in appointing a receiver to take charge of the property, unless such fact prevents a beneficial use of the property, or practically operates an exclusion of one of the joint owners from the benefit and use of the property.-LAMASTER V. ELLIOTT, Neb., 73 N. W. Rep. 925.

209. REMOVAL OF CAUSES.-A railroad corporation organized under the United States laws, against which suit is brought in a State court to recover an amount exceeding $2,000, is entitled to a removal of the cause to the proper federal court, on the ground that the "sult arises under the laws of the United States," where plaintiff's petition shows that she is a resident of the State, and defendant's federal character is set forth in its petition for removal.-TEXAS & P. RY. Co. V. WATSON, Tex., 43 S. W. Rep. 1060.

210. REMOVAL OF CAUSES Non-resident Defend. ant.-The fact that a defendant sued by an alien in the State court is a resident of another federal district does not affect his right to remove the cause, if one over which the circuit court would otherwise have had original jurisdiction; the filing of the petition and bond for removal being a waiver of the right to object to the jurisdiction on that ground.-CREAGH V. EQUITABLE LIFE ASSUR. SOC. OF UNITED STATES, U. 8. C. C., D. (Wash.), 83 Fed. Rep. 849.

211. REMOVAL OF CAUSES - Case Arising under Laws of United States.-An action in a State court, which appears by the complaint to be simply one to recover damages for trespass upon the plaintiff's mining claim, is not removable as a case arising under the laws of the United States.-ARGONAUT MIN. Co. v. KENNEDY MIN. & MILL. CO., U. S. C. C., N. D. (Cal.), 84 Fed. Rep. 1. 212. REMOVAL OF CAUSES-Waiver.-Appearing in the State court, filing a demurrer to the complaint, and procuring an order discharging an attachment by giv. ing the necessary bond therefor, all before the time at which the defendant is required by the State practice to answer or plead, is not a waiver of the defendant's right to remove, when no action was taken on the demurrer in the State court.-WHITELEY MALLEABLE CASTINGS CO. V. STERLINGWORTH RAILWAY SUPPLY CO., U.S. C. C., D. (Ind.), 83 Fed. Rep. 853.

213. REPLEVIN BOND.-An action can be maintained on a replevin bond which provides that plaintiff "shall duly prosecute the action," where plaintiff dismisses the action of her own motion, still retaining the prop. erty, of which she obtained possession by giving the bond.-MCALESTER V. SUCHY, I. T., 43 S. W. Rep. 952. 214. RES JUDICATA Equitable Conversion.-A decision that a will worked an equitable conversion of land of which testatrix died seised, in an action by C, as executor, and as trustee under the will of N, his infant daughter, against N, is not res judicata in a subsequent proceeding by C individually against C as ad. ministrator of the estate of J, a deceased daughter, N, and P, the guardian ad litem of N, in which the same question arises.-APPEAL OF CLARKE, Conn., 39 Atl. Rep. 155.

215. RES JUDICATA-Judgment or Decree for Defend. ant.-A judgment or decree for the defendant does not necessarily establish the truth of all the defenses where several are pleaded.—BELLEVILLE & ST. L. RY. Co. V. LEATHE, U. S. C. C. of App., Seventh Circuit, 84 Fed. Rep. 103.

216. SALE-Conditional Sales-Unrecorded Contracst. -An unrecorded contract, whereby machinery in possession of, and used by, a manufacturing company, is to become the property of said company when a cer tain number of periodical payments have been made, and containing a provision that the title shall remain in the vendor until all such payments have been made, is a conditional sale, within the meaning of Pub. Acts 1895, ch. 212, § 1, 2, providing that contracts for the sale of personal property shall be in writing and recorded as chattel mortgages, and that conditional sales of property not in conformity with the statute shall be considered absolute sales, except as between the vendor and vendee.-IN RE WILCOX & HOWE Co., Conn., 39 Atl. Rep. 163.

217. SALES-Fraudulent Representations-Rescission. -Where a seller of stock and bonds of a corporation falsely and fraudulently represents that the mortgage securing the stock is a first and only mortgage, he cannot defeat the buyer's suit to rescind the contract by showing that after the suit was brought he paid off, and procured the cancellation of, the prior incumbrances.-STEVENSON V. MARBLE, U. S. C. C., S. D. (Cal.), 84 Fed. Rep. 23.

218. SALES-Rescission Election.-In an action by a judgment creditor to set aside a transfer of personal property, and attachment and execution liens thereon, as fraudulent, It is immaterial that the goods for which he recovered his judgment went into the manufacture of the goods in controversy, is by failing to rescind he elected to treat the sale as valid, and is precluded from following the goods.-HADDEN V. NATCHAUG SILK Co., U. S. C. C., S. D. (N. Y.), 84 Fed. Rep. 80.

219. SEAL-Order of Court.-The provision contained in section 1 of article 3 of the constitution, that "all courts of record shall have a seal to be used in the au. thentication of all process," is mandatory; and an order of sale issued without the seal of the court is void, and the court has no power, after a sale made thereunder, to allow the process to be amended by attaching the seal.-GORDON v. BODWELL, Kan., 51 Pac. Rep. 906.

220. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-Mutuality of Contract. -A contract whereby defendant agreed, on tender within a certain time of a certain sum, to transfer certain shares of stock, is not void for lack of mutuality, so that it could not be specifically enforced, where the person holding the option has offered to perform.SAYWARD V. HOUGHTON, Cal., 51 Pac. Rep. 853.

221. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-Parties.-Where a bill is filed for the specific performance of a contract for the sale of a tract of land, and the vendor of said land has died since the date of the contract and before the institution of the suit, his heirs-at-law are necessary parties to the sult.-GALLATIN LAND, COAL & OIL CO. V. DAVIS, W. Va., 28 S. E. Rep. 747.

224. TAXATION - Licenses Manufacturer. A merchant tailor, fashioning suits of clothes from pur. chased cloth, is not a "manufacturer," within Pol. Code, § 4082, requiring a manufacturer to pay a license fee.-STATE V. JOHNSON, Mont., 51 Pac. Rep. 820.

225. TAXATION-Personalty of National Banks.-Un. der Rev. St. U. S. §§ 5214, 5219, requiring national bank ing associations to pay a certain duty "in lieu of all existing taxes," but permitting the taxation of the shares of such associations as the property of the respective owners or holders thereof by authority of the State, personal property owned by any such associa tion is not subject to taxation under State laws.-FIRST NAT. BANK OF BILLINGS V. PROVINCE, Mont., 51 Pac. Rep. 821.

226. TAX DEED-Defenses.-Act Feb. 10, 1860, p. 216, § 7, which provides that no tax sale of lands thereafter made shall be impeached or questioned in any manner or for any cause saving fraud or mistake in the assessment or sale of the wrong lands, does not preclude the defense, to an action on a tax deed, that the taxes for which the sale of land was made were levied in aid of the Rebellion, and the sale was therefore void.-BOYLE V. MANION, Miss., 22 South. Rep. 947.

227. TAX LIENS-Foreclosure-Homestead.-In an ac tion to foreclose a tax lien on a homestead, it is unnecessary to make a wife a party, as it is presumed that she has no interest in it, separate from that of her husband, other than her homestead right.-BEAN V. CITY OF BROWNWOOD, Tex., 43 S. W. Rep. 1036.

228. TAX SALES-Deed-Validity.-The assessment of two adjoining tracts of land in the same district as one will not vitiate a deed under a sale for taxes.-WINNING V. EAKIN, W. Va., 28 S. E. Rep. 757.

229. TELEGRAPHS-Damages for Failure to Deliver.Where a telegraph company received a message to transmit at night, and made repeated efforts to call up its operator at the place to which the message was to be transmitted, but, owing to the fact that its office at that place was only open in the daytime, was unable to transmit the message until 8 o'clock the next morning, the telegraph company is not liable for damages to the person sending the message, there being no special agreement in regard to the message.-ROBINSON V. WESTERN UNION TEL. CO., Tex., 43 S. W. Rep.

1053.

230. TELEGRAPH COMPANY- Damages - Mental Anguish. For inental pain and anguish alone, caused by failure to deliver telegram, unaccompanied by phys. ical injury, damages are not recoverable at law. -PEAY V. WESTERN UNION TEL. Co., Ark., 43 S. W. Rep. 965. 231. TELEGRAPH COMPANY Negligence-Proximate Cause. Where the testimony of a physician tends to show that a surgical operation might have been avoided, had he reached the patient earlier, it is not error to submit to the jury the question as to whether or not the failure of a telegraph company to properly transmit a message, whereby the physician was prevented from earlier attendance, was the proximate cause of the injuries resulting from such operation.WESTERN UNION TEL. Co. v. MORRIS, U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 83 Fed. Rep. 992.

232. TRIAL-Evidence-Relevancy.-A party to a suit who testifies in his own behalf to a fact irrelevant to the issue in support of his own testimony, and preju. dicial to his opponent, cannot object to its contradic.

tion on the ground of irrelevancy.-SISLER V. SHAFFER, W. Va., 28 S. E. Rep. 721.

233. TRUSTS-Resulting Trusts.-A resulting trust be ing a mere creature of equity, it cannot therefore arise where there is an express trust declared by the parties, and evidenced by a written declaration of such express trust.-COLEMAN V. PARRAN, W. Va., 28 S. E. Rep. 769. 234. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Sale of Land-Rescission.-A representation by a vendor of land that the tract sold cost him $200 per acre, when it in fact cost him only $150 an acre, is not such a fraudulent representation as will give the purchaser a right to rescind the contract and recover back the whole of the pur chase money paid.-SoWERS V. PARKER, Kan., 51 Pac. Rep. 888.

235. VENUE-Right to be Sued in One's County.-A plaintiff, who institutes a suit in a county other than the one in which he resides, for all the purposes of the defense of that suit, submits himself to the jurisdiction of the courts of the county in which the suit is pend ing, and, if such suit is pending in a court of limited jurisdiction, which, for want of power, cannot afford full relief, the defendant, by proper proceeding in the superior court of the county where the suit was insti tuted, may set up and have adjudicated, as to the nonresident plaintiff, all matters necessary for his com plete defense.-MOORE V. MEDLOCK, Ga., 28 S. E. Rep. 836.

236. WILL-Children Omitted.-Civ. Code, § 1307, provides that when a testator omits to provide in his will for any of his children, or issue of a deceased child, unless such omission was intentional, such child or issue must have the same share of the estate as if the deceased had died intestate: Held, that where a testatrix devised to her grandchildren land which she did not own at the time, or at any subsequent time, the grandchildren were not therefore entitled to share in her estate as if she had died intestate.-IN RE CAL LAGHAN'S ESTATE, Cal., 51 Pac. Rep. 860.

237. WILL-Contest.-A party in interest, who failed to appear and oppose the admission to probate of a proposed will, may apply to the court to vacate the order admitting it to probate, and for leave to appear and oppose its admission. The probate court has the power, upon a proper showing, to grant the applica tion.-IN RE LARSON'S ESTATE, Minn., 73 N. W. Rep. 99%.

238. WILLS-Designation of Beneficiaries.-A codicil by which a testator changed the objects of his bounty with respect to the residue of his estate, after the revo cation, read as follows: "And I give, devise and be queath to my nephews and nieces (they being my law. ful heirs), all the rest and residue and remainder of my property, real and personal:" Held, that there is no ambiguity in the language, so as to admit of parol evidence, and the nephews and nieces took under å per capita distribution.-POST V. JACKSON, Conn., 39 Atl. Rep. 151.

239. WILLS-Insanity.-A will was shown to have been made under the promptings of a delusion, or in the be lief in facts, the existence of which no rational person would believe: Held that, though testatrix was sane in other respects, she was insane in respect to the delusion, and the will made as a result thereof is void.ORCHARDSON V. COFIELD, Ill., 49 N. E. Rep. 197.

240. WILLS-Statute of Descents. When a person dies, leaving no widow, issue or father, but leaving a mother, surviving him, she becomes his sole heir, and is not deprived of his estate by a provision in his will leaving her a legacy of a certain sum per month, ac companied by an express declaration in the will that it should be in full of all claims she might have in bis estate, when such will contains no disposition of the property of testator to any one else.-ANDREWS V. HARRON, Kan., 51 Pac. Rep. 885.

241. WILLS-Trust-Perpetuity. - A devise limiting the remainder of a trust estate to the lawful heirs of the cestui que trust is void, because contrary to the stat ute of perpetuities.-SECURITY Co. v. SNOW, Conn.,

Atl. Rep. 153.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., APRIL 1, 1898.

One of the most important cases recently before the courts, is Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, in which Mr. Justice Harlan, for that court, lays down the broad proposition, that a policy of insurance by one on his own life, payable to himself, his executors, administrators and assigns, and which is silent on the subject of suicide, becomes void, if the insured commits suicide when sane, both from the presumed intention of the parties and from principles of public policy. The case first came before the United States Circuit Court for Pennsylvania, which decided in favor of the company who thereupon appealed the case to the supreme court, which affirms the lower court. The policy con. tained no suicide clause, but the application of the deceased contained the clause, "I also warrant that I will not die by my own act whether sane or insane, during the period of two years." But this application was rejected in the trial court, as not admissible under a local statute, which compels such an application to be made a part of the policy, and which had not been done in this case. But in the supreme court the case was decided upon the broad ground, that in the face of the jury's finding as to the sanity of Runk, the policies became void by the act of selfdestruction, even if the policy did not, in express terms, declare its invalidity for this reason. Life insurance, says the court, imports a mutual agreement, whereby the insurer, in consideration of the payment by the assured of a named sum annually, or at certain times, stipulates to pay a larger sum at the death of the assured. The company takes into consideration, among other things, the age and health of the parents and relatives of the applicant for insurance, together with his own age, course of life, habits, and present physical condition; and the premium exacted from the assured is determined by the probable duration of his life, calculated upon the basis of past experience in the business of insurance. The results of that experience are disclosed by standard life and annuity tables, showing at any age the probable duration of

life. These tables are deemed of such value that they may be admitted in evidence for the purpose of assisting the jury in an action for personal injury, in which it is necessary to ascertain the compensation the plaintiff is entitled to recover for the loss of what he might have earned in his trade or profession but for such injury. If a person should apply for a policy expressly providing that the company should pay the sum named if or in the event the assured, at any time during the continuance of the contract, committed self-destruction, being at the time of sound mind, it is reasonably certain that the application would be instantly rejected. It is impossible to suppose that an application of that character would be granted. If experience justifies this view, it would follow that a policy stipulating generally for the payment of the sum named in it upon the death of the assured, should not be interpreted as intended to cover the event of death caused directly and inten. tionally by self-destruction while the assured was in sound mind, but only death occurring in the ordinary course of his life. The court also predicate their conclusion upon the broad ground of public policy, viz., that a contract the tendency of which is to endanger the public interests or injuriously affect the public good, or which is subversive of sound morality, ought never to receive the sanction of a court of justice, or be made the foundation of its judgment. If, therefore, a policy-taken out by the person whose life is insured, and in which the sum named is made payable to himself, his executors, administrators, or assigns -expressly provided for the payment of the sum stipulated when or if the assured, in sound mind, took his own life, the contract, even if not prohibited by statute, would be held to be against public policy, in that it tempted or encouraged the assured to commit suicide in order to make provision for those dependent upon him, or to whom he was indebted. The court distinguishes Insurance Co. v. Terry, cited by appellant as authority. In that case, there was no question as to the effect upon the rights of the parties of intentional self-destruction where the policy contains no provision as to suicide. The court also cited and reviewed Broadaile v. Hunter, 5 Man. & G. 639; Hartman v. Ins. Co., 21 Pa. St. 466; Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 591 and Supreme Commandery v. Ains

worth, 71 Ala. 436, wherein Chief Justice Brickell, of the Supreme Court of Alabama, in a vigorous opinion held that it cannot be in the contemplation of the parties that the assured by his own criminal act shall deprive the contract of its material element and vary and enlarge the risk, and hasten the day of payment of insurance money.

The same question as to the effect of suicide by the assured when sane, was recently presented in another Pennsylvania case decided by the supreme court of that StateMorris v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co., 39 Atl. Rep. 52-the only difference being that in the latter case the policy was payable, not to the assured, but to his wife. The application contained a clause against suicide, but, as in the Ritter case, it was excluded under the Pennsylvania statute, so that the policy, as construed, contained no stipulation as to suicide. The trial court excluded evidence offered by the defense that the assured took his life while sane. On appeal, the company relied upon the decision of the circuit court of appeals in the Ritter case, but the court held the ruling of the trial court proper, and distinguished the case from the other, by reason of the fact that the policy was payable to the wife and not to the personal representative of the assured.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

CONTRACTS OF MARRIED WOMEN-CONFLICT OF LAWS-FOLLOWING STATE DECISIONS.-It was held by the United States Circuit Court, District of Connecticut, in the case of First National Bank v. Mitchell, 84 Fed. Rep. 90, that a decision by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, in insolvency proceedings, that a contract of guaranty dated and signed by others at Chicago, and to be performed in Illinois, which was afterwards signed by a married women in Connecticut, and then delivered by her husband in Illinois, was, as to her. a Connecticut contract, and invalid under the law of that State for want of capacity to make such a contract, will be followed by a federal court in an action against her on the guaranty. The court says in part: "Before considering the legal proposition involved in this decision, the question arises whether this court will enforce against a married woman, who has always resided in Connecticut, a contract made by her by a writing sent to another State, she not personally leaving the State of Connecticut, which the highest court of Connecticut has pronounced invalid and unenforceable in that State. In Milliken v. Pratt, 125

Mass. 375, the facts were practically identical; the guaranty in that case having been taken by the husband to the State of Maine. The court held that the contract was made in Maine, and valid in Massachusetts, saying: 'If the contract is completed in any State, it makes no difference. in principle, whether the citizen of this State goes in person or sends, an agent, or writes a letter across the boundary line between the two States.' In finally deciding the question, however, the court lay stress upon the fact that at the time of the trial of the case the wife could have legally made the contract in Massachusetts, saying: The question, therefore, is whether a contract made in another State, which a married woman was not at the time capable of making under the law of this commonwealth, but was then allowed by the law of that State to make, and which she could now legally make in this commonwealth, will sustain a case against her in our courts.' And Milliken v. Pratt also seems to hold that the guaranty made in Maine, as above stated, would not be enforceable in Massachusetts if Massachusetts had not consented to such enforcement, saying: As the law of another State cannot operate nor be executed in this State by its own force, but only by the comity of this State, its approbation and enforcement here may be restricted by positive prohibition of statute. A State may always by express enactment protect itself from being obliged to enforce in its courts contracts made abroad by its citizens which are not authorized by its own laws. It is possible, also, that in a State where the common law prevails in full force, by which a married woman was deemed incapable of binding herself by any contract whatever, it may be inferred that such an utter incapability, lasting throughout the joint lives of husband and wife, must be construed as so fixed by the settled policy of the State, for the protection of its own citizens, that it could not be held by the courts of that State to yield to the laws of another State in which she might undertake to contract." In Bell v. Packard, 69 Me. 105, a married woman sent a contract to Maine, where she could have legally made it, and the Supreme Court of Maine held that the contract was made in Maine, and was valid and enforceable there. In Bowles v. Field, 78 Fed. Rep. 742, a married woman residing in Indiana, while transiently in Ohio, gave a note as surety for her husband. The laws of Indiana allowed married women to contract for all purposes, except as especially provided, and among the exceptions was a contract for suretyship. The court held that, having a general power to contract, this particular limitation could have no extraterritorial force. The court said: 'It is not charged that she went to Ohio, and executed the notes as surety for her husband, for the purpose of evading the law of her domicile.' This seems to be an intimation that, if she had not had a general power to contract, and had remained in Indiana, the contract would not have been enforceable.

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