might be cited in addition, indeed of all, except those who are wise enough to startle at restoring, as if it were innovating, the constitution; and who grow enamoured of abuses, provided they are old.

"I now come to a remedy for these abuses-but first, I will remind you of the objections that have been made to the former propositions upon this subject; because it is the shortest method of shewing, that my proposition is free from them. It was not objected to Lord CHATHAM'S plan, that it would make a considerable encrease to the present number of representatives; but it was objected, that the freeholders were already represented-that his plan did not give franchise to any of that great and responsible body of men, who are now non-electors-that, on the contrary, it encreased the disparity between them and the freeholders-and farther, it was objected, that this might happen-that as so many more of the great interests in each county might be accommodated by this greater number of seats, which were to be disposed of by the same number of freeholders, that those greater interests might more probably combine-that the independent freeholders might become less significant, and county elections thereby become less influenced and less constitutional than at present. To the plan of the Chancellor of the Exchequer it was not objected, that he introduced a new body of electors, namely, the copyholders. It was admitted, that, by adding them to the freeholders, he had diminished, for so much, the objections that had been made to his father's plan; but that, except for so much, the same objections remained as to that part of the subject. Touching his plan, as to the boroughs it was objected, that to disfranchise them, might indeed be arbitrary; but that to buy them out would be to build reform, not on the purity, but corruption of franchise ;-that the purchase might never be effected;-that certainly it must be slow;-and that the worst boroughs, those of the government, would

never resign, but would be comparatively encreased in their importance by the resignation of others; that the reform was to wait for the result of all these contingencies; and at all events, that it was not to begin till the expiration of the Parliament, which had but just commenced; during all which time it would lie open to be repealed, before it began to operate.

"My proposition is free from all these objections; for it is, that one hundred members should be added, and that they should be elected by a numerous and new body of responsible electors; namely, the resident householders in every county-resident. I say, because that the principle of the constitution is so strongly in favor of residence, that it ordained that no non-resident could be an elector; and with reason, first, because residents must be best acquainted with every local circumstance; and next, because they can attend at every place of election with the least inconvenience and expense to themselves or to the candidate. Householders, I say, because being masters, or fathers of families, they must be sufficiently responsible to be entitled to franchise. There is no country in the world in which the householders of it are considered as the rabble-no country can be said to be free, where they are not allowed to be efficient citizens; they are, exclusive of the rabble, the great mass of the people; they are the natural guards of popular liberty in the first stages of it-without them it cannot be retained; as long as they have this constitutional influence, and till they become generally corrupt, popular liberty cannot be taken away. Whenever they do become generally corrupt, it cannot be retained, neither will it be long possessed, if they have not this constitutional influence; for the liberty of a nation like the honor of individuals, can never be safe but in their own custody. The householders of this country have a better right to consideration and franchise, than those of any other country, because they pay more for it.

It is admitted, that every individual of this country, one with another, pays fifty shillings a year to the revenue in tax. The master or father of a family must contribute in proportion, for himself and for each individual of his family, even to the child that is hanging at the breast. Who shall say, that this class of men ought to be confounded with the rabble? Who shall dare to say, that they ought to be proscribed from franchise? They maintain the affluence of the rich, the dignity of the noble, the majesty of the crown; they support your fleets and your armies. And who shall say, that they shall not have this right to protect their liberty?

"I have stated the inadequacy of the representative body, compared with the constituent body, even as it now stands: I have stated the inadequacy of the constituent body itself, as it now is, compared with what it ought to

I shall now state the effect of this double inadequacy upon the balance of the constitution. The constitution consists of three orders, one monarchical, one aristocratic and one popular: the balance consists in maintaining the equipoise between them. This balance was lost in the first part of the Norman æra; it was recovered in some degree after; it was impaired again in the period of the TUDORS and the STUARTS; at the revolution it is supposed to have been again recovered. Let us see whether it has not been impaired since. The Lords have been the most stationary part; yet by a great increase of their numbers of late, the upper house has obtained a great many patrimonial and private boroughs, thereby obtaining an influence over the house of commons, which does not constitutionally belong to them. But the great alteration has happened on the part of the crown. And here, for brevity, I will appeal to the authority of a great Judge, that is no more. Mr. Justice BLACKSTONE has stated all the cautionary provisions that have been made to guard against prerogative; he has then enumerated the various

sources of influence which have accrued to the crown in place of those prerogatives; and the conclusion of such a man, a lawyer, looking to be a judge; of principles sufficiently monarchical; writing in his closet, and appealing to the cool justice of the latest posterity, is, what? That influence has gone so far beyond prerogative, that at the moment he wrote, the liberty of England was rather to be found in the virtue of the Prince, than in the strength of the constitution. And what remedy does he intimate? An amendment in the representation of Parliament. Mr. HUME, a prerogative writer, taking the same view of the subject, has said, 'that the euthanasy of the British constitution must be arbitrary power!' What did the house of commons say in their memorable resolution? That the influence of the crown had encreased, was encreasing, and ought to be diminished.' Does any man doubt this authority? Were they not witnesses of the fact as well as judges of the proposition? But it does not rest on their authority; an act of the whole Legislature has since confirmed their words-they have been made statute by the act of reform, that passed afterwards. But what has happened since? An East India bill has passed, and a declaratory law; and what is the consequence? That no man, who has any modesty, or who ever expects to be credited, will deny that by those laws more influence has been conveyed to the crown or the minister, than was substracted by that act of reform. The little influence of the whole people on the representative body is thus noticed by SHERLOCK, a bishop. In his treatise on the test, and corporation laws, he says, 'That though the dissenters were but a twentieth part of the people, yet if they got into corporations, the petty boroughs being so numerous, they might by them obtain a majority in the house of commons against the whole nation.' In a word, it is undeniable, that a great majority of the house of commons are under another influence than that of the people.

It is nonsense to call this a representation of the people: the balance of the constitution is therefore gone: it must be restored, or the constitution will be undone. The only thing to be decided is, how it may be restored? It may be restored by opening all the boroughs, so as to make them places of popular and constitutional election. But will private interest hear of that? No-What follows? That there is but one mode left for restoring the balance, and that is by an additional body of constitutional representatives, chosen by an additional body of constitutional electors. Either then, this must be done, or the evil must continue; nor will that be all; for, according to the nature of the evil, it will propagate itself till it overwhelms what remains of your constitution. Is the addition of members objected to? It was not objected to Lord CHATHAM. It was not argued, that the integrity or wisdom of Parliament was confined to the number of five hundred and fifty-eight. No. It was felt, that this house is never tumultuary, but when it ceases to be a public, by becoming a party assembly. It was therefore felt, that as by the super-addition of such members, this house would become more a public, and less a party assembly, it would by course become less tumultuary, and rise in dignity and order. But if this be a serious objection, remove it; there are an hundred boroughs that might be limited to the return of one representative instead of two.-I do not propose it; but I desire that you will either propose it, or not object this addition to me. In a word, the people have lost their constitutional influence in the Legislature. Instead of having the whole, they are far from having a majority in their own representative; the majority is against them; and the majority decides for the whole. The house is a second rate aristocracy, instead of a popular representation: the pillar of the constitution is undermined; it is nonsense to say, that every thing is well, when every thing is in danger; every country in Europe