Now Louisville is not west as such, but it is not east. Anniston, Ala., is not exactly east, except southeast; is it? Mr. TRAIN. I believe you are correct, Mr. Chairman. Mr. LENNON. Yes. Go ahead. Mr. TRAIN. I will continue my statement. The ultimate deleterious impact of this operation on the environment is uncertain, but it appears less than the potential deleterious impact of the alternative actions that now appear possible. Put another way, given the present situation-the need to dispose of a large number of armed and ready rockets filled with GB agent, sealed within steel covered concrete vaults, with possibility of the explosives aging and becoming unstable, and the rockets corroding and releasing the nerve agent-the proposed ocean dumping appears to pose a lesser risk to the environment than any other course. Mr. LENNON. I will interrupt you at that point. "Rather than any other source of disposal" is what you said. Is there in point of time, in your judgement, any other way except the Operation CHASE today? Mr. TRAIN. I don't believe I understand the Chair's question. Mr. LENNON. I say is there any alternative in this point of time other than Operation CHASE! Now you are speaking as chairman, of course, of the Council of Environmental Quality and I want your definitive answer whether or not in your judgment in the point of time there is any other alternative other than Operation CHASE. Mr. TRAIN. Given the information available to me and to our council, I would consider that the other available alternatives are not as good as the alternative presented by Operation CHASE. Mr. LENNON. Not as good? Mr. TRAIN. That is correct. Mr. LENNON. And you mean by that from a safety standpoint? Mr. LENNON. To human beings? Mr. TRAIN. Yes. Mr. LENNON. We will come back to that and let you enlarge on it a little further. Proceed. Mr. TRAIN. Clearly, the potential long-term environmental effects of sealing the rockets in concrete were not taken into consideration at the time the decision was made. While the Council concurs in this case with the plan for ocean disposal because of the absence of practical alternatives-the Council wishes to comment on several aspects of the plan. The statement filed by the Department of the Army on the environmental impact of Project Chase deals only with the possible environmental effects after the concrete vaults have reached the ocean floor. In our comments to the Department of the Army with respect to its statement, we make clear our conviction that the transportation aspect of the project is of a nature requiring an environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy Act. In any event, we have had available to us the opinion of the Surgeon General to the effect that any health or safety effects involved in the transportation are negligible, particularly in view of the precautions planned by the Army. We have no reason to disagree with the Surgeon General's opinion. The Council is concerned with the structural integrity of the concrete vaults, including possible variations among them, in that, if the munitions in the vaults are in an unstable condition, there is at least some danger that at least some of the vaults might explode, implode, or rupture before the hulk reaches bottom. If this occurred at or near the surface, there is a possibility of the gas entering the atmosphere. As we have read in the Gross report, the possibility of rupture at the point is considered to be negligible. Even if this did not happen, the contamination would be in shallower waters far richer in marine life than the lower depths. These waters contain species of value to sports and commercial fisheries Because of mixing by currents, the volume of water contaminated would be greater at relatively shallow levels than at depth. Of course, again it should be noted that the Gross committee report indicates that a rupture prior to reaching the bottom is highly unlikely. Mr. FREY. Is that as of August 1 you are speaking now on the Gross report? That is how I read the Gross report, that August 1 is the date when it is no longer safe. I just wanted to clear up my mind. Mr. TRAIN. I am speaking of the Gross report as it was available to us on August 1. Mr. FREY. No, I am speaking of the date when it is not safe as of August 1, 1970, their cutoff date. Mr. TRAIN. I don't think they say they are going to become unsafe as of August 1. I would have to look at the report itself but I think they say it should be disposed of by August 1. Mr. FREY. Yes, they do. One other thing I refer to, if I may, is that as a matter of fact the Gross report says that under normal conditions the risk is currently very small. I think it goes on to say that the risks may be either increasing or decreasing with time; however, they don't have any precise information. This is found on page 3 of the first Gross report which is really-I am sorry to interrupt you but the question I am trying to get answered which you don't have within your knowledge. and unfortunately I guess Gross is gone, is what are the dangers of this from August 1 on because this certainly would have a tremendous effect on your statement. Mr. TRAIN. I have no further information than that which is presented in the Gross report. Mr. FREY. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. Mr. TRAIN. You are quite correct that the Gross committee was making an estimate as of the time their report was prepared and they do make the assumption that while stability could either increase or decrease they assume for the purpose of planning that stability would decrease. Mr. FREY. One other thing, and I think you said it before. If that assumption is wrong or happened to be wrong, then there is no way of knowing since they are not here that assumption was wrong, there is no question of stability. We did have the time at this point, say, that the assumption was wrong and we had 42 weeks to dig a hole and do what we had to do, that at that time you would still be for doing it were it not for dumping it in the ocean but using the underground disposal. Mr. TRAIN. I think I would say if time were not a factor, then I would want to reexamine the entire question. I think that would be the safest thing to say at this point. Mr. FREY. Does it disturb you at all that when something as important as this, that in the report they say that there is no precise information? "In the absence of precise information it is necessary to assume that the hazard may be increasing slowly with time." Mr. TRAIN. One of the comments we have made to the Army in connection with their environmental impact statement in several respects is that goes to the lack of precise information, and we say that this information should be developed or should have been developed. Mr. FREY. I am sorry to interrupt. Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I think the point could be developed further. Did you receive the environmental impact statement the Gross report or the report of September 15 or any of the other documents that have been referred to? Mr. TRAIN. I will tell you, Mr. Dingell, exactly what we received. Mr. DINGELL. And when. Mr. LENNON. Let me interrupt. I understood him to say they did not. Mr. DINGELL. I want that very clearly on the record. Mr. TRAIN. We received a draft copy of the environmental impact statement on the 7th of July and a final copy on the 30th of July and attached to Mr. LENNON. Let's get for the record, July of 1970? Mr. TRAIN. 1970. And attached to the original draft that we received were the report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee of the National Academy of Sciences dated June 25, 1969; the initial report of the Gross committee of July 25, 1969; the follow-up so-called report of the Gross committee of May 15, 1970; and then a series of other technical documents. I had best list them, I suppose. The paper by Dr. Joseph Epstein and Mr. James D. Wood entitled "The Properties of GB and Sea Water." A paper entitled "Study of the Effect of concrete on GB Stability" by the Analytical Chemical Department, Chemical Research Laboratories, April 30, 1970. A report on "Estimated Contamination Possible From Sea Water Explosion of the Concrete Vaults" prepared by personnel at Edgewood Arsenal, November 28, 1969. Memoranda by F. H. Crist concerning the probability of initiating a detonation of entombed M-55 rockets, June 15, 1970. And finally, the second report of the U.S. Department of the Interior's Working Group on "Ocean Dumping of Chemical Munitions," November 13, 1969. Now I think I should point out to the committee that this list does not include a copy of the AEC report to the Army. Mr. DINGELL. This is the feasibility study entitled Harpin. Mr. TRAIN. That is correct, sir. Mr. DINGELL. So this information was never made available to you? Mr. TRAIN. Yes, sir, it was but not until the 4th of August. Mr. DINGELL. Not until the 4th of August. After the environmental report was made that is required by the National Environmental Policy Act. Mr. TRAIN. That is correct, sir. Mr. DINGELL. Well, Mr. Chairman, I don't want to intrude on the time of the subcommittee but does the presence of this feasibility study change in any way your conclusion which you had previous to receiving it? Mr. TRAIN. No. First the conclusion which was presented to us by the Department of the Army in the section 102 statement filed with us was to the effect that, and I quote, "The Atomic Energy Commission advised that nuclear destruction is unsatisfactory." Mr. DINGELL. That statement was made in the statement by the Department of the Army? Mr. TRAIN. That is correct, sir. Mr. DINGELL. In the environmental policy statement? Mr. TRAIN. That is correct, on page 2. Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, it appears that the Department of the Army is kidding somebody here. Mr. LENNON. I have tried to make that crystal clear all along. The report does not show on September 15 but the fact that the Atomic Energy Commission convened in executive session on October 3 following sending to the Army this report which any reasonable, prudent citizen believed that the AEC had the capability, and it was practical and feasible and was not dangerous. Then they had a little meeting on October 3 of last year and got on the telephone and called the Army and said, "We cannot put it in writing but we are opposed to it," but they don't say that in that September 15 report, do they? You read it. Do you find anything in that September 15 report where AEC says they did oppose this? Mr. TRAIN. No, sir, although there is Mr. LENNON. They didn't have the intestinal fortitude to put in writing what they communicated over the telephone to the Army. My judgment is that they were afraid that it would become public. I didn't mean to interrupt you. Mr. DINGELL. That is all right. Tell us, please, Mr. Chairman, whether you regard this kind of performance by the Department of the Army as being in compliance with section 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act. I must confess to you I do not. Mr. TRAIN. We have had considerable discussion with the Department of the Army concerning this particular environmental impact statement and we have addressed to the Army a memorandum pointing out by way of comment the ways in which we believe the statement filed is not sufficient. Mr. DINGELL. Would you see to it that copies of those documents are submitted to the committee? Mr. TRAIN. Yes, sir, I will. Mr. LENNON. Without objection they will be received by the committee an inserted in the record immediately following the statement by the chairman. (The material referred to follows:) AUGUST 4, 1970. Memorandum for Louis M. Rousselot, Assistant Secretary, Health and Environment, Department of Defense. Subject: Environmental Impact Statement for Operation Chase. The Council on Environmental Quality has received the draft environmental impact statement for Operation Chase which you forwarded on July 7, and the final statement submitted on July 30 by the Deputy General Counsel of the Department of the Army. We have reviewed the statements for substance and for its compliance with the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. The following comments refer to the final statement, not to the draft statement. The Council strongly opposes the use of the oceans for the disposal of such toxic material. The oceans are a precious resource, shared by many nations, and our knowledge of the oceans is still so limited that we cannot confidently predict the consequences of placing in them any dangerous materials. The President in his message on the Great Lakes and Ocean Dumping on April 15 noted, "We are only beginning to find out the ecological effects of ocean dumping and current disposal technology is not adequate to handle waste of the volume now being produced." However, with regard to Operation Chase, the Council does not know of any more desirable means of disposal. Given the present set of circumstances, the proposed plan is the least undesirable of a series of thoroughly bad alternatives. The ultimate deleterious impact of this operation on the environment is uncertain, but it is less uncertain than the potential deleterious impact of the alternative actions that now appear possible. Put another way, given the present situation-the need to dispose of a large number of armed and ready rockets filled with GB agent, sealed within steel covered concrete vaults, with possibility of the explosives aging and becoming unstable, and of the rockets corroding and releasing the nerve agent-the proposed ocean dumping appears to pose a lesser risk to the environment than any other course. Clearly the long term environmental effects of sealing the rockets in concrete were not recognized at the time the decision to do so was made. With regard to the adequacy of the Environmental Impact Statement, the Council wishes to make the following major points, summarized below and expanded on the following pages: 1. The statement only covers the final stage of the operation when the chemical munitions are on the sea bottom. It does not cover the possible environmental impact from explosion or release of the nerve agent during the process of sinking, before the hulk reaches bottom. 2. The statement does not cover the handling and transportation of the materials from their present locations to the proposed dumping site. There was no review of this aspect of the project with relevant State and local agencies as required by the Interim Guidelines for preparation of Environment Impact Statements. 3. The Council believes that the question of impact of the operation on living organisms has not been considered in sufficient detail, both with relation to the effect of the agent and to the organisms which potentially may be involved. 4. There is insufficient attention given to the question of the duration of potential contamination. 5. No attention was given in the statement to the potential impact of detonation of explosive materials involved. 6. The Council strongly supports the recommendations of the Department of the Interior and of Health, Education, and Welfare that the hulk and the dumping site be monitored and maintained under continuing surveillance. 7. The Operation plan should be included in the statement, or attached as a reference. 8. It is clear that the long term environmental risks were not recognized when the rockets were imbedded in concrete. The Council believes that it was the intent of Congress expressed in the National Environmental Policy Act, that in the future, before such decisions are taken, the full environmental consequences are examined and reported upon. 1. The statement only deals with the final stage of the operation, when the chemical munitions are on the sea bottom. On page 3 of the Statement, under "The Environmental Impact of the Proposed Action," the statement is made that, "The maximum adverse environmental impact would be the temporary contamination of approximately 1 cubic mile of water at the bottom." The report does not deal with the structural integrity of the concrete vaults nor does it discuss possible |