transcripts, memorandums that are available that could in any way support the August 1 deadline that has been put out very arbitrarily in the report?

General STONE. No, sir; I don't. I frankly have never seen any. I have never seen any calculations specifically which point to this particular date. I do know now that this was a consensus of the chemists and other scientists who were on the Gross committee, that beyond this date they had no means and no knowledge upon which they could guarantee the continuing stability of the propellant.

Mr. CLINGAN. Can you identify any individual who can come before this committee and produce scientific evidence to justify the August 1 deadline?

General STONE. No, sir.

You might look to other members of the Gross committee. Dr. Steir of the Los Alamos Laboratory and the Atomic Energy Committee. Mr. CLINGAN. Thank you, General.

The only thing that disturbs me is I would rather think that such substantiating evidence would have been in the report that those members have.

One other point, General. In the Revelle report I find the following paragraph and I will read it to you if I may:

Professor Geyer pointed out that the coffins could be buried at a safe depth below the surface in a large hole of the order of 50 to 75 feet on a side in an area of alkaline ground water. Such ground water would be sufficient to render harmless any GB that escaped from the coffins and leaked outside the hole. The chances of contamination of portable water supplies would be negligibly small if the burial were in a well marked area on a government reservation in an interior drainage basin in desert country. Such storage of these coffins would not have to be permanent but the materials could be stored in this way for a sufficiently long period so that experiments could be undertaken and reasoned decisions made about permanent disposal.

Was that an accurate statement and does it remain accurate today? General STONE. I did not see that letter of Dr. Revelle's until today. This is close to abandoned salt mines which is the identical environment described by Dr. Revelle. Such a proposal was evaluated and considered by the National Academy of Sciences in their initial considerations as I understand.

Mr. CLINGAN. We are talking about temporary storage here.

General STONE. Yes, sir; but the ultimate solution is much like the problem out at the Nevada test site. You still have to move it and you have to install it then in there.

This again presumably would involve some additional hazards because of the increasing instability of the propellant over a period of time.

Mr. CLINGAN. That is assuming the Gross committee's assumption is correct?

General STONE. Yes, sir.

Mr. LENNON. Thank you, General, we apologize for intruding on so much of your time.

General STONE. May I add one point? Quite a point was made the other day on the fact that they had detected in testimony before, I believe, the Gallagher committee the fact that there are 2,664 vaults and where had 520 vaults disappeared?

We have gone back over the testimony and we have been able to isolate this out. It may have been an error in the transcript that the gentleman was reading but these were short tons.

That is the weight of the 418 vaults that we still have.

There are not any missing vaults.

(The following information was supplied in reference to the above:)

INVENTORY OF VAULTS CONTAINING ROCKETS

There is no record indicating the existence of 2,664 vaults containing rockets. The only reference to the number 2,664 and vaults or coffins is contained in a prepared statement by Mr. Charles L. Poor, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army (R&D) on 13 May 1969 before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives. Hearings before this Subcommittee covered the International Implications of Dumping Poisonous Gas and Waste into the Oceans.

Mr. Poor's prepared statement included the following Table (page 23 of the record of the hearing):

The identification of 1944 and 720 is the total weight 2,664 short tons and does not refer to numbers of vaults or coffins.

Mr. LENNON. They weigh 6.4 tons each, don't they?
General STONE. Yes, sir, approximately.

Mr. LENNON. The vaults we are talking about disposing of now will aggregate the figure you are talking about?

General STONE. Yes, sir. Mr. Train made the point that he believes the entire environmental impact statement should discuss the transportation of these vaults across country.

I would like to point out that this very type of case came up in Seattle in the Federal district court during Operation Red Hat when we were planning to bring some material through the States of Washington and Oregon. In this case, Ullman v. United States, the allegation that the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 was violated because an environmental impact statement was not filed. was dismissed because the court held that the act did not require a statement for this kind of transportation.

Mr. CLINGAN. It is on appeal, is it not?

General STONE. I can't answer the question. I don't know.
Mr. CLINGAN. I believe it is.

Mr. LENNON. The Lawrence Radiation Laboatory went to even the extent of showing the coffin configurations by levels 1, 2, 3, 4, and levels 5. They did a pretty thorough job, didn't they to be overruled less than 2 weeks later by the Commission when it got on the phone and called you and said don't do it.

General STONE. To us it was a very sound feasibility study, with one exception. They had assumed in their chemical work and theoretical work that they would be able to prove whether this propellant would be stable beyond the 1st of August.

Mr. LENNON. We had accepted the alternative then and shipped them out there, they would have been out there in a relatively isolated

But they also called the attention of the DOD to the fact these were radiation munitions, and insisted that the Army immediately create a panel or ad hoc committee of people who had the capability to recommend the destruction of these 400-plus caskets containing the nerve gas.

This panel convened. They were briefed by a total of 14 people representing either the DOD level or the Army level, and a total I believe of six representing DOD. They made their recommendations to the Army strongly urging, and I repeat that, strongly urging that the most prac tical, feasible, safe way for the disposal of these 400-plus coffins was that they be destroyed in an underground nuclear explosion and gave their reasons therefor.

At this point in the record I believe that on this panel and they were explosives, and ordinances, and munitions, and radiation experts, six of the seven of them had been identified with the Federal Government in the past in one of these capacities that I have enumerated. You gentlemen know who they are.

Inasmuch as their strongest recommendation was that they be destroyed through an underground nuclear blast I assume that the Army then immediately communicated, hopefully they immediately communicated, with the Atomic Energy Commission to determine the feasibility of such a proposal as they were recommending.

At this point in the record I would like General Stone, who is appearing here this morning, to tell us the date and to whom he made. the request of the Atomic Energy Commission.

FURTHER STATEMENTS OF HON. WILFRID E. JOHNSON, COMMIS-
SIONER, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION; HON. THEOS J. THOMP-
SON,
COMMISSIONER, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION; R. E.
HOLLINGSWORTH, GENERAL MANAGER, ATOMIC ENERGY COM-
MISSION; FREDERICK R. TESCHE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DIVISION
OF MILITARY APPLICATION, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION; AND
BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM W. STONE, JR., MEMBER, MILITARY LIAI-
SON COMMITTEE TO THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, DEPART-
MENT OF DEFENSE

General STONE. Sir, the request did not come from my office. It came from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Development. I believe Commission Thompson of the AEC has that date, sir.

Commissioner THOMPSON. I believe I can answer that question.

Mr. LENNON. Then will you give us the date that the Atomic Energy Commission was requested to make this feasibility study and who made the request-identify him-and to whom the request was directed?

Commissioner THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman, I am Commissioner Thompson of the Atomic Energy Commission. I was present at the first meeting which was held on this matter.

With me today is Commissioner Johnson.
Mr. LENNON. Commissioner Thompson.

Commissioner THOMPSON. That is correct.

Mr. LENNON. Yes, sir.

Commissioner THOMPSON. Commissioner Johnson was present when the Commission considered this matter on October 7. Let me just give you the chronology.

Mr. LENNON. I want to get the sequence if I can.

Commissioner THOMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. LENNON. What date did the Army request the Atomic Energy Commission to make the so-called feasibility study which later became known and identified as Project Harpin?

Commissioner THOMPSON. The first meeting that was held was a meeting in which Mr. Charles Poor came to the Commission and discussed it with Chairman Seaborg.

Mr. LENNON. Is that Mr. Charles Poor?

Commissioner THOMPSON. Of Dr. Foster's office.

Mr. LENNON. Dr. C. L. Poor, the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Research and Development, from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army?

Commisssioner THOMPSON. That is correct.

Mr. LENNON. He came personally?

Commissioner THOMPSON. Personally to discuss this matter.

Mr. LENNON. On what date?

Commissioner THOMPSON. On August 7, 1969.

Mr. LENNON. August 7, 1969.

Commissioner THOMPSON. That is correct.

Mr. LENNON. And discussed it with whom?

Commissioner THOMPSON. With Dr. Seaborg and myself.
Mr. LENNON. Dr. Seaborg is who, for the record?

Commissioner THOMPSON. Dr. Seaborg is the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Mr. LENNON. He is Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and there are how many members of the Atomic Energy Commission?

Commissioner THOMPSON. There are five, sir.

Mr. LENNON. There are five. You are one, Mr. Thompson is another, and Dr. Seaborg was Chairman at that time. Am I correct for the record?

Commissioner THOMPSON. Yes, sir. My name is Mr. Thompson. Mr. LENNON. Yes, sir.

Commissioner THOMPSON. And Commissioner Johnson is also with me today.

Mr. LENNON. Yes, sir. I realize that. All right, now this was on August what date?

Commissioner THOMPSON. August 7.

Mr. LENNON. August 7?

Commissioner THOMPSON. That is correct.

Mr. LENNON. The Commission responded, did it not, that it would undertake the feasibility study?

Commissioner THOMPSON. Well, in that first instance we simply discussed the matter. I personally indicated some qualifications because there were some problems involved, particularly in regard to safety

that concerned me. I have been rather heavily involved in the weapons areas so I indicated some concern. Evidently Mr. Poor went back to the Department of the Army and then on August 11 we were informally notified of the Department of Army's desire for us to consider this in a very serious way.

Mr. LENNON. You were requested by the Army, in the second instance you referred to, to reconsider your tenative decision of reservation?

Commissioner THOMPSON. Right.

Mr. LENNON. Identify the person of the Army who came back and asked you to reconsider the tentative reservation you had against this proposed feasibility study.

Commissioner THOMPSON. I am not sure that I can identify any person. I suspect that it was again a discussion between Mr. Poor and Chairman Seaborg. I cannot identify that person right now.

Mr. LENNON. You don't have this in the minutes?

Commissioner THOMPSON. This was a verbal discussion.

Mr. LENNON. That is one of the problems. Everything has been verbal. But go ahead; all right, sir, now when did the Atomic Energy Commission make the decision to authorize the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory to make this study? What was the date?

Commissioner THOMPSON. The Deputy Manager of the Nevada Operations Office and two military officers from the AEC Headquarters and a Department of the Army representative briefed a group of about 15 members of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory test division. Mr. LENNON. What dates?

Commisssioner THOMPSON. On August 19 and 20 on this general problem. At that time it was requested that LRL, in conjunction with our Nevada Operations Office, carry out a feasibility study on whether or not it was possible to dispose of these munitions by an underground explosion.

Mr. LENNON. This decision was made by the Atomic Energy Commission to authorize the facilities of its organization in Nevada, more definitively, the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, to make this study. Is that a fair statement?

Commissioner THOMPSON. Yes, sir; that is correct. We did authorize this study in order to try to see if it was feasible to do this. Mr. LENNON. The Commission authorized this study? Commissioner THOMPSON. That is correct.

Mr. LENNON. When did the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory furnish the Commission with its so-called feasibility study report on Project Harpin?

Commissioner THOMPSON. The study report was completed and sent to the AEC headquarters on September 15. On September 22 copies of the report, were forwarded, to the Department of the Army.

Mr. LENNON. Let me at this point, if I can, put my hand on it, if counsel can, read for the record the letter of transmittal dated September 22, to Brig. Gen. William W. Stone, Jr., Director, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Force Development, Department of Defense: