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The maximum adverse environmental impact would be the temporary contamination of approximately 1 cubic mile of water. However, this would occur only if all of the vaults ruptured simultaneously, which is extremely unlikely. It is more likely that the contaminated volumes will be much smaller in view of the expected slow release of the agent at the ocean bottom.

COMPLIANCE WITH LAW

Two recent public laws are particularly applicable to this proposed movement. The requirements of both statutes have been satisfied. First, Section 409 of Public Law 91-121 requires the Secretary of Defense to bring to the attention of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare the particulars of any proposed transportation of lethal chemical agents. The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare may then recommend precautionary measures necessary to protect the public health and safety. This review was made by the Surgeon General of the U.S. Public Health Service. To assist him, the Surgeon General assembled experts from within and outside the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Included were physicians, engineers, scientists, transportation, and other experts.

Mr. LENNON. At this point in the record I ask unanimous consent that there be inserted in the record the names of physicians, engineers, scientists, transportation, and other experts and particularly identify them with their specialty related to the college or university, or whatever it may be. Do you have any objection to that appearing in the record at this point?

Mr. BEAL. No, sir.

Mr. LENNON. Then will you furnish it for the record?

Mr. BEAL. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

Dr. Erwin Bellack, Chemist, Bureau of Water Hygiene.

William K. Byrd, Deputy Director for Operations, Office of Hazardous Materials, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Systems Development and Technology, Department of Transportation.

Dr. Hans L. Falk, Associate Director for Laboratory Research, National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, NIH.

Dr. Marcus M. Key, Director, Bureau of Occupational Safety and Hygiene,
Environmental Control Administration, EHS. Medical Director, USPHS.
Pope Lawrence, Senior Staff Scientist, Federal Facilities Branch, Bureau of
Abatement and Control, NAPCA. Scientist Director, USPHS.

Sim B. Shattuck, Chief, Program Services, Division of Emergency Health Services, HSMHA.

Dr. Barry D. Silverman, Medical Officer, Community Health Services, HEW Regional Office, Atlanta.

Mr. ROGERS. Wherever it would be appropriate, I would urge too that the Surgeon General submit the recommendation of this group to be made a part of the record at the appropriate point.

Mr. LENNON. Is there any objection to that on the part of the Surgeon General?

Dr. STEINFIELD. None.

Mr. LENNON. There is not.

Unanimous consent is granted that the ad hoc committee comments be placed in the record.

(The report follows:)

CONSOLIDATION OF AD HOC COMMITTEE DRAFT COMMENTS

PACKAGING

The proposed movement and disposal of the vaults poses no unusual hazard to public health and safety-provided the vaults remain intact. The actual risk of agent leakage during transportation appears comparatively small. The vaults can take the degree of temperature and vibrational exposures that they will be subjected to. The probability of leakage of these containers is not likely to be increased by the handling and transportation.

Recommendation: Rigorous physical and chemical monitoring before and after each handling operation is recommended to identify existing or potential problems.

SHIPMENT

1. The Army's plan appears to provide ample assurance that the vaults will be protected. The plan also appears to cover every imaginable contingency attending a railroad shipment of toxic material.

2. That route which presents the best rail service and possibly the shortest distance should be chosen. Any route passes through minor population centers and to evaluate the risk of the population, one would need to know the location of the tracks through town. Calculations of population densities of cities by themselves, do not give us enough information for such judgment.

3. Recommendation: Minimum publicity should be maintained. It would appear to be in the best interest of all to limit precise information to those individuals directly involved in the planning and operational phases of the move.

4. Recommendation: It would seem advisable to have aerial surveillance for the whole trip in communication with both train crews. It would give a better overview of the area including appearance of the road bed, other trains, potential accidents at road crossings, and assemblies of people.

5. Recommendation: Breakdown of railroad cars is not a likely event, but the train should contain spare cars and lifting equipment to move some of the vaults if necessary.

6. Recommendation: The pilot train must contain adequate medical and technical personnel and equipment to independently respond to any emergency.

7. Recommendation: When there are either rivers or lakes over or near which the trains pass, it would be advisable to take extra precautions. An adequate monitoring and civilian warning procedure in case of accident involving a water supply should be available.

8 Recommendation: The plan should indicate that from the time loading is commenced on the hulk at MOT, Sunny Point until the hulk clears the Cape Fear River Entrance Buoy, any additional safety precautions required by Coast Guard Captain of the Port, Wilmington will be provided by the responsible command.

9. There are three major threats during transportation to the integrity of the shipment as relating to public health.

a. Leakage The possibility of leakage during transportation appears to be comparatively small.

Recommendation: Monitoring, physical, chemical and through the use of a sufficient number of animal detectors properly situated should adequately protect against such an eventuality.

b. Sabotage-The time factor, accessibility to railroad and relatively slow movement of the trains especially through populated centers offer opportunities for sabotage attempts. Under those conditions the Army in coordination with law enforcement officials would know best how to prevent such a situation from arising. The most probable attempt would be made with either small arms or an explosive charge. The Department of Army testing program on simulated vaults has demonstrated that the hazard from attack by small arms is extremely minimal and if penetration of a warhead did occur, the area of contamination would be localized and well within the ability of the escort to handle.

Recommendation: In accordance with the Gross Committee recommendations, the Department of Army should determine the safe distance for vault separation during rail transport to negate propagation of explosive effects, both intrinsic and extrinsic.

The most serious threat to public health would seem to be as a result of an explosive charge of equivalent to 50 pounds or more of dynamite. Such an

incident could result in destruction of two vaults and dissemination of their contents.

Recommendation: Risk analysis of such an incident should be supplied and appropriate measures to safeguard the public could be planned for (see comments under HEALTH PROTECTION).

c. Collision

(1) Collision with a road vehicle transporting flammable liquids are a potential hazard. Sustained heating of the vaults at 150° C. for several hours could cause detonation of the explosive elements of the vaults. However, DOT tests and experience have shown that such a road vehicle under these circumstances burns only for 20-30 minutes.

Recommendation: As a further precaution, it is appropriate that fire fighting equipment be both on the pilot and the cargo train.

(2) Collision with a passing train will not occur since DOT will require a clear track on both sides at all times.

HEALTH PROTECTION

1. Recommendation: Personnel involved in this operation must be thoroughly trained in the medical and physical aspects of safety associated with exposure to agents involved. This includes detection, decontamination, treatment of self and casualties. This would deal with oxides of nitrogen and other hazardons gases besides the GB. It should be considered that reaction of GB in the cement may have produced a dimer which may have different properties than were anticipated. This is in analogy to an organic phosphate insecticide where su ch a dimer was formed with very unexpected toxic properties.

2. Recommendation: It would seem appropriate for the Department to be prepared to help allay public apprehension and even hysterical protests which might grow following public announcement. The public should be made aware that the full resources of the Department have been marshalled and stand ready to provide emergency medical backup in the remote event of an incident. 3. Recommendation: The Surgeon General's office should brief the Medical Directors in the affected Regions (III, IV) and arrange for them to be present when Surgeon, USCONARC, briefs the appropriate State health officials (F-3). The two Regional Medical Directors should be represented at the Office of the Surgeon, USCONARC, during the operations.

The suggestions submitted in the attached appendix are essentially those which are recommended for all disasters. They were developed by the Planning and Evaluation Branch, EHS from experience gained in all types of disasters and exercises and have been tailored to fit this operation. The Department of Defense will have to assist the states with personnel and material in order to implement the attached plans.

MISCELLANEOUS

1. Recommendation: The Surgeon General, USPHS, should also receive information copies of Advance Repship, Final Repship, Report of Arrival and Report indicating Completion of Loading and Date of Departure.

2. Recommendation: The disposal of these vaults should terminate the usage of this type of encasement of CW material.

APPENDIX-COMMUNITY HEALTH PROTECTION

State planning should be based on concept of supplementation of military resources to assure an adequate response to emergency medical requirements of a community in the event of an incident.

This should include, but not be restricted to:

A. Plan for alerting citizenry to awareness of danger. (This need not be a part of health plan but mention of planning responsibility should be made.)

B. Plans for evacuation in the event of an incident. (This may also be the responsibility of another agency.)

C. Plans for care of evacuees. (Generally the responsibility of American National Red Cross but mention should be made.)

D. Plans for immediate lifesaving resucitative measures.

It is expected that this responsibility will be carried out primarily through DOD because of specialized knowledge and equipment.

E. Plans for continuing medical care.

The medical emergency victim exposed either to life-threatening or disabling toxic materials may be expected to seek assistance at the nearest known medical

resource.

Casualties in the immediate area of the incident may be first seen by medical teams of the military and transportation provided for them to the nearest medical facility either by the military or by Community resources.

The state plan should therefore provide the DOD with:

1. Information concerning existing hospitals, and also PDH's and HRDI units along route, and the number of beds that might be made available according to the individual hospital disaster plan.

2. The number of ambulances in each community that can be made available. F. Many other individuals with real or imagined symptomatology may be expected to make their way to either hospitals or physicians offices through private transportation. To provide essential continuing medical assistance for the citizenry the State Health Plan should therefore provide for :

1. Briefing of key hospital personnel on symptomatology and treatment. of exposed individuals and military resources available.

2. Assistance to hospitals, if needed, in updating hospital disaster plans including evacuation of hospitals if necessary.

3. Supplementation of resources:

a. Drugs (Atropine).

b. Beds (PDH's).

4. Movement of patients either to military or other less crowded community hospitals. (This would supplement, if necessary capability of military.)

5. Movement of additional resources into community as may be indicated: a. Personnel

b. Drugs

6. Coordination with military in the release of press statements.

Suggested State level briefing for Governor's office, concerned agency heads, and

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a. Develop special contingency plan similar to Inter-Agency Radiological Health Assistance Plan-Incident/Accident emphasis.

b. Utilize team concept for assessing situation, determining actions, and direction of operations.

c. Develop plans for protection of population along routes of movement including health facilities.

As far as the Division of Emergency Health Service is concerned, we have experienced men in each of the states involved that are ready to assist in any way that we can. Should more be needed, they can be detailed from nearby states. If our services are utilized, it would be helpful to have as much advance notice as possible.

Mr. BEAL. After thorough review of the movement plan for several weeks, and after suggestion of certain revisions in the plan, which were adopted by the Army, the Department of HEW had no further recommendations.

The Secretary of State, whose department has carefully followed Operation CHASE since June 1969, has studied the plan for the transportation and disposal of these chemical munitions and found

no basis for a determination that the transportation and disposal in question will violate international law.

As required by the Act, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives were duly notified more than 10 days prior to planned movement and the Governors of the States concerned were formally informed and were also provided briefings. In addition, a briefing was provided for State health authorities.

Mr. LENNON. At this point, Mr. Secretary, and you may be absolutely accurate in your statement, what day was the briefing afforded to those few of us who were privileged to attend last week? Was it on Friday?

Mr. BEAL. July 30, Thursday. That was the briefing for concerned Representatives and Senators.

Mr. LENNON. July 30 was the same day that there was transmitted to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House the notice, because it was announced at that briefing that that was done. Mr. BEAL. Yes, sir.

Mr. LENNON. Let me recapitulate the paragraph on page 8, "the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives were duly notified more than 10 days prior to the planned movement and the Governors of the States concerned were formally informed and were also provided briefings."

Now, literally and definitively, that is in error because, as I read the schedule, your movements starts less than 10 days from the date you notified the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House. I want to get that point.

Mr. BEAL. The letter to the Speaker and the President said the transportation begins on the 10th of this month.

Mr. LENNON. Transportation from the embarkation seaward?
Mr. BEAL. No, sir, from the ammunition depot.

Mr. LENNON. What is the date now that your first movement starts from, say, Blue Grass?

Mr. BEAL. They both depart on the 10th.

Mr. LENNON. They both start on the 10th?

Mr. BEAL. The 10th of August.

Mr. LENNON. Let me ask the general sitting on the front row right back of you who has had charge of the briefing: Were we not furnished, sir, with an analysis of the transportation and the dates of the movement from both Blue Grass and Anniston, Ala., and the day that the vessel is supposed to be scuttled?

General BECKER. You were, sir.

Mr. LENNON. Did that not say that the vessel would be scuttled on August 10?

General BECKER. No, sir.

Mr. LENNON. Do you have a copy of that with you?

General BECKER. That is a subsequent date, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LENNON. I don't want to make a misstatement. That is in the fact sheet that you prepared up there. We got them as we were leaving that day. We didn't have them at the briefing because apparently you were not able to get them ready by the time of the briefing. What page is that on, sir, the schedule?

Will Mr. McElroy bring that forward and let me see it.
General BECKER. Mr. Chairman, here is a printed copy.

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