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1858.

IN THE EXCHEQUER CHAMBER.

LAING v. WHALEY and Another.

Feb. 8.

IN this case (reported antè, p. 675) judgment of affirmance Erroneous

was entered.

Hindmarch, at the last sitting of the Court (Dec. 2), moved that the entry of the judgment be amended. He submitted that the opinions of the majority of the Court in effect amounted to a judgment of reversal.

Per CURIAM.-We will consider how the judgment ought to be entered.

Cur. adv. vult.

WIGHTMAN, J., now said :-We are of opinion that the verdict for the plaintiff upon the issue joined on the second plea ought to stand, and that the judgment ought to be arrested.

(a) Upon the first point Wil. liams, J., Crowder, J., and Willes, J., were in support of the verdict; and Wightman, J., Erle, J., and Crompton, J., against it. Upon the second point Wightman, J., Erle, J., Williams, J., and Crompton, J., were of opinion that the judgment ought to be arrested. Crowder, J., and Willes, J., were of opinion that the declaration was good. Crompton, J., (with whom Erle, J., agreed) only thought the declaration might be

Judgment accordingly (a).

supported by supposing that an allegation of right was contained in it; which the Court in effect held that it did not contain. That as soon as the Court by a majority held the declaration proved, he considered that he was bound by that judgment; and assuming it to be proved by the facts stated, that is, without any right being proved, he was clearly of opinion that the declaration was bad.

entry of judg. ment amended.

1858.

MEMORANDA.

In last Trinity Term, the Hon. Sir John Taylor Coleridge, Knight, resigned his office of a Judge of the Court of Queen's Bench. He was succeeded by Hugh Hill, Esquire, one of Her Majesty's counsel, who was first called to the degree of the coif, and gave rings with the motto "Nil nisi cruce." He afterwards received the honour of knighthood.

In the Vacation preceding Hilary Term 1858, Jesse Addams, Esquire, D.C.L., Robert Joseph Phillimore, Esquire, D.C.L., James Parker Deane, Esquire, D.C.L, and Travers Twiss, Esquire, D.C.L., were appointed her Majesty's counsel,

AN

INDEX

TO THE

PRINCIPAL MATTERS.

ACCOUNT.

See COMMON LAW PROCEDURE
ACT, 1854, (5).

AFFIDAVIT.

See BILL OF SALE, (1), (2).
COUNTY COUrt, (2).
MASTER AND SERVANT, (2).
PRACTICE, (4).

AGENT.

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

AGREEMENT.

See GUARANTEE.

AMENDMENT.

See DISTRESS, (1).

ANNUITY.

See INCOME Tax, (1).
SUCCESSION DUTY, (2).

ARBITRATION.

See COMMON LAW PROCEDURE
ACT, 1854, (4), (5).
LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLI-
DATION ACT, 1845.
PRINTER.

Authority to refer-Partner.

A. and B. partners, dissolved the
partnership upon the terms that all
debts due to and owing by the firm
should be received and paid by A. A.
employed C., an attorney, in winding
up the affairs. A. having brought
an action against D., in the names
of himself and B., for a debt alleged
to be due to the firm, and a plea of
set-off having been pleaded, all
matters in difference between A. and
B. and D. were by a Judge's order
and by the consent of the attornies
employed in the cause, referred to
the award of M. C. acted solely
under A.'s instructions, without any
express authority from B. In an
action brought on the award :-
Held, that the submission was not

binding on B. Hatton and Cookson | authority of that other. 500 Tilbury and others,

v. Royle,

[blocks in formation]

See ARBITRATION.
SHERIFF, (1).
SOLICITOR.

AWARD.

See ARBITRATION.

BAILIFF.

See COUNTY COURT, (3).

BAILOR AND BAILEE.

Thorne v. 534

BANKING COMPANY.

See PLEADING, (1).

BANKRUPT.

See BILL OF Sale, (5).

(1). Deed of Arrangement. A deed of arrangement, under the 224th section of "The Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849," must provide for the distribution of all the debtor's estate and effects, and amongst all his creditors. But a deed providing for the distribution of all the debtor's estate amongst all the creditors, who would have been creditors under an adjudication of bankruptcy on the day of the meeting of creditors, treating such cre

Right of Bailee to set up title of ditors as creditors for the sums they

third person.

To an action of trover for goods the defendants pleaded that the goods were delivered by the plaintiff to the defendants to be by them warehoused and taken care of; that before the delivery the goods had been the property of one T. deceased, and that there was not at the time of the delivery any legal representative of the estate of T.; and that this fact was concealed from the defendants; that afterwards H. obtained letters of administration to the effects of T. and claimed the goods, and forbad the defendants to deliver them to the plaintiff.-Held a good plea.

Semble, thata warehouseman being a bailee of goods is not estopped from disputing the title of his bailor; but that, if the goods are the property of another, he may refuse to redeliver them, if he does so relying upon the right and title and by the

would on that day be entitled to prove for in bankruptcy, is not invalid, because: First, it does not contain an express assignment by the debtor of his estate, but only a covenant to assign it when required by the inspectors: Secondly, because it makes no provision for creditors who may have became so between the day of the meeting and the date of the deed, it not appearing that there were any creditors who became so between those times: Thirdly, because it contains a letter of license which is absolute and not conditional: Fourthly, because it does not contain a provision rendering it absolutely void if the debtor does not

perform the covenants contained in it.

A deed of arrangement under the 224th section is not invalidated by reason of its containing the following provisions.-First: A power to employ the debtor in winding up

his

affairs under the direction of inspectors, and for the debtor to employ persons under him with the sanction of the inspectors, and to pay those persons such reasonable remuneration as the inspectors shall think fit. Secondly: An authority to the inspectors to make advances to the debtor, in respect of any mercantile operations which may have been undertaken by the debtor. Thirdly: A provision for the payment of the costs and expenses of and attending the preparation of the deed and perusal thereof, and the management of the debtors' affairs between the meeting of the creditors and the execution of the deed, or relating, or preparatory to the meeting of creditors, and incident thereto, and to the investigation of affairs since the debtor stopped payment. Fourthly a discretionary power in the inspectors to retain the dividend which would be payable to a creditor, who at the declaration of the dividend, had not acceded to the deed, such creditor being at liberty to prove, so as to have a dividend out of existing or future funds, but so as not to disturb the former dividend. Fifthly: A power, in case the debtor should commit an act of bankruptcy, for the inspectors to retain 5001. for a certain period, as an indemnity against losses, costs, and expenses. Sixthly: A power to the inspectors to avoid the deed in certain events, at the expiration of three months from its date, excepting from the avoidance all acts, proceedings, conveyances, assignments, assurances, matters and things done under and by virtue of it; there being also a power to the inspectors, at any time after the date of the deed, to grant a certificate of conformity, as in bankruptcy, to all or either of several debtors. Semble, that the avoidance of the deed, under

the provision in question, would avoid the effect of such a certificate if previously granted to any such debtor.

In order to prove a deed of arrangement, the defendants produced from the Court of Bankruptcy a certificate of the inspectors, filed there in conformity with the 226th section of the Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849, and an account and affidavit of the defendant in conformity with the 227th section. The account included the debts and names of the creditors mentioned in the schedule to the deed. The certificate and other documents were not filed until after action brought. The defendants also proved that the deed was, for some time before the commencement of the action, in the same state as to the execution thereof by the several parties as when produced at the trial, with the exception of two creditors, without whom 6-7ths in number and value appeared to have executed.-Held, sufficient evidence of the due execution of the deed. Irving and Another v. Gray, Hutton and Others,

(2). Order for Protection.

34

The plaintiff, a bankrupt, who had obtained an order for protection to complete his examination, under the 112th section of the Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849, at the time of his bankruptcy owed two poor rates, and had been assessed to a third, but such third rate was not allowed or published until after his bankruptcy. The defendants, overseers of the poor, during the continuance of such protection, summoned the plaintiff for the nonpayment of the three rates. The plaintiff did not attend before the justices. It did not appear what took place at

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