« EelmineJätka »
standing advertisement, but that when standing advertisements are printed in the same page so as completely to fill it, the compositor is only entitled to charge for his time in making up. Hill v. Levey and Another, 7, 702
The subscribers' agreement of a proposed Company stated that it was formed for making a railway to be called "The Galway and Kilkenny Railway," and to commence at Kilkenny and terminate in the town of Galway, the capital to be one million in shares of 251. each. The deed empowered the directors to abandon the undertaking, or any part thereof and also to make
Conduct of his Cause at Trial in application to parliament for an Act
for of the purposes aforesaid: any also to fix upon, and from time to time to alter or vary the termini, route, course, or line of the railway;
and to determine whether and how
far, and to what extent the undertaking should be carried into effect and deferred or abandoned: and in case any act should authorize the construction of a part thereof, to make in any subsequent session application for the construction of the remainder. The defendant executed the deed as a subscriber for 150 shares, and paid the deposit of 17. 10s. per share. The directors applied to parliament and an Act passed (9 & 10 Vict. c. ccclx.) which incorporated the Company by the name of "The Kilkenny and Great Southern and Western Railway Company," for making a railway from Kilkenny to Cuddagh, the capital of the Company to be 225,0001, in 11,250 shares of 201. each. After the Act passed the defendant was placed on the register of shareholders as a subscriber for fifty shares of 20/. each :-Held, in the Exchequer Chamber (affirming the judgment of the Court of Exchequer), that the defendant was a shareholder in the incorporated Company, and liable as such to execution on a judgment recovered by a creditor against the Company.
The 36th section of the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 8 & 9
Vict. c. 16, which enables execution | wood to become peculiarly liable to to issue "against any of the share-take fire by neglecting to clear holders," if the execution against the away the dry grass and dead sticks. property or effects of the Company Vaughan v. The Taff Vale Railway proves ineffectual, means share- Company, holders at the time of the sheriff's return of nulla bona :-So Held, in the Exchequer Chamber, affirming the judgment of the Court of Exchequer. Nixon v. Brownlow. Nixon v. Green,
(3). Sale of Carriages for Toll.
By the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 20, s. 97, it is provided that if, on demand any person fail to pay the tolls due in respect of any carriage, &c., it shall be lawful for the Company to detain and sell the carriage, &c., of the party liable to such tolls, and out of the monies arising from such sale to retain the tolls.-Held, that a demand of the sum actually due for tolls is a condition precedent to the right to sell under this section.
A wood adjoining the defendants' railway was burnt by sparks from the locomotives. On several previous occasions it had been set on fire, and the Company had paid for the damage. Evidence was given that the defendants had done everything that was practicable to the locomotives to make them safe, but it was admitted that with these precautions the locomotives had been the means of occasionally setting fire to the wood. The banks of the rail-riages of the Company; and by s. 30, way were covered with inflammable grass. The jury found the Company guilty of negligence.
Held: First, that, assuming the fire to have been caused by lighted coals from the locomotives falling in the plaintiff's wood, the defendants were liable.
Secondly, that they were not excused by the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act, 8 & 9 Vict. c. 20, 8. 86.
Thirdly, that if the fire broke out on the defendants' land and was communicated to the wood from the banks of the railway, there was evidence to justify the verdict; and that the defendants were not protected by the 14 Geo. 3, c. 78, s. 84. Fourthly, that it was no defence that the plaintiff had allowed his
By the 9 & 10 Vict. c. ccciii., s. 29, a railway Company were empowered to take tolls for the use of their railway in respect of the tonnage of articles conveyed upon the railway certain sums per ton, and a further sum if conveyed in the car
tolls for the use of engines. Section 35 fixed a maximum rate of charge, including the charges for the use of carriages, waggons or trucks, and for locomotive power, and all other charges incident to such conveyance. By section 37, the Company were empowered to take increased charges for the conveyance of goods, by agreement with the owners of goods, by reason of any special service. The Company having for a considerable time carried on their line coals in carriages belonging to the plaintiff, from P. to H., made a demand of a gross sum equal to the amount of the tonnage rates for coals and use of engines; and also of a sum claimed by them for sending back the plaintiff's empty carriages from H. to P. They gave no explanation of the
REGISTRATION OF DESIGNS.
items making up the gross sum | cells, called the honeycomb pattern, claimed. The plaintiff having omit- and it consisted of a combination of ted to pay the amount claimed, the the large and small honeycomb, so Company sold the plaintiff's car- as to form a large honeycomb stripe riages, &c., to satisfy the amount on a small honeycomb ground. The due.-Held, that the sum claimed large honeycomb was not new and for sending back the return waggons the small honeycomb was not new, was not toll, and that the Company but they had never been used in having demanded a larger sum than combination before the plaintiffs that due for tolls, the sale was un-registered their design. Other falawful.
Semble, that the Company might be entitled to charge for sending back the waggons by agreement as for special services under section 37. Field v. The Newport, Abergavenny and Hereford Railway Company, 409
See MORTGAGE, (1).
brics had been woven with a similar combination of a large and small pattern. In an action against the defendant for infringing the plaintiffs' copyright.-Held, that the design was not "new and original " within the meaning of the 5 & 6
Vict. c. 100. Harrison and Another v. Taylor, 301
See MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT,
See DISTRESS, (2).
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
REASONABLE AND PRO-
See BANKRUPT, (2).
See COMMON LAW PROCEDURE
REGISTRATION OF DESIGNS
The plaintiffs registered, under the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 100, a design for ornamenting woven fabrics. The design was applied to a fabric woven in
SECURITY FOR COSTS.
See INCOME Tax, (1).
See CHELTENHAM IMPROVEMENT
Goods having been seized in execution and claimed, the mere fact that the undersheriff was attorney
(3). Notice of Settlement of Action. In February 1857, the defendant, a sheriff's officer, received from the undersheriff a warrant to execute a
writ of ca. sa. issued on a judgment recovered against A. the now plaintiff, by B. On the 20th April, B.'s attorney wrote to the defendant to suspend the execution for fourteen
rested on another writ, the officer The defendant being ardetained him on the plaintiff's writ till he had communicated with the plaintiff, and then, on the plaintiff's instructions, let the defendant go:
Held, that, the defendant not having been legally in custody under the plaintiff's writ, the debt was not satisfied by the detention and subsequent discharge of the defendant. Semple v. Keen,
days. On the 2nd May, B.'s attor-"Blackleg."-" Cheating Gambler." ney wrote to the defendant as follows: This action having been arranged, we have given, Mr. G." (A.'s attorney), who informs us he has paid your charges, notice of withdrawal of ca. sa.' On the same day B.'s attorney wrote to A.'s attorney acknowledging the receipt of money in settlement of the action. No notice of the withdrawal of the ca. sa. was sent to the sheriff or undersheriff. On the 7th November, the undersheriff wrote to the defendant to execute the ca. sa., and he accordingly arrested and impri
The plaintiff and defendant being present in a public house where there had been a raffle, the defendant said "I am surprised at R. allowing a blackleg in this room.' A witness being asked what he understood by "blackleg," said, "a person in the habit of cheating at cards." The question was objected to, but allowed. The Judge told the jury that if the plaintiff meant to charge the defendant with being a gambler simply the action would not lie, but if he meant to impute that he was
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 945
cheating gambler they would find for
Held: (Per Pollock, C. B., and
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
within 17th Section.
Watson, B.)-First, that it is not Acceptance and Receipt of Goods actionable without special damage to call a man a blackleg, because it does not necessarily mean a cheating gambler.
Secondly, that the evidence as to the meaning of the word "blackleg"
was not admissible.
Per Martin, B., and Bramwell, B. -First, that, under the circumstances, it must be taken that the defendant did make use of the word with intent to convey to the minds of those present that the plaintiff was a cheating gambler, and
that therefore the action was maintainable.
Secondly, that the evidence was admissible. Barnet v. Allen, 376
A. agreed verbally to buy of B. all the whalebone he could procure at a certain price, to be sent by a parti cular railway, A. agreeing to pay the carriage. Some whalebone, to an amount exceeding 107., having been delivered at the railway station been duly invoiced to him, was lost by B. consigned to A., and having in the transit. B. then wrote requesting A. to make a claim against the Company.-Held, that there having been no acceptance and receipt of the goods within the 17th section of the Statute of Frauds, A., the consignee, was not entitled to sue the railway Company for the loss. Coombs v. The Bristol and Exeter Railway Company, 510
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
(3 & 4 WM. 4, c. 27).
Acknowledgment of Title.
In 1818 the plaintiff and the defendant's grandfather became seised. as tenants in common of a meadow. The meadow was then in the possession of the defendant's grandfather, who had previously held it under a lease. The plaintiff's father became possessed in 1826, and so continued till his death in 1836. In 1837 Newton, who was proved to be a land agent who received the defendant's rents and managed his property, wrote the following letter to the plaintiff's agent:-"Sir,— Mr. P. (the defendant) is now in