« EelmineJätka »
possession of his 2-3rds of the meadow, who will no doubt accept a lease (three lives) for Ley's (the plaintiff's) 1-3rd at a fair rack-rent. You must be aware Mr. P. is not bound to pay rent for Ley's 1-3rd during the time his father held the meadow, but no doubt he will do so in case you agree for a lease. Signed J. Newton. Will you favour me with the terms of a lease for the 1-3rd of the meadow that I may lay it before Mr. P." No answer was shewn to have been given to this letter, but the defendant continued in possession of the land down to 1857, when an action of ejectment was commenced. It was not shewn that either the defendant or his predecessors had paid any rent to the plaintiff since 1818. Newton was in Court, but not called as a witness by the defendant.-Held, that the
letter was not a sufficient acknowledgment of the plaintiff's title within the 14th section of the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 27.
Held, also, by Bramwell, B., Watson, B., and Channell, B.; dissentiente Martin, B.-That the latter, coupled with the other facts, was not evidence from which the creation of a tenancy at will could be presumed.
Quare, whether the letter was admissible in evidence against the defendant. Ley v. Peter,
STAY OF PROCEEDINGS. See COSTS (1).
(1). Estate Vested in Interest before
Act-in Possession after Act.
A testator devised his real estate
to D. for life, and after D.'s decease to his eldest and other sons in tail male: and in default of such issue to H. for life, and after his decease to the eldest son of H. for life, with remainders over. The testator died in June, 1835, leaving D. and H., and the defendant (the eldest son of H.), him surviving. H. died in November, 1849, leaving the defendant him surviving. On the 19th of May, 1853, "The Succession Duty Act, 1853," came into operation. In November, 1856, D. died, whereupon the defendant succeeded to the estate under the testator's will.-Held, that the defendant was chargeable with duty under the 2nd section of "The Succession Duty Act, 1853." The Attorney General v. Lord Middleton,
tates. Relinquishment of Annuity. (2). Resettlement of Entailed Es
A testator devised his estates in L. to his brother C. for life, with remainder in tail to his first and other sons. On the 22nd March, 1848, C. and the defendant, his eldest son, executed a disentailing deed, whereby they limited the estate to such uses as they should jointly appoint, and in default of such appointment to the uses declared by the will of the testator. On the same day C. and the defendant executed another disentailing deed of estates devised to them by another testator and also limited them to such uses as they should jointly appoint. On the 23rd March, 1848, C. and the defendant executed a joint appointment, whereby, after reciting the two disentailing deeds, and certain arrangements made in respect of incumbrances with other stipulations, they appointed the estates of L. to the use that the defendant might receive thereout the yearly sum of 10001. during the
joint lives of himself and C., and subject thereto to the use of C. for life in restoration, corroboration, and confirmation of his previous life estate, and after his decease to the use of the defendant for life, and after his decease to the use of his eldest son for life, with remainder in tail male. In the year 1855 C. died.
Held: First, that the defendant took a succession under a disposition made by himself, within the meaning of the 12th section of "The Succession Duty Act, 1853," and was therefore chargeable with duty at the rate of 3 per cent.
Secondly, that the defendant was not entitled under the 38th section to any allowance in respect of the 10007. a year which ceased on the death of C. The Attorney General v. Major Sibthorp, 424
The time appointed for the sitting of a Court must be understood as the mean time at the place where the Court sits, and not Greenwich time, unless it be so expressed. Curtis v. March, 866
See RAILWAY COMPANY, (3).
See BANKRUPT, (2). CONSTABLE. PLEADING, (2).
See BILL OF SALE, (5). INSURANCE.
See LIVERPOOL DOCKS.
VENDOR AND VENDEE.
When Property vests in Vendee.
The defendants, merchants at Bristol, through a broker, contracted to buy of the plaintiffs, merchants at Rotterdam, ten tons of the best refined rape oil, to be shipped "free on board" at Rotterdam in September 1857, at 487. 15s. per ton, to be paid for, on delivery to the defendants of the bills of lading, by bill of exchange to be accepted by the defendants payable three months after date, and to be dated on the day of shipment of the oil. On the 8th of September the plaintiff's (having on the previous day advised that the shipment
would be made) shipped on board a general ship, trading between Rotterdam and Bristol, five tons of the oil, and the master signed a bill of lading by which the oil was deliverable "unto shipper's order;" and the plaintiffs indorsed it specially to the defendants. On the same day the plaintiff's inclosed in a letter to the broker the bill of lading, invoice and a bill of exchange drawn on the defendants in accordance with the
contract. On the night of the 9th the ship with the oil on board was run down in the Bristol Channel and the oil totally lost. The plaintiffs' letter of the 8th arrived at Bristol on the afternoon of the 10th in due course of post, but after business hours. On the morning of the 11th the broker left with the defendants the bill of lading, invoice and bill of exchange for their acceptance. At that time he knew of the loss of the ship. In about two hours afterwards the defendants returned to the broker the documents left with them, on the ground that, under the circumstances, they were not liable to pay for the oil. In an action for not
accepting the bill of exchange, and for goods sold and delivered :-Held, that the property in the oil vested in the defendants on its delivery on board the ship, and consequently the plaintiffs were entitled to recover on both counts: Per Pollock, C. B., Martin, B., and Channell, B.-Bramwell, B., dissentiente. Browne and Another v. Hare and Another,
See PRACTICE, (4).
WAREHOUSEMAN. See BAILOR AND BAILEE.
WARRANT OF COMMIT. MENT.
See MASTER AND SERVANT, (2).
Case for Fouling-Against Stranger by Person taking Water by Licence of Owner.
A declaration alleged that the plaintiffs were possessed of steamengines and boilers, and used, had, and enjoyed the benefit and advantage of the waters of a certain branch canal to supply the same, and which waters ought to have flowed and been without the fouling or pollution thereafter mentioned: yet the defendant wrongfully discharged into the water of the canal foul materials and thereby rendered the waters foul, whereby the plaintiffs' engines and boilers were injured. The defendant pleaded; first, not guilty: secondly, that the waters of the canal ought not to have flowed and been without the fouling mentioned. An arbitrator, to whom the cause was referred, found that the plaintiffs, by permission of a canal company, made a cut from the canal to their own premises, by and with which water they fed the which water got to those premises boilers of their engines. The defendant, without any right or permission from the Company, fouled the water in the canal, whereby the water as it came into the plaintiff's' premises was fouled, and by the use of it the plaintiffs' boilers were injured. Judgment having been given for the plaintiffs:
Held, in the Exchequer Chamber, by Williams, J., Crowder, J., and Villes, J., that the verdict upon the issue joined on the second plea ought to be found for the plaintiffs: by Wightman, J., Erle, J., and Cromp
hals and th dbal, when s and box
dy, that t
cat from the
ight or per
whereby the e plaintifs
by the use
s were in
RAYNER AND HODGES, PRINTERS, 109, FETTER LANE, FLEET STREET.