to the extent of the husband's interest therein (Fisher v. Shirley, 43 Ch. D. 290); and not only bound his interest in her real estate but prevented him from concurring with her in defeating the settlement (Pimm v. Insall, 1 Mac. & G. 449; Ex p. Blake, 16 Beav. 463; Sharpe v. Foy, 4 Ch. 35).

Nor, independently of this act, could a female infant enter into a binding contract to settle her separate estate (Simpson v. Jones, 2 R. & M. 365). But she might, when adult, confirm such contract (Smith v. Lucas, 18 Ch. D. 531), e.g., by appointing new trustees (Merryweather v. Jones, 4 Giff. 509; see Haywood v. Tidy, 63 L. T. 679).

18 & 19 Vict.

c. 43, s. 1.

An infant's contract to make a settlement has been held to be voidable, Infant's connot void (Smith v. Lucas, 18 Ch. D. 531; Cooke v. Cooke, 38 Ch. D. 209; tract voidable. Duncan v. Dixon, 44 Ch. D. 211); and has also been held not to fall within

37 & 38 Vict. c. 62 (Duncan v. Dixon, sup.)

Where a person elects to avoid a settlement made by him or her when an infant, any interest to which he or she is entitled in property brought into settlement by the other person may be impounded to make good the loss to the other beneficiaries (Carter v. Silber, 1891, 3 Ch. 553; Hamilton v. Hamilton, 1892, 1 Ch. 396). In the case, however, of a woman, property subject to a restraint on anticipation cannot be impounded (Hamilton v. Hamilton, sup.)

(b) The act applies to Ireland (23 & 24 Vict. c. 83).

The court has no jurisdiction to compel an infant ward to make a Jurisdiction settlement of his own property (Leigh v. Leigh, 40 Ch. Div. 290; Buck- under the master v. Buckmaster, 35 Ch. Div. 21; Seaton v. Seaton, 13 App. Cas. 80; act. as to an undertaking given by a suitor of a ward, see Bolton v. Bolton, 1891, 3 Ch. 270). In the case of infants not wards who marry after the age at which they are capable of contracting marriage, the court has no jurisdiction to settle their property (Re Potter, 7 Eq. 484). The court may, however, compel a representation to be made good on the faith of which a settlement of an infant's property has been sanctioned under this act (Mills v. Fox, 37 Ch. D. 153). An application under the act does not make the infant a ward of court (Re Dalton, 6 D. M. & G. 201); and the court will not inquire into the propriety of the marriage (Ib.; but see Re Strong, 26 L. J. Ch. 64). In Re Sampson and Wall (25 Ch. Div. Post-nuptial 482) the Court of Appeal decided that notwithstanding the words "upon settlements. or in contemplation of his or her marriage," the act enabled a settlement to be made after the marriage had taken place; but the House of Lords declined to express an opinion on the point (Seaton v. Seaton, 13 App. Cas. 61); and the decision would not authorize a settlement where a considerable interval had elapsed since the marriage (Leigh v. Leigh, 40 Ch. Div. 295). Where an infant had married before the age mentioned in sect. 4, a post-nuptial settlement was approved after she had attained that age (Re Philips, 34 Ch. D. 467; but see Leigh v. Leigh, sup.) It was said by Stuart, V.-C., that the court had no jurisdiction under the act to approve a settlement originally made without its concurrence (Re Fuller, 10th February, 1860; Morgan, 213, 5th ed.)

The disability of infancy is the only disability with which the act deals. Effect of the It does not affect the disability of coverture (Seaton v. Seaton, 13 App. act. Cas. 70, 79). Nor does it enable an infant to execute during infancy a power conferred upon her by a settlement approved by the court (Re Armit, I. R. 5 Eq. 352; see, however, as to the decision in this case, Re D'Angibau, Andrews v. Andrews, 15 Ch. Div. 228). An order under this section which has not been acted upon will not prevent the transfer of the fund to the infant after twenty-one (Sams v. Cronin, 22 W. R. 204). The power of making a settlement given by sect. 1 is not limited to a settlement upon the infant's husband and children (Re Scott, Scott v. Hanbury, 1891, 1 Ch. 298). Where a settlement made in execution of a power of appointment was sanctioned by the court, and the objects failed, there was a resulting trust for the appointor (Ib.) A legacy bequeathed to the wife after marriage was held to be "property in expectancy within this section, and capable of being bound by the settlement (Re Johnson, Moore v. Johnson, 1891, 3 Ch. 48).

18 & 19 Vict. c. 43, s. 2.

2. Provided always, that in case any appointment under a power of appointment, or any disentailing assurance, shall have In case infant been executed by any infant tenant in tail under the provisions die under age, of this act, and such infant shall afterwards die under age, such appointment, appointment or disentailing assurance shall thereupon become absolutely void (c).

&c., to be

void.

The sanction

of the Court of Chancery to be given upon petition.

The settlement.

Not to apply to males

under twenty

or females

under seven

teen years

of age.

(c) The section is limited to tenants in tail (Re Scott, Scott v. Hanbury, 1891, 1 Ch. 298).

3. The sanction of the Court of Chancery to any such settlement or contract for a settlement may be given, upon petition presented by the infant or his or her guardian in a summary way, without the institution of a suit (d); and if there be no guardian, the court may require a guardian to be appointed or not, as it shall think fit (e); and the court also may, if it shall think fit, require that any person interested or appearing to be interested in the property should be served with notice of such petition.

(d) Applications under the act, which were formerly by petition (Peareth v. Marriott, 1866, W. N. p. 48), are now by summons (R. S. C. Ord. 55, r. 2 (10)).

Ord. 55, r. 26, provides that applications to obtain the sanction of the court to infants making settlements on marriage under the act of 18 & 19 Vict. c. 43, evidence is to be produced to show-(a) the age of the infant; (b) whether the infant has any parents or guardians; (c) with whom or under whose care the infant is living, and if the infant has no parents or guardians, what near relations the infant has; (d) the rank and position in life of the infant and parents; (e) what the infant's property and fortune consist of; (f) the age, rank and position in life of the person to whom the infant is about to be married; (g) what property, fortune, and income such person has; (h) the fitness of the proposed trustees and their consent to act. The proposals for the settlement of the property of the infant and of the person to whom such infant is proposed to be married are to be submitted to the judge.

As to the clauses which will be inserted in the settlement, see Re Williams (8 W. R. 678); Re M'Clintock (10 Ir. Ch. R. N. S. 469); Ex p. Smith (22 W. R. 294); Rudge v. Winnall (11 Beav. 98). A covenant to settle after-acquired property may be inserted (Re Johnson, Moore v. Johnson, 1891, 3 Ch. 48). As to the form of settlement where the marriage was in contempt of court, see Re Sampson and Wall (25 Ch. Div. 482). The costs of the settlement may be paid out of the corpus of the fund (De Stacpoole v. De Stacpoole, 37 Ch. D. 139).

(e) As to the appointment of guardians, see Dan. Ch. Pr., and note in Annual Practice to R. S. C. Ord. 16, r. 16.

4. Provided always, that nothing in this act contained shall apply to any male infant under the age of twenty years, or to any female infant under the age of seventeen years (f).

(f) Where a female infant married under seventeen a settlement was approved after she attained that age (Re Phillips, 34 Ch. D. 467; but see Leigh v. Leigh, 40 Ch. Div. 297).

ALIENATION OF THE INTERESTS OF MARRIED
WOMEN IN PERSONAL ESTATE.

20 & 21 VICTORIÆ, CAP. 57.

An Act to enable Married. Women to dispose of Reversionary Interests in Personal Estate.

Be it enacted as follows:

[25th August, 1857.]

20 & 21 Vict.

c. 57, s. 1.

reversionary

release powers

1. After the thirty-first day of December, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-seven, it shall be lawful for every married Married woman by deed to dispose of (a) every future or reversionary women may interest, whether vested or contingent, of such married woman, dispose of or her husband in her right, in any personal estate whatsoever, interests in to which she shall be entitled under any instrument made after personal the said thirty-first day of December, one thousand eight hundred estate, and and fifty-seven (4) (except such a settlement as after mentioned),. over such and also to release or extinguish any power (c) which may be estate, and vested in or limited or reserved to her in regard to any such also their rights to a personal estate, as fully and effectually as she could do if she settlement were a feme sole, and also to release and extinguish her right out of such or equity to a settlement out of any personal estate to which estate in possession. she, or her husband in her right, may be entitled in possession under any such instrument as aforesaid, save and except that no such disposition, release or extinguishment shall be valid unless the husband concur in the deed by which the same shall be effected, nor unless the deed be acknowledged by her as hereinafter directed: provided always, that nothing herein contained shall extend to any reversionary interest to which she shall become entitled by virtue of any deed, will or instrument, by which she shall be restrained from alienating or affecting the same.

action not

settled to her

(a) For a married woman's power of disposition over reversionary inte- Married rests in personalty settled to her separate use, see the note to 3 & 4 Will. 4, woman unable c. 74, s. 78, ante, p. 297. As regards her reversionary interests in per- to dispose of sonalty not settled to her separate use, it was well established before reversionary 20 & 21 Vict. c. 57, that a husband could not assign or release his wife's choses in reversionary choses in action so as to bind her surviving, and the fact of her joining in the assignment made no difference (Purdew v. Jackson, 1 Russ. 1; Cresswell v. Dewell, 4 Giff. 460; see Winter v. Easum, 2 D. J. & S. 272; Bolitho v. Hillyar, 34 Beav. 180; Rogers v. Ancaster, 14 Beav. 445; Hore v. Becher, 12 Sim. 465; Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, L. R. 2 P. C. 87). Nor could a married woman by election part with her reversionary choses in action (Williams v. Mayne, I. R. 1 Eq. 519). A husband and wife could not effectually dispose of the life interest of the wife in a fund not

separate use, except under 20 & 21 Vict.

c. 57.

316

20 & 21 Vict.
c. 57, s. 1.

Cases under
section.

Alienation of Interests of Married Women in Personalty.

settled to her separate use beyond the duration of the coverture (Stiffe v. Everitt, 1 M. & C. 37; Re Godfrey, I. R. 1 Eq. 533). A husband and son, having surrendered and released their respective interests to the wife, for the express purpose of giving her a present absolute interest in a fund, and thereby enabling her to assign it to the son, the court refused to establish an equitable merger to defeat its own practice in the protection of married women (Whittle v. Henning, 2 Phill. C. C. 731; Story v. Tonge, 7 Beav. 91; Hanchett v. Briscoe, 22 Beav. 496; see however 14 Sim. 592-599; Bishop v. Colebrooke, 16 Sim. 39).

An assignment under this act ought not to be regarded as that of the husband and wife according to their respective interests (Re Batchelor, Sloper v. Oliver, 16 Eq. 485). Where the property assigned consisted of a wife's reversionary interest under a will, the assignment prevented the executors from exercising any right of retainer over the interest assigned in respect of a debt due from the husband to the testator (Re Batchelor, sup. ; compare the effect on such retainer of the wife's •Seere Turner, equity to a settlement: Re Briant, Poulter v. Shackel, 39 Ch. D. 471). A policy of insurance effected by a married woman in her own name may be Jurner v. Fitzroy, disposed of under this act (Witherby v. Rackham, 1891, W. N. 57). X 6.2.3.758.7

Powers.

Deeds to be

the manner

required by

c. 74, for
disposing of
interests in
or powers
over land in
England or
Wales;

If the act 18 & 19 Vict. c. 43 (ante, p. 312), applies to post-nuptial settlements, it does not enable a married woman to evade the formalities of this act (Seaton v. Seaton, 13 App. Cas. 70).

An acknowledgment under this act by a married woman of an assignment was taken into consideration even where the act did not apply (Roberts v. Cooper, 1891, 2 Ch. 335).

(b) An appointment of a reversionary interest in personalty by deed after 1857, under a special power in a deed dated before 1857, does not bring the interest within this act, even if the prior life interest is assigned at the same time (Re Butler, I. R. 3 Eq. 138).

(c) As to the various kinds of powers, their suspension and extinction, and as to the execution of powers by married women, see the note to 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 78, ante, p. 296.

2. Every deed to be executed in England or Wales by a maracknowledged ried woman for any of the of this act shall be acknowby married purposes women in ledged by her, and be otherwise perfected, in the manner by the act 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, prescribed for the acknowledgment and perfecting of deeds disposing of interests of married women in 3. & 4. Will. 4, land; and every deed to be executed in Ireland by a married woman for any of the purposes of the act shall be acknowledged by her and be otherwise perfected in the manner by the act 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 92, prescribed for the acknowledgment and perfecting of deeds disposing of interests of married women in land: and all and singular the clauses and provisions in the said acts concerning the disposition of lands by married women, including Will. 4, c. 92. the provisions for dispensing with the concurrence of the husbands of married women, in the cases in the said acts mentioned shall extend and be applicable to such interests in personal estate, and to such powers as may be disposed of, released, or extinguished by virtue of this act, as fully and effectually as if such interests or powers were interests in or powers over land (d).

In Ireland,
as by 4 & 5

(d) An order was made under this act, enabling a married woman, without the concurrence of her husband, to dispose of a reversionary interest in government stock (Re Rogers, L. R. 1 C. P. 47). If such an order be obtained by fraud or suppression of facts it will be set aside (Ex p. Cockerell, 4 C. P. D. 39).

3. Provided always, that the powers of disposition given to a 20 & 21 Vict. married woman by this act shall not interfere with any power c. 57, s. 3. which independently of this act may be vested in or limited or The powers reserved to her, so as to prevent her from exercising such power of disposition in any case, except so far as by any disposition made by her given by this under this act she may be prevented from so doing, in conse- interfere with quence of such power having been suspended or extinguished any other by such disposition.

act not to

powers.

settlements

4. Provided always, that the powers of disposition hereby Act not to given to a married woman shall not enable her to dispose of any extend to interest in personal estate settled upon her by any settlement or of married agreement for a settlement made on the occasion of her mar- women upon riage (e). marriage.

(e) An agreement in contemplation of marriage was executed by the husband and wife to settle a money fund of the wife's for her separate use -to return to the husband if he should survive. The court considered that the wife was to have the absolute interest in the event of her surviving, and that the case fell within the exception contained in this section (Clarke v. Green, 2 H. & M. 474).

5. This act shall not extend to Scotland.

Not to extend to Scotland.

MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY.

33 & 34 VICTORIÆ, CAP. 93.

An Act to amend the Law relating to the Property of

Married Women.

[9th August, 1870.]

WHEREAS it is desirable to amend the law of property and 33 & 34 Vict. contract with respect to married women: Be it enacted as follows:

c. 93, s. 1.

women to be

1. The wages and earnings of any married woman acquired Earnings of or gained by her after the passing of this act in any employ- married ment, occupation, or trade in which she is engaged or which deemed their she carries on separately from her husband, and also any money own property. or property so acquired by her through the exercise of any literary, artistic, or scientific skill, and all investments of such wages, earnings, money, or property, shall be deemed and taken to be property held and settled to her separate use, independent of any husband to whom she may be married, and her receipts alone shall be a good discharge for such wages, earnings, money, and property (a).

This act has been repealed, saving all acts done and rights or liabilities acquired thereunder (M. W. P. Act, 1882, s. 22, post, p. 338).

(a) Under the old law a husband might in his own name recover his