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45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 20. Married

liable to the

parish for

the mainte

husband.

31 & 32 Vict. e. 122.

20. Where in England the husband of any woman having separate property becomes chargeable to any union or parish, the justices having jurisdiction in such union or parish may, in woman to be petty sessions assembled, upon application of the guardians of the poor, issue a summons against the wife, and make and enforce such order against her for the maintenance of her nance of her husband out of such separate property as by the thirty-third section of the Poor Law Amendment Act, 1868, they may now make and enforce against a husband for the maintenance of his wife if she becomes chargeable to any union or parish. Where in Ireland relief is given under the provisions of the acts relating to the relief of the destitute poor to the husband of any woman having separate property, the cost price of such relief is hereby declared to be a loan from the guardians of the union in which the same shall be given, and shall be recoverable from such woman as if she were a feme sole by the same actions and proceedings as money lent.

Married

woman to be

parish for the mainte

21. A married woman having separate property shall be liable to the subject to all such liability for the maintenance of her children and grandchildren as the husband is now by law subject to for the maintenance of her children and grandchildren: Provided always, that nothing in this act shall relieve her husband from any liability imposed upon him by law to maintain her children or grandchildren (x).

nance of her children.

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Interpreta

(x) See Peters v. Cowie (2 Q. B. D. 131); Coleman v. Birmingham (6 Q. B. D. 615).

22. The Married Women's Property Act, 1870, and the Married Women's Property Act, 1870, Amendment Act, 1874, are hereby repealed: Provided that such repeal shall not affect any act done or right acquired while either of such acts was in force, or any right or liability of any husband or wife, married before the commencement of this act, to sue or be sued under the provisions of the said repealed acts or either of them, for or in respect of any debt, contract, wrong, or other matter or thing whatsoever, for or in respect of which any such right or liability shall have accrued to or against such husband or wife before the commencement of this act.

23. For the purposes of this act the legal personal representative of any married woman shall in respect of her separate estate have the same rights and liabilities and be subject to the same jurisdiction as she would be if she were living (y).

(y) A husband who takes separate property jure mariti is a "legal personal representative" within this section, and liable thereunder to the extent of the property so taken (Surman v. Wharton, 1891, 1 Q. B. 491).

24. The word "contract" in this act shall include the accepttion of terms. ance of any trust, or of the office of executrix or administratrix,

and the provisions of this act as to liabilities of married women shall extend to all liabilities by reason of any breach of trust or devastavit committed by any married woman being a trustee or executrix or administratrix either before or after her marriage, and her husband shall not be subject to such liabilities unless he has acted or intermeddled in the trust or administration. The word "property" in this act includes a thing in action.

45 & 46 Vict.

c. 75, s. 24.

25. The date of the commencement of this act shall be the Commencefirst of January one thousand eight hundred and eighty-three. ment of act. 26. This act shall not extend to Scotland.

Extent of act.

27. This act may be cited as the Married Women's Property Short title. Act, 1882.

47 & 48 VICTORIÆ, C. 14.

An Act to Amend the sixteenth section of the Married
Women's Property Act, 1882.

[23rd June, 1884.]

c. 14.

WHEREAS by section sixteen of the Married Women's Property 47 & 48 Vict. Act, 1882, a wife is, under the circumstances therein mentioned, declared to be liable to criminal proceedings by her husband, and a doubt has arisen as to whether the husband is admissible as a witness against his wife in such criminal proceedings, while section twelve of the same act declares that in any proceeding under that section a husband or wife shall be competent to give evidence against each other; and it is desirable that the said doubt should be removed, and the said act otherwise amended; Be it therefore enacted as follows:

tent witness

1. In any such criminal proceeding against a husband or a Husband or wife as is authorized by the Married Women's Property Act, wife compe1882, the husband and wife respectively shall be competent and in criminal admissible witnesses, and, except when defendant, compellable proceedings to give evidence (a).

(a) See Re Brittledon (12 Q. B. Div. 266).

under 45 &
46 Vict. c. 75.

2. This act may be cited as the Married Women's Property Short title. Act, 1884, and this act, and the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, may be cited together as the Married Women's Property Acts, 1882 and 1884.

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LAW OF DOWER.

3 & 4 WILLIAM IV. CAP. 105.

An Act for the Amendment of the Law relating to Dower. [29th August, 1833.]

INTERPRETATION CLAUSE.

Be it enacted, that the words and expressions hereinafter mentioned, which in their ordinary signification have a more confined or a different meaning, shall in this act, except where the nature of the provision or the context of the act shall exclude such construction, be interpreted as follows; that is to say, the word "land" shall extend to manors, advowsons, messuages, and all other hereditaments, whether corporeal or incorporeal (except such as are not liable to dower), and to any share thereof; and every word importing the singular number only shall extend and be applied to several persons or things as well as one person or thing.

The principal objects of this statute are,

1st. To make equitable estates in possession liable to dower, and to dispense with the necessity of the actual seisin of the husband.

2nd. To take away the right of dower out of lands disposed of by the husband in his lifetime or by his will, and to give partial charges created by the husband priority over the right of dower.

3rd. To enable the husband to bar the right of dower by a declaration in a deed or in a will. The act does not extend to widows married on or before the 1st of January, 1834.

The old law of dower gave to a surviving wife a right to have assigned to her for her life one-third of all the lands and hereditaments of which her husband was seised in law (that is, had the legal property by descent, there being at the same time no possession), or, in fact, for an estate of inheritance in possession at any time during the marriage, with a few exceptions such as common sans nombre and personal annuities (See the statement of the old law of dower in the first Report of the R. P. Commrs. 16-19; Co. Litt. 32 a; Lyster v. Mahony, 1 Dru. & War. 236). The widow of a man to whom an estate was devised in fee, with a limitation over to the testator's heir, in case the devisee had no children or issue, was held to be entitled to dower (Moody v. King, 2 Bing. 447; Smith v. Spencer, 4 W. R. 729). She was not entitled to dower out of an estate pur autre vie (Low v. Burron, 3 P. W. 262; Re Michell, Moore v. Moore, 1892, 2 Ch. 99). Dower is due of mines wrought during coverture, but not of mines or strata unopened. If lands assigned for dower contain an open mine, tenant in dower may work it for her own benefit (Stoughton v. Leigh, 1 Taunt. 401; Dickin v. Hamer, 1 Dr. & Sm. 284). And a dowress may claim one-third of the income of the proceeds arising from the royalties of mines opened after her husband's decease (Dickin v. Hamer, sup.), or of proceeds of timber cut after her husband's decease (Bishop v. Bishop, 5 Jur. 931; Dickin v. Hamer, sup.) Where

c. 105, s. 1.

land subject to dower was taken by a railway company, the dowress had 3 & 4 Will. 4, the value of her dower paid to her out of the purchase-money (Re Hall, 9 Eq. 179). In another case one-third of the purchase-money was carried over to a separate account, the dividends being payable to the dowress for life (Harrop v. Wilson, 34 Beav. 166). See, further, as to the property out of which a woman is entitled to dower, and the requisites to dower, the note to sect. 2, post; Tudor's L. C. Conv. 68 et seq., 3rd. ed.

In consequence of two maxims of the common law-first, that no right Barring can be barred until it accrues; and, secondly, that no right or title to an dower. estate of freehold can be barred by a collateral satisfaction-it was impossible to bar a woman of her dower by any assignment or assurance of lands, either before or during the marriage (Vernon's case, 4 Rep. 1; Co. Litt. 36 b).

Dower, however, might be barred by a legal jointure. Before the Legal passing of the Statute of Uses (27 Hen. 8, c. 10), the greater part of the jointures. lands in England having been conveyed to uses which were not liable to dower (Dyer, 266, pl. 7; 4 Rep. 1 b), it was usual to make a provision for the wife before marriage out of the husband's lands (3 Rep. 58 b; 4 Rep. 1 b; Wilmot's Notes, 184, 185). The Statute of Uses having transferred the legal estate to the cestui que use, all women then married would have become dowable of lands held to the use of their husbands, and retained their title to lands settled on them in jointure. To prevent that injustice, it is by the 6th section of the Statute of Uses declared, that a woman having an estate in jointure with her husband (five species of which are enumerated) shall not be entitled to dower; and the 9th section reserves to the wife a right to refuse a jointure or to claim her dower (See Wilmot's Notes, 184, &c.) It was decided that the species of estates enumerated are proposed only as examples, and the courts have in construction extended the operation of the statute to other instances within its principle, though not within its words (4 Rep. 2 a). By the effect of that statute, therefore, no widow can claim both jointure and dower. A jointure within that statute is defined to be a competent livelihood of freehold to the wife of lands and tenements, to take effect in profit or possession presently after the death of the husband, for the life of the wife at least, if she herself be not the cause of its determination or forfeiture (Co. Litt. 36 b, 37).

According to Lord Coke (Co. Litt. 36 b), there are six requisites to a strict legal jointure, viz., 1st. The provision for the wife must by original limitation take effect in possession or profit immediately after the husband's death (Wood v. Shirly, Cro. Jac. 488). 2nd. It must be for the term of her own life or greater estate (Dyer, 97 b). 3rd. It must be made to herself, and no other for her. 4th. It must be made in satisfaction of the whole, and not of part, of her dower. 5th. It must be either expressed or averred to be in satisfaction of her dower (See 9 Mod. 152; 3 Atk. 8; 1 Ves. sen. 54; 4 Ves. 391). And 6th. It may be made either before or after marriage (4 Rep. 3).

Jointure before marriage is a peremptory bar of dower; jointure after marriage she has an option to renounce (1 Swanst. 429, n.); but a feme covert was held not competent during the coverture to elect between a jointure made to her after marriage and her dower at common law (Frank v. Frank, 3 M. & C. 171).

A jointure settled on a wife by articles, to which she was not a party, will not deprive her of dower (Buckingham v. Drury, 3 Br. P. C. 497; Daly v. Lynch, Ib. 48); but an infant having before her marriage a jointure made to her in bar of dower, is thereby bound and barred by the stat. 27 Hen. 8, c. 10 (Ib.)

In equity, a trust estate, an agreement to settle lands as a jointure, Equitable or a covenant from the husband that his heirs, executors, or administrators jointures. would pay an annuity to his wife, for her life, in case she survived him, in full for her jointure and in bar of dower, without expressing that it should be charged on lands, or, in short, any provision, however precarious, and whether secured out of realty or personalty, which an adult before marriage

3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 105, s. 1.

Where widow barred of distributive share in husband's personalty.

Attendant terms.

Uses to bar dower.

accepts in lieu of dower, is a good jointure (Buckingham v. Drury, 5 Br. P. C. 570; 4 Br. C. C. 506; Wilmot's Notes, 177; Charles v. Andrews, 9 Mod. 152; Williams v. Chitty, 3 Ves. jun. 545; Tinney v. Tinney, 3 Atk. 8; Carruthers v. Carruthers, 4 Br. C. C. 500; Estcourt v. Estcourt, 1 Cox, 20; Simpson v. Gutteridge, 1 Madd. R. 613; 4 Rep. 2 a, n. by Thomas; Harg. Co. Litt. 36 b, n. (5); Sugd. V. & P. 543, 544, 11th ed.; Dyke v. Rendall, 2 D. M. & G. 209). A future contingent provision, accepted by an adult female upon her marriage in lieu of dower, is in equity a valid bar to dower (Re Herons, 1 Flan. & K. 330; see Power v. Sheil, 1 Moll. 312; Williams v. Chitty, 3 Ves. 545; Corbet v. Corbet, 1 Sim. & St. 612; 5 Russ. 254).

A wife had a jointure secured on her husband's estate X. In 1844, the husband contracted to purchase an estate Y., and to enable him to sell the estate X., the wife, in 1845, released her jointure, and he then covenanted to secure it out of "estates he should thereafter acquire." Before the estate Y. had been conveyed, the husband contracted to sell it: it was held, that in equity the estate Y. was charged with the jointure (Warde v. Warde, 16 Beav. 103; Wellesley v. Wellesley, 4 M. & C. 554),

By a settlement made on the marriage of an adult female, it was declared that "for providing a competent jointure" for the wife, the father of the husband had paid him 3,000l., and that the husband had given a bond for the payment of 2,0007. six months after the marriage, to be settled on trusts for the benefit of himself, his wife, and the issue of the marriage On a bill by the wife for dower out of land subsequently acquired by the husband, it was held that her right was barred by the settlement (Dyke v. Rendall, 2 D. M. & G. 209). Marriage articles executed by a tenant in tail in remainder, whereby he agreed to execute a legal post-nuptial settlement, to secure a jointure, were held a bar in equity to the wife's right of dower (Pennefather v. Pennefather, I. R. 6 Eq. 171). So in the case of marriage articles, whereby the intended husband covenanted that in case he should die in the lifetime of his intended wife, without issue by her, she should be entitled to one-half of what property, real or personal, he should die seised or possessed of (Hamilton v. Jackson, 2 J. & Lat. 295).

It has been said that in order to exclude the right to dower, there must be either an express declaration or a plain intention (Hamilton v. Jackson, 2 J. & Lat. 299; O'Rorke v. O'Rorke. 17 L. R. Ir. 153). A mere grant by a marriage settlement of an annuity to the wife surviving, has been held not to bar dower, even out of the lands charged with the annuity (Cody v. Cody, 5 L. R. Ir. 620).

The word "thirds" is not confined to real estate, but is a general expression which may signify, according to the context and scope of the instrument, the interest of a widow in any property, whether personal or real, of her deceased husband. So a stipulation in a marriage settlement, that the provision thereby made for the wife was to be "in lieu of dower or thirds," was held, on the husband dying intestate, to bar the claim of his widow to a distributive share in his personal estate (Thompson v. Watts, 2 J. & H. 291; see Sambourne v. Barry, I. R. 6 Eq. 28; Gurly v. Gurly, 8 Cl. & Fin. 743; Re Burgess, 11 Ir. Ch. R. N. S. 164; Colleton v. Garth, 6 Sim. 19).

As to the law of jointures, see 1 Rop. on Husband and Wife, by Bright, c. 10; Cruise's Dig. tit. 7; Bac. Abr. Dower and Jointure (G.); Gilb. on Uses, by Sugd. p. 321, &c.

As to how far attendant terms could have been used to bar a right to dower, see Mole v. Smith, Jac. R. 496; Radnor v. Vandebendy, Show. P. C. 69; Pr. Ch. 65; Swannock v. Lifford, 2 Atk. 208; Ambl. 6; Co. Litt. 208 a, n.; Willoughby v. Willoughby, 1 T. R. 763; Maundrell v. Maundrell, 10 Ves. 246; Wynn v. Williams, 5 Ves. 130; Butl. Co. Litt. 290 b, n. 1. s. 13; Re Sleeman, 4 Ir. Ch. R. 563; 8 & 9 Vict. c. 112, post; Corry v. Cremorne, 12 Ir. Ch. R. 136; Anderson v. Pignet, 8 Ch. 180, post.

As to the form of limitation to uses to bar dower, see Gilb. on Uses, by

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