sentatives would be entitled to the legacy. (Sidney v. Vaughan, 2 Bro. Parl. Ca. 254; Vivian v. Mills, 1 Beav. 315; Blease v. Burgh, 2 Beav. 221.; but see and consider Leeming v. Sherratt, (2 Hare, 14). But if the happening of the event on which the legacy is to be paid is uncertain, the legacy is contingent; as, for instance, if the legacy is bequeathed to be paid to the legatee at his or her marriage, the legacy fails by the legatee dying unmarried (Atkins v. Hiccocks, 1 Atk. 500); or if a sum is given to the legatee at a particular age or time (Onslow & South, 1 Eq. Abr. 295. pt. 6); or "in case," "if," "when," or "provided " he attains a particular age or marries, the legatee must attain the prescribed age, or the prescribed event must happen before the sum can vest, unless the interest of the legacy in the meantime is given, or is directed to be paid to the legatee, in which case the legacy would be vested. (1 Jar. Wills, 764; Wms. Exors., pt. 3. bk. 3. ch. 2. s. 5.) In Vawdry v. Geddes (1 Russ. & M. 208), Sir J. Leach said: "Where interim interest is given, it is presumed the testator meant an immediate gift, because, for the purpose of interest, the particular legacy is to be immediately separated from the bulk of the property, but that presumption fails entirely when the testator has declared that the legacy is to go over in case of the death of the legatee before a particular period." If, in the first place, the interest is given to the legatee until a particular age, at which time the executors or administrators are directed to transfer the capital to him, the legacy is contingent until he attains that age. 363; Sansbury v. Rawlins, 1 Sim. & 1 R. & M. 203.) (See Batsford v. Kebbell, 3 Ves. If the payment of the legacy is postponed for the sake of convenience, -as if a legacy is directed to be paid to A., after the decease of B., to whom a life interest is bequeathed,--A. takes a vested interest on the testator's decease, the payment to A. being postponed only for the purpose of enabling B. to enjoy a prior life interest in the legacy. (1 Jar. Wills, 763.) of testamen children. In the bequest of legacies to children, a ques- Construction tion often arises, what objects are to be included tary gifts to in the bequest under different circumstances, and the rules of construction on this subject, laid down by Mr. Jarman in his valuable Treatise on Wills, will place the matter before the reader in a useful and intelligible form. He says: "First. That an immediate gift to children, whether it be to the children of a living or a deceased person, and whether to children simply, or to all the children, and whether there be a gift over in case of the decease of any of the children under age or not, comprehends the children living at the testator's death (if any), and those only. Secondly. That where a particular estate or interest is carved out, with a gift over to the children of the person taking that interest, or the children of any other person, such gift will embrace not only the objects living at the death of the testator, but all who may subsequently come into existence before the period of As to lapse. distribution. Thirdly. That where the period of distribution is postponed until the attainment of a given age by the children, the gift will apply to those who are living at the death of the testator, and who come into existence before the first child attains that age, i. e. the period when the fund becomes distributable in respect of any one object or member of the class. Fourthly. With regard to immediate gifts, it is well settled that if there be no object in esse at the death of the testator, the gift will embrace all the children who may subsequently come into existence by way of executory gift. Fifthly. That where the words "to be born," or "to be begotten," are annexed to a devise or bequest to children, if the gift be immediate, so that it would, but for the words in question, have been confined to children (if any), they will have the effect of extending it to all the children who shall ever come into existence." (See 2 Jarm. on Wills, p. 74, et seq.) A legacy, which is bequeathed to an object who dies in the lifetime of the testator, lapses in favour of the residuary legatee, unless the legacy is given to several persons as joint tenants or to persons as a class,—as for instance, to the children or to the brothers or sisters of a person living or deceased, -in which cases the death of one will not occasion a lapse, but the survivors would take the whole. (1 Jar. Wills, 293; Leigh v. Leigh, 2 W. Rep. 205). A residuary devise will now include real estate comprised in lapsed and void devises. (1 Vict. c. 26. s. 25). But if the legatee or devisee is a child or other issue of the testator, and he dies leaving issue, and any such issue should be living at the death of the testator, such devise or bequest will not lapse, but will take effect as if the devisee or legatee had died immediately after the testator, unless a contrary intention appears by the will (sect. 33). But this section does not extend to a testamentary appointment. (Griffiths v. Gale, 12 Sim. 354). perpetuities. In every case where the intention is to settle the Rule against personal estate of the testator, care must be taken to insert no provision which can in any respect transgress the rule against perpetuities, which prohibits the capital or corpus of property of any description, from being tied up for a longer period than a life or lives in being, and twenty-one years from the death of the testator; and in exercising powers of appointment in favour of particular objects referred to in the power, it is necessary to bear in mind that for this purpose, the rule referred to is so applied as if the appointment was contained in the document creating the power. (1 Sug. Pow. 498). for the accu income. Then again, the provisions for the accumulation Provisions of income must be drawn with due attention to the mulation of terms of the Thellusson Act (39 & 40 Geo. 3. c. 98.), which enacts: "That no person or persons shall by any deed or deeds, surrender or surrenders, will, codicil or otherwise howsoever, settle or dispose of any real or personal property, so and in such manner that the rents, issues, profits or produce thereof shall be wholly or partially accumulated for any longer term than the life or lives of any such grantor or grantors, settlor or settlors, or the term of twentyone years from the death of any such grantor, settlor, devisor or testator, or during the minority or respective minorities of any person or persons who shall be living, or in ventre sa mère at the time of the death of such grantor, devisor or testator, or during the minority or respective minorities only of any person or persons who, under the uses or trusts of the deed, surrender, will or other assurances directing such accumulations would for the time being, if of full age, be entitled unto the rents, issues and profits, or the interest, dividends or annual produce so directed to be accumulated; and in every case where any accumulation shall be directed otherwise than as aforesaid, such direction shall be null and void, and the rents, issues, profits and produce of such property so directed to be accumulated, shall, so long as the same shall be directed to be accumulated contrary to the provisions of this act, go to and be received by such person or persons as would have been entitled thereto if such accumulation had not been directed." The 3rd section provides, that nothing in the act shall extend to any provision for payment of debts of any grantor, settlor or devisor, or other person or persons, or to any provision for raising portions for any child or children of any grantor, settlor or devisor, or any child or children of any person taking any interest under any such conveyance, settlement or devise, or direction touching the produce of timber or wood upon any lands or tenements. to any |