Justice v. The Mersey Steel and Iron Company ..

142

Kennaway v. Kennaway

Le Blanch v. Reuter's Telegram Company, Limited
Leigh, deceased, Re; Rowcliffe v. Leigh

Lloyd's Banking Company, Limited, v. Ogle
Longbottom, Ex Parte; In Re Ellershaw

289

5

128

252

114

Lord Hanmer v. Flight

Mathias v. Mathias

Matthews v. Matthews

Meek v. Michaelsen

Morgan's Patent, In Re

Limited

236, 246

197

149

178

Mostyn, Baronet v. The West Mostyn Coal and Iron Company,

Murr v. Cooke

Needham v. The Rivers Protection and Manure Company
Nelson v. The Singapore Steamship Company

New Westminster Brewery Company, The, v. Hannah..

295

279

132, 199, 228

Oakes v. Redford

Oger v. Bradnum

Pacey and Wife v. The London Tramways Company
Pike v. Frank Keene and Byne

Pollock v. Campbell Brothers

"Polymede," The

Preston v. Lamont

Provident Permanent Building Society, The, v. Greenhill

Rafael v. Ongley

Richardson v. The Great Eastern Railway Company

Rowcliffe v. Leigh

Runnacles v. Mesquita

Sargant v. Read

Schroeder v. The Central Bank of London

Scott v. The Royal Wax Candle Company

Sheppard v. Beane

Sloman and Company . The Governor and Government of the

Colony of New Zealand..

Smith and Others, Re

Smith v. Lewis

Sugden v. Lord St. Leonards

Vallance v. The Birmingham and Midland Land and Investment

PAGE

179

58, 230

202

224

15

160

81

29

263

18

296

54

298

59

217

212, 213

149

115

66

284

VOL. II. OF "REPORTS OF CASES" (CONTAINING

NOS. 1, 2, 3, AND 4).

: 0:

Directions to Binder.-The various portions of this Volume should be arranged in the following Order ::

1. The Title Page, prefixed to No. 4.

2. The Preface, prefixed to No. 1.

3. The List of Reported Cases, prefixed to No. 4. 4. The Table of Contents, prefixed to No. 4.

5. The Chamber Cases contained in No. 1.

6. The Court Cases contained in Nos. 2, 3, and 4.

7. The Index to the Chamber Cases (Second Series), at end of No. 4.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

I. SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE ACT, 1875

SECTION 3

Hopewell v. Barnes. (The Judges of the Court of Chancery,

being now Judges of the High Court, of which the Common

Pleas is now a Division, it follows, that where a judgment has

been recovered against a person interested in a fund in the

Chancery Division, a stop order will be granted to the judgment

creditor by a Vice-Chancellor, without a preliminary charging

order having been obtained in the Common Pleas Division, in which

the judgment was recovered)

SECTION 16

SUBSECTION (1)

PAGE

1-141

1-2

I

2-4

In Re Morgan's Patent. (The jurisdiction over the Register of

Patent Proprietors, which was conferred on the Master of the

Rolls by the 15 & 16 Vict., c. 83, s. 38, can be no longer exer-

cised by him, having been transferred to the High Court of

Justice by section 16, subsection (1), of the Supreme Court of

Judicature Act, 1873)

SECTION 17

SECTION 18

Le Blanch v. Reuter's Telegram Company (Limited). (The

Divisional Court of Appeal from Inferior Courts has no juris-

diction to hear an appeal from a judgment of the Lord Mayor's

Court upon a demurrer to pleadings, but the Court of Appeal

has, under sec. 18, subsect. (4), of the Supreme Court of Judicature

Act, 1873, such jurisdiction)

Glover v. The Greenbank Alkali Company. (The Lords Justices

of Appeal, not being members of the High Court of Justice, have

no power to give leave to file an affidavit in the Chancery Division

of that Court)

Allan v. The United Kingdom Electric Telegraph Company
(Limited). (The Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction to order

the enrolment of a decree of the Court of Chancery, enrolled pre-

vious to the 1st November, 1875, to be vacated. The power to

make such an order is now vested in the Lord Chancellor only).

Cave v. Mackenzie. (An order of a Judge at Assizes, that an

action entered for trial before him should be struck out of the

list, is not appealable to the Court of Appeal, although the

action has been sent down for trial at the Assizes by the Master

of the Rolls, pursuant to Order XXXVI., Rule 39)

Garling v. Royds. (The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal is
purely appellate. An application to the Court of Appeal to

order the Registrars of the Chancery Division, to set down an

action in the Chancery Division for trial by jury, was therefore

refused)

Smith v. Lewis. (The Court of Appeal cannot interfere with the

exercise of the discretion of a Judge of the Chancery Division,

in refusing to release a person whom he had sent to prison for

contempt of Court) ·

SECTION 19

The "Transit." (The Court of Appeal, following in this re-

spect the principles laid down by the Privy Council, will not,

except in a case of overwhelming pressure, reverse a decision of

a Judge of the Admiralty Division, where he has come to a

conclusion of fact upon conflicting testimony, and after hearing in

open Court and observing the demeanour of the witnesses; but

where the Judge's decision is founded upon inferences drawn

from the evidence by the Judge, it will, if erroneous, be re-

viewed, and if necessary reversed, without great pressure, by

the Court of Appeal)

SECTION 22

Taylor v. Greenhalgh. (Two actions, one brought by A., and the

other by B., against C., in respect of injuries sustained by A. and

B. in an accident that occurred through C.'s negligence, resulted

in verdicts for C. Final judgment was signed in July, 1874, and

in September 1874, B. paid the costs in his action. A. and B.

both gave due notice of appeal, but B. did not proceed with his

appeal until after A's appeal had been heard in November, 1875.

On January 18, 1876, B. gave notice of appeal, and his appeal

came on for hearing under the Supreme Court of Judicature Act,

1875. Held, that although a year had elapsed since judgment

had been signed, B's right to appeal was not barred by Order

LVIII., Rule 15, as, under the special circumstances of the

case, it was a "pending" appeal within the meaning of sect.

22 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873)

SECTION 24

SUBSECTION (2)

Eyre v. Hughes. (A., a solicitor, who had from time to time

advanced money to two of his clients, B. and C., to enable them

to carry on building transactions, submitted accounts to them,

which were signed by them. A. then took a mortgage from them

to secure the money already due to him [including untaxed bills

of costs], and further advances. The mortgage deed provided,

that A. might immediately after the execution of the mortgage

enter into possession of the property, and let and manage it as

he should think fit, and should retain a large commission

on the gross receipts as a remuneration, and that if the

rents and profits should be insufficient for the payments, A.

might apply the same in payment of the interest upon

the principal, and should pay the costs, &c., out of his own

moneys, and the amount so paid should become part of the

principal intended to be thereby secured. A. declined to make

any further advances unless B. and C. executed the mortgage

deed, which they accordingly did. A. instituted a suit for fore-

PAGE

12

15

18-29

18

29-33

29

33-76

33-57