1. How far carrier liable for injury by each other. Nugent v. Smith. 203, 217 note.
2. No claim for demurrage or detention of a ship under warrant of arrest issued by the unsuccessful promoters of a salvage suit can be allowed in the ab- sence of mala fides or malicious negli- 2. Horses become frightened on ferry- gence. The Strathnaver.
See INSURANCE, MARINE, 82.
See NEGLIGENCE, 194, 199 note. RAILWAY COMPANY, 176.
give, devise, and bequeath all my prop- erty over which I have any disposing power." The trusts of the will were for his wife for life for her separate use, and after her death for all his chil- dren who should attain twenty-one in equal shares, and upon failure of chil- dren for the brothers and sisters of his wife;
Held, that the will must be read reddendo singula singulis, and operated as an appointment under two special powers, one of which was a power to appoint among his children subject to a life interest in his wife during widow- hood; and the other was a power to appoint a life interest to his wife in a fund which, subject to such power, was held on trust for his children at twenty- one in equal shares. Thornton v. Thorn- ton.
See POWER, 703. SETTLEMENT.
1. Where an agreement has been entered into for the sale of a house at a fixed price, and of the fixtures and furniture therein at a valuation by a person named by both parties, and he under- takes the valuation, but if refused per- mission by the vendor to enter the premises for that purpose, the court will make a mandatory order to com- pel the vendor to allow the entry to enable the valuation to proceed.
2. The court has jurisdiction to make any interlocutory order which is reason- ably asked as ancillary to the adminis tration of justice at the hearing. Smith v. Peters.
ASSESSMENT AND TAXATION. 1. The vestry of a metropolitan parish, having paved a new street, under 18
& 19 Vict. c. 120, s. 105, assessed the London School Board, in respect of a school-house, as being "owners" of one of "the houses forming the street." The school-house did not immediately front the street, but stood back from it some seventy or eighty feet, in a large yard, the whole area being about 29,500 square feet. There was a row of eleven small houses (with gardens at the back of them) between this area and the street but the only access to the school was by a private passage which ran along one side of the last house and garden into the school-yard, with gates opening from the street in ques- tion; the width of the passage being twenty feet and the length about sixty- four feet:
Held, that the school-house, though not actually one of the houses "form- ing the street," yet practically formed part of it, within s. 105.
3. The conservators of the River Thames, who are by statute owners of the river bed, gave permission, by resolution, to the plaintiffs to lay down certain moor- ings in the river bed, and place a der- rick hulk at them, the work to be done to the satisfaction of the conservators and under the inspection of the harbor master, and to remain on certain con- ditions being agreed to and observed by the plaintiffs. These conditions provided that a certain rent should be paid for the moorings, and specified the purposes for, and the manner in which, the hulk was to be used, and that in all other respects it was to be worked to the satisfaction of the con- servators, under the inspection of the harbor master; and the permission was expressed to be granted on the full understanding, on the part of the plain- tiffs, that if at any time thereafter it should be found inexpedient to permit the moorings for the derrick hulk to remain in that or any other part of the river, the conservators would, under the powers vested in them by the 91st section of the Thames Conservancy Act, cause the same to be removed. That section provides that no mooring chains shall be put down in the river without the permission of the conser- vators, and that the conservators may
any time, by giving a week's notice in writing, require such mooring chains to be removed; and if not removed accordingly, may themselves remove them.
In pursuance of the permission so given, the plaintiffs procured moor- ings to be laid down, paying for the necessary labor and materials, and placed a derrick hulk at such moorings, which had continued there for some years, and was used by the plaintiffs for the purposes of unloading and reload- ing coal in the course of their business as coal merchants. The moorings so laid down consisted of anchors and stones, which were laid down in deep holes, dug in the bed of the river, and covered in with large quantities of bal- last. The moorings so formed were of a permanent character, and it would have been impossible for the derrick using them to weigh them in the ordi- nary way in which ships weigh anchor:
Held, reversing the decision of the court below, that the plaintiffs were the occupiers of the moorings, and were liable to be rated in respect of such occupation. Cory v. Bristow.
1. How far signature of, binds parties under Statute of Frauds. Beer V. London, etc. 408, 421 note.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 373, 378 note.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 373, 378 note. NEGLIGENCE, 194, 199 note.
have been provable against the bank- rupt had the proceedings in bankruptcy continued against him. On demurrer:
Held, that the plea was good, as the vesting order vested the property of the bankrupt in the plaintiff, subject to the right to set off debts which would have been provable in the bank ruptcy. West v. Baker.
Held, that both the securities given to the bankers were valid as against the trustee in the liquidation, there not be- ing in the transactions anything amounting to either a fraudulent prefer- ence or an act of bankruptcy:
5. Held, also, that the deposit of the builder's certificate created a good equi- table mortgage of the unfinished ship, including the engines which were being built for her, but subject as to the en- gines to any lien for unpaid purchase- money to which the engine-builders might be entitled :
4. In August S., a shipbuilder, whose ac- count current with his bankers was overdrawn, offered to give them se- curity upon a ship which he was build- ing. The bankers declined to accept the security then, but said that circum- stances might arise to make it desirable 6. that they should have it, and he prom- ised to give it them when they wished it. On the 28th of September the offer was renewed, but the bankers urged him to sell the ship, and so prevent the necessity of their taking the security. On the 7th of October S. had an inter- view with them at the bank, and they told him that they would accept the se- curity, and that he was to lodge the builder's certificate of the ship with their manager. The next day he signed the certificate, and gave it to the bank manager. The certificate described the ship and her engines, and stated that she had been built for the bank mana- ger. At this time she was not launch- ed, but was in an unfinished state in the builder's yard. The engines were not on board, but were lying unfinished in the yard of the firm who were mak- ing them for the shipbuilder. On the 9th of October the shipbuilder had an- other interview with the bankers, when they told him they could advance him no more money, and did not see how he could go on, to which he assented; but they agreed to advance him £770 to pay his workmen's weekly wages, on the security of an assignment of a debt owing to him from another person, and told him that they could go no further, and that he had better consult his so- licitor as to his position. On the 10th of October the manager endeavored to get himself registered as the owner of the ship, but, as she was not launched, this could not be done. But he placed a man in possession of her, and fixed a notice upon her that she was his prop- erty. On the 10th of October S. paid his workmen, and then discharged them, and closed his place of business. On the 12th of October he filed a liqui- dation petition :
A creditor suggested to his debtor that the latter should buy goods on credit from other persons, and should with the proceeds of their sale pay off the debt due to the former. The debtor adopted the suggestion, and out of the proceeds of the sale of goods which he obtained on credit he made several payments on account of the debt. There was evidence that the payments were made under pressure from the creditor. The debtor afterwards filed a liquidation petition :
Held, that, as the transaction was fraudulent in its inception, it was im- material that the payments were made under pressure, but that they must be set aside as being fraudulent pref-
Where a jury have found a verdict on an issue of fact, but no order con- sequent thereon has been made by the judge, it is not necessary that an ap plication for a new trial should be made within twenty-one days from the finding.
9. Rule 143 of the Bankruptcy Rules, 1870, does not apply to such a case, either directly or by analogy. Matter of Reader.
10. An assignment of substantially the whole of a mortgagor's property to se- cure a previously existing debt and fur- ther advances is not an act of bank- ruptcy, if there is a contemporaneous parol agreement on the part of the
11. One of two partners in trade assigned the whole of his separate assets, and gave a power of attorney to assign all his personal property, as security for a previously existing separate debt. The partnership was at this time insolvent:
Held, that the execution of the deed was an act of bankruptcy, notwith- standing the fact that none of the part- nership assets were in terms included in the deed.
12. A bill of sale contained a provision that it should be void in case the mortgagor should pay the principal money thereby secured "upon demand, if and when the mortgagee should so require by a notice in writing," and un- til payment of the principal should pay interest thereon half-yearly, and also a proportionate part thereof "to the ex- piration of the said notice, when the same shall be given." And in default of payment power was given to the mortgagee to seize and sell the prop- erty comprised in the deed.
1. A. being indebted to plaintiff, gave him a check for the amount, payable to plaintiff's order, upon the defendants, a banking company. Plaintiff indorsed his name on the check, and crossed it with the name of his bankers, "Lon- don and County Banking Co." The check was stolen and passed for full value to C. C. paid it into his bankers, the London and Westminster Bank; and they presented it to the defendants, who paid it to them notwithstanding the crossing, "London and County Banking Co." Plaintiff brought an ac- tion against defendants for a conver sion, and for so paying the check, rely- ing on 21 & 22 Vict. c. 79, s. 2, which enacts that a check on a banker, pay- able to order or bearer and uncross- ed, may be crossed by the holder with the name of a banker, and such cross- ing shall be deemed a material part of the check, and the banker upon whom it is drawn shall not pay it to any other than the banker named in the crossing:
Held (affirming the judgment of the Queen's Bench), that the statute did not affect the negotiability of the check; the plaintiff had indorsed the check, so that C. had become bona fide holder of it before it was presented to the de- fendants, and the plaintiff was not the holder; and there was nothing in the statute to give the plaintiff, who had ceased to be the holder, any right of action against the defendants. Smith V. Union Bank.
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