capacity to judge of colors or of tones, considers judgment as the third degree of activity of every fundamental faculty; and admitting as many kinds of judgment as special faculties, denies it the prerogative of being looked on as a primitive power. In his opinion, every fundamental faculty has four degrees of activity: the first is perception; the second, memory; the third, judgment; and the fourth, imagination.

I, myself, neither consider judgment as a fundamental faculty, nor with Gall, as a degree of activity, or as a mode of action to every faculty. Judgment cannot be a quantitive mode, and certainly not the third in degree, for some individuals judge very accurately of impressions as soon as perceived, without possessing the memory of them to a great extent; and others, with an excellent memory of particular kinds of impressions, judge very indifferently of the same. It even happens that certain faculties are in the highest degree, or spontaneously, active, while the judgment in relation to these very powers is bad. In other cases, the faculties are exceedingly active, and also judge with perfect propriety. Moreover, judgment cannot be an attribute of every fundamental faculty of the mind, since the affective powers, being blind, neither recollect nor judge their actions. What judgments have physical love, pride, circumspection, and all the other feelings? They require to be enlightened by the understanding, or intellectual faculties; and on this account it is, that when left to themselves they occasion so many disorders. And not only does this remark apply to the inferior but also to the superior affective powers; to hope and veneration, as well as to the love of approbation and circumspection; we may fear things innocent or noxious, and venerate idols as well as the God of the true Christian.

I conceive, then, that judgment is a mode of action of the intellectual faculties only; and not a mode of quantity but of quality. The better to understand my meaning, let us observe, that there is a relation between external objects themselves, and also between external objects and the affective and intellectual faculties of man and animals. These relations are even determinate, and in their

Hunger and Now, if these

essence invariable; they admit modifications only. aliment, this and digestion have a mutual relation. relations are seen to be perfect and to exist as they are usually found, we say the function is good or healthy. If the sense of taste approve of aliments which man commonly employs and digests, the taste is good and perfect; but there is disorder or aberration whenever the functions depart from their ordinary modes of manifesting themselves; if, for instance, the taste select articles generally esteemed filthy or unfit for food, such as chalk, charcoal, tallow, &c. it is disordered or bad.

The intellectual faculties are in relation with the affective powers and with external objects, and their functions are subject to determinate laws. The faculties of coloring and of melody cannot arbitrarily be pleased, the one with every disposition of colors, and the other with every combination of tones. Now, the functions of the intellectual faculties may be perfect or imperfect, that is, be in harmony, or the contrary, with their innate laws, and the product of these two states announced is judgment; for the intellectual faculties alone know their own and the relations of the affective powers with the external world. The expression judgment, however, it must be observed, is used to indicate as well the power of perceiving the relations that subsist between impressions themselves, as the manner in which this power is affected by these. We distinguish different savors from each other, and we feel the different impressions they make. In both these operations we judge. The same thing holds in regard to all the perceptive faculties: they perceive the relations of their appropriate and peculiar impressions, and recognise the effect this act of perception produces. The faculty of coloring, for instance, perceives several colors, and is then affected agreeably or disagreeably; in consequence, it approves or disapproves of their arrangement. The perception of any relation whatever is the essence of judgment.

The judgment of the faculties which perceives the physical qualities of external objects, even of tones or melody, is also called We are said to have a good or a bad taste, or judgment, in

taste.

coloring, drawing, and music, in speaking of forms, proportions, &c.

Each perceptive faculty feels impressions and relations of one kind only; that of configuration knows forms; that of coloring colors; and that of tune tones. The judgment, or the more or less healthy action of each, is in like manner confined to its special function. There are consequently as many kinds of judgment as perceptive faculties, and one kind must not be confounded with another. The regular and perfect manifestation of the functions of the two reflective powers, however, examining the relations of all the intellectual and affective faculties to their respective objects, and the relations of the various powers among themselves, particularly deserves the name judgment; it essentially constitutes the philosophic judgment, which is applicable to every sort of notion. It is synonymous with reasoning. Comparison and causality being the highest intellectual powers, and an essential and necessary part of a reasonable being; their perfect action or good judgment consequently ranks above all other kinds of judgment. However, reason or the reflective faculties in themselves are not infallible; they may be deceived by the erroneous notions and feelings on which they operate. Sound and true reasoning requires two things; first, sound reflective faculties; and second, exact notions and just feelings, viz. sound premises.

VIII. Association.

Several philosophers in Great Britain, and especially Dugald Stewart, have lately spoken much of a peculiar faculty of association. They have examined the laws of its activity, and ascribed to it a great influence on our manner of thinking and feeling; they have even considered it as the cause of the sublime and beautiful.

These propositions I conceive are erroneous; association, in my opinion, being only an effect of the mutual influence, of the fundamental faculties. One being active, excites another, or several, and the phenomenon is association; which occurs not only among

the intellectual faculties, when what is called association of ideas results, but also among the affective and intellectual together; and, indeed, among all the fundamental faculties. The sight of a rose may recall one we love; ambition may excite courage, or an intellectual faculty; artificial signs may arouse the perceptive faculties; and these, in their turn, make us remember arbitrary signs.

Association is a phenomenon of some importance in the practical part of anthropology; and when I come to speak of the modifications of the mental functions, I shall enter into its consideration at some length.

The principles of association are the same as those of sympathy. Faculties whose organs are situated near each other, or which act at the same time, will readily excite one another. Faculties also, which contribute to the same peculiar function, will be apt to exert a mutual influence. The strongest of the faculties will further excite and overwhelm the weaker with ease.

The mutual influence or association of the fundamental faculties explains the principles of Mnemonics, or the science of artificial memory, and shows its importance. To enable us to recall ideas or words, we may call in any of our other faculties, which acts with great energy, to assist. If that of locality, for instance, be vigorous, ideas will be easily recollected through the assistance of localities; that is, by associating ideas with localities. Local memory will remember the peculiar ideas associated with particular places. The same means or faculties, however, it must be understood, will not serve in every case. Individuals must severally make use of their strongest to excite their weakest powers; one will employ form, a second color, a third places, and others numbers, analogies of sounds, causes, and so on, with success.

This consideration in its whole extent may be kept in view with advantage in education. No intellectual faculty is ever to be tutored singly, but all which are necessary to the perfect understanding of a subject are to be exercised together. Geography will aid the memory of events, and the reverse; and so on with the rest.

Association also elucidates the common saying, We think in our mother tongue. The meaning of this phrase is not determined; if language be supposed primitively to produce thought, a grave error is committed; for we think in no language; the feelings and ideas existed before the signs which express them, and we may have feelings and thoughts without a term to make them known. Language is only associated with the feelings and thoughts; but as this is done very frequently and with extreme rapidity, even in conformity with the succession of thoughts, we are said to think in our native language. The fact, however, is interesting in itself, and proves the importance of the mutual influence of the faculties. Several of the modern languages, it is true, have a determinate structure, and do not admit of inversions, and ideas consequently follow regularly in a certain order; but ideas are not therefore results of the signs by which they are expressed. It is obvious, however, that the structure of a language must give a peculiar direction to the mental operations; and again, that the prevailing spirit or general mental constitution of every nation may be known by its language. The French directs the mind especially to individual objects and their qualities; the German, on the contrary, forces it to combine, at once, all particular notions. Notwithstanding these admitted effects of language, signs must never be confounded with ideas, nor simultaneous action mistaken for identity.

The second idea which Mr. Alison and others entertain of association as the source of the beautiful and of the pleasure that flows from it, is also unsupported by observation. Pleasure does not derive from association only. Every faculty is in relation to certain impressions; these, being either in harmony with it, or the reverse, produce pleasure or pain. The power of configuration is pleased with certain forms, and displeased with others. The faculty of coloring likes certain colors, and dislikes others. In the same way impressions of tones are immediately pronounced agreeable or disagreeable. The perceptive faculties are pleased by their respective harmonious impressions.

On the other hand it is, however, certain that association may