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piracy, and that it was the who armed the murderer of Guftavus against the life of his fovereign. It certainly was the intereft of the French that the king of Sweden fhould die at that period, because he was not only decidedly for restoring the monarchy of France, but was preparing to take the field against them, as generaliffimo of the combined forces :-but does it follow that every murder committed ought to be laid at the door of him who would derive advantage from the death of the perfons murdered?

The author next confiders the cafe of the Americans, whom the writer of the Thoughts on Peace has pointed out as a people who, by their wife fyftem of neutrality, were enriching themselves at the expence of the new world. That they are enriching themfelves he does not deny: but he maintains that this prefent government was brought into the greatest danger by the French principles, propagated among them by the agents. and emiffaries of the convention; that they fhook the patriarch of the new world (Washington) in his curule chair; that they fucceeded fo far as to kindle up a civil war in the United States; and that, had it not been for the perfonal character of Washington, who was able to combine the public force against the rebels, and to pull up the trees of pretended liberty planted in Pennsylvania, there would have been an end of the prefent contitution of North America. In this reprefentation, there is unquestionably fome truth: but is it not confiderably distorted; and is not too much made of a fpirit of refiftance which broke out to a new excife law, rather than to the form of government? When the cyder counties in England complained of the excife on cyder, did any one fuppofe that they wanted to pull down the British conftitution?

Next comes the cafe of Switzerland; and, in direct oppofition to the Baronefs de Stael, the author denies that it owed its tranquillity to any refpect that France had for its neutrality. Here he is qualified to fpeak with more precifion than moft others, from perfonal knowlege; and as this cafe is rather more in point than the others, we will enlarge rather more on it. He afferts that Switzerland is indebted for its prefervation to two miracles of good fortune, and to the most dreadful of calamities, even to that very one which the Baronefs congratulates it for having efcaped. What he calls the two miracles are, ift, that when the French republic fent pofitive orders to Gen. Montefquiou to invade Switzerland, the little ftate of Geneva had the courage to prepare for refiftance, and to form a barrier between the French army of the Alps and the Swiss cantons, until the latter fhould have had time to arm. 2d, That the French General, who was to have fallen on the Swiss, had APP. REV. VOL. XVII. the


the rare virtue to fufpend the execution of his hoftile orders.

It is true, (fays M. D'I.) that he fucceeded in getting these orders revoked but it was by refolving to expofe himself to Tuin, rather than not reprefent to his principals, the great injustice and the danger of kindling up this new war.' The most dreadful of all calamities, which with two miracles of good fortune preferved Switzerland, was that Geneva fubmitted to become an expiatory victim to the French revolution: in other words, that, to preferve the reft of Switzerland from it, fhe devoted herself to it. The language which Gen. Montesquiou held in his difpatches to the provifional council redounds too much to his honour, to be omitted here. Do not, (faid he,) let France be difhonoured by an execrable abuse of power. Will you fuffer the cradle of a republic that now fixes the attention of the univerfe to be polluted with the vices which infe&ed courts? Will you draw on France the application of the fable of the wolf and the lamb? Shall we be more honoured or more powerful, when we fhail have crufhed the weakest of our neighbours, been guilty of a crying act of injustice, and have kindled up a new war?" &c. &c. Geneva, fays our author, was attacked, not because she was meditating hoftilities against France, but because he wanted to fhelter herself from aggresfion, by having endeavoured to get herself included in the neutrality of Switzerland; which mighty crime was, in the language of Briffet, in his report of Nov.21,1792, in the name of the diplomatic committee, but an ill-difguifed acceffion to the coalitionof kings.

Our author admits that, fince the fall of Robespierre, a great change of difpofition has appeared in the convention, whofe ruling members, he believes, are now defirous of peace: this change, however, he attributes not to good principles, for be fays that they were concerned in or countenanced all the horrors that have difgraced and defolated France; and he afcribes it to the war, the preffure of which they feel most fenfibly. He afks, Whether it would be fafe to truft to engagements made by fuch men; and he anfwers yes, provided they will prove their fincerity by restoring all their conquefts.' If they refuse to do this, he reminds the public that the party now at the helm in France is that very Brifotine or Girondift party, which, with a perfidioufnefs unparalleled in the annals of mankind, annulled and trampled under foot the very first treaty that ever was contracted with the French republic. Was it not this very party, (fays our author,) which, after having given full powers for negociating a treaty with the Genevans, waited until the latter had ratified it, and then coolly declared to them, that no other terms fhould be granted to them than a communication of principles. It will remain for us to examine whether a free


people can and ought to bind itself by treaties; whether they be not ufelefs with republics, which ought always to be governed by a community of principles; whether they be not indecent with any government that does not derive its powers from the people; for, perhaps, therein lies the fecret of your revolution, and of thofe that are preparing.'

Without a reftitution of all the conquefts made by France, our author thinks the balance of power in Europe will be deftroyed; and without that balance, he contends, Europe would fink into a ftate of confufion, the ftrong every where falling on and fwallowing up the weak. If peace be concluded on any other bafis than that of the ftatus quo, the neighbours of France, he is fure, muft foon fubmit to her yoke, or be again obliged to draw the fword, to recover thofe very conquefts which a love for peace might induce fome of them to confent to cede for the prefent to the convention; and he deems it wiser for them to go on with the war now, when France is fo exhaufted, than to give her time to breathe and recruit herself.

This brings him to his fecond chapter, in which he examines the financial refources of the convention; and which, he fays, confift folely in affignats. Thefe refources, however, he is confident, are nearly exhaufted, and muft foon fail them. He infits that it was folely by affignats that they were enabled to bring into the field armies three times as numerous as those employed by Louis XIVth; and confequently, that it is principally to affignats that they are indebied for three times greater conquefts than any which were ever made by that monarch. With the affignats, he contends, thofe armies muft melt away, and with them thofe fucceffes which have astonished and alarmed Europe. In aid of his opinion that the refources hitherto derived from this paper-money will foon be exhaufted, he makes feveral obfervations,-founded, we grant, in fact, but whether fuch as warrant his inference, we will leave to our readers to determine. When affignats were firft iffued, they maintained their credit pretty well, as long as it was understood that there was landed property in the hands of the public equal in value to the fum for which they were put into circulation :-but when the emiffion was multiplied to an alarming extent, a depreciation proportioned to the alarm took place. The convention, to keep up the falling credit of the paper, paffed decrees for making it penal in any one to pay away an affignat for less than its nominal value: this decree, together with another for establishing what was called the maximum, for fixing a price on all goods beyond which no buyer was to go, kept up the affignats fome time; as did alfo the fyftem of terror, which, by daily fending numbers of wealthy citizens to the guillotine, was conftantly


conftantly pouring into the treafury a new fupply of ways and means, arifing from confifcations :-but the law of the maximum and the fyftem of terror being done away, the depreciation of affignats began again rapidly to increafe; and, the refource of confifcations being gone, the neceffity of iffuing new affignats daily became of courfe more preffing. This is not all; not only the treafury is not to be fupplied in future, but it is to make reftitution of all that it gained by forfeitures during the bloody reign of Robespierre. The property of the whole Girondist party, now returned to power, is to be reftored; and fo is that of the perfons, not emigrants, murdered in the name of the law during the rule of that merciless ruffian. These immenfe reftitutions will leave for the liquidation of the affignats only the original fecurity, the church and crown lands, and the eftates of the emigrants,-a fund infinitely hort of the fum neceffary to pay off the immenfe number of millions of livres for which the affignats not only have already been iffued, but ftill must be iffued before the war is at an end. On the whole, M. D'I. does not hefitate to fay that the republic will perish by the fame means which pulled down the monarchy-the derangement of its finances.

To fupport this opinion by fomething ftronger than affertion, he goes into the following detail. Jobannot, in his famous report to the convention 22 Dec. 1794, ftated that the annual produce of the eflates become the property of the nation, mortgaged as a fecurity for the payment of affignats, and ftill unfold, amounted to about 300 millions of livres, which at forty years' purchase would make a capital of twelve th ufand millions; to which fhould be added other national property that was not let, but could not be eftimated at less than 2000 millions, and 1000 millions more that would arise from the perfonal estates of emigrants; making in the whole fifteen thousand millions. This, then, is the foundation on which ftands the credit of the affignats. M. D'I. throws out of this account the last two items of it, but without telling us why. He then obferves that lands, at the best of times, did not on an average fell for more than 27 or 28 years' purchafe; and he affigns fome very substantial reafons for an opinion, that it is not to be expected that the republic could poflibly get more than 20 years' purchase, when fhe is obliged to bring annually fuch an immenfe quantity of lands into the market. At this rate, the twelve thousand millions would be reduced to one half. Now out of these fiz thousand millions, he fays, must be deducted the immenfe reftitutions to be made to the federalifts and others, conformably to the decree of the 20th of March 1795. These reftitutions, it was faid in the convention, would amount to about one thousand


thousand millions; but M D'I. without affigning his reafons, eftimates them at double that fum, and thus reduces the capital of the eftates at the difpofal of the nation to four thousand millions. He does not, however, ftop here; for he obferves, that by the decree of 1ft Jan. 1795, the nation took on itself the payment of the debts chargeable on the eftates of the emigrants. Cambon declared that day in the convention that the creditors of the emigrants were about one million in number; and our author, fuppofing that to each of thefe, one with another, is due a fum of 2000 livres, reduces the fund out of which the affignats are to be paid to 2000 millions. Out of this fund, the convention will have to pay off firft the affignats actually in circulation, and which Cambon eftimated that day at 6400 millions of livres; and which M. D'I. thinks cannot now be estimated lower than eight thousand millions: next the new affignats that must be iffued for the farther profecution of the war; and, calculating the expences of the war from this day to the end of the prefent year only, he thinks they cannot fall fhort of five thousand millions. Here then, without mentioning the fupplies neceflary for fupporting expiring agriculture and ruined farmers, without faying a word about the rewards promifed to the foldiers of the republic at the expiration of their military labours, is a fum of thirteen thousand millions of livres, for the payment of which the convention has only the fum of two thousand millions. At the fight of this picture of the French finances, M. D'I. is not afraid to declare that, if the combined powers will but keep their arms in their hands, the convention will, through the failure of ways and means to carry on the war, be reduced to the neceffity of restoring all its conquefts. He is extremely fanguine on this head; but, to do him juftice, the arguments with which he fupports his opinions are very fpecious.

In chap. 3. he treats of the financial refources of England, her revenue, her trade, her taxes, her debt, and her credit; and he draws a picture of her profperity, which is extremely flattering to an English reader. Of her moral character he speaks in terms of admiration. If ever there was a war, (lays he,) in which England gave unquestionable proofs of her moral rectitude and her difintereftednefs, it is furely the prefent. For a proof of this affertion I appeal to the fincere exertions that the has made, and to the blood and treature which the has facrificed, to preferve Holland from the ruin to which the French had doomed her. That ruin is now accomplished: but, though it has afforded the convention matter for longs of triumph, it will not be long ere they difcover that they have done the trade of England the moft fignal fervice poffible; and


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