SIR J. YOUNG: I did not say this House had power to grant a Bill of Indemnity, but I said the House had within itself ample power to protect the witnesses examined before its Committees. There is a remarkable difference between the two things. One does, and the other does not, raise the question of privilege which was raised by the hon. and learned Member for Whitehaven (Mr. Hildyard). House of Lords were made upon that oc- | adopted-I doubt not with the sincere be casion. lief in the soundness and the peaceful ten dency of their policy-measures which necessarily involved us in hostilities, and which are the cause of our being, if not actually, certainly on the brink of being, engaged in a great war. I cannot avoid saying that I do not see in their conduct of diplomatic negotiations those signs. of vigour and that determination of purpose, by the display of which, in the first instance, they might, I think, have avoided the predicament in which we are at present placed; and by which alone they may be able yet to preserve peace or to bring war to a satisfactory and early conclusion. can assure your Lordships that I am not going into a minute and detailed review of the papers which have been laid before you. Let me, however, say that they are full of matter of the deepest interest, and that they appear to me to be for the most part written with great ability. I shall only shortly refer to some passages in them in support of the view which I have from the first taken of these transactions; but, as I have already said, I will not detain your Lordships with any detailed examination of their contents. MR. ROEBUCK: But, suppose a witness makes a confession of corrupt practices before a Committee, can the House shroud him? I should believe, from all my experience in matters connected with the law, this House would not and should not endeavour to do so. If a man were to make a confession, and I indict him, he having confessed he was guilty of an act contrary to law, this House could not interfere. MR. I. BUTT said, if the House would permit him, he would withdraw the Motion for twenty, and substitute fifteen. MR. SPEAKER said, it would not be necessary to resolve that fifteen should be the number, as the usual constitution of such a Committee was that number. It was only necessary to withdraw the Resolution. Motion withdrawn. My Lords, I have said, on a former occasion, and having examined the blue books before us, I say again, that the great error committed by Her Majesty's House adjourned at half after Nine Government was the course they took o'clock. RUSSIA AND THE PORTE. THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDE: My Lords, I rise to call your Lordships' attention to the Motion of which I have given notice. And in doing so I feel it necessary, in consequence of some observations which fell from the noble Earl (the Earl of Aberdeen) on a former occasion, to assure your Lordships that no person is more anxious than I am at all times to preserve peace, if that object can be attained consistently with the interests, and still more if with the honour of this country; and that any ground of quarrel which I may have with Her Majesty's Government is not that they have not earlier engaged us in war, but that they have VOL. CXXX. [THIRD SERIES.] I when, having had a full report made to them of the warlike preparations of Russia, and of the menacing attitude which she had assumed, and having received information of the important mission of Prince Menchikoff—and of intentions which were suspected throughout Europe-they were invited by the French Government to consider the whole aspect of affairs in the East, and to come to a common understanding as to what should be the course of the two Powers on the occurrence of the contingencies to be anticipated. My Lords, I entirely concur with the course taken by Her Majesty's Government with regard to the origin of this unhappy affair-I think that we had nothing to do with the question of the Holy Places, as it is called. I think that the instructions contained in Lord John Russell's despatches upon that subject on the 28th of January are excellent. They simply instruct our agents that with that question, we have, and will have, nothing to do. But on the same 28th of January, the communication from the French Govern T ment, to which I have just referred, was | operations, had its presence been required received by Her Majesty's Government; by the Sultan. I think that this was a and on the 29th of January (as your Lordships will see by the papers), Lord John Russell answered that Her Majesty's Government agreed in the view taken by the French Government of the gravity of the circumstances which they had brought to their notice, that they thought it desirable that a common understanding between the great Powers should be arrived at, and that "he will immediately take into consideration what steps will be necessary for that purpose." Now having thus, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, stated and promised that steps should be immediately considered, in order that a common understanding might be arrived at, it appears almost incredible that up to this moment no such understanding, so far as we are informed, has been come to with respect to any eventuality that has arisen or which might arise. I think that that has been the great and fundamental mistake; and it seems to me that, as far as we are informed, we are in a similar position now to that in which we have been placed since January, 1853. very wise suggestion which Colonel Rose made to Her Majesty's Ministers; but they chose to disregard his advice, and they justified the Admiral for not making any approach towards Constantinople. Now that has been justified by the noble Earl at the head of Her Majesty's Government on two grounds. I understand his reasons to be that, in the first place, we had received such assurances from the Russian Government as we could rely upon implicitly, and that, on that account, we apprehended no danger. My Lords, the second reason given by the noble Earl is, I venture to say, about the most extraordinary and imaginative that ever was uttered by a Prime Minister in a British senate. that, forsooth, if we had assumed anything approaching to an attitude of menace, that, if we had shown a determination to defend the Turkish Government, the Emperor of Russia would at once have seized Constantinople. My Lords, I have never heard such a preposterous notion. How, let me ask, was the Emperor of Russia to perform this Soon after that date came all those great feat? By his ships, when the Engevents which are connected with Prince lish and French fleets were there to supMenchikoff's mission. I will not enter port the Turks? No; but I understand it upon them in detail;-I have only to re- was his armies which were to march upon mind the House that, immediately on his Constantinople. Why, if that statement arrival at Constantinople, he demanded was really intended by the noble Earl to the concession of a secret convention which be serious, I venture to say that the state was inconsistent with the independence of of ignorance in which Her Majesty's Gothe Sultan and his Government. And I vernment are with regard-to use a French say that then, again, as is shown by phrase-with regard to the "mobilisation" these papers, a great mistake was made of the Russian army, is truly deplorable. by our Government, both in the conduct It is notorious that of all the armies in they adopted in the East, and much more Europe, the Russian is the army which, in the language they used at home upon however well organised it may be in some that occasion. My Lords, you cannot have respects-however powerful it may be in failed to observe that Colonel Rose did not defence-however formidable at times in demand that the fleet should enter the the field of battle-and, however well disDardanelles, that it should come to Con- ciplined, in some respects, is the worst orstantinople, that it should commit any in-ganised army belonging to any civilised fraction of any treaty, or assume a menacing attitude; but merely that the Admiral should bring the fleet to the Bay of Vourla, situated near the harbour of Smyrna, a little earlier than he had intended. This Bay of Vourla, I need hardly tell your Lordships, is a frequent station for ships of war, and in anchoring there our fleet could not be supposed to have any intention either of menacing Russia or of supporting Turkey. All that would have been done would be that the fleet would have been there a little nearer to the scene of nation for moving, and with regard to the commissariat and other arrangements which the movement of a great army requires. That is a notorious fact. But the other reason given by the noble Earl was the assurances which had been received from Russia. And here I cannot help avowing, that until I read these papers I could not bring myself to believe that if a straightforward question had been put to the Russian Government, on the object of Prince Menchikoff's mission, it would not have been answered-if answered at all — in a manner which might be implicitly re-cated to the Russian Government, which lied on. But I am bound to say that evidently filled that Court and Cabinet with I was in error. It does appear that joy and delight. It is notorious to every Sir George Seymour did upon one occa- man who has attended for any time to the sion put a question to the Chancellor of march of events, in what is termed the the Russian Empire, as to whether Prince Eastern Question, and to the policy of Menchikoff had or had not any ulte- Russia, that for the last twenty-four years rior instructions or demands to make it has been the object of that Cabinet to beyond that question of the Holy Places excite differences between France and which had been before under discussion; England, and more especially to excite and the answer he received was such as differences between those two Powers on would satisfy any man of honour-any questions relating to Turkey. This has gentleman that the Russian Government been its constant aim; and, of course, did not entertain any such intentions. But, great was the joy of Russian Ministers in the first place, if the Government rely when they perceived that Her Majesty's upon that despatch alone to which I have Government had done for them voluntarily alluded, I must observe that that did not what they had been in vain striving reach this country till the 4th of April; for a long time to do for themselves. I whereas it was about ten days previously, have mentioned this to demonstrate the on the 23rd of March, that the noble soundness of the opinion which I have Earl at the head of the Foreign Office expressed upon the policy of our Governhad written to Colonel Rose, informing ment; and I will now trouble your Lordhim that they did not think it was neces- ships with a few extracts from the papers sary to send the fleets eastward. But I in order to show the justice of the view I do not lay any stress upon what may appear take of the conduct of our Government. I a little inconsistency, because there are in cannot refrain from reading a despatch, these papers references made to personal dated St. Petersburg, April 7, addressed interviews and conversations which are by Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow, very properly not given in detail. And and by him subsequently read to Her Matherefore I doubt not that the assurances jesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs. It cerwhich were previously received were such tainly shows in a striking manner the as very naturally to justify our Government march of the Russian mind in the whole in thinking that there was no danger from of this transaction. In this despatch Russian intrigue, and that they were fully Count Nesselrode sayswarranted in believing the assurances that they received. Assurances, however, will go a certain way, but only a certain way; and against these assurances were circumstances calculated to have led to a different conclusion; and most admirably does Colonel Rose put it in his despatch, when he says that Prince Menchikoff's promises How happy must the noble Earl have and assurances are very fair, but that the been to receive these assurances, who facts contradict him, and upon those facts told us the other night that of all the he justifies the demand he made for bring-men who had ever shown acrimony, ing up the fleet. Now see what was the consequence, not only of their conduct for I am ready to admit that on that point a difference of opinion might prevail, and that it might be justified-but of the language used by the British Ministry at that time. Not content with withholding our fleet from our oppressed ally on the demand of our Minister, Her Majesty's Government expressed openly the greatest alarm at and reprehension of the conduct of the French Government in sending their fleet. Not content with that language in London and Paris, they wrote a despatch to St. Petersburg, to be communi "The Emperor desires you, M. le Baron, to thank Lord Aberdeen and Lord Clarendon very particularly, in his name for the salutary impulse which they have recently given to the decisions of the British Cabinet. The former as on this occasion shown us a new proof of confidence of which our august master is highly sensible." [No. 138.] and severity, and bitterness, in opposing the Russian Government, or who had written and spoken with the utmost force against the Russian Emperor and his policy, that he was that man. The noble Earl then reverted to the treaty of Adrianople, and reviewed the circumstances which attended the then success of Russia against Turkey. My Lords, every sane man knows that if we, or any other European Power, had held up our finger at that time to support Turkey, or that if the Sultan had known the condition of the Russian army at that time, that that army must have been totally annihi lated-we —we know, in fact, that that conquest | say that this despatch of Count Nesselrode was attained as much by the influence of shows you as clearly as possible, if you Russian gold as of Russian arms. But wanted proof, that it was the separation of the noble Earl told us that he animadverted severely on the treaty of Adrianople; and yet it appears that the Emperor of Russia has so entirely forgotten the past conduct of the noble Earl as to state that he receives this as a new proof of that confidence which he felt that the noble Earl had always reposed in him. The Count Nesselrode pays a much milder compliment to my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; for he only said "The latter with whom our relations have hardly yet commenced, thus enters upon them under auspices which justify us in hoping that they will be of the most satisfactory nature." Now, to turn to the more serious part of this despatch-not but that these personal matters are important when dealing with such a subject--the Russian Chancellor proceeds: "Nothing would be more to be regretted than to see the two great maritime Powers combining together, were it but for a moment, and in appearance rather than in fact, upon the Eastern question as it now stands " [that is, while Prince Menchikoff's demands were under consideration.] "Although their views in this respect differ in reality toto cœlo, nevertheless, as the European public is by no means competent to draw the distinction, their ostensible identity could not fail to represent them under the aspect of an intimate alliance." Exactly what I say, I repeat that this, which Count Nesselrode deprecates is the attitude that you should have assumed, and indeed adopted in reality. Now let me pray your Lordships' attention to another passage in the despatch : "The attitude of England will suffice to neutralise what, on the part of the French or the Turks, if the latter should feel encouraged by the presence of the French fleet, might embarrass, or retard too long, the favourable solution of the question in dispute." A favourable solution, indeed! In favour of whom? What was the question in dispute? It was whether the Emperor of Russia should acquire a joint sovereignty over a great part of the Turkish empire. The favourable solution would have been a giving in to these claims. That was the solution which your Minister at Constantinople, although he was not specially instructed on the question, yet, knowing naturally what must be the policy of this country and of this Government, of course resisted to the utmost of his power, when he found that it was pursued by Prince Menchikoff. I France and England at that moment-proclaimed as it was by the language our Ambassador was instructed to address to the Russian Government at St. Petersburg— that gave Prince Menchikoff the courageI may say the audacity-to proceed in those demands which have led to this unfortunate state of affairs. When the fleets were sent for, Prince Menchikoff immediately abated his pretensions; and the Turkish Minister tells Colonel Rose that they did not know what the Prince Menchikoff wanted. "We do not know," said they, "what he is about; one day he endeavours to cajole us by promises of the aid and support that Russia can give us in any event, and another day he endeavours to terrify us with menaces of his Imperial master's vengeance. But some design he certainly appears to have against the independence and honour of the country." Prince Menchikoff thus obtained time to have recourse to his own Government for fresh instructions, and to state the impediments that he met with. In the meanwhile the attitude assumed by England and praised by Count Nesselrode had told at St. Petersburg; the instructions issued were in conformity with the impression thus formed; and it was when Prince Menchikoff received those further instructions (as expressly stated in the blue book) that he made these totally inadmissible demands. I am, therefore, justified in saying that those demands would not have been made had it not been for the course which our Government took in withholding the British fleet and in separating from the French Government. Now, see in what a position you put your Minister at the Court of Constantinople. When Lord Stratford de Redcliffe went there he found that his instructions were entirely founded in error. He found himself without any support whatever when these monstrous propositions were made by Prince Menchikoff. Now, having mentioned that noble Lord, I am sure that I shall not be accused of any partiality to him, either from the relationship in which I have the honour to stand towards him or, from the friendship existing between us, if I express my great admiration of the ability which he has displayed throughout these transactions. It is wonderful how he has succeeded as he has done. He had against him, of course, the Russian Mi nister and the whole Russian party in the Divan, assisted by Russian gold, as the Russian party and Minister always is. He had to keep up the courage of the Turks on the one hand, while he was unable to promise them any support on the other. Further than that, as matters advanced he bad still further to impress upon them the necessity of fortitude and at the same time of patience; for he could not call into activity what is called the Turkish party at Constantinople, because they were for immediate war, and Lord Clarendon's instructions were to repress all hasty and warlike demonstrations at that particular time. I do not think that you can imagine any Ambassador placed in more embarrassing and difficult circumstances, and it is greatly to the honour of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe that he has come out of them with increased reputation for himself, if not with increased credit for the country. At length Prince Menchikoff retired from Constantinople. That, again, was a time when it would well have become the noble Earl to have called his Cabinet together, and to have reminded them of the promises given by Lord John Russell on the 29th of January, and to have arrived at a common understanding with France; at least as to the eventuality immediately impending-I mean the occupation of the Principalities. I will not detain your Lordships by going into details of negotiations, but I must refer to the despatch of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, dated July 4th [No. 353], in which he gives a most clear and most admirable exposition of the whole state of the case, and in which he calls upon his Government to come to a decision one way or another. I think there never was framed a more admirable state paper than that. It shows you not only the predicament in which, partly by your advice, the Turkish Government has been placed, but the risks which you must incur, and of the mischiefs which in one way or the other are sure to ensue from the state into which affairs have fallen; he says that it is not for him, but for the Government, to judge what line is to be adopted; and he recommends that a firm decision should be come to with the least possible delay. He warns the noble Earl (the Earl of Clarendon) that evils that are only evaded for a time are most likely to recur again with exaggerated power and force; and he tells you that that is not the way to surmount a grave difficulty, but that it is your duty to view it in all its proportions, to measure it well, that you may be able to combat it, and then to make finally and as early as possible your decision as to the course you will adopt. Referring to the consequences of leaving the Turkish Government to its fate or interfering to assist it, he says— from the Greek Protectorate as from the Prin"If the ultimate exclusion of Russia, as well cipalities, be really the important object, which has been hitherto presumed, success, I humbly conceive, will never be attained, according to any reasonable calculation, without a previous understanding on the part of England and France to stop at no sacrifice necessary to secure it." Now, my Lords, I am happy to say that at last we have acted in conformity with that opinion so far as it relates to some understanding with France; but up to this moment no understanding has been arrived at respecting the sacrifices we are prepared to make, and for what object they are to be made. I shall not take up your Lordships' time with the proceedings at the Conference at Vienna, or the Vienna note, and the events which have subsequently taken place. It is said to have been a great thing to have secured the alliance of Austria and the German Powers, and no person is more aware of the importance of that alliance being secured than I am; but I do not see, and those papers do not tell us, how far we are in alliance with that Power, or whether that Power approves of the course we have taken in the Black Sea, or how far the position in which we stand is in entire accordance with the views of the Austrian Government. But this I say, you will perceive from these papers, that while you were hesitating and vacillating, and holding aloof from France, and depending entirely upon Russia, that Austria did not come to your assistance-it was not then that you got any assurance from the German Powers; but when you told them boldly and distinctly that stronger steps would be taken by France and England, that was the time that Austria seemed to become alive to her true interest-for her interest it is; and it was by your determined attitude, and not by your vacillation, that you obtained whatever influence you possess in the Austrian Court. There then took place a melancholy event, to which I will not advert; but I must turn to the instructions that were given to our Minister at the Court of St. Petersburg respecting the last communication which he was required to make. My Lords, I must say that the communication |