ish troops in the war of 1828-29, will show what can be done in that province by an energetic commander.* During the winter the populations will be conciliated and resources collected for the ensuing campaign. Proclamations have already been circulated by General Mouravieff, artfully representing the Russian invasion as undertaken not as an aggression upon Turkey, but to defend the Sultan from the Western Powers, who are represented as having already taken possession of his capital, and as compelling him to embrace the religion and to introduce the institutions of Christianity. Such representations, however false they may be, and however absurd they may appear to those unacquainted with the country, will have their effect upon the ignorant and bigoted inhabitants of Kurdistan. We have hitherto, with our usual self-confidence, underrated the resources of Russia, and made light of her power. We have been bitterly punished for our presumption, and yet the lesson is still lost upon us. Any hopes which were founded upon Omar Pasha's advance upon Kutais were groundless. Had that expedition been undertaken three months earlier and with sufficient force, it might, indeed, have compelled General Mouravieff to raise the siege of Kars; but entered upon when the winter season had already commenced, and without the support or sympathy of the population, it could only be a desperate adventure which might be and was attended by a temporary success, but which might have ended in a disaster. Kars having once fallen, Omar Pasha had nothing left but to fall back upon the Black Sea. The Allies appear to us to have committed no greater error than in neutralising or overlooking the peculiar capabilities and position of Omar Pasha. The eminent military qualities which he had displayed upon the Danube, and the services he had rendered to the cause of the Allies, surely entitled him to a different treatment. If there be one general whose reputation has been established during the war, and against whom no voice has been yet raised, it is Omar Pasha. Whether from an unworthy feeling of jealousy, or from some other motive not explained, he appears to have been kept idle during the whole summer and to have been treated with marked indifference by the generals of the allied forces. We have reason to believe that the expedition to Kutais was undertaken rather to free himself from a position which The Russians then took Baibourt and advanced to within a short distance of Trebizond. he justly deemed unworthy of his character and reputation, than in the expectation of success or in accordance with his own better judgment. Had he been sent after the successful termination of the campaign on the Danube into the Asiatic provinces of Turkey, furnished with the means of maintaining and reorganising the forces already collected there, and supplied with skilful and experienced officers from the Indian army, the result of the war in Armenia would have been very different. Instead of Russia having to boast of victories, and having a material set-off against our acquisitions in the Crimea and the Black Seain Asia, too, she would have been defeated, and she would have learnt that on no point could she hope to resist the well-planned measures of the Allies. We shall now have to undertake an Asiatic campaign under every disadvantage. It will cost us thousands of valuable lives and a great amount of treasure to recover that which common prudence and foresight might have preserved. We cannot abandon Turkey in Asia to its fate, both on her account and our own. The Turks themselves cannot defend it. Unless we prepare, without a moment's delay, to take the field or to assist the Turks in doing so, Russia will shortly be in possession of provinces which will compensate for any losses she may sustain in Europe, and will enable her to reject every condition of peace involving the cession of territory or the renouncing of any material claim. what use will the Crimea be to us,' she will say, if we are to have no fortifications at Sebastopol, or no fleet in the Black Sea? We will hold those rich and fertile provinces of Armenia, inhabited by a laborious Christian population, and of infinitely more value to us than a dismantled fortress and useless harbour. Through them we shall extend our influence into the heart of Asia, and maintain an undisputed control over Persia.' 'Of We have said enough to show the importance we attach to the fall of Kars, not only as enabling Russia to carry on the war successfully in Asia, but as affecting the question of peace. There is one other advantage enjoyed by Russia which we consider scarcely less important. We allude to the assistance which she openly receives from Prussia, not only in carrying on her export and import trade, but in obtaining the necessary materials of war. It is remarkable that notwithstanding all that has been said in this country of the crippled. means of Russia, of the complete destruction of her commerce, and of the open discontent of her nobles, arising from the ruin.. which the sacrifice of the produce of their estates has entailed, there is good reason for believing that as yet she has not suffered in these respects to any very material extent. Owing to the facilities afforded by Prussia, the Russian landowners have been able to dispose of most of their produce, although probably with less advantage than before the war, yet still without such loss as would cause them very serious injury. Some of the most important of Russian exports still fetch in the European markets no higher prices than they did three years ago, and we have lately seen even our own Admiralty advertising for contracts for Russian tallow! The Black Sea and Sea of Azoff have been completely closed, but the consequent destruction of the grain-trade has been almost as severely felt by the Western Powers, who have been long more or less dependent upon the southern provinces of Russia for their yearly supplies of the most essential article of food, as by the Russians themselves. We have consequently successfully blockaded that part of our enemy's territories which might with advantage to ourselves have been left comparatively free; whilst we have entirely neglected those outlets the closing of which would inflict incalculable damage upon Russia without any loss to ourselves.* It may be added that we have lost the advantages which a complete interruption of the trade of Northern Russia would have been to us in the development of the resources of our colonies. When the war was found to be inevitable, our merchants naturally anticipated more than an illusory blockade, and sought to supply the market from British dependencies with those articles for which it had previously depended upon Russia. The bad faith of the Government Since the above remarks were written, we have found our view of the state of Russian trade fully confirmed by the Annual Report of the Com mittee of the Hull Chamber of Commerce. 'On taking a retrospect,' says that document, 'for the past year of the trade of this port, which, it is well known, is largely concerned with the north of Europe, it does not appear that the business has been so limited by the war with Russia as might have been reasonably anticipated, although it must be remarked that no port in the kingdom has suffered so much from the interruption of business with that country. The frontiers of Prussia being open for the transport of goods to and from Russia, it appears that the articles of flax, hemp, tallow, and linseed, to some extent, have been able to bear the heavy land-carriage and charges for shipment from Memel and Konigsberg, so that the importation of these articles (except linseed) has been fully adequate to the consumption of this district.' We have reason to believe that the same remark would apply to the Russian trade with France. T has hitherto led to a comparative failure of an attempt, which, if successful, would be of such immense benefit to this country. As some equivalent and counterpoise to the friendly assistance which Russia receives from Prussia, the Allies have at length succeeded in inducing Sweden, if not to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance, at least to pledge herself neither to allow Russia to obtain or occupy, by negotiation, exchange, or otherwise, any, territory appertaining to the Swedish Crown, nor to cede to her any right of pasturage or fishing-ground, and to resist any pretensions that she may put forward in that respect. This treaty is so far important as destroying a hope which Russia has long entertained of obtaining a seaport on the coast of Norway. There is no stronger proof of the long sighted and aggressive policy of Russia than the mode in which she has generally contrived, when concluding a treaty with a Power with which she has been at war, to obtain the concession of an apparently insignificant piece of territory, or some seemingly harmless privilege, which, whenever she considered the time opportune, could be used as a basis for fresh demands, as a means of extending her influence, or as a pretext for fresh hostilities. Thus, at the conclusion of one peace with Turkey, she obtained some unimportant fortresses on the eastern coast of the Black Sea, which enabled her subsequently to put forward a claim to the whole of Circassia. On another occasion, the frontier-line between the Asiatic provinces of Turkey and Russia was made to deviate almost at right-angles from its natural course, in order to include the Christian convent of Echmiadzin, which was represented as unworthy of the consideration of a Mussulman government, but the possession of which enabled Russia to secure the head of the Armenian Church, and consequently to establish a permanent influence over a large portion of the Christian subjects of the Sultan.* *The acquisition of this celebrated Armenian convent is one of the most remarkable examples of the crafty policy of Russia, supported by a perfect knowledge of the country and interest with which she has to deal. It is the ancient residence of the Armenian Patriarch; every bishop of the Armenian faith must go there for consecration, and, consequently, the head of every Armenian community in Turkey is more or less under the control of Russia. The Armenians struggled for some time against this influence, and even threatened to remove the patriarchate to one of its ancient seats at Cis, in Cilicia; but the steady determination and menaces of Russia prevailed, and unsupported they were compelled to yield. It would be a result well worthy of the war to restore Echmiadzin to E N N N sion of a few uninhabited islands at the mouth of the Danube ultimately gave Russia the complete control of the navigation of that great river, the command of the commerce of the Principalities, and a constant power of invading Turkey. It has always been the policy of Russia to put one foot forward, at first. cautiously and stealthily; then, when her pretended claim has been admitted by prescription, by the inability to resist of a weak power, or by the culpable indifference of Europe, to take her stand boldly as a matter of right, and to advance the other foot. We may have tacitly sanctioned her pretensions by not opposing the usurpation, but when subsequently we are inclined to question them, we are solemnly warned of the monstrous audacity of attempting to dismember the Russian empire!* The world has rarely seen so detestable a policy and so mischievous a justification! 99 A glance at the map will show how Russia has pursued this course in the north-west of Europe. It has been one of her great objects to obtain a naval station in the North Sea, which might be accessible at every season of the year, and might enable her to maintain a fleet at all times ready to threaten the coasts of the Western Powers. The deep fiords or inland bays of Norway present admirable harbours for the erection of an arsenal and the construction of a fleet. She has long determined upon Hammerfest, as the point which would best suit her purpose. Having pushed her frontiers so near to the North Sea as almost to divide Norway into two, a pretext could easily be found to warrant her in asserting, if not actually a treaty right, at least one of those specious claims which she is at all times so skilful in put ting forward, and so persevering in enforcing, until a weak neighbour is wearied or bullied into compliance. In the case of Turkey, notwithstanding the horror which some statesmen appear to feel at what they are pleased to term the dismemberment of Russia." We agree in the quaint illustration of Mr. Fox, that there is no more ground for calling the taking away from Russia her ill-acquired possessions dismemberment,' than there would be reason to call the emptying of a burglar's pockets of his false keys and his stolen goods, a robbery. *The policy of Russia has been summed up in some well-known sentences of the national historian Karamsin :—The character of our foreign policy never varies. We endeavour to be at peace with all, and to make our conquests without war, always holding ourselves on the defensive. We do not trust to the friendship of those whose interests are not the same as our own, and we lose no occasion of injuring them without ostensibly violating treaties.' Hammerfest Russian engineers had already been employed to examine the capabilities of the harbour for a naval depôt, and had commenced a survey of the surrounding country, whilst the migration of some Lap tribes had furnished an excuse for putting forward territorial pretensions. We need scarcely point out the vast importance of frustrating the designs of Russia. Whilst her fleet is blocked up by the ice during the winter months, and is confined at all times within narrow and easily defended straits, she can never be a great maritime power. If she were once to establish herself on the German Ocean, she would be a standing menace to Europe, and would compel England to maintain at all times a fleet on the largest war footing. Her ascendancy in Europe would then indeed be complete. The treaty between the Allies and Sweden not only solemnly pledges that country not to cede any territory to Russia, but it binds France and England to furnish her with effective means of resisting any attempt on the part of Russia to acquire it. In whatever light Russia may think it her policy to view this treaty, it is undoubtedly a hostile demonstration against Russia. It is, however, believed, that there are secret articles which connect Sweden even more closely with the Western Powers, and which may eventually engage her in actual hostilities. The war must, however, take larger dimensions, our objects and policy must be more clearly defined than they have hitherto been, before we can fairly induce a weak power like Sweden to arm in our cause and wantonly to exasperate so formidable a neighbour. We have now placed before our readers the position of the belligerent powers at the end of the second year's campaign, and the terms of peace that the allied governments believe themselves warranted in proposing to Russia. It will have been seen that we do not anticipate the acceptance of those proposals. As yet, on neither side have there been successes sufficiently decisive or important to ensure a substantial peace. We have taken the south side of Sebastopol and destroyed the Black Sea fleet, after so long a struggle and with so great a loss that Russia is able to point to its prolonged defence as almost a victory gained. The north side still defies out arms, and the position of the opposing forces is such that it will probably require another year's campaign to reduce it, unless the Russian generals should abandon it as a strategetical measure, without attempting any further resistance. We have achieved partial successes elsewhere, but, as we have shown, they have been more than counterbalanced in their results by the fall of Kars, the destruction of a Turkish army in Asia, and the advantages thus afforded to Russia in entering upon a campaign early this year. Let it not be supposed that, in making the foregoing remarks, we wish to underrate our victory at Sebastopol; whatever may have been the errors which led to the disasters and reverses we have unhappily to deplore, those errors have been amply redeemed by the unparalleled courage and long suffering of our troops and of those of our allies. In spite of a heroic and desperate resistance, directed with extraordinary skill, and supported by almost unlimited resources in munitions of war and in men, this great stronghold, which we were unable to invest, has yielded to our arms. ourselves these facts when about to renew the struggle and to enter into the third year's campaign. We have, we repeat, from the first been too much inclined to underrate our enemy, to catch at the vaguest rumours of her difficulties and sufferings, and to undervalue the vast resources and inherent strength of Russia when engaged in a great national struggle. To this over-confidence we owe more than one reverse and that failure of complete success which renders any prospect of peace still almost hopeless. We trust that there is no likelihood of our falling into this error again. There is no cause whatever to be disheartened. The victory is ours if we throw our whole strength and energy into the contest. If it were to have been more easily achieved, there would have been a less urgent necessity for the war. In entering upon the next year's campaign the Allied Governments will have to take into consideration two questions, with which, as we have seen, they have hitherto not dealt, although of the utmost importance, viz. the pretended neutrality of Prussia, and the means of carrying on the war against Russia in Asia. We have already shown that in consequence of the facilities afforded by her neighbour Russia has not only been able to export the produce of her northern provinces and to receive in turn such British Whilst thus bearing testimony to the conduct of the allied armies, we cannot omit a tribute to the courage and fertility of resources displayed by our enemy. During nearly a year they have been exposed to an almost continual bombardment, which their general has well termed infernal.' They have borne sufferings as great, if not greater, than even those to which we have been exposed. Repulsed in every attempt, although made with the utmost devotion and resolution, to force our lines and to interrupt our advances, and hope-and other European manufactures and less of ultimate success, they persevered without flinching in a desperate defence; and, when further resistance on the south side was altogether impossible, retreated in perfect order in the very face of their enemy by a frail bridge thrown across a broad inlet of the sea-a feat almost unexampled in the history of war. Some of our readers may have seen photographs brought to this country of the interior of the Redan, the Malakhoff, and other works thrown up by the enemy, since our appearance before Sebastopol, to defend the open quarters of the city. These faithful representations cannot fail to produce in us a feeling of mortification, somewhat indeed akin to humiliation. They show a skill and knowledge, and a power of turning every resource to an account, together with a consideration for the safety of the men, which contrast strangely with our ill-constructed and ill-designed works. The defence of Sebastopol will form an episode in the military history of Russia to which she will justly refer with pride. It would be as unwise and impolitic as it would be unworthy of our national character to endeavour to conceal from colonial produce as she requires for the consumption of her population, but that she has been able to obtain arms, munitions of war, and other articles, the supply of which is a direct violation of that neutrality which Prussia affects to preserve. On the other hand, the Prussian Government has shown an almost open hostility to the Western Powers by thwarting them in the smallest matters which might give umbrage to Russia. The position thus assumed by Prussia has undoubtedly been of great advantage to her population, who appear to have renounced those generous qualities and that ardent love of liberty and national independence which the German race once boasted, in favour of the temporary profits of an extended transit trade. It has been the fashion in this country, arising from an earnest desire to palliate the conduct of a people for which we have hitherto felt a sincere respect, to separate the policy of the King from the feelings and wishes of his subjects, but we fear it must be now admitted that there are not sufficient grounds for this distinction. The King has throughout his dominions received the most unequivocal and almost unanimous demon 1 strations of sympathy and encouragement in the course his Government has pursued. The Federal Diet, sharing with him in their admiration for what they are pleased to term the conservative character of Russia as a counterbalance to the revolutionary tendencies of the West," and keeping only in view the direct and palpable German interests connected with the Eastern question, have pursued the same selfish, short-sighted policy. It will be remembered that, in declaring their concurrence in the principles of the four points forming the basis of the Vienna negotiations, they took care to add that they especially appropriated and maintained the first and second points (that is to say, those for the settlement of the questions relating to the Principalities and the navigation of the Danube) as connected with German interests; at the same time, with a want of common sense and foresight truly deplorable, they refuse their open and cordial sanction and support to that interpretation of the principle contained in the third point, which would be the only security for the permanent maintenance of those interests. To the peculiarly selfish policy which has hitherto influenced the German Powers and people may probably be added that hereditary jealousy and fear of France engendered by the aggressive wars of Napoleon, which would lead them to prefer the preponderance of Russia in central Germany to that of France-as if this great and enlightened race could not look forward to a real national independence, equally free from the undue interference and influence of either power. The position thus assumed by Prussia and the Diet unfortunately justifies their exclusion from all participation in negotiations for peace, and thus greatly diminishes—if it does not destroy the influence to which they would otherwise be justly entitled in the affairs of Europe. But we fear that it will require more than the moral effects of their foolish policy to bring Germany to a true sense of duty towards Europe and civilization. It is essential to the interests of the Allies and to the attainment of the objects of the war, that this state of real hostility, cloaked by a pretended neutrality, should at once cease. If Prussia, whether from national considerations or from sympathy with Russia, be resolved not to take any active part in the war, she cannot, at least, be permitted to afford aid to our enemy; consequently one of the first subjects which the Allies will have to consider, in the Conferences about to be held at Paris, will be the means of enforcing, at the risk even of driving Prussia into open hostilities, a strict neutrality, and of closing her ports and frontiers as an outlet to Russian trade. In spite of the scruples of Mr. Cobden, measures must be taken to blockade her ports in the Baltic, and to put an end to the Russian transit trade. Prussia has hitherto held aloof from any direct participation in the war. If she be now compelled to share in its sacrifices and its calamities, it will be owing to the dishonest and unstatesmanlike conduct of her Government. Of the result, notwithstanding the boasted strength of the federative union, we have little doubt. However much we may lament the disasters which such a war would inevitably entail upon a German Protestant Power, in whose prosperity and independence this country has ever felt a deep and friendly interest, we are yet obliged to remember that we are now bound up with Allies in the prosecution of a great cause, and that we are pledged to carry on the war with the utmost vigour against an enemy to which Prussia openly affords encouragement and aid. With regard to the position of Austria, we need only remark that she is better able than ever to persevere in her neutrality-the only policy by which she can hope to escape the disasters which war would inevitably entail upon her. However much, therefore, we might desire her active cooperation against Russia, and although we might two years ago have compelled her to declare in our favour, we now see less prospect than ever of her taking any share, at least for some time to come, in the contest. Our successes may encourage her in giving her so-called moral support' to our demands upon the Court of St. Petersburg, but she will go no further. Neither side can afford to quarrel with her. Russia has no wish that she should throw her great military strength into the balance in favour of the Allies, and the Allies cannot now provoke the hostility of a Power which is already in possession of two Turkish provinces, and has an army of 200,000 men ready to march upon Constantinople to cut off their retreat from the Crimea. It is evident, therefore, that we are now entirely dependent upon her for any arrangement with regard to the Principalities, and that their evacuation is hopeless unless it agrees with her political views. The Emperor of the French has already forcibly expressed his sentiments, in which this country heartily concurs, with regard to the neutrality of the German States, and the impossibility of their persistence in this policy as soon as the struggle assumes |