specimens of their incautious concessions, and shall also endeavour to show the real nature of the system which they are unconsciously supporting. But, before commencing our task, we are anxious to explain that the portions of their works which we select for condemnation must not be taken as a specimen of the whole. These selections, indeed, give the system of the authors and constitute their characteristic peculiarities. But there is also much to edify and instruct in their volumes, especially in those of Mr. Jowett. Indeed it would be quite possible to cut out everything objectionable from his book, and leave an expurgated commentary of unusual value. As an interpreter, his great merit is that he endeavours to ascertain the true meaning of St. Paul, without attempting to wrest his words to the support of some preconceived dogma of theology.* This merit is rare in England, though common in Germany, a fact which admits of an obvious explanation. The German professors, in general, have held the opinions of St. Paul no more authoritative than the opinions of Aristotle; consequently they are under no temptation to extract from his sayings a confirmation of their own. Whereas the orthodox Arminian will inevitably wish to find the apostle an antipredestinarian; the orthodox Calvinist to identify him with the Westminster Divines. There is, however, on the other hand, a bias to be dreaded in what is called the most liberal school of interpretation. If, namely, a man begins with the foregone conclusion that the apostles must have been frequently mistaken, he will then be under a temptation to prove them so. From this bias we think neither Mr. Williams nor Mr. Jowett is exempt. In mentioning the work of the latter, we must not omit to notice that though it professes to be a critical edition of the Epistles to the Romans, Thessalonians, and Galatians, yet its more important feature consists in the numerous dissertations on questions ethical, metaphysical, and theological, which are interpolated between the pages of St. Paul, with whom, for the most part, they have a very slight connexion. Most We may avail ourselves of this opportunity to recommend to our readers a recently published work which possesses this and most other merits of Mr. Jowett's volumes, with hardly any of his faults. We mean Mr. Stanley's excellent edition of the Epistles to the Corinthians. In careful execution of the exegetical portion, it is not inferior to the best German commentaries: while it adds that vivid realisation of the past, and that richness of historical illustration, distinctive of its anthor. of these essays are written with earnestness and ability, and some of them may be praised, without reserve, as truly valuable contributions to our religious literature. We may specify particularly those on the Quotations from the Old Testament,' on Casuistry,' and 'on the State of the Heathen World,' the last of which, however, is an abridgmeut from Tholuck. In criticising the writers before us, then, we hope that we shall not forget the respect due to their character in the animadversion due to their conclusions. Nor will they be so unreasonable as to claim for themselves an infallibility which they do not concede even to the apostles. There is one portion of his work, however, in which the public might reasonably have believed Mr. Jowett less fallible than he has proved himself. In exegetical_research we might naturally have hoped to find his commentary on a level with the time; and in Hellenistic scholarship we should certainly have looked for perfect accuracy. It is, therefore, with surprise as well as regret that we find neither of these expectations fully realised. Thus, in enumerating the exegetical writers whom he has consulted, he omits all mention of the two most eminent names of modern times, De Wette and Meyer; while he notices Olshausen, who, as an interpreter, ranks, except in orthodoxy, immeasurably below them both. Again, we might have hoped from the successor of Gaisford an independent text of the Epistles which he edits; whereas we find him adopting Lachmann's text as perfect, and maintaining it with a servile adherence. A far more important blemish, however, is to be found in Mr. Jowett's neglect of accurate verbal scholarship. In this respect his commentary must be regarded as a retrograde step in biblical literature. Up to the end of the last century it was the fashion to treat the grammar of the New Testament in a free and easy manner, very convenient to interpreters. In those days any preposition might stand for any other; prepositions might govern any case they pleased, without change of meaning; conjunctions might indicate all relations promiscuously; For example, in his note on Rom. xiv. 6 (xai 8 μ. 7. X.), he says, 'these words are chiefly worth remarking as illustrative of the entire want of au thority of some of the readings of the Textus Receptus. Now, so far from this being the case, the words in question, though they have but little manuscript authority, are guaranteed by so great a weight of patristic authority, that Tischendorf, in his second edition, has retained them in the text. voices, moods, and tenses were equally ac- ΕΙΣ may always stand for EN; * We do not mean to deny that in some instances Winer went too far in maintaining a more rigid observance of distinctions than really exists. For example, he almost denies, or at least says that it cannot with certainty be proved, that the aorist is ever used for the perfect in the New Testament; a usage of which there is the clearest proof. Indeed the recent English critics (Mr. Ellicott, Mr. Alford, and others), who nominally profess their adherence to his doctrine on this point, are compelled to violate consistency by frequently themBelves translating the aorist as a perfect. But if there be an ultra-зcrupulosity in Winer's grammatical conscience, it is a safer extreme than that of laxity. Akin to this grammatical laxity is the historical and geographical inaccuracy into which Mr. Jowett occasionally falls. As an illustration, we may mention that he informs his readers, in a note upon Rom. xvi. 1, that Cenchreæ (which he calls Cenchrea) was the port of Corinth on the Corinthian Gulf;' and to prove that this is not a mere typographical error, he elsewhere calls the same place the port of Corinth' (ii. p. 34), implying that it was the only, or the chief port of Corinth. The mistake is much the same as if a Frenchman should say that Hull was the port of Manchester on the Irish sea. Again, while speaking of St. Paul's expressed intention to visit Spain (Rom. xv. 24), he says, There is no reason to suppose that the journey was ever accomplished '-apparently forgetting the celebrated statement of Clemens Romanus, St. Paul's disciple, that St. Paul before his death' visited the extremity of the west.' These last-mentioned peculiarities enable us to understand Mr. Jowett's opinion, that historical and topographical inquiries' are useless to the student of the New Testament (i. 27-30). Neither,' he says, are the descriptions of particular cities [thinking perhaps of Cenchrex] or countries at A few examples will suffice to justify our as- all more instructive.. Such inquiries sertion. Thus, in a note on Gal. i. 6, we are told have no real connexion with the that it is doubtful whether iv is put for eis, or a confusion of iv and eis;' and further, that in the interpretation of Scripture; and they tend New Testament prepositions are often transposed to withdraw the mind from the true sources Again, in Gal. iv. 13, dù with the accusative is of illustration of the Epistles, and the true translated as if it had been followed by the geni- nature of the earliest Christianity.' How tive; and this is justified by a false parallel with Phil. i. 15, di' eidoxíav knpuocovat, which does not they produce this effect Mr. Jowett fails to mean (as Mr. Jowett supposes), they preach in good explain. Perhaps, however, some light will, but they preach out of good will, just as the may be thrown upon the question by the preceding di póvov means out of envy. So again, knowledge that a geographical idea of all on 1 Thess. iv. 14, we read the only remaining the countries of the earth is quite different mode is to take oa for iv. Again in vol. i. 7, from that (shall we say) spiritual notion of Yokopev (2 Cor. v. 16) is translated, 'I will know,' as if it had been yvwoopela. And on this mistrans- place which occurs in the Epistles' (ii. 104). lation a most serious historical error is grounded, which we shall presently notice. Again, in Gal. i. 23, akovovres oav is translated, they heard, the sense of the imperfect being ignored. Again, Rom. i. 1, KAŋròs dróσrodos is rendered, called an apostle, instead of a called apostle. Again, on Rom. i. 32, we are told in a note that St. Paul uses où μóvov allà ai simply for 'and;' to which we may reply, if he meant nothing but xai it would have been easier to write nothing but kai. But the most startling solecism of all is contained in the note on Rom. vii. 25, ἄρα οὖν αὐτὸς ἐγὼ τῷ μὲν νοϊ δουλεύω νόμῳ θεοῦ, τῇ δὲ σαρκὶ νόμῳ ἁμαρτίας. The difficulty of this verse Mr. Jowett attempts to remove by a novel and original suggestion. He translates it, With the mind I myself serve the law of God; [here the interpolated semicolon should be obBerved] howbeit with the flesh the law of sin.' He adds in a note an explanation, that the first part of the verse (adròs ¿yi τ μèv vot d. v. 0.) means, ་ This last remark illustrates the working of an influence which has evidently had a Very large share in the production of Mr. Jowett's present work, and in the formation of his peculiar system-his devotion, name We 'I myself (that is, in my true self) serve the law of ly, to the transcendental idealism of Hegel. There are, indeed, many passages of his writing which it is impossible for any one not in some measure acquainted with that philosophy to understand at all. Thus, when he says that, 'Objects considered in their most abstract point of view may be said to contain a positive and negative element; everything is and is not; is in itself and is not in relation to other things' (ii. 488), his readers must be perplexed if they do not happen to know that he is enunciating the famous Widerspruchslehre, or doctrine of contradiction, by which Hegel has solved all the mysteries of the universe. Again, when he tells us that the opposition between 'God and man, mind and matter, soul and body,' may be lost by our regarding these pairs of opposites as passing into each other' (ii. 505), we recognise the Hegelian doctrine of Moments,' by virtue of which the Seyn and the Nichts pass into each other and form the Daseyn. Again, the following remark on the comprehensibility of the Divine nature is purely Hegelian 'As in heathen times it was more natural to think of extraordinary phenomena, such as thunder and lightning, as the work of the gods, than as arising from physical causes, so also it is still natural to the religious mind to consider the bewilderments and entanglements which it has itself made as a proof of the unsearchableness of the Divine nature.'-ii. 489. Among these 'bewilderments and entanglements which the mind itself has made,' Mr. Jowett, following Hegel, places such questions as the origin of evil and the freedom of the will. And the passage we have quoted above implies that it is as absurd to consider the Divine nature unsearchable, as it would be to consider every thunderstorm miraculous. To most of our readers we suspect that such a doctrine will be novel, and even startling; but those acquainted with the modern development of German philosophy will be aware that it is the great boast of Hegel to have made the Divine nature scientifically comprehensible, and to have explained by the rigid application of his method the enigmas above-mentioned, which had hitherto proved insoluble to the human mind. Like Mr. Jowett (ii. 488), he maintained that for this complex action of soul and body, of mind and matter, we must find some simple and consistent expression.' And an expression' he found accordingly, which is certainly consistent,' though perhaps hardly 'simple.' Whether it be also true, or only a mere verbal juggle, is a more doubtful matter. We may indeed compre hend under the same logical formula (as) Hegel does) the evolution of substance out of cause and effect, of water out of oxygen and hydrogen, of law out of free-will and necessity, and of Deity out of mind and nature. Nay, we may go farther and classify, as Oken has done in his Physio-Philosophy, the whole creation under the Hegelian categories. But when we have done all this, several questions still demand an answer: first, whether the analogies which form the basis of our classification are founded on a real identity of relation, or upon an arbitrary caprice of fancy; secondly, whether we comprehend a contradiction at all the better, because we say that we unite both its opposite poles in a single conception; thirdly, whether a logical evolution, to which Hegel reduces the Deity, is a more fundamental conception of the mind than a living being. For our own part the old question will still recur to us- Can man by searching find out God?' Nay, the more we contemplate the universe, the more we are inclined to exclaim with the apostle, 'How unsearchable are His judgments, and His ways past finding out.' But we are aware that by this confession we expose ourselves to the reproach from all Hegelians of utter incapacity for scientific method.* Besides the above more direct instances of the introduction of Hegelianism, we find the leaven of the same philosophy diffused through the whole mass of Mr. Jowett's volumes. Thus, according to that system, history is the self-evolution of the eternal reason in a perpetual process of development. Consequently the present age cannot realize or comprehend a past age, being itself another thought of the eternal process, and not the same thought. Truths are only true for the age which uttered them; morality is in a state of flux, perpetually progressive. The influence of this theory is palpably felt in the following passage :— 'We cannot imagine an individual separated from his age; no more can we imagine the truths of Christianity separated from the time at which they appeared, or from the stage of language in which they came to the birth.'ii. 39. Tholuck, whom he classes among those who obsti*This is the reproach made by Hegel against nately persist in calling God incomprehensible, and refusing to accept the scientific analysis of the nature of Deity which he (Hegel) has provided. See senschaften' (ed. 1880), p. 593, et seq.—a passage Hegel's Encyclopaedie der Philosophischen Wiswhich seems to have supplied Mr. Jowett with a portion of his remarks in vol. ii. pp. 488, 489. So Mr. Jowett proves the impossibility of our realising the moral condition of the past by the example of the Jews under the old theocracy. Religion, he observes, which, to the believer in Christ, is an individual principle, was to the Jews a national one. 'To think of the Jew, in the earlier period of Jewish history, isolating himself from his fellows, and determining to walk in all the commandments of the law blameless, would be as absurd as to think of an individual forming a state, or inventing a language.'—ii. 494. Surely when he wrote these words their author must have forgotten that there were such men as David, Samuel, and Elijah. The following exemplifies the same influence acting in another field :— 'In describing things spiritual, forms of thought are necessarily fluctuating, because they are inadequate; that which is sometimes the cause being equally, from another point of view, the effect.'-ii. 141. In fact, according to Hegel's logic, as we have just mentioned, cause and effect pass into each other, and form substance by their union. This will perhaps render it more easy to comprehend the inversion of modes of thought' which has taken place between our age and that of St. Paul, 'so that what is with us the effect, is with the Apostle the cause, or conversely' (ii. 40). Another most curious illustration of this German influence is the essay on what Mr. Jowett calls the mixed modes of time and place in Scripture.' In this he maintains that the very ideas of time and space in the apostolic age were different from those in our own minds. We have already quoted one passage from this dissertation, upon the spiritual notion of place.' In another we are told that 'this spiritual notion of time and place is not possible to ourselves. These mixed modes of time and place are no longer mixed to us, but clear and distinct. We live in the light of history and of nature, and can never mingle together what is inward and what is without us. We cannot but imagine everywhere, and at all times, heaven to be different from earth, the past from the future and present. No inward conscience can ever efface the limits that separate them. No "contemplation of things under the form of eternity" will take us from the realities of life. We sometimes repeat the familiar language of Scripture, but always in a metaphorical sense. *ii. 105. The only foundation for the singular notions of this essay is (1) the vivid manner of St. Paul in In the same spirit we are told (i. 298) that it is quite impossible for us in the present day to realize the spirit or the life of St. Paul. 'Could any one say now the life not that I live but that Christ liveth in me?' asks Mr. Jowett. We thought and hoped that there had been hours and hours in the life of every true Christian when he could say this; and that the difference was rather, that St. Paul realized perpetually that which, with most of his followers, is but intermittent. Akin to the above is the assertion that 'the indefiniteness of the language of the New Testament harmonises with the infinity of the subject. It has not the precision of Attic Greek; but could the precision of Attic Greek have expressed the truths of the Gospel?'-ii. 39. If the truths of the Gospel cannot be expressed in Attic Greek, it naturally oecurs to us to ask whether they can be expressed in any of the languages of modern Europe? We suppose Mr. Jowett would reply that German is the only tongue in which they can now be shadowed forth. Still more redolent of Transcendentalism is the discovery that the clearness of Paley's style [in the Hora Pauli na] has given him a fallacious advantage with the [i. e. of Paley, not of Mr. Jowett], which flatters reader,' and that the perspicuity of the writer the reader into intelligence, makes him ready to admit what he can so easily understand.'-i. 109. This is the first time we ever heard that the clear statement of an argument tended to hide its fallacy. We had fancied that it was the muddy stream which best concealed the rocks and shoals beneath its surface. We had supposed that a cloudy and confused style best screened the shifting of meanings, the ambiguity of middle terms, and the craft of rhetoric. We have been told before, although we never believed it, that clear writers were necessarily shallow. It was reserved for Mr. Jowett to establish the principle that clearness is lows conversely that obscurity is equivalent equivalent to fallacy. We suppose it fol to demonstration-in which case it cannot be denied that German metaphysicians are the most irrefragable of reasoners. We hope, however, that none of our readers will suspect us of joining in the indiscriminate outcry against Germany, which is heard from some of the least sometimes, by way of anticipation, speaking of future events as present; and (2) his saying by a natural hyperbole that the tidings of the conversion of the Romans and Thessalonians were spread throughout the world (Rom, i. 8; 1 Thess. i. 8). reflecting of our religious contemporaries. | statements support. That system, which Cloud-towers by ghostly masons wrought In shadowy thoroughfares of thought." Therefore we regret to see a man of Mr. Jowett's ability led captive by the boasted Method of Hegelian metaphysics; a method which seems to us near akin to that uséodsia Ts havns spoken of by the Apostle. Not that we should have wished him less conversant with German letters, but only more familiar with a different department; we wish that he had devoted himself rather to German criticism than to German metaphysics; that he had read Hegel less and Winter more. We believe that Mr. Jowett would have been less ready to follow his German masters whithersoever they led, and that both he and Mr. Williams would have been more cautious in their admissions, had they fully realized the true nature of that system of infidelity which some of their *There is much truth in a saying of Elmsley, the Greek critic, who, when he was asked how it was that the Germans beat the English in scholarship,' replied, 'because they never go out to tea.' In point of fact, a German professor will toil patiently at his desk for fourteen hours out of the twenty-four, never quitting it except to eat the simple meals which the Frau Professorinn has cooked for him. His literary work supplies to him the place which in the mind of the Englishman is shared by politics, society, and money-getting-engrossing pursuits, which usually drive literature into the corner. Axiom 1. All the physical changes and all the moral changes which occur throughout the universe, are unalterably determined by antecedent necessity, so that they follow each other by invariable laws.' Ax. 1. Cor. 1. The chain of physical causation is eternal and excludes creator.' Ax. 1. Cor. 2. A miracle, being by definition an interruption of the physical laws of the universe, is impossible." Axiom 2. The will of God is only another name for the laws of nature.' Ax. 2. Cor. 1. 'It is absurd to suppose sin offensive to God, for sin is a manifestation of the laws of man's moral nature, and as such is a part of the will of God.' Ax. 2. Cor. 2. All religions are equally from God, being equally developments of the moral laws which determine the moral progress of mankind.' Ax. 2. Cor. 3. Revealed Religion (so called) is identical with Natural Religion in origin and authority.' In these articles of faith, Schelling and Hegel, Harriet Martineau and Auguste Comte, are all agreed. This agreement we shall illustrate by some quotations, arranged seriatim beneath each of the articles in question. And we shall then consider how far the Christian writers before us have inadvertently seemed to concur with this consensus infidelium. Ax. 1. All the physical changes and all the. moral changes which occur throughout the universe are unalterably dete mined by antecedent necessity, so that they follow each other by invariable laws.' So the idealistic pantheist Fichte says 'Whatever actually exists, exists of absolute necessity, and necessarily exists in the precise form in which it does exist. It is impossible that it should not exist, or that it should exist otherwise than as it does.' -(Fichte on the Origin of Hist r., Lecture 9.) 12. |