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within the time stipulated. Both defenses were overruled by the district court, and a decree was entered in favor of the libelant, the owner of the Harbinger.

The appellants contend that there was an implied agreement that the ship should be at Philadelphia by the 1st day of January, unless prevented by the excepted perils. But the stipulation that the ship shall "with all convenient speed sail and proceed to Philadelphia” is to be read in connection with the other provisions of the charter party. Only thus can the intention of the parties be discovered. Now, it was specified that the ship was then "trading," and undoubtedly the contracting parties had regard to that important fact. Indications of this appear upon the face of the contract. No mention was made of the place from which the vessel was to sail; neither did the contract designate any date for the commencement of the voyage to Philadelphia; nor was the time within which the vessel should arrive there defined. Her lay days for loading, it will be perceived, were to begin, not on January 1st, but not before. Clearly, within the contemplation of the parties, the lay days might begin later. On the one hand the owner of the ship was not to tender her before January 1st, and on the other hand the charterers might refuse to load her if she failed to arrive by the last day of the month. The charterers did not exact from the ship a stipulation to be in Philadelphia early in January, but were content to reserve to themselves the option to cancel if she did not come during the month. That the charterers may not have known, when the contract was made, that the ship was at Charleston loading for Bremerhaven, is unimportant. They seem to have been willing to take the chance of any delay in the ship's arrival at Philadelphia caused by her fulfillment with reasonable diligence of her then existing trading engagement, whatever it might be. In Hudson v. Hill, 43 Law J. C. P. 273, a stipulation to proceed "forthwith" was held simply to mean that the vessel should go with reasonable dispatch. Here the language was "with all convenient speed," and this, we think, meant reasonable diligence with reference to the trading voyage which the ship had already undertaken. Upon this construction of the charter party there was no breach of the stipulation to proceed to Philadelphia. The evidence fully discloses the movements of the vessel, and shows that she completed her voyage to Bremerhaven and made needed repairs without any unreasonable delay, and then with proper diligence sailed and proceeded to Philadelphia.

The case of McAndrew v. Adams, 1 Bing. N. C. 29, which the appellants cite, is clearly distinguishable from the present case. There the ship was to proceed in ballast from Portsmouth to St. Michaels, two or three weeks distant, to bring back cargo of fruit for the London market. The course of the fruit trade required expedition. The charter party was made October 20th. December 1st was named as the first of the lay days for loading. With reasonable diligence the vessel might have arrived in London by January 1st; but instead of proceeding in ballast directly to St. Michaels, the vessel went to Oporto with troops, which she was not able to land, and therefore was obliged to return to Portsmouth, and reland the troops there on No

vember 28th. She did not finally sail on her voyage to St. Michaels until December 6th, and did not reach London until February 1st. Nor is our conclusion inconsistent with the ruling in Lowber v. Bangs, 2 Wall. 728, that a stipulation that the vessel should "proceed from Melbourne to Calcutta with all possible dispatch" required her to go directly from the one place to the other.

The second defense raises the question, was the ship "ready for cargo" within the agreed time? In the court below an unsuccessful attempt was made to establish a custom in the port of Philadelphia that where a vessel is chartered to load within a certain time, and the last day falls on Sunday, she must tender herself on the preceding Saturday. The point has not been pressed here, and it may be dismissed without comment. As already mentioned, the ship in herself was in actual readiness to receive the cargo she had contracted to carry, when she came to anchor in the port of Philadelphia. Was she "ready for cargo," within the meaning of the charter party? We think she was. Observe, the contract contemplated-indeed, expressly provided for-what actually happened, namely, the arrival of the vessel on Sunday, January 31st; and it must be assumed that the parties knew that by the law of Pennsylvania worldly labor on Sunday is forbidden, and therefore that the loading of the ship could not begin on that day, nor anything more be done on her part than was done. Again, the clause in question relates not to the act of loading, but to the ship's own readiness to take in cargo. The two things are distinct. Here the ship was ready in fact; she fulfilled the very terms of the contract. The words "ready for cargo," in the connection in which they occur, naturally refer to the condition of the ship herself, and we see nothing to indicate that they were used in any other sense. It appears, indeed, that by the rules, adopted April 28, 1887, of the Philadelphia Maritime Exchange, an incorporated body of merchants, notice that a vessel chartered to load grain at Philadelphia is ready for cargo, to be valid, must be accompanied by a pass of the surveyors of the board of marine underwriters certifying to the vessel's readiness. But clearly these rules are not to be imported into a charter party made in the city of New York for the employment of a British vessel, when the contract itself makes no reference to them. Hick v. Tweedy, 63 Law T. (N. S.) 765. It is not shown that the Harbinger had ever before been at Philadelphia. Her foreign owner had not given his assent to these rules. They were not known to him, so far as appears. Moreover, one of the appellants' most experienced witnesses testified: "The object of this notice is to show the readiness of the vessel, so that her lay days may commence the following day." The whole evidence indicates that this is the sole purpose of serving upon the charterer the notice and accompanying surveyors' certificate. Therefore, even if upon the proofs it could be said that such a usage exists at Philadelphia distinct from the rules of the maritime exchange, still such usage could not properly affect the construction of a clause of the charter party which does not relate to the matter of lay days, but concerns the readiness of the ship to receive cargo. We have only to add that the words, "Vessel to load under the inspection of underwriters' agents, at her expense, and to comply with

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st the above views; for not only fer to the act of loading the ship er, but it strongly suggests that, if the ys readiness for cargo depend on a sur

have given expression to that intention. te conclusion that the ship was "ready for sts not necessary for us to express an opinion er under the general rule of law that, where e of a contract falls on Sunday, it is legally ay, the ship's admitted readiness the next mornAccompliance with the charter party.

affirmed.

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LA CHAMPAGNE.

SEWALL et al. v. LA CHAMPAGNE.

(District Court, S. D. New York. November 26, 1892.)

ON DAMAGES-Salvage CLAIM.

sonable amount paid in settlement of a salvage claim against a vessel ed in collision, where the claim actually went to suit on disputed facts, Sere is no reason for supposing that the settlement was collusive, is a per item of damage to be charged against the vessel found in fault for the

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SAN-ASCERTAINING VALUE OF VESSEL BEFORE COLLISION.

A vessel, after collision, was sold in her damaged condition for $6,650, and the damage was repaired for $9,500, making her sound value by this method $16.150 Estimates as to her value by witnesses for one party varied from $19,000 to $14,000, for the other party from $22,000 to $25,000. The commisfoner adopted the value first above given. Held, that his finding would not be disturbed.

& SAME-DEMURRAGE-WHEN NOT RECOVERABLE-INTEREST.

Where owners of a vessel damaged by collision elect to have her sold in her damaged condition, they cannot recover demurrage; for interest is the legal indemnity for the delay in collecting the balance of her original value from the wrongdoer.

SAME-INTEREST ON AMOUNT PAID FOR WRECK-WHEN RECOVERABLE.

Interest should be added on the amount paid for the wreck by the purchaser during the period occupied by him in repairing, when that mode is adopted of settling the value of the vessel, since, in order to repair, it is necessary that such amount should lie idle during that period.

5. SAME-LOSS OF FREIGHT-VESSEL'S EXPENSES.

On a voyage broken up by collision, an allowance, as an item of damages, of the whole amount of freight, less the expenses of the vessel during the time it would have taken her to complete her voyage, is proper.

In Admiralty. On exceptions to commissioner's report,

Owen, Gray & Sturges, for libelants.

Jones & Govin, for claimants.

BROWN, District Judge. The damages from collision in the above case having been apportioned, (43 Fed. Rep. 444,) and the report of the commissioner assessing the damages filed, exceptions have been taken to the amount allowed for the damages to the vessel, for demurrage, for salvage, for freight, and for some other items.

1. Salvage. The collision occurred on February 26, 1890, about 25 miles off Shinnecock light, Long island. The schooner was afterwards towed in by the Merritt Wrecking Company, who claimed salvage. The claim being resisted by the libelants, the vessel was libeled therefor, and was sold under a decree of the court on or about April 3, 1890. The claim of salvage was settled upon a compromise be tween the parties for $2,750, which was paid by the libelants on April 30, 1890, besides a considerable bill for the costs and expenses of suit. The sum of $2,750 has been allowed by the commissioner, but not the costs. The Fletcher, 42 Fed. Rep. 504.

The considerations urged against the validity of the original claim to salvage, have, no doubt, much support in the evidence. The facts were, however, in dispute, and the matter was in litigation. There is no ground to suppose the compromise was a collusive settlement. The libelants were just as much interested as La Champagne in opposing the claim; and on the whole I concur with the views expressed in extenso by the commissioner in the allowance of this claim.

2. Damage to the Schooner. The libelants, having elected to have the schooner sold, were entitled to recover the difference between her value in her damaged condition and her value before the collision. There were two methods of arriving at this difference: One, by proof of the schooner's market value before and after collision respectively; and the other, by proof of the cost of repair and of putting her in as good condition as before. Both kinds of evidence were given. The purchaser of the vessel caused her to be repaired at an expense of $11,000, of which $1,500, as he testified, would cover all extra repairs outside of the damages caused by the collision. The commissioner upon this evidence accordingly allowed $9,500 for damages to the schooner, besides the $2,750, the amount paid for salvage. I do not find in the proofs of value of the schooner any sufficient reason for disturbing this finding.

The amount realized on the marshal's sale and received by the libelants, was $6,650. Assuming that to have been the fair market value of the schooner in her damaged condition, adding to that amount the $9,500, allowed by the commissioner, and also the additional sum of $83.12 mentioned below, (5,) would make a total of $16,233.12 as the value of the schooner before collision. The estimates made by the claimants' witnesses as to her value varied from $12,000 to $14,000; those of the libelants' witnesses from $22,000 to $25,000. Upon such evidence the allowance of a sum for damage which virtually makes the schooner worth $16,233 before collision, furnishes no reasonable ground of complaint to the defendants. The libelants cannot complain of the use of the evidence as to the cost of repairs, because this is a proper limit in the recovery of damage, and a necessary check upon the uncertain estimates of value; while if the wreck was worth more than the sum for which it sold, it is the libelants' own fault that they permitted the sale for that sum to outside parties, instead of protecting their own interests. The exceptions on this item are, therefore, overruled.

3. Demurrage. By electing to have the vessel sold, the libelants elected not to use the vessel further, and disclaimed any further use of her. They elected to take her value, viz., $6,650, and to have the

their rules," do not militate against the above views; for not only does that provision manifestly refer to the act of loading the ship after acceptance by the charterer, but it strongly suggests that, if the parties meant to have the ship's readiness for cargo depend on a surveyor's certificate, they would have given expression to that intention. Having thus reached the conclusion that the ship was "ready for cargo" on January 31st, it is not necessary for us to express an opinion upon the question whether under the general rule of law that, where the time of performance of a contract falls on Sunday, it is legally performable the next day, the ship's admitted readiness the next morning was sufficient compliance with the charter party. The decree below is affirmed.

LA CHAMPAGNE.

SEWALL et al. v. LA CHAMPAGNE.

(District Court, S. D. New York. November 26, 1892.)

1. COLLISION-DAMAGES-SALVAGE CLAIM.

A reasonable amount paid in settlement of a salvage claim against a vessel damaged in collision, where the claim actually went to suit on disputed facts, and there is no reason for supposing that the settlement was collusive, is a proper item of damage to be charged against the vessel found in fault for the collision.

8. SAME

ASCERTAINING VALUE OF VESSEL BEFORE COLLISION.

A vessel, after collision, was sold in her damaged condition for $6,650, and the damage was repaired for $9,500, making her sound value by this method $16,150. Estimates as to her value by witnesses for one party varied from $12,000 to $14,000, for the other party from $22,000 to $25,000. The commissioner adopted the value first above given. Held, that his finding would not be disturbed.

8. SAME-DEMURRAGE-WHEN NOT RECOVERABLE-INTEREST.

Where owners of a vessel damaged by collision elect to have her sold in her damaged condition, they cannot recover demurrage; for interest is the legal indemnity for the delay in collecting the balance of her original value from the wrongdoer.

4. SAME-INTEREST ON AMOUNT PAID FOR WRECK-WHEN RECOVERABLE.

Interest should be added on the amount paid for the wreck by the purchaser during the period occupied by him in repairing, when that mode is adopted of settling the value of the vessel, since, in order to repair, it is necessary that such amount should lie idle during that period.

5. SAME-LOSS OF FREIGHT-VESSEL'S EXPENSES.

On a voyage broken up by collision, an allowance, as an item of damages, of the whole amount of freight, less the expenses of the vessel during the time it would have taken her to complete her voyage, is proper.

In Admiralty. On exceptions to commissioner's report,

Owen, Gray & Sturges, for libelants.

Jones & Govin, for claimants.

BROWN, District Judge. The damages from collision in the above case having been apportioned, (43 Fed. Rep. 444,) and the report of the commissioner assessing the damages filed, exceptions have been taken to the amount allowed for the damages to the vessel, for demurrage, for salvage, for freight, and for some other items.

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