Seulliva” Some of them are, by their own statements, Crect rapiers whie at least two others claim that they were acta's men, and were compelled to join the expedition ja sessure di force and threats of violence. If any of the witging in the case were constrained or compelled to ga un maar in the expedition, because of violence, or threats of Yours, alors them by men engaged in the enterprise,—that is, I hd not join and remain with the expedition voluntarily, but we geded to do so by men engaged therein, then they would margaried, in law, as accomplices; for an accomplice is a volun260 3888caat in a crime. "He is a person who knowingly and volunad with common intent with the principal offender, unites in The Commession of an offense." Bearing in mind this distinction be ve a person who is an accomplice and one who is not, you are fursher Distructed that whether the testimony of an accomplice be true is a question which, like all controverted questions of fact, is smitted solely to you to determine for yourselves. It is not within the province of the court to pass upon controverted questions of fact, or upon questions affecting the credibility of witnesses. But it is the duty of the court to call your attention to certain rules which obtain in courts of justice in reference to these persons known in law as "accomplices." On this point you are instructed "that a particeps criminis-that is, an accomplice,-notwithstanding the turpitude of his conduct, is not on that account an incompetent witness." It is the settled rule in this country that an accomplice in the commission of a crime is a competent witness, and the government has the right to use him as a witness. It is the duty of the court to admit his testimony, and that of the jury to consider it. The testimony of an accomplice is, however, always to be received with caution, and weighed and scrutinized with great care by the jury; and it is usual for courts to instruct juries-and you are so instructed in this case-not to regard the evidence of an accomplice unless he is confirmed and corroborated in some material parts of his evidence connecting the defendant with the crime, by unimpeachable testimony. But you are not to understand by this that he is to be believed only in such parts as are thus confirmed, which would be virtually to exclude him, inasmuch as the confirmatory evidence proves, of itself, those parts it applies to. If he is confirmed in material parts connecting the defendant on trial with. the offenses charged in the indictment, he may be credited in others; and the jury will decide how far they will believe a witness, from the confirmation he receives by other evidence; from the nature, probability, and consistency of his story; from his manner of delivering it, and the ordinary circumstances which impress the mind with its truth. U. S. v. Kessler, Baldw. 22; U. S. v. Beeves, 38 Fed. Rep. 409, 410. With the rules above announced for your guidance, you will give to the testimony of such witnesses as have been shown to be ac complices such weight as you consider it entitled to receive.

As the court has already intimated, you are the exclusive judges of the credibility of witnesses, and of the weight to be attached to their testimony; and, in weighing and considering the evidence before you, you should endeavor to reconcile and harmonize it, if you can. "When

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this cannot be done, you must determine for yourselves what portion of the conflicting testimony is most worthy of belief. The court can only give you a few general rules as guides for weighing and deciding between testimony that cannot be reconciled. You should look to the circumstances surrounding the respective witnesses, and the way in which they testify, in considering the weight to be given to their testimony; to their means of information, and opportunity of knowing the facts whereof they speak. You should also consider the manner and bearing of the witnesses in testifying. Do they show a zeal in stating facts favorable to one side, and reluctance in disclosing facts that would benefit the other? Do they testify in that frank, candid, straightforward way which a witness should do, under the solemnity of an oath? Or do they evade or equivocate? You should also look to the consistency of their testimony. * * You should especially look to the interest which the respective witnesses have in the suit, or in its result. Where a witness has a direct, personal interest in the result of the suit, the temptation is strong to color, pervert, or withhold the facts." Under the foregoing rules you will give to the testimony of the witnesses such weight as in your judgment it should receive.

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You are further instructed that the presumption of law is in favor of the innocence of the defendant, until his guilt is established, by the evidence, to the satisfaction of the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt; and if, upon full consideration of all the facts and circumstances in evidence, you entertain a reasonable doubt of his guilt, you should give him the benefit of it, and acquit him. It is difficult to define, in exact terms, the nature of a reasonable doubt. It may be said to arise "from a mental operation, and exists in the mind when the judg ment is not fully satisfied as to the truth of a criminal charge, or the occurrence of a particular event, or the existence of a thing. It is a matter that must be determined by the jury, acting under the obligations of their oaths and their sense of right and duty." If, from an examination and consideration of all the facts and circumstances in evidence, taken in connection with the charge of the court, you are satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty, as charged in the indictment, you will return a verdict in the following form: "We, the jury, find the defendant, Carmen Ybanez, guilty, as charged in the first and second counts of the indictment." If, however, you find him guilty either under the first or second count, but not guilty as to the other, you will frame your verdict accordingly, indicating under which one of the two counts he is guilty, and under what one he is found not guilty. If your finding be in his favor as to both of said counts of the indictment, you will simply say: "We, the jury, find the defendant not guilty."

It is said, gentlemen of the jury, by the learned judge from whose charge I have already quoted, that

"The all-pervading object of this neutrality law is peace with all nations,— national amity,-which will alone enable us to enjoy friendly intercourse and uninterrupted commerce, the great source of wealth and prosperity; in short, to prevent war, with all its sad and desolating consequences.”

Such being the object of the law, it is the duty of courts and juries to enforce it, whenever the occasion arises, with fairness and im

and with firmness. While our own governa safe asylum to honest, upright, and has the right to demand, on their part, obe- for our international obligations; and alher person living under the influence of Amerjoy the utmost liberty, consistent with public is a liberty regulated by law. It is not an unferred upon an individual, to violate the law sad thus produce anarchy at home, or, as the case amicable relations which may subsist between tand that of a friendly foreign power. Men must the social fabric falls. Independent states and charge their international obligations to each other, the maintenance of peace, and the continuance of recourse. The evidence in this case makes it manifest executive department of the federal government, with the stance and co-operation of the state authorities, has per8 duty in the endeavor to prevent a violation of the neutralss by dispersing armed bodies of men, who, from the inception Garza movement until recently, infested the lower portion of sudicial district, and by aiding in the arrest of numerous persons sposed to be offenders against the statute. Let us, also, gentlen. perform the duty assigned to us. The defendant now on trial scharged with a violation of this law, and it is for you to say whether he is guilty or innocent of the offense. Give the case a fair, candid, and impartial hearing. If he be innocent, do not hesitate so to declare. But if, under the evidence and foregoing instructions, you deem him guilty, then so say by your verdict. The case is now remitted to your keeping. Take it, and render such a verdict as may be just both to the government and the defendant.

UNITED STATES v. BRADFORD.

(District Court, D. South Carolina. January 6, 1893.)

FALSE PRETENSES-INTENT TO DEFRAUD.

Under Act April 18, 1884, making it a felony to falsely pretend to be an officer or employe of the United States, with intent to defraud the United States or any person, where an indictment charges such false personation in order to defraud the United States or a certain railroad company, it must be shown, to authorize a conviction, that defendant, to consummate his fraudulent intent, so falsely represented himself to some agent of the government, or to some agent of the railroad company.

At Law. Indictment against Samuel J. Bradford for violation of Act April 18, 1884. Verdict of not guilty.

B. A. Hagood, Asst. U. S. Atty.

Samuel Lord, for defendant.

SIMONTON, District Judge. The defendant is indicted under the act of congress approved 18th April, 1884, (23 St. p. 11,) falsely and fraudulently pretending and assuming to be an employe of the United States in order to defraud the United States or the Northeastern

Railroad Company. The admitted facts in the case are that on the morning of 19th December, 1892, Mr. Waring, postal clerk, was in his postal car at the depot of the Northeastern Railroad in CharlesAfter assorting his mail, and while resting, he discovered the defendant concealing himself in a dark corner of the car. As soon as he discovered him, he sprung up and seized him by the collar. That defendant said at once, "I am Bradford, and in the service." Waring denying that he was in the service, defendant then said, "I have been discharged, but I am trying to steal a ride to Florence." Waring had an officer called, by whom defendant was arrested. In order to convict the defendant under this act, it must appear that he had formed an intent to defraud either the United States or the Northeastern Railroad Company; and that, to carry out this intent,—that is to say, as the means of consummating his intent,-he falsely pretended to be an employe of the United States. If it was his intent to defraud the United States, it must be shown by evidence that he falsely pretended to be such an employe to some agent of the government, in order, under this false personation, to consummate his intent. If his intent were to defraud the railroad company, then he must have represented falsely to some agent of the railroad company that he was an employe of the United States. These essential elements are wanting in this case. The jury must find the defendant not guilty

UNITED STATES v. HURSHMAN.

(District Court, D. Washington, S. D. November 16, 1892.)

INDIANS-SALES OF LIQUOR.

Rev. St. § 2139, provides that every person who disposes of spirituous liquors to any Indian "under the charge of any Indian superintendent or agent * * *shall be punished. *" Held, that an Indian of the

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Nez Perces tribe, a soldier in the United States army, is within the meaning of the statute.

At Law. Charles Hurshman was accused of the offense of unlawfully disposing of spirituous liquor to an Indian, under Rev. St. § 2139, and held to answer therefor by a United States commissioner. The grand jury, being uncertain as to whether or not the facts shown by the testimony of the witnesses for the government brought the case within the statute, made a special presentment of the case. The court, being of the opinion that the presentment contained all the requisites of an indictment, caused the defendant to be arraigned, and required him to plead thereto, which he did, first by a demurrer, and afterwards by a plea of not guilty. Demurrer overruled. Trial, and verdict of not guilty.

Patrick Henry Winston, U. S. Atty.

H. S. Blandford, for defendant.

HANFORD District Judge. Although the defendant has been ac quitted, and this particular case is no longer of importance, the question upon the demurrer is new, and merits a concise and precise

statement and decision in writing. The presentment charged the defendant with having disposed of spirituous liquor to one James Williams, an Indian of the Nez Perces tribe, who was at the time a regular enlisted soldier in the United States army, on duty with his regiment at Ft. Walla Walla. Section 2139, Rev. St., upon which the prosecution is founded, reads as follows:

"Sec. 2139. No ardent spirits shall be introduced, under any pretense, into the Indian country. Every person who sells, exchanges, gives, barters, or disposes of any spirituous liquors or wine to any Indian under the charge of any Indian superintendent or agent ** *shall be punishable. *

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The sufficiency of the presentment is questioned on the ground that it does not allege that the Indian to whom the liquor was furnished was at the time under charge of an Indian superintendent or agent of the United States, and it is assumed that the contrary appears by the statement that said Indian was at said time a regularly enlisted soldier of the United States army, on duty with his regiment. I hold that the words "under the charge of any Indian superintendent or agent," were intentionally put into the statute by congress, and must be given force and effect as expressive of the legislative will. I have repeatedly decided that it is not a crime, under this statute, to dispose of spirituous liquor to British Columbia Indians, or Indians upon whom the rights, privileges, and immunities of citizenship have been conferred by the laws of the United States; and it is my opinion now that the statute under consideration is not applicable to any case of selling or disposing of liquor to an Indian not at the time subject to the general authority and supervision given by the laws of the United States to the officers of Indian affairs. I also concede that, consistently with the maintenance of military discipline, there can be no control by officers of the department of the interior of soldiers while on duty, or during their terms of enlistment. But, when an Indian enlists in the military service, the officers of Indian affairs are only partially relieved of their charge concerning him, and but temporarily deprived of power to control his person. While he is in the army said officers continue to be charged with the duty of caring for his family and property and interests as a member of his tribe, and upon his discharge from the army their right to control him will be fully restored. I consider that the principle applicable to the case of an Indian who, by absenting himself from his home for pleasure or profit, temporarily places himself beyond the physical power of his superintendent or agent, should be applied to this case. Neither the Indians themselves, the officers of the army who induce them to enlist, or officers of the interior department who consent to it, have any power to change the laws; and no act of either, affecting for the time being the actual situation of an Indian, can change his status from that of a ward of the nation.

That the Indian named in the presentment is under charge of an Indian superintendent or agent is a legal conclusion from the fact of his being a Indian of the Nez l'erces tribe. The facts being stated, the presentment is a sufficient pleading, although it does not state the legal conclusion.