side the board, of any large amount of the funds of the bank, although the law limits even these loans. But the danger arises when the parties in the board either conspire together or connive at some of their members taking large amounts of the funds of the bank for their use in speculation or investment, or the like; and so in each report there is required to be entered the liabilities of directors. In this report it is stated as "Liabilities of Directors (Individual and Firm) as Payers." The testimony of defendant is that on August 1, 1887, the bank was the owner of over $18,000 of paper drawn by L. D. Randall & Co.; that L. D. Randall was at that date a director in this bank, and, when this paper was discounted, was a member of the firm of L. D. Randall & Co.; but that.in this report to the comptroller he did not enter as a liability of director this said amount of L. D. Randall & Co. paper, because, as he thought, L. D. Randall was not liable as payer. If he so thought at that time, he erred in judgment. You are instructed that in this respect the entry as to liabilities of directors is, according to defendant's evidence, not correct and true, and that defendant should have entered that amount under the heading of "Liabilities of Directors." As to whether it is, as made by defendant, a "false entry," within the meaning of the term as I have defined it, you must decide under all the facts proven. Here, also, you may pertinently consider what, if any, influence upon the method which defendant practiced as to the Randall & Co. paper in report of August 1, 1887, the letter of the comptroller had.

In the last report in evidence preceding this letter from the comptroller there had been reported, as liabilities of directors as payers, the aggregate of $53,867.08. This was of date of May 13, 1887. The comptroller's letter, as I have stated, is July 1, 1887. In this letter the comptroller calls attention, by special reference, to the fact that certain loans he names exceeded the limit prescribed by law, and among them the comptroller named the loans to L. D. Randall of $19,049. (At this time L. D. Randall was a director in the bank.) The comptroller notifies defendant and the other directors of the bank as follows: "Attention is again called to the unlawful use of the bank's funds by its officers and directors;" and he adds: "I must ask that these loans be reduced immediately to within the limit," etc. Within about a month after the receipt of this letter another report was demanded by the comptroller. At the time of this last called for report of August 1, 1887, the bank was the holder of paper drawn by L. D. Randall & Co. for the amount of $18,000, and of L. D. Randall of about $5,000, in all exceeding the sum of $23,000, as paper on which said L. D. Randall, then a director, was liable as payer. The testimony of the defendant is to the effect that he did not enter this paper on which L. D. Randall was liable as a payer in the liabilities of directors as the same is entered in the report of August 1, 1887, and as of October 5,1887. In this respect the entry as to liabilities of directors is in each of said reports incorrect and untrue; and it is for the jury to say, from all the facts and circumstances proven, whether defendant made, with reference thereto, in said reports, a "false entry," within the meaning of said term as I have defined it to them in the preceding instructions. The defendant was permitted to state the reason why, as

he stated, he did not enter the said L. D. Randall & Co. paper among liabilities of directors, etc. The court permitted this reason to be given, that the jury might consider it as bearing on the question of intent; whether defendant had in his action any intent to deceive or defraud the persons named in the indictment, if you find that he made a false entry in this particular.

As to one other piece of paper, purporting to be a draft made by the Iowa City Gaslight Company by J. K. Graves, president, in favor of J. K. Graves, and held by the bank for about $5,700, defendant testifies that he did not enter this paper among liabilities of directors. Evidence has been admitted, namely, the sworn testimony of the defendant, tending to show that at the time this draft was drawn, or the orignal draft of the same import, of which this was one of the renewals, defendant knew that this paper, drawn by said J. K. Graves, who was then a director of the bank and a brother of defendant, and nominally drawn by him as president of the gas company, was in fact the paper of J. K. Graves, and so known to the defendant. The government contends that this draft was but a ruse or device whereby the said J. K. Graves was to be permitted to further increase his paper in the bank, under attempted color of a draft by said gas company. If the jury find from the facts proven that, at the time this paper was drawn and taken by the bank, said J. K. Graves had no authority to sign said paper with the name of said gas company as by him as its said president, and that the paper was in fact said J. K. Graves' paper and discounted for J. K. Graves' personal benefit, and that all these facts were at the time fully known to said defendant, and, so knowing, said defendant intentionally did not enter the same among liabilities of directors, the jury will determine from all the facts proven whether said defendant made a false entry in said report of liabilities of directors with reference to this matter, within the meaning of the term "false entry" as heretofore defined to them.

I have considered in some detail the items entering into the report of August 1, 1887. Many of the same items, and much of the same method of making the report, enter into the report of October 5, 1887. I shall not attempt to consider the several items of the October report. The jury may take the method of treatment I have given as to the August report, and themselves apply the same substantial method so far as properly applicable to the October report; and when they have considered all the evidence relating to the charges of false entries in said October report, and applying thereto the law as I have herein given it, the jury will determine whether the defendant made any "false entry" (as I have heretofore defined it) in said October report, with regard to loans and discounts or overdrafts or liabilities of directors, as stated in the several counts relating thereto.

If the jury do not find, in any one of the two reports above described, that defendant made any false entry charged in the indictment as the same is submitted to you, and as the term "false entry" has been hereinbefore described and defined, you will proceed no further in your investigations; for the making of such false entry therein is, as heretofore stated, essential to the finding of defendant's guilt. If

he made no false entry, he is not guilty of the crime charged, and must be acquitted. But if you should find, within the instructions above given you, that defendant did make any such "false entry" as to the particulars above stated, and within the meaning of the term as I have defined it to you, then you will proceed to consider the second and remaining point, which the government must prove to entitle it to a verdict of guilty, viz.: Did defendant make such false entry or entries, or any of them, with intent to deceive any agent appointed to examine the bank's condition, or to deceive some one or more officers of said bank, or to defraud said bank, or any other corporation or firm or person? And if the jury find such intent, in any manner as charged, is proven against defendant, this finding, in connection with finding defendant made the false entry as above defined, will authorize a verdict of guilty against defendant; but, if the jury do not find proven against defendant any such intent, the defendant must be acquitted.

It is a sound and wise principle of law that a man shall be held to intend the legitimate consequences of his acts; that is, that he intended that which is the naturai and necessary result of his act, freely and knowingly done. If a man, knowing a coin is counterfeit, passes that coin upon another as genuine, he will not be allowed to say that he passed it with innocent intent. From his act of intentionally passing the coin as genuine, when he knows it to be counterfeit, the law presumes and holds him to the presumption that he passed it with guilty intent. If a man brings to me a horse, and proposes to sell it to me, and affirms to me that he owns the horse, and that his ownership is full and complete, when in fact he knows the horse belongs to another, and that he has not the least right or interest as owner in said horse, and I, relying on his statement, purchase the horse of him, he will not be heard to claim that he sold the horse to me with innocent intent, but the law stamps his act as done with guilty intent, as done with an intent to deceive me, and with fraudu lent and false pretenses. In other words, wrongful acts knowingly and intentionally committed can neither be justified nor excused on the ground of innocent intent. The color of the act determines the complexion of the intent.

If a director of a national bank, in a report to the comptroller of the condition of his bank, makes an entry which is false, which does not contain or state the truth with regard to the condition of the bank upon the date named in this report, and such entry relates to a material matter, and such director, at the time he made such false entry, knew it was false and calculated to deceive, and that it did not give a true and correct statement of said bank's condition at the time with respect to such entry, in such case the law will not permit him to say that he made such false entry with innocent intent, and not expecting to deceive any one thereby. If such a director willfully puts up a report designed to allay any suspicion then existing, designed to induce faith and trust in his institution, and it is proven that the entries in that report are false in fact, and at the time he made them he knew them to be false, it would be a mockery upon justice to allow him to say that he made those entries with innocent intent. In such v.53F.no.7-42

a case, gentlemen, the act done is in law stamped with guilty intent on the part of the person doing it.

Notice, gentlemen, that in all the instances I have named I have given prominence to the fact of knowledge in the person doing the act. I do not mean that a man can be convicted of the crime charged in this indictment for merely negligent, careless action. Speaking generally I may say that, if the director making the false entry was in fact ignorant of the condition of the bank, and did not know its resources and liabilities, however recreant he might be to the position he held and the duties devolving upon him, and whatever other liabilities, civil or criminal, he might thereby be subject to, he could not be convicted under the section on which this indictment is based; and yet I ought to add that this does not in any wise justify or authorize a director to purposely, willfully, and knowingly close his eyes and his ears to the facts around him, or which lie directly in his path, for the purpose of making it easier to those engaged in plundering or wrecking a bank. Let me illustrate my meaning: If a director of a national bank, knowing that those in charge of or actively managing the bank are despoiling it, robbing its treasury, knowing that the funds of the bank are being dissipated, improperly withdrawn from the bank, and worthless paper (miscalled "securities") is being substituted instead thereof, if, thus knowing, such director refuses to accept the information lying directly across his path, and purposely keeps himself in ignorance or refrains from taking active part in the bank's management, that he may thereby permit such transactions to go undisturbed or undetected, and he then lends the credit of his name, puts his signature to untrue and false reports connected with the condition of the bank for the purpose of enabling such a fraud to go undetected,—in such a case it will be no shield to him to show that he had no knowledge of the truth or falsity of the report he has signed. To hold otherwise would be to make the law go hand in hand with rankest injustice, to legalize robbery, to make our temples of justice modern cities of refuge, and our courts encouragers of what plain people properly call crime.

Therefore I have to say to you, gentlemen, as the law of the case upon this point, that if the defendant, at the date named in the reports to the comptroller named in the indictment, as submitted to you, knowingly inserted in a report of the resources and liabilities of his bank a false entry as heretofore defined to you, and as charged in the indictment submitted to you, of such a nature that the ordinary, natural, and legitimate result thereof would be to deceive the other officers of the bank, or any one of them, or any agent then or thereafter appointed to examine affairs of said bank, or to defraud the bank or any other company, body politic, or corporation, or any individual person whatever, then, in the absence of contravening proof, you are authorized and justified to find that defendant made such false entry with the intent to deceive or to defraud, within the meaning of the statute, and to find against the defendant as to the second and remaining point as above stated.

You may have noticed, as I stated to you the section under which defendant has been brought to trial, that the statute does not require

that any person should have been in fact defrauded or actually deceived by the false entry in order to make the crime complete; and so it is not necessary, in order to complete the proof of a violation of this section, that it shall be shown to you that any officer of the bank, or any agent appointed to examine into the condition of the bank, has in fact been deceived by a false entry in the report, nor that in fact any company, corporation, or individual person has been defrauded by the false entry. The attempt to deceive or to defraud may not have been adroitly planned or skillfully performed,-it may have been so bunglingly carried into execution as that every officer of the bank and the bank examiner could, upon referring to the bank records, readily detect the entry to be a false entry; yet if there was any attempt to deceive, if the false entry was knowingly entered, and was a false entry which was naturally and necessarily calculated to mislead, this would be sufficient, in the absence of contravening proof, to authorize the finding that the person making it made such false entry with intent to deceive. The law might have made it otherwise, but it has not. The law wisely was framed to meet the criminal on the very threshold of his crime, and before he had consummated such crime. The policy of the law was by congress wisely established, so that one reading the report should have the right to rely thereon as being a true report; and a depositor or bank dealing with the bank making the report is not required to investigate the books of the reporting bank to see if the report is honest and true. The bank official, at his peril, must make it truthful according to his knowledge when he signs his name to the report as being correct; and, if he intentionally made it otherwise, he must answer to the law in any attempted or intended deceit he has practiced. And therefore if the evidence shall prove to you that any "false entry," as I have defined it, submitted to you for your consideration, has been knowingly made by the defendant. with the intent to defraud or to deceive any of the parties named in the indictment, that is sufficient to constitute the crime charged against the defendant, even though none of said named parties have actually and in fact been deceived or defrauded thereby. The gist of the crime is in making the false entry with intent to deceive or defraud any of said parties.

Your verdict, gentlemen, must be found upon the evidence introduced before you, and be considered by you under the law as given by the court. As I have heretofore said to you, this trial commences before you with the presumption of innocence in favor of defendant, and your verdict must be for defendant, unless you find the evidence overthrows this presumption, and brings your minds beyond a reasonable doubt to a verdict of guilty.

I have to say to you further, gentlemen, and this statement is to be understood as affecting the entire charge given you, that, if you can reconcile the evidence before you upon any reasonable hypothesis of the defendant's innocence, it is your duty to do so. And, before you can find the defendant guilty of the crime charged in the indictment, you must find such guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This reasonable doubt relates to the defendant's guilt under all the evidence. You will take up the evidence bearing on each proposition of fact, and de