of Deputies on the charge of having been at the head of a conspiracy for the return of Napoleon. He was, however, satisfactorily acquitted, and he afterwards publicly repelled the accusations which had been brought against him in a "Mémoire Justificatif." Enfeebled by bodily infirmities, he expired at Ruel, his country seat, near Paris, on April 4th, 1817.

Masséna was gifted by nature with a powerful frame of body and indomitable resolution. A brave man, he was considered the most skillful tactician among Napoleon's generals, and on the field of battle he was remarkable for coolness and the precision of his orders. He had, moreover, the invaluable quality in a commander of not being dispirited by defeat. His faults were principally rapacity and avarice, and they frequently brought down upon him the displeasure and punishment of Napoleon.

THE SIEGE OF GENOA IN 1800.

Some of you remember Genoa; you have seen that queenly city with its streets of palaces, rising tier above tier from the water, girdling with the long lines of its bright white houses the vast sweep of its harbor, the mouth of which is marked by a huge natural mole of rock, crowned by its magnificent light-house tower. You remember how its white houses rose out of a mass of fig and olive, and orange-trees, the glory of its old patrician luxury; you may have observed the mountains behind the town spotted at intervals by small circular low towers, one of which is distinctly conspicuous where the ridge of the hills rises to its summit, and hides from view all the country behind it. Those towers are the forts of the famous lines, which converge inland from the eastern and western extremities of the city, looking down, the western line on the valley of the Polcevera, the eastern on that of the Bisagno, till they meet on the summit of the mountains, where the hills cease to rise from the sea, and become more or less of a table-land running off towards the interior, at the distance of between two and three miles from the outside of the city. Thus a very large open space is enclosed within the lines, and Genoa is capable therefore of becoming a vast entrenched camp, holding not so much a garrison as an army.

In the autumn of 1799 the Austrians had driven the French out of Lombardy and Piedmont; their last victory of Fossano or Genola had won the fortress of Coni or Cuneo close under the Alps, and at the very extremity of the plain of the Po; the French clung to Italy only by their hold of the Riviera of Genoa, the narrow strip of coast between the Apennines and the sea, which extends from the frontiers of France almost to the mouth of the Arno. Hither the remains of the French force were collected, commanded by General Masséna, and the point of chief importance to his defence was the city of Genoa. Napoleon had just returned from Egypt, and was become First Consul; but he could not be expected to take the field till the following spring, and till then Masséna was hopeless of relief from without; everything was to depend on his own pertinacity. The strength of Masséna's army made it impossible to force it in such a position as Genoa; but its very numbers, added to the population of a great city, held out to the enemy a hope of reducing it by famine; and as Genoa derives most of its supplies by sea, Lord Keith, the British naval commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, lent the assistance of his naval force to the Austrians, and by the vigilance of his cruisers, the whole coasting trade right and left along the Riviera was effectually cut off.

It is not at once that the inhabitants of a great city, accustomed to the daily sight of well-stored shops and an abundant market, begin to realize the idea of scarcity; or that the wealthy classes of society, who have never known any other state than one of abundance and luxury, begin seriously to conceive of famine. But the shops were emptied, and the store-houses began to be drawn upon; and no fresh supply or hope of supply appeared. Winter passed away, and spring returned, so early and so beautiful on that garden-like coast, sheltered as it is from the north winds by its belt of mountains, and open to the full rays of the southern sun. Spring returned, and clothed the hill-sides within the lines with its fresh verdure. But that verdure was no longer the mere delight of the careless eye of luxury, refreshing the citizens by its loveliness and softness when they rode or walked up thither from the city to enjoy the surpassing beauty of the

prospect. The green hill-sides were now visited for a very different object; ladies of the highest rank might be seen cutting up every plant which it was possible to turn to food, and bearing home the common weeds of our road-sides as a most precious treasure.

The French general pitied the distress of the people; but the lives and strength of his garrison seemed to him more important than the lives of the Genoese, and such provisions as remained were reserved in the first place for the French army. Scarcity became utter want, and want became famine. In the most gorgeous palaces of that gorgeous city, no less than in the humblest tenements of its humblest poor, death was busy; not the momentary death of battle or massacre, nor the speedy death of pestilence, but the lingering and most miserable death of famine. Infants died before their parents' eyes; husbands and wives lay down to expire together. A man whom I saw at Genoa in 1825 told me that his father and two of his brothers had been starved to death in this fatal siege. So it went on, till in the month of June, when Napoleon had already descended from the Alps into the plain of Lombardy, the misery became unendurable, and Masséna surrendered. But before he did so, twenty thousand innocent persons, old and young, women and children, had died by the most horrible of deaths which humanity can endure. Other horrors which occurred besides during this blockade I pass over; the agonizing death of twenty thousand innocent and helpless persons requires nothing to be added to it.

Now is it right that such a tragedy as this should take place, and that the laws of war should be supposed to justify the authors of it? Conceive having been a naval officer in Lord Keith's squadron at that time, and being employed in stopping the food which was being brought for the relief of such misery. For the thing was done deliberately; the helplessness of the Genoese was known, their distress was known; it was known that they could not force Masséna to surrender; it was known that they were dying daily by hundreds; yet week after week, and month after month, did the British ships of war keep their iron watch along all the coast: no vessel nor boat laden with any article of provision could escape their

The

vigilance. One cannot but be thankful that Nelson was spared from commanding at this horrible blockade of Genoa. Now on which side the law of nations should throw the guilt of most atrocious murder, is of little comparative consequence, or whether it should attach it to both sides equally; but that the deliberate starving to death of twenty thousand helpless persons should be regarded as a crime in one or both of the parties concerned in it, seems to me self-evident. simplest course would seem to be that all non-combatants should be allowed to go out of a blockaded town, and that the general who should refuse to let them pass, should be regarded in the same light as one who were to murder his prisoners, or who were to be in the habit of butchering women and children. For it is not true that war only looks to the speediest and most effectual way of attaining its object, so that as the letting the inhabitants go out would enable the garrison to maintain the town longer, the laws of war authorize the keeping them in and starving them. Poisoning wells might be a still quicker method of reducing a place; but do the laws of war therefore sanction it? I shall not be supposed for a moment to be placing the guilt of the individuals concerned in the two cases which I am going to compare, on an equal footing; it would be most unjust to do so, for in the one case they acted, as they supposed, according to a law which made what they did their duty. But take the cases themselves, and examine them in all their circumstances; the degree of suffering inflicted, the innocence and helplessness of the sufferers, the interests at stake, and the possibility of otherwise securing them; and if any man can defend the lawfulness in the abstract of the starvation of the inhabitants of Genoa, I will engage also to establish the lawfulness of the massacres of September (in Paris, 1793).—DR. T. ARNOLD.

THE CAMPAIGN OF WAGRAM.

After the battle of Essling, 1809, the command of all the troops in the island of Lobau was given to Masséna, while arrangements were being made with incredible activity for the construction of a large bridge for the passage of the

Danube, and the concentration of all the troops south of the Danube in the island, from which they were to debouch. The works executed at this time by the engineer department, under the orders of Lieutenant-General Bertrand, one of the best engineers in France, were probably the most extraordinary that have ever been constructed in any campaign since the days of Vauban; the bridge of Cæsar over the Rhine, and all the other structures of the Roman armies, must yield to them in the grandeur of their conception, and the rapidity and perfection of their execution. With the aid of a battalion of naval artisans of every trade, and a corps of twelve hundred sailors who had arrived from Antwerp under naval officers, and the immense resources contained in the arsenals of Vienna, Bertrand in twenty-two days constructed three bridges 1540 feet in length, from the right bank of the Danube to the island of Lobau, two being upon piles, and the third of boats.

Meanwhile, orders were dispatched to every corps in the army to concentrate at Ebersdorf: these orders were written and signed in advance, and had affixed to them the exact date when they were to be sent, as well as the precise hour of the day when the corps was to reach Ebersdorf, graduated according to the distance that the troops had to march. On the afternoon of the second of July, the Emperor removed his headquarters from Schönbrunn to Ebersdorf, and at the same moment troops had begun to arrive from all directions. Orders had been sent to Eugène to bring up the army of Italy, which consisted of four divisions, and to Marmont to advance with his two divisions from Dalmatia; Bernadotte, with the Saxon troops-Vandamme, with the troops of the Confederation of the Rhine-and Wrede, with the Bavarians, had been directed to hasten down the valley of the Danube, and Macdonald to descend from the Alps of Carinthia and Carniola. From the 2d to the 4th of July, these various corps were arriving; and as fast as they came up, they were marched into the island of Lobau; 150,000 infantry, 750 cannon, and three hundred squadons of cavalry, constituted the army concentrated in that singular position. On the night of the 4th, four bridges, prepared beforehand, were thrown across the narrow