of any use to them; and this laid them under a necessity, as haughty as they were, of servilely making their court to the grandees of Persia to obtain money of them, every where current, and of becoming voluntary slaves before they were subdued by force.

If the glory of a state, says Polybius, is made to consist in the aggrandizing and extending itself, in making conquests, in ruling over many people, and attracting the eyes of the whole earth, it must be owned that no government had ever so many advantages, nor was so calculated for obtaining this end, as that of the Romans. Like the government of Sparta, it united in one the three forms of authority we have mentioned. The consuls held the place of kings; the senate formed the public council, and the people had a great share in the administration. There was only this difference in it, that it was not by a plan and design laid down from the beginning, as at Sparta, but by the consequence of events, that Rome assumed this form of government; every one of the three parties which made up the body of the state, had a distinct power; the description of which may not here be disagreeable, as it may very much contribute to the understanding of the Roman history. Polybius is very particular upon this subject.

THE POWER OF THE CONSULS.

Whilst the consuls resided at Rome, they had the administration of all public affairs. All the other magistrates, except the tribunes of the people, were subject to them, and obliged to obey them. Upon them turned whatever related to the deliberations of the senate. They admitted embassadors into it, proposed the public affairs, and reduced its resolutions to form in writing. They carried them to the people, called assemblies for that purpose, in which they were to deliberate on the common affairs of the public, laid before them the decrees of the senate for their examina-. tion, and according to the importance of the subject,

after

after a deliberation, attended with many other formalities, concluded by the majority of voices. They presided in the creation of the magistrates of the republic, and for this reason were so frequently recalled from the army, and were not ordinarily allowed to be both absent from Italy.

As to war and military expeditions, the consuls had álmost sovereign power; they had the care of raising armies; of settling the number of troops, which the allies were separately to furnish; and of nominating the principal officers to serve under them. When they were in the field, they had the right of condemning and punishing without appeal. They disposed of the public money at their pleasure, and applied it as they judged convenient; the quæstor constantly attending them, and supplying them with such sums as they required, out of the funds assigned to them for the service; so that, considering the Roman republic in this point, one would be almost inclined to think it governed by a regal and monarchical authority.

THE POWER OF THE SENATE.

The senate almost absolutely disposed of the finances and public treasure. They took account of all the revenues and expences of the state, and the quæstors could not deliver out any sum except to the consuls, without a decree of the senate. The case was the same, with a reference to all the expences the censors were obliged to be at for the support and repairs of the public buildings.

The senate nominated commissioners to take cognizance of all the extraordinary crimes which were committed at Rome and in Italy, and demanded the attention of the public authority, such as treason, conspiracy, poisoning and murders, and to pass sentence upon them. The affairs and causes of private men, or cities, which had any relation to the state, were also judged by the senate. It was the senate which sent embassadors, declared war against the ene

mies of the state, granted audience, and gave answers to the deputies and embassadors of foreign people and princes. It was the senate likewise which sent commissioners abroad, to hear the complaints of the allies, to regulate the limits and the frontiers, to see good order observed in the provinces and to decide the pretensions of states and kingdoms. Thus a stranger who should have come to Rome in the absence of the consuls, would have thought the government of the republic was entirely aristocratical, that is, in the hands of the elders and sages.

THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE.

The power of the people, however was very considerable. They were sole masters and arbiters of rewards and punishments, which is the most essential part of government. They often fixed pecuniary mulcts upon such as had been possessed of the highest employments, and had alone the right of condemning the Roman citizens capitally. And in this last case, there was a very laudable custom at Rome, according to Polybius, and worthy of observation, which was to leave a person who was accused of a capital crime, the power of preventing judgment, and retiring into some neighbouring city, where he past the rest of his life in peace and liberty, in a voJuntary banishment. It was the people, who by their suffrages conferred all offices and honours, which in the republic are the most glorious rewards of probity and merit. They had alone the right of instituting and abrogating laws, and what is still more considerable, it was the people who deliberated of peace and war, who decided alliances, treaties of peace, and conventions with foreign people and princes. Who would not have thought such a government absolutely po pular and democratical?

THE MUTUAL DEPENDENCE OF THE CONSUL, SENATE, AND PEOPLE UPON EACH OTHER.

It is this mutual dependence of the

of a republic, wherein the security,

different parts strength, and beauty

beauty of it consists. From this reciprocal want they have of one another, arises a kind of harmony between the different members, and an unanimous concurrence; which holding them all strictly united amongst themselves, by the bond of common interest, renders the body of the state invulnerable, and not to be conquered by any foreign power.

We have already observed, that the power of the consul, in time of war, was almost sovereign, and yet he absolutely depended, in several particulars, both upon the senate and people. For on one side it was only by order from the senate that he could receive' the sums that were necessary for the provisions, clothes, and pay of the soldiers; and the denial, or delay of these succours, disabled the general from forming any attempt or pursuing their designs as far as he could wish. The same senate, at the end of the year, could appoint a successor to the consul, or continue him in the command of the army, and thereby had it in their power to leave him the glory of ending the war, or to take it from him. Lastly, it depended upon the senate to cast a blemish upon the achievements of the generals, or advance their glory. For it was the se nate which decreed the honour of a triumph, and appointed the expences necessary for that pompous solemnity. On the other side, as it belonged to the people to declare war, to confirm or disannul the treaties made with princes and foreign nations, and to call the generals to an account for their conduct at their return from the army, it is easy to see how attentive it was necessary for them to be in conciliating the favour of the people.

As to the senate, though their power was so great in other respects, yet in several points it was subject to that of the people. In great affairs, and such especially as concerned the lives of the citizens, the intervention of their authority was requisite. When any laws were proposed, even such as tended to diiminish the rights, honours, and prerogatives of the senate, and the estates of the senators, the people

were

were the judges whether they should be received or rejected. But the greatest instance of their power was, that if but one of their tribunes opposed the resolutions and designs of the senate, it sufficed to put a stop to them, so that after this opposition the senate could proceed no farther.

Lastly, the people likewise in their turn, were nearly concerned to keep fair with the senators, both in general and in particular. The receivers of taxes, tributes, and customs, in a word, of all the income and revenue of the state, the contractors who engaged to furnish the army with provisions, to repair the temples and other public buildings, to keep up the high roads, these persons formed numerous societies, which were all taken out of the people, and subsisted a great number of citizens, some being employed in collecting the revenues, others serving for security to the farmers, others lending their money by way of advance, and putting it out to use in that manner. Now the censors were the persons who adjudged these farms to the companies who offered to accept them, and also allotted to the undertakers the several works to be done; and it was the senate, which either of itself, or by commissioners of their nomination, passed judgment without appeal, concerning the disputes which might arise upon any of these matters, so far as to disannul sometimes such agreements as became impracticable, and to grant a farther time for the payment, or to lower the rate of the leases, upon account of some ill accident intervening And, what was still more capable of inspiring the people with modesty and respect for the decrees of the senate, [4] the judges of the greatest part of the public and private affairs of any consequence, were taken out of their body. The citizens were likewise obliged to keep fair with the consuls upon whom they all depended, especially in time of war, and when they served under them in the army.

[k] The form of judgment was changed in after-times.

It