It was this mutual relation and agreement of all the orders of the republic, which rendered the government of Rome the most accomplished that ever was in the world.

When we read, in the infancy of the republic, and the times immediately following it, of the almost continual seditions which so long divided the senate and people, and that kind of intestine war between the tribunes and consuls, we justly stand astonished, how a state agitated by such frequent and violent convulsions, should not only be able to subsist, but to conquer, even at that very time, all the neighbouring people, and presently after to extend their victories into countries far more remote. Polybius gives a solid reason for it, which reflects a considerable honour upon the Roman people; and this is, that when the republic was attacked by an enemy from without, the fear of the common danger, and the motive of the public good, suspended their private quarrels, and entirely re-united them. The love of their country was then in a manner the soul which put all the parts and members of the state into motion, every one striving to discharge their duty in their several functions, either by forming resolutions with deliberation and wisdom, or by putting them in execution with promptitude and alacrity; and it was this good understanding and unanimity which constantly rendered the republic invincible, and gave success to all their undertakings.

It was this very constitution of the Roman government which maintained and subsisted the republic for some time, even after the citizens, delivered from the fear of a foreign enemy, grown haughty and insolent by their victories, emasculated by riches and pleasures, and corrupted by praise and flattery, began to abuse their power, and commit violence and wrong in a thousand instances. For in this condition the authority of the senate, and that of the people, being always counter-balanced by each other, when one of the two parties at any time endeavour to extend its power, the other presently joined all its forces to pull

it down, and keep, it in order; and thus, by this mutual equality, this balancing power and authority, the republic always maintained itself in its liberty and independency.

CAUSES OF THE CHANGE OF A REPUBLIC INTO A MONARCHY.

It is with a state and a republic, says Polybius, as with the human body, which has its progress and increase, its time of strength and maturity, its declension and end; and usually, when a state is arrived at the height of grandeur and power, it afterwards degenerates by more or less sensible declensions, and falls at last to ruin.

Thus, says Polybius, whilst the government of Carthage, like that of Sparta and Rome, was made up of the [1] three sorts of power we have been speaking of, it was very potent and flourishing. But in the beginning of the second Punic war, and in the time of Hannibal, it might be said in some measure, to be upon the decline. Its youth, flower, and vigour, were already faded; it had begun to fall from its former height, and tend towards its ruin. Whereas Rome was then, as I may say, in full strength and vigour, and making large advances towards the conquest of the world. The reason which Polybius gives, of the fall of the one, and the increase of the other's power, is drawn from the principles he had laid down concerning the successive revolutions of states. Amongst the Carthaginians, the people had at that time the principal authority in all public affairs; on the other hand, at Rome, the senate had then more credit than ever. From whence he concludes, that a people, guided by the prudence of old men, must necessarily have the advantage over a state governed, or rather hurried on by the rash counsels of the multitude. Rome accordingly, which, properly speaking, began then to extend its power, and make trial of its strength against foreigners, governed by the wise counsels of

[] Kings, formerly named Suffetæ, the senate and the people.

the

1

the senate, was at last superior in the total result of the war, though in particular it had the disadvantage in several engagements, and established its power and greatness upon the ruins of its rival.

But all things under the sun have their decrease and end, and the wisest and best constituted republics as well as all the rest. Now the fall of states must arise either from internal causes, and such as subsist in the state itself, or from causes that are foreign and external. It is not easy for human wisdom, however penetrating, to foresee the latter, as they depend upon numberless, uncertain and obscure events; whereas the former have, if I may be allowed to say so, a fixed order, and almost certain prognostics.

To pass a right judgment upon the cause of changes in states, we need only attend to the manner in which these states are usually formed and established, and we shall then be surprised to see by what unforeseen and unexpected revolutions things return almost always to the first point from whence they set out.

It is natural, [m] when a multitude of men are found together in the same country, without laws, government, or any subordination, and by a necessary consequence exposed to a great deal of wrong and violence, that the strongest amongst them, as always happens among animals, should become their head. This man employing afterwards his power and authority to protect and succour the rest, to defend them against violence and injustice, to procure them rest and tranquillity, to favour constantly such as are judged to be men of the greatest probity, and to be exact in treating every one of his subjects according to their merit; they then with one consent confirm the authority he had at first usurped, and of violent had made just and reasonable. They then swear to pay him an entire obedience and a perfect submission, which is so much the more firm and sure, as it is founded upon the interest of those who engaged to submit to

[m] We see in Herodotus, that thus established in the person of the kingdom of the Medes was Dejoces,

it.

it. [n] Such is usually the origin of monarchy, and such the steps by which it is converted into regal sway, which, in the governing of willing subjects, chuses rather to employ the wisdom of counsels, than terrorand force; which motives conduced most in making Romulus a king.

In after-times the successors of this authority, at first so mild and beneficial, observing their power to be thoroughly established, and plentifully enjoying all kind of happiness and honours, begin to abuse their power, commit numberless wrongs, exercise abundance of cruelty, and become the object of the peo ple's hatred. It is easy to discern in this description the character of Tarquinius Superbus, the last king of the Romans.

The royal authority being thus changed into tyranny, conspiracies are formed against the tyrants, and persons of the greatest distinction, greatness of mind, valour and fortitude, place themselves at the head of the conspirators, men of that character bearing the unjust treatment of their masters with the greatest impatience. The people then, seeing that they owe their quiet and liberty to their courage, willingly submit to their government, and cheerfully intrust the supreme authority in their hands; as it actually happened when the Tarquins were expelled Rome. And thus an aristocracy is formed, or a government by wise men and elders, such as those grave old men were, of whom the senate was composed.

This sort of government may have a longer duration and stability, but at last it degenerates in its turn like the rest; and instead of those prudent, experienced, and disinterested old men, who had no other view but the good of their country, a small number of men, distinguished from the rest only by ambition, pride and avarice, industriously engross authority to themselves, which paves the way to an oligarchy; of which we have seen some first essays and images in the

[κ] Μόνην τὴν ἐξ ἑκόντων συγχωρεμένην, καὶ τῇ γνώμη τὸ πλεῖον ἢ φόβῳ καὶ βίᾳ κυβερνωμένη,

violent

violent conduct of the decemvirs, and in the cruel avarice of the wealthiest senators, which forced the people more than once to stand upon their defence against their vexations, by those famous retreats upon the Sacred and Aventin hills; and this is what is called an oligarchy.

When a republic is in this condition, and the citizens are alike disgusted and tired with all the preceding forms of government, it is natural that they should turn their views and desires towards a democracy, by striving to increase the power of the people in general, and to equal their rights and privileges with those of the nobility. So long as the sense and remembrance of past ills remain, good order subsists for some time, and an equality is kept up amongst the citizens. But those who come after, and are little affected with the advantages of the old liberty and pcpular equality, which are now grown stale through use, seek to raise themselves above others, and such are generally the most wealthy. As the legitimate admission to honours, arising from virtue and merit, is often denied them, they employ their great wealth in buying the votes of the people, and use their utmost endeavours to corrupt them by bribes and donations. When once these an.bitious men, abandoned to their lust of power, have obtained their ends of the multitude by the temptation of gain, there are no longer any excesses of which they are not capable. The commonwealth falls in this manner into the greatest of misfortunes, which is when the populace becomes supreme dispensers of all things; and this is called ochlocracy,

Polybius observes, that this change of manners, which draws after it an alteration of government, is the usual consequence of the good success and long prosperity of a state. When a republic, says he, having passed through great dangers, becomes victorious after long and heavy wars, and arrived at the height of glory and power, has no more enemies to dispute empire with it, but has subjected all to itself; such a prosperity,