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ARTICLE II.

PHILOSOPHY MAY VERY MUCH CONTRIBUTE TO THE PERFECTION OF REASON.

[h] OF all the natural gifts which man has received from God, reason is the most excellent; that which distinguishes him from other animals, and which displays in him the brightest lines of his resemblance to God. By, reason, he has the idea of what is beautiful, great, just, and true; he decides and judges concerning the properties of every thing; he compares several objects together, deduces consequences from principles, make use of one truth to come at another; and lastly, by reason he gives order and connection to his notions and reasonings, which diffuse a light and grace through them, which render them far more intelligible, and discover more fully their whole force and truth. The importance of a science, which aids and assists the mind in all these operations, is easily conceived.

We find excellent reflections upon this subject, in the first discourse prefixed to the art of thinking. I shall make use of them here, as knowing nothing more proper to give youth a just esteem and taste for philosophy, or more capable of explaining to them all the advantages, and even necessities of it.

There is nothing, says the author of this logic, more valuable than good sense, and rectitude of mind in discerning truth and falshood. All the other qualities of the mind are limited in their use, but exactness of reason is universally useful, in all parts and in all the employments of life. It is not only difficult in the sciences to distinguish truth from error, but also in most of the subjects that man speak of, and the affairs of which they treat. They are almost universally dif

[h] In homine optimum quid est? ratio. Hâc antecedit animalia. Ratio perfecta, proprium hominis

bonum est; cetera illi cum animalibus satisque communia. Senec. Epist. 76.

ferent

ferent paths, some true and others false, and it is the business of reason to make the choice. Those who chuse well have a right understanding, and those who chuse amiss have a wrong one; and this is the first and most important difference that we can make betwixt the qualities of the human mind.

Thus our principal application should be to form the judgment, and render it as exact as may be ; and it is to this end the greatest part of our study should be directed. We make use of reason as an instrument to acquire the sciences; and on the other hand, we should make use of the sciences as an instrument to bring our reason to perfection; a right mind being far more considerable than all the branches of speculative knowledge we are capable of obtaining, by means of the most true and solid sciences.-Men are not born to spend their time in measuring of lines, in examining the proportion of angles, or considering the different motions of matter. Their understanding is too great, their life too short, their time too precious to be employed upon such trivial objects. But they are obliged to be just, equitable and judicious in all their discourses, in all their actions, in all the affairs they undertake, and for this they should principally exercise and form themselves.

This care and study is so much the more necessary, as it is surprising how seldom we meet with this exactness of judgment. We scarce meet with any but wrong minds, that have very little discernment of truth, take all things by a false bias, that pay themselves with very bad reasons, and would put them off upon others as current, suffer themselves to be carried away by the slightest appearances, and are always in excess; who boldly decide concerning matters they are ignorant of and do not understand, and who adhere to their own opinions with such inflexible obstinacy, that they will hearken to nobody that can undeceive them.

This ill turn of the mind is not only the cause of errors in the sciences, but also of most part of the faults which are committed in civil life; unjust quar

rels,

rels, suits of law ill-grounded, rash advice, and illconcerted enterprises. There are few of these which have not their source in some error and some fault of judgment. So that there is no defect which we are more nearly concerned to correct.

A great part of the false judgments of mankind are caused by precipitation of mind, and through want of attention; so that a rash judgment is passed upon what we know but confusedly and obscurely. The small regard which men have for truth, makes them often careless about distinguishing what is true from what is false. They suffer all sorts of discourse and maxims to enter into their minds, chuse rather to take them for true than to examine them. If they do not understand them, they are willing to believe that others do; and thus they burden their memory with abundance of false and obscure things not understood, and reason upon those principles, almost without considering what they say or what they think. Vanity and presumption very much contribute to this fault. They think it a shame to doubt and be ignorant, and chuse rather to talk and decide at random, than to own that they are not sufficiently informed in the points in debate, to pass a judgment upon them. We all abound in ignorance and error, and yet there is no difficulty so great as to prevail upon any one to own himself mistaken, though the acknowledgment be so just and agreeable to our natural condition.

There are others, on the contrary, who, having understanding enough to know that many things are obscure and uncertain, and being willing to shew, by another kind of vanity, that they are not carried away by popular credulity, place their glory in maintaining that there is nothing certain. Thus they get rid of the trouble of examining them, and upon this bad principle call in question the most received truths and religion itself. This is the source of Pyrrhonism, which is another extravagance of human understand. ing, and though it seems opposite to the rashness of those who give credit to every thing and decide upon

every thing, yet it proceeds notwithstanding from the same source, which is the want of attention. For as the one will not give themselves the trouble to find, out error, so the others will not take the pains to discover truth, with the care that is necessary to discern the evidence of it. The least glimmering of light is sufficient for the one to make them believe extravagant falshoods, and suffices to the other to make them - doubt of the most certain facts. But both in the one and the other these very different effects arise from the same want of application.

Right reason places all things in the rank that properly belongs to them; it doubts concerning such as are doubtful, rejects such as are false, and sincerely acknowledges such as are evident.

To these reflections extracted from the art of thinking I shall add one from M. L'Abbe Fleury.

All the world, says he, in his treatise of study, see the usefulness of reasoning justly; I mean not only in the sciences, but in business, and the whole conduct of life. But many perhaps do not see the necessity of recurring to the first principles, because in reality there are few who do it. The most part of mankind reason only in a narrow compass, from one principle, which the authority of others, or their own passion, has imprinted in their minds, to the necessary means for acquiring what they desire. I must first grow rich, then I will engage in such an employment, I will take such a step, I will suffer this and that, and so of the rest. But what shall I do with my substance when I have got it, or is it an advantage to me to be rich? these are points which are not enquired into.

The man of real learning, the true philosopher, goes much farther, and begins a great deal higher. He neither stops at the authority of others, nor his own prejudices. He still proceeds, till he has found out a principle of natural light, and so clear a truth, that he can no longer call it in question. But then, when he has once discovered it, he boldly deduces all the consequences that flow from it, and never swerves

from

from them; and thence it follows that he is stedfast in his doctrine and conduct, inflexible in his resolutions, patient in the execution, even in his temper, and constant in virtue.

It is plain enough of what importance it is to fortify, with early impressions, the minds of youth, by such principles, against the false judgments and false reasonings which occur so commonly in the discourse and conduct of mankind; and this is the effect of Philosophy, whose principal end, as I have already observed, is to give perfection to reason.

I am very sensible that reason is a natural gift, that it proceeds not from art, and cannot be the pure effect of labour; but art and labour may improve it, direct it, and carry it to perfection. We now find in performances of wit, in discourses from the pulpit and at the bar, in treatises relating to science, an order, exactness, proportion and solidity, which were not formerly so common. Several are of opinion, and upon good grounds, that we owe this manner of thinking and writing to the extraordinary progress which has been made for an age past in the study of Philosophy.

When I say that Philosophy is very useful towards bringing reason to perfection, I would not be understood to speak only of the rules which logic in particular lays down upon this subject. They are very useful in themselves, not only as they serve to discover the defect of certain perplexed arguments, but as they assist us in tracing the source of most part of the errors which creep into our thoughts and reasonings. The same may be said of the rules of rhetoric. It cannot be denied but that they are a very great help to eloquence; but it is principally in the application made of them to the discourses of the ancients and moderns, whose beauties and faults are explained to youth, by the conformity or opposition they bear to these precepts.

The same thing may be said of the rules of logic. Their principal usefulness consists in the application of them to the several questions we examine, and the reasonings we make upon any subject whatsoever.

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