given to servant viding for the due management of the affairs of the company, and alter and repeal the same; such bye-laws must be authenticated by the seal of the company, and a copy given to every officer and servant Copy must be affected thereby (i). A penalty, not exceeding 51. for each offence, may, by such bye-laws, be imposed upon servants of the company (k). But a justice may order a part only of the penalty to be paid (1). As a general principle, all bye-laws in restraint of trade must be Bye-laws must reasonable and beneficial to the public, or they cannot be supported (m). The sanction of the Board does not of course preclude an inquiry into the validity of bye-laws (n). be reasonable. Requirement of fare on failure to produce ticket. Townsend. It was argued in an early case that a bye-law (similar to bye-law No. 1 of the model code) by which a passenger failing to produce his ticket was required to pay the fare from the place where the train originally started, was not a reasonable bye-law, but the Court appeared to be of opinion that it was (0), though holding it not to be enforceable by arrest (o). And in a later case in Ireland, where the bye-law imposed a penalty of forty shillings in default of payment of the fare, only Pigot, C. B., appeared to have any doubt as to the validity of the bye-law (p). But in Dearden v. Townsend, the Court Dearden v. of Queen's Bench was clear that a bye-law requiring payment of the fare from the place whence the train started, or a forfeiture of not more than forty shillings, could only operate in the case of a passenger intending to defraud the company, and that upon any other construction the bye-law would be invalid (9). Since Dearden v. Townsend, the bye-law, omitting as in the model code the words. imposing a forfeiture, has been under the consideration of the Courts. very frequently; and it may now be taken as established beyond doubt by authority that bye-law No. 1 in the model code is unreasonable and void (r), and even although the passenger may have an intent to defraud (s), the result of the decisions seeming to be, though there has been no express decision to that effect upon bye-law No. 1, that the passenger cannot be convicted under the bye-law. (i) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 16, s. 124. (k) Ibid. s. 125. (7) Ibid. s. 126. (m) Gunmakers' Co. v. Fell, Willes, 389; Bosworth v. Herne, Cas. temp. Hardw. 405. (n) See R. v. Wood, 1 E. & B. 49. As to how far bye-laws are divisible, see R. v. Lundic, 31 L. J., M. C. 157. Bye-laws exempting railway companies from responsibility for passengers' luggage were void in G. W. R. Co. v. Goodman, 12 C. B. 313, and Williams v. G. W. R. Co., 10 Exch. 15. (0) Chilton v. London and Croydon R. Co., 16 M. & W. 212; 5 Railw. Cas. 4. H.- VOL. I. (p) Barry v. Midland Great Western R. Co., 17 Ir. C. L. 103. (g) Dearden v. Townsend, L. R., 1 Q. B. 10; 38 L. J., M. C 50; 12 Jur., N. S. 120. (r) Saunders v. South Eastern R. Co., L. R., 5 Q. B. D. 456; 43 L. T. 281; 29 W. R. 56. For previous dicta to the contrary, see per Lush, J., in Brown v. Great Eastern R. Co., L. R., 2 Q. B. D. 406, decided against the company because they had not made a demand. (s) See Dyson v. L. & N. W. R. Co., L. R., 7 Q. B. D. 32; 50 L. J., M. C. 78; 44 L. T. 609; 29 W. R. 565, decided on bye-law No. 8. L L 16. Regulations Nor can the fare from the station whence the train started be as to Bye-Laws. Non-payment of fare-continued. Procedure on bye-law. Higher fare for shorter distance. R v. Frere. recovered by civil action (t), although the fare from the station of the passenger's departure can (u), and if the passenger should have agreed to it beforehand when credit was given, any amount of fare, however high, can be recovered (r). Bye-law No. 8 is unreasonable and void (y), although the passenger may have an intent to defraud (2). The true view of the law is, it is submitted, that thrown out but not positively enunciated by Cockburn, C. J., in Saunders v. South Eastern R. Co. (a), that any bye-law in pari materia with sect. 103 of the Act of 1845 (p. 519, post) must be subsidiary to that section and not a variation of it, and it seems to follow that upon bye-laws No. 1 or No. 8 as at present framed, no conviction can be maintained. With regard to procedure, if a company proceed upon the bye-law, they cannot rely upon the statute (b), but if the complaint upon the bye-law should be dismissed, they may prefer a fresh complaint upon the statute (c). Looking to the strong and frequent disapproval of the byelaws expressed by the High Court (d), it is perhaps to be regretted that the question of their validity cannot be authoritatively decided by the Court of Appeal (on the ground that this question can only be raised in a criminal cause, and in a criminal cause no such appeal lies), the more especially as Bramwell and Cotton, L.JJ. (e), in deciding that no civil action lay on the bye-laws, "desired it to be understood that they expressed no opinion either one way or other" on the question of repugnancy to the statute. In R. v. Frere, a bye-law subjected to a penalty any passenger who should enter a carriage without having paid his fare; and the fare from Colchester to Norwich was 5s., and 78. from Colchester to Diss (an intermediate station between Colchester and Norwich), and a person took a ticket from Colchester to Norwich, but got out at Diss, and refused to pay the 28. difference; it was held that he could not be convicted under the bye-law (f). This decision proceeded on the ground that the defendant had paid his fare within the meaning of the particular bye-law, Lord Campbell, C. J., " cautiously abstaining (t) London and Brighton R. Co. v. Wat- (x) Ib., per Bramwell, L.J. (y) Bentham v. Hoyle, L. R., 3 Q. B. D. 289; 47 L. J., M. P. 51; 31 L. T. 753; 26 W. R. 314. (z) Dyson v. L. & N. W. R. Co., L. R., 7 Q. B. D. 32, and supra. (a) L. R., 5 Q. B. D., at 461, and supra. (b) See 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 10. (c) See per Lindley, J., in Dyson v. L. & N. W. R. Co., L. R., 7 Q. B. D., at p. 37. (d) See especially per Lord Coleridge, C.J., in London and Brighton R. Co. v. Watson, L. R., 3 C. P. D. 249. (e) In London and Brighton R. Co. v. Watson, L. R., 4 C. P. D., at p. 119. (f) R. v. Frere, 4 E. & B. 598. from pronouncing an opinion on the power of the company to make rules requiring a larger fare for a less distance." There is no doubt that the companies have power to require such a fare (g). A conviction upon a bye-law properly framed, in aid of such a requirement, of a person fraudulently infringing it would, it is submitted, be good. The passenger at any rate could be sued for the higher fare. In Pocock's case, a passenger took at Westbourne Park a return ticket to West Drayton for half-a-crown, and travelled by it, and also further on to Paddington on the return journey without a new ticket or further payment. At Paddington he claimed to be exempted from the further payment of threepence, the single fare from Westbourne Park to Paddington, on the ground that as the charge for a return ticket from Paddington to West Drayton was only half-a-crown, the half-crown which he had already paid covered the journey from Westbourne Park to Paddington. But Huddleston, B., and Hawkins, J., held the claim for exemption to be unsustainable (h), and the passenger to be liable to an action for the threepence. Here it will be seen that the company having carried the passenger the journey contracted for, the passenger claimed to be carried further, so that the case is distinguishable from R. v. Frere, which is the more common one of the journey contracted for being longer and cheaper than that which the passenger claims to make. But it is submitted that in such a case the passenger's claim could not be sustained: also that the fare recoverable would not be the reasonable fare for the shorter distance less the amount already paid, but the whole fare for the shorter distance without any such deduction; and this reasoning would apply to a claim to alight without further payment short of any journey contracted for, whether there should be a higher fare for a less distance or not. The failure to produce a ticket, though coupled with a refusal to pay the fare from the station of departure, does not authorize a company to remove the traveller from a carriage by force. This was held by the Court of Appeal in Butler v. Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire R. Co. (i), in which the court pronounced no opinion on the validity of the "bad" bye-law No. 1 under which the removal was made, but pointed out that it did not expressly authorize the removal. It has been held in Scotland that bye-law No. 2 which makes it using ticket on (g) See Attorney-General v. Birmingham and Derby Junction R. Co., 2 Rail. Ca. 124. (h) Great Western R. Co. v. Pocock, 41 L. T. 415; 28 W. R. 49. (i) Butler v. Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire R. Co., L. R. 21 Q. B. D. 207; 57 L. J., Q. B. 564; 36 W. R. 726, C.A., reversing Manisty, J., and apparently wrong day. as to Bye-Laws. 16. Regulations penal to use a ticket on the day other than that for which it is available, applies to a case of fraud only (j). Publication of conviction. Ste am-vessels 17. Trespasses, Crimes, and Penalties. Obstructing The companies frequently publish particulars of convictions for offences against bye-laws, and it seems that the publication of such particulars is not actionable as libel, if the particulars be true (k). By the Railways Clauses Act, 1863 (1), the companies may make bye-laws for regulating their steam vessels, and by the Explosives Act, 1875 (38 Vict. c. 17 (sect. 33), post, vol. II.), railway companies over whose railway explosive substances are carried are bound to make regulations for the conveyance of it. 17. Trespasses, Crimes, and Penalties. Any person wilfully obstructing any person setting out the line of persons setting railway, or pulling up stakes or marks showing the line, is liable to a penalty of 5l.: (Railways Clauses Act, 1845, s. 24.) out railway. Drunken servants, &c. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 55. Obstruction of train. Any officer or agent of a railway company, or any special constable duly appointed, and all such persons as they may call to their assistance, may seize and detain any engine-driver, servant, or other person employed in conducting traffic, or in repairing works, who is found drunk while so employed, or who commits any offence against bye-laws, or wilfully, or negligently does or omits to do any act whereby danger is caused or trains obstructed: the offender may be conveyed forthwith before some justice of the peace for the place within which the offence was committed (m), without warrant; and, when convicted, is liable to two months' imprisonment or to pay a fine of 107., or may be committed to quarter sessions, and, on conviction, be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years: (5 & 6 Vict. c. 55, s. 17 (n).) The provisions seem to apply to servants of the company only. The Criminal Law Consolidation Acts of 1861 contain various provisions (0) relating to the obstructions of engines, &c., and having general application, whether the railway be open for traffic or not (p). Thus, by 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 36, whoever, by any unlawful act, obstruct engine &c., obstructs any engine or carriage, is guilty of a misdemeanor. Under this section, there need not be a physical obstruction. A person may be convicted as "obstructing" for unlawfully altering Doing or omitting anything to or carriages. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, 8, 36. also not cited. See the case criticised in (j) Thom v. Caledonian R. Co., 14 (k) Alexander v. North Eastern R. Co., 34 L. J., Q. B. 152; Biggs v. Great Eastern R. Co., 16 W. R. 908; Gwynne v. South Eastern R. Co., Q. B. Guildhall, July, 1868 (2501. damages recovered). (7) 26 & 27 Vict. c. 92, s. 32. (m) If the offence is committed in Scot land, see 5 & 6 Vict. c. 55, s. 18, vol. II. (n) Parties charged with offences under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 55, s. 17, may also be tried at the sessions. See 5 & 6 Vict. c. 56, s. 2, post, vol. II. (o) See these provisions at length in vol. II. (p) See R. v. Bradford, 29 L. J., M. C. 171. passengers. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 34. signals, and thereby nearly stopping a train (q), or for imitating the action of inspectors of the line, and thereby diminishing its speed (7). By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 34, whoever, by any unlawful act, or by Endangering a wilful omission or neglect, endangers the safety of any person conveyed or being in or upon a railway, or shall aid or assist therein, is guilty of a misdemeanor, and, being convicted, is liable to similar punishment (s). Any unlawful act which a person does, the natural consequence of which is to endanger the safety of persons conveyed on the railway, is an offence within this section. Therefore, where two boys were playing with a cart belonging to a railway company and standing near the line, upon which the cart eventually ran down by its own impetus, and, after clearing a hedge and ditch, rested so close to the rails as to obstruct carriages passing thereon, it was ruled by Pigott, B., that if the jury thought the obstruction was the natural consequence of starting the cart, the prisoners ought to be found guilty, inasmuch as starting the cart was a trespass (t). By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 35, whosoever "unlawfully and maliciously" (1) puts or throws on any railway any wood, stone, or other thing, or (2) displaces any rail, sleeper, &c., or (3) moves any points or other machinery, or (4) shows or removes any signal or light, or (5) does any other thing, with intent to obstruct or destroy any engine or carriage using the railway, is guilty of felony, and, being convicted, is liable to be kept in penal servitude for life, or for not less than [five (u)] years, or to be imprisoned for not more than two years, with or without hard labour, and, if a male under sixteen, with or without whipping. any Placing wood, with intent to overthrow &c. on railway obstruct or engine, &c. &c. with intent to endanger safety of Moreover, by 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 32, whosoever does any of Placing wood, the acts lastly mentioned, "with intent to endanger the safety of person travelling or being upon such railway," is guilty of felony, and passenger. liable to similar punishment (a). And, by sect. 33 of the same Act, whosoever unlawfully and maliciously throws, or causes to fall or strike, against any engine or carriage, any wood, stone, or other thing, with intent to injure (q) R. v. Hadfield, L. R., 1 C. C. R. 253; 10 Cox, 574. The prisoner, who was drunk, changed the signals from "all clear" to "danger" and "caution." (r) R. v. Hardy, L. R., 1 C. C. R. 278; 10 Cox, 656. (8) Where a man pleaded guilty to an indictment under the above section (34), and the Court of Quarter Sessions stated a case for the Court of Criminal Appeal as to whether he ought not to have been indicted for felony under sect. 33, the case was rejected. R. v. Clark, 36 L. J., M. C. 16. (t) R. v. Monaghan, 11 Cox, 608. As or to the meaning of "wilful" under the (u) 27 & 28 Vict. c. 47, s. 2. (a) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 32. This clause and 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 35, are taken from 14 & 15 Viet. c. 19, s. 6 (which was repealed by 24 & 25 Viet. c 95), and unlawfully substituted for "wilfully." As to "hard labour" and "whipping," see sects. 74 and 75. This act does not extend to Scotland; see sect. 78. Throwing stones, way carriage &c. upon a rail with |