APPENDIX A Looking at the picture from the standpoint of injury to New Orleans, it might be said that the principal territory from and to which New Orleans enjoys a substantial volume of foreign commerce, both import and export, is in the northern Mississippi Valley territory on and north of the northern boundary of the State of Tennessee and on and north of the southern boundary of the States of Missouri and Kansas. From this territory New Orleans receives its principal high-class and high-revenue-paying cargo considered essential to the successful operation of the steamship lines operating out of the port of New Orleans and the gulf. The commodities produced in the territory adjacent to the gulf and moving through New Orleans and other gulf ports for export to foreign countries consist principally of raw materials, such as lumber, staves, cotton, cottonseed products, cotton-mill products, rosin, turpentine, rice, sulfur, salt, cement, grain, flour, leaf tobacco, and petroleum products. The principal movement of export grain through New Orleans consists of corn, originating in Illinois and Iowa, and wheat, originating in the Midwest. This export movement of corn and wheat would be lost to the port should the seaway project be developed and the predictions of its proponents come true. Further the development of the St. Lawrence seaway would result in New Orleans losing all, or substantially all, of the foreign commerce now moving through this port that originates at and is consigned to this northern Mississippi Valley territory. The loss of this foreign commerce would, in our opinion, seriously and adversely affect the steamship lines and the steamship services operating to foreign ports. As a matter of fact, in some instances our steamship services would possibly be discontinued. This loss of tonnage and resulting effect upon our steamship services would seriously and adversely affect producers, manufacturers, shippers, and receivers located in Louisiana, Mississippi, Arkansas, Alabama, Tennessee, and Texas who must of necessity depend upon the port of New Orleans and the steamship services now maintained from and to the port as an outlet for their goods shipped to foreign markets, and as an inlet for the goods they purchase in foreign countries. If New Orleans and other gulf ports are made to depend upon cargo originating only in the States bordering on and adjacent to the golf, there would not be sufficient cargo originating at or destined to this territory to enable steamship operators to maintain adequate and dependable steamship services. Another important fact to be considered is that foreign owners of tramp vessels would derive the greatest benefit from development of the St. Lawrence seaway at the expense of American steamship owners and operators; also at the expense of United States gulf ports as well as United States Atlantic ports; also at the expense of transportation carriers, rail, truck, and water, serving United States gulf and Atlantic ports; also at the expense of producers, shippers, and receivers located in the territory adjacent to New Orleans and other gulf ports who are dependent upon the gulf ports and steamship services operated therefrom to foreign ports. There is cause for concern not merely to the ports located along the Atlantic seaboard and gulf, but to interior producing points. Completion of the seaway would make it possible to transport raw sugar to points on the Great Lakes. It takes little imagination to picture the disturbance which the erection of sugar refineries at points like Chicago or Cleveland would cause the sugar-producing States of the Middle West, as well as Lousiana, Atlantic, and Pacific Coast States. Ocean transport over the seaway would destroy investments in sugar refineries in Colorado, Louisiana, Maryland, New York, Georgia, and California, with no resulting advantage to the consuming public located in this area. We respectfully submit that in opposing the seaway we are not motivated by any desire to deprive the Midwest of the benefits of ocean transportation, but we cannot lose sight of the fact that should the seaway be constructed not only New Orleans would lose a substantial amount of tonnage, but a similar loss would be experienced by New York, the Atlantic ports, as well as other Gulf ports. The Midwest is the principal source of our export and import traffic. Those who argue that the seaway would not be harmful to New Orleans and the other ports have either overlooked or disregarded this important fact. STATEMENT OF ALEX. C. COCKE, PRESIDENT, NEW ORLEANS BOARD OF TRADE, LTD. For many years the New Orleans Board of Trade, Ltd., composed of the principal executives of the leading commodity, shipping, transportation, and financial interests of the community, has weighed the merits and disadvantages of the St. Lawrence seaway project. This matter was discussed again thoroughly at the monthly meeting of the board of directors held on February 18, 1953. It was the unanimous decision of the board that our organization wholeheartedly reaffirm its opposition to this costly and, in our opinion, unnecessary project. While House Joint Resolution 104, and kindred legislation, indicate a proposed expenditure of $100 million, the past history of this project leads inevitably to the conclusion that its ultimate objectives could not possibly be achieved unless it embraced all of the features which have been before the Congress for more than 20 years and consistently rejected. This project, for which economic justification has yet to be established, would finally require the expenditure of over a billion dollars, and a construction period conservatively estimated to be from 6 to 8 years. Moreover, the seaway would be icebound and therefore unusable at least 5 months of each year. These unfavorable factors obviously do not furnish any logical reasons on which approval can be legitimately sought. The board of trade cannot support any project that is not economically sound, particularly at a time when means are being sought to balance our Federal receipts and expenditures. New Orleans and other gulf ports have an important stake in this matter, serving as the outlet for the commerce of the entire midcontinent area. Economically sound traffic patterns have been established using the Mississippi River and its tributary river system as the basis. This sound structure would be seriously impaired by the approval and construction of the St. Lawrence seaway project which would tend further to affect adversely our present domestic and foreign transportation network. In previous statements presented to congressional committees, our position has been fully outlined. It does not appear feasible or necessary, therefore, at this time, in view of the brevity of the scheduled hearings, to enumerate, in detail, all the reasons for our continuing our opposition, but we do wish the record to show it is our considered judgment that the present legislation should be rejected by the committee. STATEMENT OF C. A. MILLER, VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL COUNCIL, THE AMERICAN SHORT LINE RAILROAD ASSOCIATION Gentlemen of the committee, for the record, my name is C. A. Miller, vice president and general counsel of the American Short Line Railroad Association. Our offices are at 2000 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D. C. As most of you know, the American Short Line Railroad Association is a voluntary unincorporated association with a membership of more than 300 short-line railroads, located in 46 States. The association has been in existence for 40 years. This statement is in opposition to the proposal for the St. Lawrence seaway project which your committee now has under consideration. Almost so far back as the memory of man runneth there have been proposals before the Congress, in one form or another, having for their objective the construction of a St. Lawrence seaway and power project, or some variation thereof. The present proposal, as we understand it, would allow this country to join with Canada in constructing a 27-foot channel in the International Rapids section of the St. Lawrence River, through the creation of a St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation to work with Canada in the construction and operation of that part of the project in the United States. I have been with our association for more than 22 years, and I recall that hearings were held by the House Committee on Rivers and Harbors in June and July 1941 with respect to the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin. That was back in the 77th Congress. The members of our association have long opposed the construction of the so-called St. Lawrence Waterway, or seaway, regardless of the forms which the various proposals have taken. Each year, in annual meetings of the members of our association, legislative policies are adopted. They are printed and distributed to the Members of Congress, the members of the association, and others interested in them. So far back as 1941 our legislative policies have included 87338-53-25 opposition to the construction of the proposed St. Lawrence Waterway or seaway. That proposal has been reviewed year by year, and it remains one of our fundamental legislative policies. Reviewing the history of the so-called St. Lawrence proposals, I find that an officer of our association, generally our president, Mr. J. M. Hood, has testified in opposition to the St. Lawrence Waterway proposal in substantially every hearing which the committees of the House and Senate have held on that subject. The members of our association have been very active in opposition to these proposals. Back in April 1951, when this committee held hearings on this subject, one of those who testified in opposition to it was Mr. Gregory S. Prince, then assistant general counsel, but now general solicitor, of the Association of American Railroads. Those of you who were members of this committee at that time will no doubt recall his testimony. For factual accuracy and clarity of expression and presentation, it is practically unequaled in the annals of congressional committee hearings. Some of you may remember how he was complimented at the close of his testimony, after he had been carefully questioned by the members of this committee. I commend its reading by those of you who were not members of the committee at that time, and I commend its rereading by those of you who were members of the committee at that time. It is my opinion that Mr. Prince presented to your committee an unanswerable argument in opposition to the proposal which you now have before you. There has also been presented to your committee, in the early part of 1952, a 100-page book entitled "The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway Project." This book was prepared by Mr. Arthur H. Schwietert, the traffic director of the Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry, and Dr. Leverett S. Lyon, the chief executive officer of the Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry. Dr. Lyon was for some years a member of the faculty of the School of Economics and Business of the University of Chicago. He was formerly dean of the School of Business and head of the Department of Economics of Washington University at St. Louis, Mo. That book deserves a reexamination by the members of this committee. Taken in conjunction with what Mr. Prince said, this book presents in clear, understandable, and persuasive terms the economic fallacy of the proposal which is now before your committee. It will be recalled that your committee, after full hearings and an exhaustive study, voted against this project when it was up for consideration in 1951. Times have not changed much since then. The inexorable laws of economics have not changed, and the factual situation has not changed much. The only thing that seems to have changed is that the Canadian Government now says that it will proceed with this project without participation by the United States, if the United States does not elect to go along with it. While the Canadian Government concededly has the right to do this, I do not think its proposal to do so should be treated by the United States as a threat. If Canada wants to "go it alone" on this project, I think it should be permittted to do so. Certainly, there is no sound reason why the United States should “knuckle,” and especially when it is inevitable that the United States, in one form or another, will be saddled with approximately a billion dollars of indebtedness in doing so. We have often heard of milliondollar blunders or multi-million-dollar blunders, but this proposal would engulf us in what might well be termed a "billion-dollar blunder." The members of this committee can search the records of the hearings on this proposal so far back as they may be available to it, and I am certain that they cannot find, on the record, substantial evidence to the effect that the investment of any huge sum in the St. Lawrence proposal, in any form, would be economically justified, so far as the people of the United States are concerned. Historically, it will be recalled that it has been the purpose of this country to develop and maintain the Great Lakes as a transportation facility. The development of the St. Lawrence has, likewise, been the responsibility of Canada. This is as it should be. You need only to look at the map to see that the St. Lawrence, from our border to the Atlantic Ocean is solely under the control of Canada. In a situation of this kind, there is always a great urge for a lawyer to go back and summarize or review the various reasons why a thing should or should not be done, weighing the pros and cons, and presenting a conclusion based thereon. Time, and a decent respect for the engagements of your committee, precludes my doing that in this instance. I am sure the facts will have been so presented to you, in summary and graphic form, that upon a fair consideration of all of the pros and cons, you will necessarily reach the conclusion that the United States should not participate in such a blunder as is here proposed. At least, the members of our association hope this will be your conclusion. We respectfully urge it. We think this committee should again do as it did in 1951 and vote down the proposal. NEW ORLEANS CITYWIDE COMMITTEE IN OPPOSITION TO THE Hon. GEORGE A. DONDERO, Public Works Committee, House of Representatives, House Office Building, Washington, D. C. DEAR CONGRESSMAN: The New Orleans Citywide Committee on Opposition to the St. Lawrence Seaway Project, whose membership is composed of the leading commercial, industrial, civic, and traffic organizations in the community, wishes to present to your committee its objections to the legislation introduced into this session of Congress on this project, especially House Joint Resolution 104 and similar bills. The reasons for these objections are outlined below. ST. LAWRENCE HISTORY Periodically efforts are made to revive the St. Lawrence seaway and power project. Whenever this happens it causes a tremendous outlay of time and energy on the part of Congress. The issue has been thoroughly covered both by proponents and opponents and discussed at length. Every factor has been adequately reviewed and always, even though the various Congresses have undergone the usual change of membership, the proposal, because of its lack of genuine merit, has been rejected. QUESTION OF DESIRABILITY The project never has and cannot now be justified from a navigation standpoint. It will generate no appreciable amount of new traffic and the tonnage that may be expected to move over it will represent mainly the diversion from existing and adequate water and rail routes. Even if the most sanguine tonnage estimates are realized, revenues will be far from sufficient to maintain and liquidate the enormous cost of the undertaking, which will be a constant drain on the taxpayers of the United States. If Canada is sincere, and financially able to construct the proposed 27-foot waterway, which is nearly 2,000 miles in its total extent, and lies largely in Canadian territory, there is no need for the United States to burden itself with an expenditure of more than $100 million in constructing a short segment, approximately 114 miles, which will serve no practical purpose. Canada will still have on its side of the boundary, due to the physical characteristics of the area, four-fifths of the waterway, including the Welland Canal and locks, together with the long stretch of the St. Lawrence River from the New YorkCanadian boundary to its mouth. NATIONAL SECURITY From the standpoint of national security the United States will be just as well served with a Canadian-built canal on the Canadian side of the boundary as it would with a canal which has only 114 miles of its length in the United States. The St. Lawrence seaway would violate the principles of dispersion and decentralization, which are the basic fundamentals of a sound national defense setup. It would concentrate industrial production into a tightly compressed area, extremely vulnerable and exposed to attack by the only potential enemy we know about. One concentrated air attack would wreck the defense area of the St. Lawrence. One bomb, exploded in one lock, would stop all navigation on the waterway and bottle up all the shipping west of the damaged lock. GOVERNMENT CORPORATION FINANCING Financing the seaway through the medium of a corporation whose bonds are guaranteed both as to principal and interest by the United States Government is obviously an evasive tactic which seeks to circumvent the usual procedures of Congress and bypass the normal scrutiny of congressional Appropriations Committees. It hardly seems fair to the American taxpayer at this time to add to the public debt by such a devious and dubious arrangement. PIECEMEAL APPROACH The current legislation proposing only a 114-mile segment of the seaway is cunningly deceptive. It is obviously an attempt to obtain in piecemeal fashion ultimate completion of a project which Congress has on several occasions adjudged in its entirety to be unacceptable. The current proposals reflect no significant arguments in support of our participation in the seaway that have not previously been advanced. It has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of Congress that United States participation in the waterway project is economically unjustified and commercially unwise, that it is not a defense measure, and that it is completely unrealistic to commit the United States in a joint construction effort on the basis that if we do not join, Canada will undertake it alone. INADEQUACY OF 27-FOOT DEPTH The St. Lawrence project calls for a channel depth of 27 feet, which is inadequate for modern deepsea vessels, since it would accommodate less than 5 percent of the American merchant marine. The United States and Canada would be spending money for the exclusive benefit of foreign vessels of limited size and draft, built and operated by countries in which construction costs and wage levels are low, creating a situation in which our ships could not successfully compete. LIMITED SERVICEABILITY Since the seaway would be icebound at least 5 months of each year, existing transportation, warehousing, and port facilities would be called upon to offer standby facilities during that period, which would be unreasonable and unfair. As information, and in order to identify the organizations and agencies in New Orleans in whose behalf this statement is made, the membership of the New Orleans Citywide Committee in Opposition to the St. Lawrence Seaway Project is attached. Cordially, A. E. PRADILLO, Secretary. MEMBERSHIP OF THE NEW ORLEANS CITYWIDE COMMITTEE IN OPPOSITION TO THE ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY PROJECT Advertising Club of New Orleans American Association of Small Business American Federation of Labor Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans Central Trades and Labor Council Commission Council City of New Orleans Exchange Club of New Orleans Executive Club of Louisiana Forwarding Agents and Foreign Freight Brokers Association of New Orleans Green Coffee Association of New Orleans Junior Chamber of Commerce Kiwanis Club Lions Club Louisiana Sugar Exchange, Inc. New Orleans Chamber of Commerce New Orleans Board of Trade New Orleans Business and Professional Women's Club New Orleans Clearing House Association New Orleans Cotton Exchange New Orleans Insurance Exchange New Orleans Traffic and Transportation Bureau New Orleans Public Belt Railroad Commission New Orleans Steamship Association New Orleans Stock Exchange New Orleans Traffic Club Orleans Levee Board |