Propeller Club of the United States, Port of New Orleans
Rotary Club

Real Estate Board of New Orleans

Young Men's Business Club

Hon. GEORGE A. DONDERO,

GREEN COFFEE ASSOCIATION OF NEW ORLEANS,

Chairman, Public Works Committee,

New Orleans, La., June 10, 1953.

House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN: We wish to refer to your bill before the House, namely House Joint Resolution 104, which we understand will be heard before the Public Works Committee, beginning June 11.

Although we are very keenly interested in this bill, the short advance notice of the hearing prevents the attendance of a representative from our association. This association has before this, in previous hearings, outlined reasons for its opposition to such a bill but, for the record, reiterates the following principal objections:

(a) We believe that House Joint Resolution 104 is but a beginning and that the proponents have, as the ultimate objective, the complete St. Lawrence seaway project as several times rejected by Congress.

(b) We incline to the opinion that this project is uneconomic because of the high cost of the complete project which we definitely envision as the ultimate objective.

Due to the brief duration of your hearing, oral testimonies will probably not be heard and, therefore, we would like to go on record against this project, because we are still of the opinion it is unnecessary and economically unsound, and we would like to have our statement inserted in the record.

In addition to the 6 copies for the record, we are enclosing 25 extra copies of this statement for distribution to the members of the committee and others interested.

With kindest regards.
Very truly yours,

GEORGE G. WESTFELDT, Jr., President.

STATEMENT OF C. J. GOODYEAR, TRAFFIC MANAGER, THE PHILADELPHIA & READING COAL & IRON Co., PHILADELPHIA, PA., ON BEHALF OF NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SHIPPERS ADVISORY BOARDS

The National Association of Shippers Advisory Boards is an association of 13 regional shippers' advisory boards, each of which operates in its own region, the whole organization covering the entire country. The total membership of the regional boards aggregates approximately 24,000 persons who are in one way or another concerned with rail transportation, principally as shippers or receivers of freight. None of them is engaged in the business of transportation. It is estimated that the members of these regional boards are the shippers or receivers of about 90 percent of the Nation's freight traffic.

The purpose of these shippers' advisory boards is to encourage cooperation between the railroads and the shipping public, to the end of promoting more efficient rail transportation for the public service.

Twelve of the thirteen regional boards have considered the matter of the construction of the St. Lawrence seaway, and have formally decided that the construction of the seaway should be opposed, as detrimental to the welfare of the country as a whole. The 13th regional board has taken no action, either way, in this matter. This one board is the Great Lakes Regional Advisory Board, which covers the Lower Peninsula of Michigan, northeastern Indiana, northern Ohio, northwestern Pennsylvania, and the western edge of New York.

The National Association of Shippers Advisory Boards has, almost from its inception more than 15 years ago, opposed the construction of the St. Lawrence seaway. In accordance with this policy, I have been directed by the president of the association, Mr. Arthur P. Little, of Framingham, Mass., to present to this committee the opposition of the association to the proposed legislation, and the reasons for that opposition.

We do not believe that the waterway is desirable from the point of view of the American people as a whole.

The

If the Government of the Dominion of Canada believes strongly enough in the desirability of such a waterway, there is nothing we can do to prevent such action. But we see no good reason for participation by the United States in either the construction, maintenance, or operation of such a waterway. Welland Canal was originally built, was later enlarged and modernized, and has always been maintained and operated by the Canadian Government. If there has ever been any charge, or even a suggestion, of disadvantage to the commerce of the United States by reason of Canadian management, it has never come to our attention.

We adhere to the opinion previously expressed on many occasions before committees of both the Senate and the House of Representatives, that the development of the so-called seaway would in the long run be of disadvantage to the United States of America.

It would be a seasonal waterway, closed by ice during more than a third of the year. During the period of operation, the waterway would, of course, attract a certain amount of traffic, most of which would be diverted from the railroads. Such traffic would, during the closed winter season, be diverted back to the railroads for transportation by them at the season of the year when ground transportation is most difficult and costly. Such a situation, depriving the railroads of the traffic during the season of the most economical transportation conditions, and turning back that traffic for transportation under the most difficult and expensive conditions, will result in reducing carrier revenues in summer, and greatly increasing operating expenses in winter. The railroads serving the area will find it necessary to maintain in good condition all of the facilities they now have, in order to serve the needs of the traffic during the winter months and the traffic of those not so favorably located as to be able to use the waterway. The cost of this maintenance would be spread over a smaller tonnage to the extent of the use of the waterway. Obviously, this burden on the rail carriers must result in the need for higher freight rates to be paid by the shipping public in general, for the benefit of the few who would be in position to utilize the waterway during the open season.

The seaboard of the United States, from Maine to Texas, is dotted with deepwater ports which, though private enterprise, through local public funds, and through congressional appropriations have been developed, and continue to be improved and maintained at a level of efficiency well able to handle promptly and economically all of the present and prospective foreign commerce of the Nation which is tributary to the Atlantic and gulf coasts.

The diversion of traffic from these ports on the scale which the proponents of the waterway seems to expect would be a serious blow to many of these ports, all the way from Maine to Texas. These ports are well served by the world's greatest and best railroads, and some of them by the great natural waterways of the Mississippi Valley.

Another angle of this situation which has not, to our knowledge, been previously developed, is the effect of the waterway on the importation of foreign residual petroleum oils. This oil, which is the residue after the extraction of gasoline and other refined products, may be described as the waste from the foreign petroleum industry.

This residual oil has been imported into this country and dumped into the fuel markets along our Atlantic coast at prices which constitute ruinous competition with our domestic oil industry, and more particularly with our coal industry.

During the year 1952 the imports of residual fuel oil reached a total of 128 million barrels, which displaced about 32 million tons of anthracite and bituminous coal. Many mines have been closed, and many more work short time because of the dumping of this foreign oil. During the first 4 weeks of this year the flow of the imported residual oil was 48 percent greater than during the same period of last year.

These imports in 1952 cost American railroads about $111 million in coal revenue, American mine labor over $100 million in wages, and the United States Government $1,280,000 in transportation taxes.

This serious situation now exists only along the seaboard, where the tank ships can make direct deliveries at the ports, with distribution to short-haul areas by truck or barge. If this St. Lawrence waterway is built, the foreign oil interests will be enabled to make the same kind of deliveries by tankers at Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, Milwaukee, and other Great Lakes ports. The effect on the American coal and railroad industries in laying open the stronghold of the country's coal market to the vicious attack from foreign residual

oil would be nothing short of a catastrophe. The annual damage to our economy which would result from such a development would probably be greater, in financial terms, than all of the dubious benefits which would accrue from the seaway over a period of many years.

And the movement of this foreign oil would in no wise contribute to the national security. The growth of foreign oil trade in the Great Lakes Basin would have the same effect that has been brought about by its advent into the Atlantic seaboard market-accentuated, of course, by the additional volume. More mines will close, more mines on short working time, greater decline in railroad revenues, greater wage losses in coal mines and on railroads, more poverty and distress.

The movement of the foreign oil in case of war or other national emergency of like nature would, as on past occasions, be interfered with or stopped altogether by hostile forces. Where then would the consumers of the foreign oil turn for fuel? Our domestic petroleum industry would be under pressure to supply our normal needs and the accelerated consumption of our Armed Forces, so the demand would revert back to a coal industry and a rail system disorganized and weakened by the influx of foreign oil. And closed mines cannot be put into production overnight. Once closed and abandoned they deteriorate rapidly and in order to be put back in operation must be dewatered, repaired, and reequipped at considerable cost of material and manpower and generally many months of time. A serious deficiency in fuel supply all along the Atlantic seaboard and in the whole Great Lakes Basin during an emergency period would undoubtedly result.

We will not undertake here to go into detail with respect to the many reasons which move us to opposition to this proposal. We will mention briefly only a few of them.

We do not presume to be expert in financial matters. It appears to us, however, that, regardless of the fact that this proposal is for a separate corporation, the liability for the expenditures proposed will still rest on the United States, so that the form of the proposal is in effect a mere subterfuge.

Furthermore, additional legislation is already pending which would extend the 27-foot waterway up the lakes at the cost of an additional $100 million, and this is only one step in a continuing process of heavy expenditures which will be neces; sary to the extension of the 27-foot waterway to the ports where the claimed traffic can be made available.

The total cost of this adventure in the long run would probably be greater than had been estimated under the broad St. Lawrence seaway projects which the Congress has repeatedly refused to approve.

These heavy expenditures, at a time when the country already staggers under the heaviest taxation in history, we believe would be utterly inexcusable.

Of course, the proposed waterway would be of little use unless the upper lake channels were deepened to a corresponding depth. The expense incurred, however, would be stupendous, and as said above, would in our opinion be entirely unjustified. The traffic through the proposed seaway, even if tolls were very heavy, would never pay carrying charges on such expenditures.

We do not accept the estimates of traffic volume which have been submitted by the Department of Commerce. We do not believe that the waterway as proposed would be physically able to handle such volume. We believe that if the traffic volume reached such proportions as these estimates would indicate, the effect on the present transportation system of the United States would be so serious as to have a profound effect on the commerce of the country at large. The loss of millions of tons of traffic by railroads who would be forced to maintain full capacity in order to take care of the winter traffic, would without doubt make it necessary to raise the general level of freight rates-almost countrywide, as the effects of the diversion of traffic would affect the railroads in nearly every corner of the United States.

If, on the other hand, the traffic through the waterway is light enough to have no serious effect on other means of inland transportation, the waterway cannot be self-liquidating, and the hundred million dollars will be wasted.

There are other means of transportation-economical means-to serve all of the traffic that would move on the proposed waterway. These transportation facilities have been built and maintained by the American public, either through investment by private capital, or through public improvements financed by the Government. The proposed seaway cannot be considered a public necessity. The construction of the waterway would make available a route into the heart of the continent for small, light-draft foreign ships, but would exclude nearly all

of the deep-water shipping which flies the flag of the United States, because ships manned by American sailors must be large to be able to compete in the foreign trade.

As previously stated, the result would be untold damage to the economy of the country, serious disruption of the railroad and coal industries, diversion of traffic and serious reductions of income at all of our port cities from Maine to Texas, with an almost certain disruption of railroad traffic which must result in increased freight rates for the great majority of shippers and receivers of freight who will be unable to use the waterway.

STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER JOHN J. HALLORAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE
PORT OF BOSTON AUTHORITY

I appear in opposition to this St. Lawrence seaway legislation as the representative of His Excellency Christian A. Herter, Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and for the record should like to read the letter of instructions which I have received from the Governor. It is as follows:

THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,

Mr. JOHN J. HALLORAN,

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, State House, Boston, April 14, 1953.

Port of Boston Authority,

Boston, Mass.

DEAR MR. HALLORAN: I understand that you are going to Washington to testify in opposition to the participation of the United States in the construction of the St. Lawrence seaway.

May I ask you if at the time you testify you will be good enough to record me as likewise being opposed. As a member of Congress for 10 years I have consistently taken the position that the construction of the seaway represented a tremendous expenditure of money in which all the country would be obliged to share, including New England, and that the returns from that investment were of doubtful value except to a small segment of the country.

If anything, the seaway for which we would have to pay our share would be, in fact, injurious to us.

In recording me against the construction of the seaway I hope you will make it clear that I have consistently favored the development of the power resources of the St. Lawrence and that I feel that these questions can very well be considered as separate questions.

With very kind personal regards.

Most sincerely yours,

CHRISTIAN A. HERTER.

I am also directed to record the opposition of the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce, the Maritime Association, and the New England Conference in opposition to the St. Lawrence waterway.

As the representative of the Port of Boston Authority, I should like to present the following statement:

PORT OF BOSTON AUTHORITY STATEMENT IN REGARD TO THE ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY The port of Boston Authority is opposed to the construction of the St. Lawrence seaway and specifically to Senate bill 589, 83d Congress, 1st session. It has opposed previous bills, and has presented testimony to that effect, notably Senate Joint Resolution 104, 79th Congress, 2d session, and Senate Joint Resolution 111, 80th Congress, 1st session. The authority believes that the seaway as a route for navigation would be costly, unworkable, and disastrous to our national economy. It further believes that the project at the very least would not benefit and at the very most must destroy the commerce of the port of Boston.

The first consideration is that the seaway must be closed by ice for nearly 5 months in each year. This is fundamental in any serious appraisal of the project. There are variations between different years but in general the "closed" season runs from December 1 to May 1. This means that traders who make use of the seaway in the "open" season must either suspend business during the frozen months or fall back on other means of transport which,

in turn, must provide standby facilities to take care of the additional load, knowing that these will lie idle for the remainder of the year, or else struggle through the critical 5 months' period with overburdened ports, tracks, trains, and trucks.

Gen

Proponents of the project make much of the argument that Great Lakes navigation has been successful despite winter closings. But here we must distinguish. The great part of lake commerce has been the bulk movement of ore, coal, and grain. These can readily be arranged for seasonal movement. eral cargo traffic, on the other hand, has practically disappeared because it has been impractical to provide adequate steamship service for merely a partyear operation.

A second consideration is that the seaway is too shallow. The project calls for 27 feet of depth. Proponents assert that this would be deep enough for ships drawing up to 251⁄2 feet of water, which would permit fairly good sized ocean freighters to come up the St. Lawrence and into the lakes. This is wrong. The assumed maximum draft of 251⁄2 feet only allows 12 feet of water between keel and bottom. Possibly such a ship might engage the channel in still water and at low speed. Actually, ac responsible ship operator would tolerate so little clearance.

First of all, a ship passing from salt to fresh water will at once settle by at least 6 inches, because of the lesser density of the water. Secondly, a ship in motion tends to settle astern, or "squat" as mariners say. The amount of the "squat" increases with the ship's size and with its speed. So more room must be allowed. Then in open water, where wave action is encountered, even more clearance must be allowed. The total clearance has been variously figured, from a maximum of 8 feet to a minimum of 3 or 4. Assuming 4 feet, the maximum allowable to draft for seaway vessels becomes, not 254, but 27 minus 4 feet, or 23 feet.

This means small ships. A study of actual vessels with drafts of 23 feet indicates that the St. Lawrence-type ship would be no more than 400 feet long and would have a payload capacity of about 5,000 tons. In contrast, the well-known C-2 design of the Maritime Commission draws 25.9 feet, is 450 feet long, and carries about 7,200 tons of useful load. The Victory ship, which can carry at least 9,000 tons, draws 28 feet 6 inches. The new designs of the Maritime Administration draw 29 feet, in fact almost all of the newer ships being built in this country have similar drafts, and the National Federation of American Shipping recently pointed out that less than 4 percent of privately owned ships of the American merchant marine could transit the seaway at any time.

In the Great Lakes, further limitations are found. The Welland Canal has only 25 feet of water. No Lake Erie port has more than 25 feet. A rock shelf in the Detroit River is reported at 21 feet while above Detroit only 2 major ports have as much as 26 feet. It is worth noting here that 35 feet is considered the minimum practical depth for harbor channels which must accommodate seagoing craft and that the main ship channel in Boston harbor is 40 feet deep.

All of this has a bearing on the supposed emergency shipbuilding possibilities of Great Lakes shipyards. Regardless of the capacity of shipways no vessel for ocean service could be built unless it could transit the lakes and the seaway and reach the ocean. This imposes a definite limit on what could be done, coupled with the fact that for 5 months in the year no new vessels would reach salt water at all.

Of course, lake-type ships of shallow draft and great carrying capacity can be successfully used in the inland waters, but such ships are not designed to withstand ocean stresses and are not suitable for long ocean voyages. Used through the seaway, they must transship their cargoes at some port like Montreal. But the idea of the seaway is to provide an uninterrupted passage to and from the sea. On these figures, the only vessels which could make the through voyage across oceans and into the lakes would be the little 23-foot ships, practically the equivalent of the small tramp freighter common in the Atlantic trade and chiefly of foreign registry.

The conclusion is inescapable that seaway proponents have no thought of making the 27-foot channel permanent. What they must mean is to get started on 27 feet and then ask for more aid to get at least a 30-foot channel not only in the seaway but also through the Great Lakes. In fact, there is already talk of an amendment to S. 589 so as to provide the seaway depth through Great Lakes channels.