STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. BERNARD L. ROBINSON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, UNITED STATES ARMY

General ROBINSON. Yes, sir. They are available here and I will ask to have them distributed.

Mr. DONDERO. While they are doing that, General, you may begin your statement, or whatever preliminary statement you wish to make. General ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate very much the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon. I have a prepared statement which I would like to read, together with 10 enclosures, which I would like to have entered as a part of the record.

I strongly urge United States participation in the modernization of the St. Lawrence navigation facilities, Lake Erie to Montreal, because it will contribute materially to our national security and because the project is economically sound.

The St. Lawrence ranks among the great rivers of the world. It is unique in that it is the connecting channel between the ocean and the greatest inland body of water in the world-the Great Lakes System-which itself constitutes a tremendous low-cost transportation medium. A mighty inland empire, agriculturally, industrially, and commercially, surrounds the Great Lakes.

From Duluth to Ogdensburg, 1,200 miles, controlling depths of 25 feet on the Great Lakes system generally prevail in the connecting channels. Within each lake natural depths are much greater. Lake Erie, the shallowest of the group, affords depths averaging 75 feet or more.

In the 114 miles of the St. Lawrence from Ogdensburg downstream to Montreal a bottleneck exists-the 14-foot canal facilities built 50 to 75 years ago. Those canal facilities, which constitute the only means of conveyance for waterborne shipments between the sea and the Great Lakes, are now totally inadequate for modern-day shipping. Existing and prospective commerce demands modernization of those facilities. Below Montreal a 35-foot project channel prevails to the

sea.

Consideration of the seaway project has been reduced to simple terms because of recent events. The power phase development is well on its way to joint accomplishment by the Hydroelectric Power Commission of Ontario and an entity to be designated in the United States. Proceedings before the Federal Power Commission indicate the likelihood that the Power Authority of the State of New York will be the United States designee.

Mr. McGREGOR. If I may interrupt, I am wondering if the Chair will agree with that statement and that the Power Authority for New York will be the United States designee.

Mr. DONDERO. It will have to be the New York Power Authority or the Federal Government-1 of the 2.

Mr. DEMPSEY. Why? Couldn't independent power companies do this, that is, private companies?

Mr. DONDERO. They would be able and willing to buy the power at the bus bar, but the question of international complications with Canada might complicate it in such a way that I doubt whether private enterprise could do it. If they could do it, I am for them doing it.

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Mr. DEMPSEY. So am I.

General ROBINSON. Both of those non-Federal agencies have made clear their desire and capability to proceed with the power development upon issue of the Commission's license to the New York State Authority. Requisite approval by the International Joint Commission, created by the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, was issued on October 29, 1952.

Construction of the seaway is thus assured, since Canada has made it abundantly clear that it is prepared to undertake the seaway modernization, Lake Erie to Montreal, unilaterally. The Parliament enacted the necessary authorizing legislation in December 1951. Canada is anxious to go it alone, but is willing for us to participate in the seaway project if we do so without delay.

The project consists of a relatively small amount of dredging, seven new locks between Ogdensburg and Montreal, canal excavation, and certain auxiliary works. If we choose to let Canada go it alone it will build all of those seven locks entirely in Canadian territory. Thus Canada will have physical control of those facilities and unilateral determination of shipping tolls forevermore.

Mr. DONDERO. General, would you suspend for half a moment while I ask the committee if they would like to have the General or his assistant give us the physical location of what you are talking about on the map that is on the wall, so that the members will understand it? This map is a new map, and if Mr. Stellar will do that while you are giving your testimony, I think it would help.

General ROBINSON. All right, sir. The relatively small amount of dredging is in the 68-mile section off to the left of the map known as the Thousand Islands section, from Lake Ontario to the International Rapids section.

Mr. McGREGOR. If I may inquire, General, that goes over to the Lake Ontario-Lake Erie connection, doesn't it?

General ROBINSON. It goes into Lake Ontario through the Thousand Islands section.

Mr. MCGREGOR. It does not come down near the Lake Erie connection with Lake Ontario?

General ROBINSON. There is no dredging in the lake, no, sir. The other work would be in Canada in connection with the Welland Canal. That dredging in the Welland Canal would be done by Canada.

The section shown on the map there is in two parts. The International Rapids section, which is the part entailing the United States participation in the seaway phase as contemplated in the Dondero bill; it consists in the overall of 3 locks, and 2 lateral canals, a powerhouse straddling the international boundary, a spillway dam, and a second control dam, where Mr. Stellar is now pointing; and certain ancillary works on the United States side including dikes to retain the new water levels, highway relocation, and so on.

A series of 4 locks are to be built by Canada under the joint plan, 2 there at Beauharnois and 2 in the vicinity of Montreal (Mr. Stellar pointing). In addition certain channel improvements would be accomplished by Canada, which constitute the remainder of the project, all of those in Canada being at Canadian expense.

The alternative Canadian scheme shown on the map calls for seven locks wholly within Canadian territory, together with dredging practically entirely within Canada.

Mr. McGREGOR. General, if I might take a moment, with the Chair's permission, I wonder if you could explain the difference between this and what the Army engineers and the Blatnik-Dondero bill recommended 2 years ago which would cost approximately $1 billion. That was an overall coverage of dredging from one extreme to the other. Is that correct?

General ROBINSON. That billion dollars is not a Corps of Engineers estimate for dredging.

Mr. McGREGOR. $800 million, but that figure did not include some of the necessary items.

General ROBINSON. The overall work is the same. The allocation of costs is different, and the entities to construct the various components are different, and I will cover that further in my testimony.

Mr. McGREGOR. Did it go from one end to the other, General? It evidently covered a greater area than this legislation covers.

General ROBINSON. Oh, yes. It included the upper lakes connecting channels, the St. Lawrence development, Duluth to Montreal, and also included the construction of the power development at Federal expense under the 1941 agreement with Canada, which is now superseded.

Mr. McGREGOR. This 1941 agreement expired, did it not, General? General ROBINSON. To all intents and purposes it expired due to action of Canada.

Mr. McGREGOR. It is not in force?

General ROBINSON. No, sir. It is not.

Mr. DONDERO. You may proceed, General.

General ROBINSON. On the other hand, if we join in this construction, as I strongly urge, 3 of the 7 new locks will be built by us entirely on American soil between Ogdensburg and Massena.

Mr. DONDERO. Where is Ogdensburg and where is Massena? Show us that.

General ROBINSON. Yes, sir. They are here [Mr. Stellar pointing to map].

The remaining four locks will be built and controlled by Canada in the reach from Massena to Montreal. Thus we will gain physical control of three of the locks and joint participation for bilateral determination of important considerations, including shipping tolls, rules of measurement, priority of shipping in wartime, and traffic charges to be imposed after the amortization period.

Accordingly, the question here involved is not whether the seaway shall be built, but it is simply whether we shall have a voice in the manner of its construction, operation, and subsequent administration. In the current session of the Congress eight bills concerning the St. Lawrence project have been introduced and referred to your committee. In enclosure 1 hereto I list those bills and their sponsors. Since I have been given to understand that the committee at its meeting on June 4 ruled to confine these hearings substantially to the Dondero bill, House Joint Resolution 104, and the practically corresponding Zablocki bill, H. R. 3319, my testimony will be directed essentially thereto.

All of these bills were introduced prior to the recently announced position of the administration on the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence project. To assist in making the record clear, I attach to my statement as enclosure 2 a résumé listing the actions I deem particularly important relative to this project since June 1952.

Under the Dondero bill and the recently announced position of the administration, the United States would accomplish the navigation work in the International Rapids section and the Thousand Islands section of the St. Lawrence River. Canada would build the seaway works in the Canadian section of the St. Lawrence River, Montreal to Cornwall, together with the deepening of the Welland Canal. These works combined, in conjunction with the power development, would produce a 27-foot waterway, Lake Erie to Montreal.

Construction of the United States seaway works under the Dondero bill would be accomplished by a newly created St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, with authority to finance the United States share of the undertaking on a self-liquidating basis.

The administration supports the concept of the Dondero bill, subject to the modifications suggested by the Bureau of the Budget contained in committee print No. 1, the substantive changes of which were embodied in committee print No. 2, recently favorably reported out by the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee.

Committee prints Nos. 1 and 2 differ from the Dondero bill in these particulars :

(a) Instead of having the new Corporation be an independent instrumentality, the revision calls for the Corporation to be subject to the direction and control of the President or head of such agency as he may designate;

(b) Management of the Corporation is placed in a single administrator instead of being vested in a board of three directors; and

(c) Financing would be arranged by the Secretary of the Treasury rather than having the Corporation issue guaranteed revenue bonds directly to the investing public.

I support those legislative modifications. In recent testimony before the Senate committee the Budget Bureau's representative indicated that the President would, at least initially, designate the Secretary of Defense to exercise control over the Corporation, and that the Corps of Engineers would undoubtedly be the agency to construct the United States seaway works.

I regard the seaway to be analogous to the Panama Canal, which is under the control of the Secretary of the Army. Also, because of its experience and the availability of a working organization, I recommend that in the case of the seaway the Corps of Engineers be designated to handle the design, construction, maintenance, and operation of such physical works as may now be authorized.

In the next portion of my statement, Mr. Chairman, I shall state briefly the reasons why I consider the seaway important to our security and defense, and why I deem the project economically sound. After that coverage I shall take up the chief criticisms against the project, although those considerations have now been reduced to a purely academic level, since Canada is ready to proceed at once with the 27-foot seaway even without our participation.

NATIONAL SECURITY

The Department of Defense has consistently supported the St. Lawrence project as being important to the national defense, both from a long- and a short-term viewpoint. The reasons may be briefed as follows:

(1) A modernized waterway will facilitate the mass movement at low cost of recently discovered high-grade, open-pit iron ore in the Labrador-Quebec field to our central area steel-manufacturing arsenal. This will supplement our present source of Lake Superior district open-pit ore, the reserves of which are becoming seriously diminished. Open-pit ores possess the advantage of ready expansibility in an emergency, in addition to their lower cost, not inherent in underground mining operations or in taconite beneficiation. Without the seaway, delivery of the Labrador ore to our inland steel-producing centers would present serious transportation problems in wartime.

(2) The deep-draft waterway will facilitate transportation of munitions to overseas bases. It offers a relatively protected route, reducing by 1,000 miles the open-sea distance to the British Isles.

(3) Seaway construction will provide access to additional shipbuilding and ship-repair facilities on the Great Lakes, as well as the tremendous industrial and agricultural potential surrounding and tributary to the Great Lakes.

(4) Related power project will provide an additional source of economic electric power in a region with an industrial potential vital to our mobilization.

(5) Participation by the United States in the seaway construction will assure us an opportunity to participate in important decisions, such as setting requisite priorities for shipping in an emergency, taking adequate precautions against sabotage, and establishing tolls, commodity by commodity, in such manner as to assure equitable treatment for American interests.

I believe that these points, made by our defense authorities, are generally recognized as being entirely valid. I may comment, however, on one criticism that has been leveled against the security value of the seaway on a number of occasions in recent years. It appears again in the following quotation from a statement by the Association of American Railroads in February 1953:

Furthermore, in measuring the value of the proposed waterway from the standpoint of national defense, the inherent vulnerability of a system of locks and dams must be taken into consideration. The 8 locks and 2 dams stretching over 100 miles in the St. Lawrence River, and locks in the Welland Canal stretching over 26 miles, would all have to be protected and maintained in operation. The cost of such protection would be tremendous, and also ineffectual.

As to the inherent vulnerability, it should be made clear that the structural facilities involved are no more vulnerable than other installations, such as the aluminum plant at Massena, N. Y., or strategic bridges and railroad yards-and in all likelihood less vulnerable than more widespread targets such as Detroit and Buffalo. The dangers from a determined air attack or from sabotage must, be course, be recognized and guarded against. The seaway locks will, however, be located in an area which is already one of high defense priority and they would, therefore, not require commitments for defense that do not already exist in large measure. Moreover, they can readily be