spot in their constitution is due to the fact that the greater part of the Royal Air Force exists to perform the same functions as the Army, i.e. the attack and defence of territory, and that these functions should logically be co-ordinated in one department and under one staff, responsible in war for what is essentially military, as distinct from naval, strategy.

There remains that side of the Air Ministry which deals with civil aviation. This is often regarded as one of the stoutest planks in their structure, for it is argued that flying is such a tender growth that civil and Service aviation should be closely allied and should help each other. This is yet another myth which merits exposure.

Civil aviation, it is generally admitted, cannot yet 'fly alone,' and while there is need for a Government subsidy, it is not unnatural that there should be some degree of State control. Under the Air Ministry system, however, the taxpayer is paying not far short of £500,000 per annum towards British civil aviation, and the results are very meagre. In the Air Estimates for 1926 we find a sum of £462,000 for civil aviation, aerodromes, air routes and surveys, technical equipment, works and lands, and subsidies; a further £14,467 in respect of the Directorate of Civil Aviation, and £7900 for meteorological services at civil aerodromes, making £484,367 in all. This section of the Ministry should also, of course, be debited with some share of the cost of the office of the Secretary of State for Air, as the latter exists not only to administer the Royal Air Force, but also the directorate of civil aviation.

For this large sum the country only secures :

1. A share in Imperial Airways, Ltd., whose total fleet is no more than 14 aeroplanes.

2. An interest in the, so far, very little developed Imperial air routes.

3. An interest in a very nebulous scheme for the development of commercial airships.

4. An interest in the promotion of half a dozen small aeroplane clubs.

With the exception of the most useful efforts of these

Clubs to increase the reserve of trained pilots, the sum of their activities cannot be regarded as great, nor do they represent any appreciable contribution to British Air Power. As a reserve for the Royal Air Force, commercial aviation, so far as it provides machines and pilots, is negligible. Its chief value lies in the fact that it keeps alive the aircraft industry to some extent, and thus assists to maintain the means whereby the Royal Air Force could be expanded in emergency. But the prosperity and size of the aircraft industry in this country depend upon orders, including foreign orders, for British aeroplanes; and here we see the disadvantage of a Government Department dominating what should be a commercial concern; moreover, this disadvantage is enhanced when that Department is also responsible for a fighting Service.

·

Government departments are not given to hawking their wares,' although the Post Office and Stationery Office are showing considerable enterprise in this respect. Nevertheless, the Air Ministry, having cast their mantle over British civil aviation, might do considerably more than they do to popularise British aircraft. To begin with, they might encourage Air missions to foreign Powers when opportunities occur. Naval missions have done much to assist British shipbuilding, and in this form of enterprise the Air Ministry might well take a leaf out of the Admiralty's book. For instance, air influence in Brazil is American; in Turkey, German and French; and in Japanese military aviation French again. In Chile and in the Japanese naval air service it is British, thanks chiefly to the work of the late Com mander Travers in Chile, and of Colonel the Master of Sempill in Japan.

Turning from the administrative to the technical aspect, we are faced with the depressing fact that, under the auspices of the Air Ministry, British aircraft do not hold one single world's record. Apologists assert that this is of little real account because record-breaking aircraft are freak machines,' and of little commercial or military utility, and that time and effort are far better spent on developing aviation on more solid

lines.

These arguments might have much to commend them

if they applied to something as well developed as the ship, the locomotive, or the motor-car; but aircraft design is very far from having attained such a position of stability. Aeronautics is not yet an exact science, and it is only by pressing forward in any new direction where opportunity occurs and engineering and scientific developments make it possible, that an appreciable advance will be made. The highest incentive to the British designer is to enable him to compete with foreign designers. Even if he produces a 'freak machine' he has proclaimed himself a pioneer in progress, whether in improved speed, climb, weight-carrying capacity or endurance. Under the Air Ministry régime we are, seemingly, content to let others lead while we lag.

race.

An example of this is the Schneider Cup seaplane Having ignored records and high speed, research work in this country has, of late, been half-hearted, with the result that last year the British machine was beaten by the American winner by the huge margin of 30 miles an hour. This year we have no entry for the race. The world's speed record is 278.4 miles per hour. We have no type of aeroplane that will come within 50 miles an hour of this speed. This can hardly be justified by the great superiority of British aircraft in other respects. At any rate, such an apology is not likely to be conclusive to foreign buyers. World's air records not only spur on designers, they are valuable advertisements. Britishbuilt machines cost more, size for size, than foreign-built ones, and in view of the fact that they cannot claim any one of the eighty odd world's air records, it is a little difficult to proclaim with conviction 'British goods are best.'

The British private firms cannot be expected to compete single-handed against foreign firms assisted by their Governments, as many are assisted, to establish records. There can be little question that the British aircraft industry would thrive better if more of the taxpayers' contribution was devoted to research experiment and design and less to the maintenance of an Air Ministry as a separate Department of the State. As it is, the aircraft industry lives a hand-to-mouth existence, and is ceasing to provide even the nucleus of what we might require in war.

Summarising the arguments advanced in this article,

we see :

1. That British Air Power has been built up on a confused idea of what is meant by air warfare.'

2. That Air Power really means the power to use aircraft to defend or attack objectives on the ground plane, where the issues of war must ultimately be decided.

3. That the control of such aircraft, both in peace and war, should on no account be divorced from other forces organised with the same object.

4. That war in the air is only incidental to war from the air, and does not justify a separate Air Ministry.

5. That the existence of a separate Air Ministry, a separate Air Staff and a separate school of, so-called, air strategy, is illogical and a danger to national defence.

6. That except for the defence of this country against continental air attack, British Air Power is secondary in importance to British Sea Power, which is the basis of Imperial security.

7. That territory can only be held by troops and not by aircraft, although the latter can be of valuable assistance to armies or garrisons if there is unity of command.

8. That the national importance of an adequate defence against the continental air menace is so great, that it is necessary to retain the Royal Air Force with the prestige of a separate Service; but that this, again, does not justify a separate bureaucracy to run it.

9. That the Staffs of the Army and Navy should not be divorced from the training and work of air forces in war, which should be combined with that of the older Services in their respective elements.

10. That the Admiralty should assume unfettered control of all aircraft required to ensure sea security, whether designed to work with the fleet or to defend shipping in narrow waters.

11. That the General Staff at the War Office and the Air Staff at the Air Ministry should be merged into one Staff responsible for military strategy, home defence, and land operations overseas.

12. That civil aviation instead of being a potential reserve to British Air Power is, at present, an expensive luxury which we can ill afford.

13. That this latter defect is largely due to excessive expenditure on overhead charges inseparable from the Air Ministry system. The remedy is a smaller staff in another Department-the Board of Trade is the most obvious one-less Government control, and more of the available funds devoted to commercial enterprise.

14. That research, design and supply of aircraft, equally do not justify an Air Ministry, but should be co-ordinated by committees representative of military, naval, and commercial aviation.

If effect were given to these proposals the result would be a welcome relief to the taxpayer, the removal of a system which is cumbersome and inefficient in peace, and a menace to the successful conduct of any campaign in war, greater freedom for the development of commercial aviation, and generally enhanced British Air Power.