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AN

INDEX

TO THE

PRINCIPAL MATTERS.

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 2. Acceptance in Satisfaction, what is.

1. What amounts to.

The plaintiff, the acceptor of a bill
of exchange, on the day it fell due,
sent a person to the defendant, who
held it, to pay the amount of the bill
and bring it back. The defendant
received the money and gave a receipt
for it, but said he could not give up
the bill. The plaintiff being informed
of this, sent again to the defendant to
demand the bill or the money, but he
did not give up either. Afterwards,
on the same day, the defendant sent
to the plaintiff a paper signed by one
G., acknowledging the receipt from
the defendant of the amount of the
bill, and undertaking to bear the
plaintiff harmless for the amount, if
the bill, which he stated to have been
lost, should be presented. The plain-
tiff kept this guarantee, but neverthe-
less sued the defendant for money
had and received: -Held, that his
right of action vested on the defend-
ant's refusal to repay the money or
give up the bill; and therefore that
the receipt by the plaintiff of G.'s
guarantee was in the nature of accord
and satisfaction, and was no defence
to the action, unless specially pleaded.
Alexander v. Strong,
733

The plaintiffs, merchants at Liver-
pool, were in the habit of consigning
to the defendants, brokers at Mont-
real, goods on sale or return, and of
receiving in payment bills on British
houses purchased by the defendants
with the proceeds. The plaintiffs
having desired that none but un-
doubted bills should be sent to them,
the defendants remitted a bill drawn
by and upon parties supposed at the
time to be in good credit. The plain-
tiffs, on receiving it, returned for an-
swer that it had been refused accept-
ance, and requested the defendants to
do what was needful to procure secu-
rity from the drawer, and to take all
legal and necessary steps for their se-
curity. In an action brought by the
plaintiffs for money had and received,
to recover from the defendants the
proceeds of the consignment to which
this bill had reference, the defendants
pleaded the delivery to the plaintiffs,
and acceptance by them, of the bill
of exchange in full satisfaction. The
Judge directed the jury, that if the
bill was such a one as by the course
of dealing between the parties the
plaintiffs were bound to take, that was
a taking in full satisfaction: -Held,
that this was a misdirection; for that

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ACTION ON THE CASE. When maintainable.-Evidence of Malice.

Where, in a suit in equity, an order was made that one G. should pay into the name of the Accountant-General, in trust in the cause, a certain sum admitted by his answer to have been the amount of the sale of a trust fund; and the solicitor for the plaintiff in the suit registered it under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 19, and G. was in consequence prevented from disposing of his lands:-Held, that the registering of the order was not of itself a wrongful act, and that no action could be maintained for it without proof of malice.

Semble, that such an order is within the equity of the stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 19. Gibbs v. Pike,

AFFIDAVIT.

351

See LANCASTER COURT OF COMMON

PLEAS.

(1). Title.

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(3). Filed on former Rule, right of using.

A party shewing cause against a rule has a right to read an affidavit of his filed in Court, which was made in support of a former application for a rule involving the same question, and of which the other side took an office copy. Ryan v. Smith, 223

(4). To hold to bail, when sufficiently states a Debt.

An affidavit to hold to bail, stating the defendant to be indebted to the plaintiff in £22 "on the balance of an account for goods sold and delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant:"-Heldsufficient, without stating that it was an account stated between the parties. Kenrick v. Davies,

AMENDMENT.

Of Pleadings, Time for.

22

An application to the Court to amend pleadings does not fall within the rule respecting the setting aside proceedings for irregularity, with regard to the promptness of the application. Welsh v. Hall,

APPROVEMENT.

See COMMON.

14

An affidavit on which a rule for judgment as in case of a nonsuit was founded, was intitled "Between J. S., plaintiff, and G. J., defendant." The affidavit in answer to the rule stated, that there were two G. J.'s, and that all former proceedings in the cause were intitled "J. S. v. G. J. the elder?"-Held, that the affidavit was sufficient. Singleton v. Johnson, 67 See MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED, (1).

APPROPRIATION OF PAY

MENTS.

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that he had heard the evidence produced "touching the matters in difference," stated that he made his award "of and concerning the premises," and then proceeded to find specially on each of the issues in the action:-Held, that the award was sufficient, although it appeared that there was a matter in difference submitted to the arbitrator as to the non

Where a cause is referred to arbitration, with power to the arbitrator to settle all matters in difference between the parties, the submission providing also that the parties respectively are to be examined on oath, supply of slates. Dunn v. Warlters,

if thought necessary by him, it is in the discretion of the arbitrator to examine the parties, each in support of his own case, if he think fit. Wells v. Benskin, 45

(2). Award.
1. When final.

1. A cause and all matters in difference between the parties (there being no matters in difference except in the cause) were referred by order of Nisi Prius to the award, order, arbitrament, final end, and determination of A. B.; the order providing, that the verdict should be entered for the plaintiff for the damages in the declaration, subject to be reduced or vacated, or instead thereof a verdict for the defendant or a nonsuit entered according to his award. The arbitrator, by his award, directed that the verdict entered for the plaintiff should be vacated, and a nonsuit entered: -Held, (Parke, B., dissentiente), that the award was bad, as not finally determining the matters in difference in the cause. Wild v. Holt, 161

293

2. When final-Ascertainment of Costs of Reference.

By the terms of an order of reference at Nisi Prius, the costs of the cause were to abide the event, "the costs of the reference and award to be in the arbitrator, who shall ascertain the same:" -Held, that the arbitrator was bound to ascertain and determine the costs of the reference and award. Morgan v. Smith, 427

3. When uncertain or inconsistent.

Assumpsit on an agreement to build a house according to certain drawings, plans, and specifications, and to the satisfaction of the plaintiff, and with the best materials: alleging as breaches that the defendant did not build the house to the satisfaction of the plaintiff; and that he did not perform the work with the best materials. Pleas, 1st, non assumpsit; 2ndly, that the defendant did the works to the satisfaction of the plaintiff; 3rd, that before the breach the contract was rescinded; 4th, leave 2. A declaration on an agreement and license; 5th, that the defendant to supply timber and slates to the deviated from the drawings by the plaintiff for the building of a house, direction of the plaintiff's architect; alleged as a breach the non-supply | 6th, a plea stating an agreement between plaintiff and defendant to build a stone wall in lieu of the wall mentioned in the original agreement; 7th, that the defendant, by command of the plaintiff, erected a stone wall instead of a brick wall. The plaintiff

of the timber only. The defendant pleaded-1st, non assumpsit; 2nd, that he did supply timber; 3rd, part payment. The cause and all matters in difference were referred, and the arbitrator, by his award, after reciting

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ATTACHΜΕΝΤ.

See SHERIFF.

For Non-payment of Money pursuant to Allocatur.

How waived.

An arbitrator having by his award ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff a sum of money, the plaintiff filed an affidavit of debt in the Court of Bankruptcy, under stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, and the defendant gave a bond, with sureties, conditioned for payment of the money, but omitting the alternative in the statute, of rendering himself to custody:-Held, that the plaintiff's having adopted this proceeding did not preclude him from applying for an attachment for non-performance of the award and rule of Court thereon. Mendell v. Tyrrell,

ATTORNEY.

217

See TITHE COMMUTATION Aст, (2). (1). Communication to, when privileged.

Where, upon the sale of an estate, the same attorney was employed by the vendor and by the purchaser, a communication from the purchaser to the attorney, asking for time to pay the purchase-money, was held not to be privileged. Perry v. Smith, 681 (2). When privileged from disclosing Client's Deed.

A party who is protected from producing a deed at Nisi Prius, on the ground that he holds it as a trustee for one of the parties, is not compellable to disclose the contents of it.

An attorney for a party in a cause is not bound to state the contents of a deed, of which he first obtained a knowledge by having obtained and read it, at the suggestion of his counsel, at the consultation in the cause. (Rolfe, B., dubitante.) Davies v. Waters, 608

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(3). Taxation of Bill. Jurisdiction of Master as to Negligence.

On taxation of an attorney's bill the Master has no jurisdiction to disallow items on the ground that in respect of the business to which they refer, the attorney was guilty of negligence.

Where A. and B. delivered a bill in their joint names for business done as attornies, and the Master on taxation disallowed part of the bill, on the ground that B. was not a certificated attorney during a portion of the time to which the bill referred, the Court, on affidavit that B.'s name was used at the request of friends, but that he was really not a partner with A., allowed A. to deliver a fresh bill in his own name only for the items so disallowed. Matchett v. Parkes, 767

BAIL.

Exception to, how waived.

A plaintiff does not waive his right of exception to bail put in under the stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 4, by delivering a declaration in chief, and consenting to further time to plead. Regina v. The Sheriff of Montgomeryshire, 448

BANKRUPTCY.

(1). Operation of 2 & 3 Vict. c. 29. To an action of trover by assignees of a bankrupt, the defendant pleaded, first, a traverse of the plaintiffs' property as assignees; secondly, that after the bankruptcy, and before the fiat, the plaintiffs, as assignees, by reason of the relation of their title to

the time of the bankruptcy, although not then appointed, were the owners of and entitled to the possession of the goods; that the bankrupt, subject only to their said title as assignees,

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