enabling the town council to elect a mayor, not only from the aldermen and councillors, but from those qualified to be such.

It will he found that this extension of the persons from whom the mayor may be chosen will not frequently be resorted to, as there are usually a number of gentlemen among the aldermen and councillors ready to take upon themselves the onerous duties of mayor. Nevertheless, it is an excellent provision for time of need.

Another amendment of less significance, but of greater utility, is the power conferred on town councils to appoint a deputy town clerk, to act in case of the illness or absence of the town clerk.

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In many large towns this advantage has been secured by local Acts and in others, the necessity of the case forced the town council, or the town clerk, to appoint a deputy. The powers of the deputy, in these instances, were extremely doubtful, and it is a good thing to have them definitely settled.

An amendment has been made in the disqualification attaching to a burgess on account of his having received "union or parochial relief or other alms." The word "union" has been introduced, at the instance of the Local Government Board, to avoid any difficulty that might arise from the relief given, having been a charge on the common fund of the union, under the Union Chargeability Act (28 & 29 Vict. c. 79).

This amendment has been carried further by a special exemption of those who have received medical or surgical assistance from the trustees of the municipal charities, or who have been removed, by order of a justice, to a hospital or place for reception of the sick, at the cost of any local authority, or whose children have been admitted to any public or endowed school.

The persons who can be removed by the order of a justice to a hospital, at the expense of the local authority, are those who are suffering from a dangerously infectious disorder, and who are without proper lodging or accommodation, or lodged in a room

occupied by more than one family, or on board any ship, or in a common lodging house.

It is very rarely that such persons have to be removed by the order of a justice. As a rule, the removal is the voluntary act of the sufferer. The writer ventured to suggest that the words "by order of a justice" should be omitted from the clause. In times of epidemic it is most important that no impediment should be placed in the way of the isolation of persons suffering from infectious diseases, and the clause, thus amended, would have rendered it clear that a burgess would not lose his vote by voluntarily allowing himself to be removed to a hospital. Perhaps the clause as it stands saves the right of the volunteer, for it would be contrary to common sense to hold that a volunteer, who confers a benefit on the community, should stand in a worse position than his obstinate neighbour, who has to be compelled, at the serious risks attendant upon delay, to obey the law. At all events, such a construction seems most agreeable to " convenience, reason, and justice."

Has the status of women, in relation to municipal privileges, been altered by this Act? It appears not. The Act declares that for all purposes connected with, and having reference to, the right to vote at municipal elections, words importing the masculine gender shall include women. If such a special provision had not been inserted, it might have been contended that as any person of full age, and qualified by rating and residence, may become a burgess, and as the candidate for corporate office must be selected from the burgesses, that there is nothing to prevent women, upon the burgess roll, serving any municipal office. This conclusion would have seemed inevitable, if the Legislature had not gone out of its way, to declare that women should have only one municipal privilege, that is, the right to

vote.

The Legislature having done this, the plain inference is that there was no intention to confer upon women rights beyond those expressed. Expressio unius, est exclusio alterius.

There are other minor amendments, to which reference will be made in the proper place in the text of the Act; but they are not of sufficient importance to demand further attention here.

It was, no doubt, undesirable that fundamental changes in the law should be introduced into a Bill, having for its main object the consolidation of the existing law. Nevertheless, there were some grave difficulties in interpreting several of the existing enactments, that might have been fairly dealt with in a Consolidation Bill. These would not have been widely at variance with the existing law, but would have simply expressed what is generally understood to be the meaning of doubtful points, and would have materially added to the solid improvement of Municipal Law.

Some of these points will be noticed in the comments on the text of the Act. There is one point, however, of paramount importance which it was very desirable should have been cleared up. It is the question of what is a legal expenditure, by the town council, of corporate funds?

Any order of the council for the payment of money out of the borough fund may be removed into the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court, and wholly or partially disallowed or confirmed, on motion and hearing, with or without costs, according to the judgment and discretion of the Court.

With the exception of the remuneration payable to some officials, and certain payments to the Treasury, all payments out of the borough fund must be made by order of the council.

Now the 44th section of 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 78, which conferred the right on all persons interested in the borough fund to apply for a certiorari, specially mentions that it is given for the purpose of affording a more direct and easy method for misappropriation. Although this recital is omitted from the Consolidated Act, there can be no doubt that no judge would entertain a motion for a certiorari except on the ground of misappropriation.

This, however, does not dispose of the difficulty. The question still remains, What is a misappropriation?

The Act of 1835 created a borough fund, into which, generally speaking, the whole of the income of the corporate body not derived from rates was paid.

Section 92 of that Act provided that certain expenditure should be paid out of the borough fund, and that there should also be paid out of the borough fund all other expenses not therein otherwise provided for, which should be necessarily incurred in carrying into effect the provisions of that Act. In case the borough fund should be more than sufficient for the purposes aforesaid, the surplus could be applied, under the direction of the council, for the public benefit of the inhabitants and improvement of the borough.

In the event of the borough fund proving insufficient, the council could then make a borough rate to meet the deficiency.

The Legislature made a distinction between boroughs where there is a surplus of the borough fund, and where there is a deficiency in that fund, to be supplied by a rate.

The principle (if any) upon which this distinction is founded seems to be this: Where the funds at the command of the council are derived from estates, tolls, fees, and such like, then the powers of expenditure are enlarged; but where the funds under the control of the council arise from rates, then the expenditure is restricted.

This principle leads us to the anomaly that an expenditure which is lawful in one borough is illegal in another.

Further, the difficulty is increased by the very definition of the objects for which a rate can be made, namely, all other expenses which should be necessarily incurred in carrying into effect the provisions of the Act.

Who are to be judges of these expenses? Common sense would naturally suggest the town council. They are the representatives of the ratepayers. They have administrative functions entrusted to them, and should have the best means of acquiring information upon the necessity of an expenditure; and whilst they

exercise their powers honestly, impartially, and without corrupt motives, the decision of that body should be final.

In the case of The Queen on the Prosecution of Roberts and Others v. The Mayor, &c., of Sheffield (L. R. Q. B. vol. vi. p. 652), certain orders of the town council for the payment of expenses incurred by the corporation for the public benefit of the inhabitants were held illegal on the ground that these were not expenses necessarily incurred in carrying into effect the provisions of the Municipal Corporations Acts. There is in Sheffield no surplus of the borough fund.

In giving judgment in this case, the CHIEF JUSTICE said: The corporation were actuated by the laudable desire to protect the true interests of the borough, and to prevent the water company from frustrating a very important sanitary provision. He very much wished he could protect the corporation against the expenses which must now fall upon the individual members.

Mr. Justice BLACKBURN said: We must take it that the expenses were really incurred, and that the town council were coming forward-and were justified morally in coming forward— on the ground that they were protecting the interests of a large portion of the inhabitants.

Mr. Justice MELLOR said: I am far from saying that the interference of the council in these matters was an officious interference. On the contrary, in all probability, in regard to some opposition at all events, I think it may be taken to have been properly made—that is, morally proper.

Mr. Justice LUSH said: I cannot help thinking the corporation acted with perfect bona fides, in the genuine belief that they were acting for the benefit of the inhabitants; and, as I understand, the result shows that they were so acting.

There was no moral misappropriation, therefore, and yet the judges of the Queen's Bench held that they were bound in the exercise of their judgment and discretion to disallow a very proper expenditure, because they felt themselves bound by the technicali