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v.

"The said petition is insufficient in law, because it appears from the allegations thereof, that if plaintiff has been injured or damaged, that the same was caused wholly by his own contributory negligence and wilful trespass upon the property of defendant." The The petition in this cause is very full, and, tested by the principles set forth in many well considered cases by courts of high authority, must be considered as sufficient. The same rule which applies to persons of sufficient age to have discretion sufficient to protect themselves, in reference to contributory negligence, cannot be applied to infants of tender years, and in refe. ence to them, the negligence of a party through whose want of care they receive injury will fix liability, notwithstanding the act of the infant may have been such as would defeat a recovery by an adult receiving an injury under the same circumstances. In R. R. Co. Stout, 17 Wall. 660, the rule is thus stated: "It is well settled that the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by the same rules which govern that of an adult. While it is the general rule in regard to an adult, that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of that case." The defence urged in the case above cited was the same as in this case; the facts were almost identical, and the defence was insufficient. In the following cases: R. R. Co. v. Fitzsimmons, 22 Kans. 687; Koons v. R. R. Co. 65 Mo. 592; Keifer v. R. R. Co. 21 Minn. 207, the facts and pleadings were substanstially the same as in the present, and the plaintiff's were held entitled to recover.

The petition in this cause negatives the idea of negligence upon the part of the parents of the child injured; shows that the turn-table was in a public place, and very near to a public street;that children were accustomed to play on the turn-table; that on the same day on which the injury was inflicted, and but a short time before the child was injured, another child was injured, of which the servant of the appellee had notice; that no steps were taken to so secure the turn-table that children could not revolve it, and thereby receive injury; that the injured child was only seven years of age, and wanting in that discretion necessary to its own protection. Such facts entitled the plaintiff to maintain the action, and, if proved, to a recovery.

The question of discretion in the child, and of consequent responsibility for negligence,

was not one for the court, and to be determined upon demurrer, but was for the jury. R. R. Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 664. A court cannot declare, as a matter of law, that a child of seven years is sui juris; and when, from the age of the child, there may be doubt upon that question, it should be submitted to the jury. 2 Thomson on Neg. 1181, 1182, and citations. The fact that the turn-table was upon the premises of the appellee does not affect the question, nor relieve it from the duty of exercising in reference thereto such care as will render it not a dangerous machine to child ren who are attracted to it for amusement. Reversed and remanded.

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The State is not liable in damages to an individual for an injury resulting from the alleged misconduct or neg. ligence of its officers or agents.

The demurrer to the complaint raises the question of the responsibility of the State for the consequences of the misconduct or negligence of its officers and agents. The plaintiff, a convict sentenced to hard labor in the state prison for series of years, was assigned to work on the Cape Fear and Yadkin Valley Railroad, and, while engaged in blasting rock, by a premature explosion sustained an injury in the loss of both his eyes. The complaint ascribes the explosion to the gross negligence of the supervising manager, under whose authority and control he was placed, in not supplying water in sufficient quantity to use in the operation and prevent the accident. This is the case made in the complaint, and the liability of the state to make compensation is sustained upon the ground of the coerced labor put upon the plaintiff, and the taking from him all volition in avoiding danger and providing for his own safety.

SMITH, C. J.

The only question presented is, whether the State, in administering the functions of government through its appointed agents and officers, is legally liable to a claim in compensatory damages for an injury resulting from their misconduct or negligence. That the doctrine of respondeant superior, applicable to the relations of principal and agent created between other persons, does not prevail against the sovereign in the necessary employment of public agents, is too well settled upon authority and

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practice to admit of controversy. Gibbons v. U. S. 8 Wall. 269; Story on Ag. § 319. Admitting the general principle, the plaintiff's counsel undertakes to withdraw the present claim from its operation, for that the convict was put to work in constructing a railroad, a private enterprise, and not employed at any public work when the accident occurred, and thus the state has voluntarily assumed the responsibilities of one of its own citizens incurred under like circumstances. We cannot recognize the distinction as affecting the results, nor feel the force of the reasoning by which it is sustained. We do not perceive why, when convicts employed in quarrying rock for the construction of the penitentiary itself, the rule of liability should be different from that which controls when they are engaged in similar work to aid in the building of a railroad or other less public work. They are in both cases under the control and supervision of managers or overseers appointed by the public authorities, and the protection of law. The substitution of hard labor outside of the walls of the prison when the convict's condition is normal, and he has, in fresh air, pure water, and wholesome food, superior advantages over a close confinement, is a humane and ameliorating policy in reference to the convict himself, as well as a more profitable use of his labor for the state, and not coming in competition with the trade of private persons, and yet it is the performance of an imposed service for crime and answers all the purposes of punishment for its commission. We are clearly of opinion that the state has incurred no legal liability for the negligence imputed to the overseer, and he alone, if any one, is answerable for the consequences of his neglect. The demurrer must therefore be sustained, and the action dismissed.

Action dismissed

PERJURY.

We need not assume that perjury is more prevalent than it ever before was. It is well known that, in spite of the natural character for down-right veracity the commonness of this crime in English courts was always a subject of lamentation among our moralist. The pillory was especially reserved for it until recent times.

The bishops actually met in 1754 to take counsel how to cope with this crying sin.

time. There is nothing to show that the alterations first largely introduced into the law of evidence in 1851, and extended, with misgivings in many minds, to the Divorce Court in 1860, have led to an increase in perjury. After thirty years trial of a liberal system of evidence, no clear reason for retracing our footsteps can be adduced.

But no one can be acquainted with the inside of our courts without being aware of the enormous amount of petty perjury which is perpetrated there and which passes unpunished.

Men perjure themselves because they wish to make good their claims or escape liability. They do so because they are friendly to one of the parties, or because they have once incautiously out of court told some one a certain story and resolve to stick to it when they are subpoenaed by an enterprising solicitor, or because they are vain and wish to figure in public proceedings.

These motives will always operate, and cannot be effectually resisted. But men commit perjury also because they assume, with too much reason, that they will not be punished, and this is a temptation which might be diminished by means too obvious to require explanation.-London Times.

Digest of Decisions.

PENNSLYVANIA.

(Supreme Court.)

SMITH V. PRANGLE. April 24, 1882.

Lease.-Smith leased a house of Prangle for one year. The lease was in writing and coutained a confession of judgment for the amount of the year's rent, together with notice to quit, &c. The rent upon the lease was paid in full for the year the lease was made. Before the expiration of the year the lessee gave the lessor notice that he would not remain on the premises unless certain improvements were made; and afterwards removed from the premises, first paying the lessor the first quarter's rent in the new year. The lessor then entered judgment upon the lease for the amount of the whole year's rent and proceeded to issue execution thereon. The judgment was afterwards opened and the defendant let into a defence, and upon trial the jury found in favor of the plaintiff for three quarter's rent with interest.

Held, that there was nothing to continue or extend the confession of judgment as security, beyond the first year's rent, and that when the rent of that year was paid the judgment was paid. Judgment reversed.

THE UNITED Brethren MUTUAL ADI SOTYCIEPENNOF-
SYLVANIA v. MCDERMOND.

Insurance Company.—In a contract of an assured with a Mutual Insurance Society, where the payment of the policy is sought to be avoided, inter alia, by reason of assured failure to notify the Secretary of the postoffice address of himself or some agent, held, that as the agent of the company, was fully iully informed on this particular, and as it was of no material consequence to the society, this would not avoid the policy if the mortuary assessment were duly paid by the assured.

The professional perjurer with the straw in his shoe is as prominent a figure as any in our legal history. In view of all this, we are not disposed to strand the remarks of Lord Coleridge and Lord James Bagallay, and say that things are worse than they were at any previous and that of his death could be given in evidence.

What an agent does in the transaction of the business he is engaged to perform may be given as evidence to affect his principal.

In this case any declarations made by the agent of the Society between the time of the insurance of deceased

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THE judges of the supreme court are making rapid strides in disposing of cases on the general docket. Attorneys interested in cases from numbers two to three hundred on the docket should see to it, that their cases are fully prepared for examination by the court, as they are liable to be reached at any time.

POLITICS AND THE BENCH.

Scarcely a greater curse can befall a people than to inflict upon them a political Judge-to clothe in judicial ermine a man who has no higher ambition than the triumph of his party faction. This is a truth so self evident, as to require no argument for establishment.

How can fit men be secured for judicial positions? Scarcely by the hazard of party conventions. These are governed by caprice, chance, and, to a large extent, sad to say, corruption. They are composed of delegates chosen by primaries, which, in most instances, are made up of the worst elements of society, and run by political bummers, in the pay of sordid, selfish men whose aim is to secure power for purposes of pelf, and who indulge never a care or thought for the public weal. They will instruct for the man for Judge who will agree to do the most work for the ticket, regardless of any consideration of character or fitness.

How lamentably true it is that, with the average politician of the present day, of all parties, personal aggrandizement and the spoils of office constitute the chief concern.

But it were needless to moralize on this subject. Deprecation is fruitless. The better elements of society might change all this if they would; but no amount of warning or appeal will cause them to assert themselves, and so the bummers have their way, and will have it.-Colorado Law Reporter.

INTOXICATION AS A PROXIMATE CAUSE.

Davis became intoxicated with liquor furnished by defendant at his hotel; refused defendant's invitation to take him home in a stage but starts down the lake in a skiff and is drowned.

The wife of Davis sues defendant under the Civil Damage Act and the General Term Fourth Department (Davis v. Standish) holds that she has a right of action for injury resulting from her husband's death, and that where the intoxication renders the man incapable of caring for himself, by reason thereof his death is produced and intoxication is the proximate and direct cause of death.

We are of the opinion that this decision will

receive a vigorous overhauling in the Court of Appeals if taken there. How the defendant could possibly have contemplated such a result so as to bring his act of liquor selling, within the rule, making it the proximate cause, is more than we can understand from anything reported in the case. While the decision is apparently supported by some Illinois cases, it is a pioneer case in this state, which ought to be well digested and reviewed at Albany before becoming a precedent, if the old maxim is to retain its place as a living legal principle in questions of damage.-Brooklyn Daily Record.

AN AFFIDAVIT BY TELEPHONE.

their deepest and most earnest convictions overruled by the solemn judgment of courts, whose honesty of purpose cannot be questioned; and again, where their own doubts prevail, they find, after careful argument, that the actual right is where they first surmised a wrong. The Legislature frames a law; the courts expound it; but the lawyers must see that the law so made and expounded is properly applicable to the facts of each particular case. Differences of opinions arise-honest differences. It is not true that lawyers see a thing as they are paid to see it. It is the mission of the true lawyer to settle controversies, not to foster them. But when controversies have arisen, they should be determined according to the eternal principles of truth and justice, and, in ascertaining the correct application of these principles, there should be the greatest latitude of free discussion and the total banishment of all personal animosity.

John Freeman, assistant book-keeper in the department of public works, and notary public, before whom the various foremen are required to swear that the pay-rolls submitted by them, are correct, took the affidavit of William Inness, foreman of repairs at the crib, by telephone.dered among the people whenever they see all Having called the crib, the following colloquy ensued:

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A proper respect for the law is best engen

the officers of the courts conducting themselves with decorum and integrity.

Instead of regarding the practice of law as a system of cunning tricks and devices, the true advocate beholds in it the majesty and benevolence of peace and order; protection against ruffiantly violence the shelter of the weak against the strong; the checking of craftiness

"Take off your hat and hold up your right and fraud upon the unwary or the helpless; hand."

"I have done so."

"You solemnly swear that the August payroll for repairs at the crib is correct?" "I do."

Mr. Freeman readily distinguished Mr. Inness' voice and says an oath taken by telephone is binding in law.-Chicago News.

UTILITY OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS.

The following is from an address delivered by A. W. Slayback, Esqr., of St. Louis, before the members of the Colorado Bar, at Denver, ptember 11th, 1882:

Lawyers devote their lives to the advocacy of human rights and to the proper administration of justice.

They study books and study men. They investigate science itself, and thrust the probe of disputation into the very vitals of philosophy in order that truth may live and error die.

The discipline of their profession tends to enlarged and constantly enlarging charity. They know what it is for the best of friends to maintain different opinions upon an agreed state of facts. They know what it is to see

the assertion of that pure type of liberty which deprives no man of his property or his pleasure so long as he inflicts no damage upon society, or the individuals who compose society; and the adjustment and distribution of property and privilege so that no man shall suffer in his feelings, or lose that which is his own without obtaining prompt and adequate redress.

What moral and physical courage is required to make a man, who is trained to please if he can, stand up for the rights of a client, or the cause he deems proper, while the public sentiment is all against him? It is some strength to the champion of justice at such an hour to feel that he has the respect, the confidence and the sympathy of his manly professional breth

ren.

Bar associations are designed to cultivate fraternal feelings among honorable members, the men who are imbued with the philosophy, and alive to the dignity of the legal profession and to elevate the standard of ethics.

Lawyers are often hated unjustly for espousing a cause which has but few friends; but it becomes their duty to see that the law is administered without fear, favor or affection, regardless of popular clamor, and independent of personal feelings.

The Bar Association is a strength and refuge to the honorable man, and it is a dread to the evil-doer.

No saint ever wore a robe that some demon would not steal to serve the devil in; and, of course, a bad mau will now and then gain admittance to the bar. But take them numerically, as compared with other callings and professions, and the average standard of honor and integrity is as high, if not higher, in the legal profession than in any other. I will make no exception. And the jokes and jibes at lawyers' expense, and the caricatures made of them by witless dramatists, to please ignorant and vicious auditories, while generally treated as beneath all notice by lawyers, are nevertheless aimed at a very limited portion of the profession, whose members it is the mission of the Bar Association to weed out

Those of you who have belonged to such organizations in older states have witnessed their beneficial influence, not only upon the bar but upon the entire community.

The Bar Association is an adjunct of advanced civilization, educating the conscience of the profession and drawing a line between the regulars and the guerrillas in the great army of law and order.

In a country where government itself simply means the supremacy of law, rather than the will or the opinion of any individual whatever, it has a tendency to elevate, enlighten and advance the character of the legal profession, exalts the standard of civilization, and benefits the entire community.

In a progressive age and a prosperous and progressive country erroneous judgment can no longer mark injustice with the exploded sanction of authority. It is the axiom of modern learning, that law is discovered, not made, and decisions have weight, not according to their antiquity, but in proportion as they conform to correct reasoning and sound

sense.

Jurisprudence constitutes so important a part in human affairs, that whatever nien find worth struggling for, must rank in secondary and subordinate position to the paramount consideration of establishing correct principles, for the assertion and maintenance of human rights and the redress and punishment for human wrongs. For the security of life, property and peace of mind, the people must often look to their lawyers.

Confidence must be reposed, property must be entrusted, responsibilities must be lodged in the lawyer. If he proves unfaithful or treacherous, scarcely any punishment is considered too severe for him; but there is one punishment he is always sure to get, and that, too, not easy

to be borne, and that is, the united scorn and contempt of all the honorable members of the profession. And there is no possible solace in any transient advantage that can compensate an apostate practitioner for bringing that sort of disgrace upon himself which will not fade

or wash out.

Whatever lends dignity to the court and its officers carries dread to the breast of the wrong-doer. Whatever lessens the estimate in which lawyers are held, impedes the administration of justice; and the estimate lawyers entertain for each other is apt to extend to the community outside. They are presumed, like brothers, to know each other; and I venture to assert that no mau can rise to distinction and success at the American bar, in any of the states, unless he passes through that straight and narrow gateway-the recognition and endorsement of his brother lawyers. It may come slowly, reluctantly, but it must and will come, if, by his conduct, bearing, learning and industry, the practitioner secures the good will and the applause of his professional brethren.

Hence the importance of cultivating those amenities, courtesies and decencies of debate which, amid the conflicts of interests and the collisions of intellects, do not detract from the force of an argument or the scope of true reason, and yet impart sweetness and serenity to the labors and disappointments, the heartaches and the anxieties of a lawyer's life.

The rivalries and contentions of lawyers often give them the appearance of gladiators pitted against each other for the mere purpose of affording savage satisfaction to their spectators, by reason of the punishment and pain they inflict upon each other. To the zealous advocate, alive to his client's interest and cause, this is a tempting trap. But it is a fatal trad for the peace and the prosperity of the profession. There should be some influence hanging, ever overhanging us, to remind us that our opponent in the argument is personally a brother and a friend, whose sympathies and sufferings, labors and fellowship should not be sacrificed on the foul altar of false advantage.

The Bar Association tends to refine the social pleasures and to soothe the angry impulses, and affords a sort of locus penitentiæ for good fellows to make friends again after they have been temporarily angry with and estranged from each other. Its influence is at once elevating and comforting, and those who stand aloof from such organizations are not full and wellrounded men, but are somewhere deficient.

Although Missouri has been a state for about fifty-two years, our Bar Association is only going on two years old. The St. Louis Bar Association was organized several years before

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