In writing opinions and other documents, Mr. Justice Clifford, of the United States Supreme Court, always avoided as much as possible the definite article. He would write page after page without a single "the." Why he did so no one ever found out, except the jocular Justice Grier, who alone could take liberties with his dignified colleague from Maine. Once, ber, a rate of assessment lower than that named in said paper was agreed upon by the directors of the insurance company. 1882. IOWA. (Supreme Court of Iowa.) in hope of solving the mystery, he asked, slap- WOOD v. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. Co. July 13, ping Clifford on the back as he spoke: "Cliffy, old boy, what makes you hate the definite article so?" But Clifford drew himself up with Roman dignity and replied, gravely: "Brother Grier, you may criticise my law, but my style is my own." 3. Error of Judgment.-Where certain rigging apparatus was removed by the master, believing that no damage would result from such removal, and on the advice of an experienced rigger, and the master afterwards directed the servant to come to a certain portion of the structure, to which the apparatus had been attached, where he himself was, and the servant obeyed, and while he was where ordered to be, the structure gave way in consequence of the removal of the apparatus; Held, no such evidence as would render the master liable to the servant. Authority of Railroad Agents.-Whether the station agents along the line of a railway have authority to bind the company by contracts to furnish cars for the transportation of property is a question of fact and not of law, nor can courts take judicial notice that such agents possess such power, or are held out to the world as possessing it; and it is error to reject testimony offered to prove they have such power. BECK, J., dissenting. The law will regard station agents as fully authorized to make contracts for future transportation of property, and there is no necessity for the shipper to prove that the station agent was authorized by the railroad company to make the contract for transportation. EVERETT v. UNION PAC. R. Co. July 13, 1882. Witnesses-Discretion of Court.-The court has a discretion before trial to limit the number of witnesses to be examined to prove any one point in the case, and where the order limiting the number of witnesses was made before any witnesses were introduced, the plaintiff had the power of selecting any that she chose to examine, and cannot be heard to say that she was prejudicially surprised. Where it is not claimed that plaintiff sought to introduce witnesses who were not examined on a former trial, it cannot be said that the court abused its discretion. Where the court instructed the jury that the "marketable value" of property was the amount for which it would sell if put upon the open market and sold in the manner in which property is ordinarily sold in the community in which it is situated, the instruction would not raise the inference that forced sales were meant by the court. Evidence of the value of land sold in the neighborhood 10 or 12 years before is not competent to prove the value of the later period. The value of land appropriated by a railroad is what it is worth in its then condition, and not what its prospective value would be if laid out into city lots. Where the evidence was conflicting. and all the evidence is not before this court, the verdict will not be set aside as against the weight of evidence. SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA Promissory Note Executed through Ignorance; Muckry v. Peterson........ SUPREME COURT OF UTAH Riot-Force used: People v. Loughlin......... SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Agreement for sale of Lands-Forfeiture; Old and New Firm Debts; Shafer's Appeal..... DIGEST OF DECISIONS Recent cases from: California....... Minnesota. Pennsylvania... Maine....... Iowa............. Michigan THE TRUE LAWYER.. FOR SALE. 22 23 ག 24 24 29 29 30 The following Second Hand Law Books are for sale at this office: Swans Treatise (1875)...... Wilcox's Railroad Laws (1874).......... Chitty's Pleadings......... ........Price $3.00 66 1832-3.. Ohio Crim. Code (Wilson) 1878....................................................................................... THE Chicago Legal Adviser should at once consult its legal adviser as to the best method of avoiding a libel suit. It says: An insurance agent in Ohio was recently convicted of perjury in that state for falsely swearing to an affidavit, and sentenced to the penitentiary. The Fargo (Dak.) Argus defines the proceeding in a manner decidedly original. It says: "The Hall family seems to be in trouble. J. B. Hall, an insurance man of Columbus, Ohio, has been selected as a victim by the strong arm of the law on the alleged theory that his affidavits were not in accordance with the facts." The Hon. J. B. Hall has not been sentenced to the penitentiary. He is undoubtedly a democrat, a member of the legislature of this great state, and is also the president of a life insurance company. But these things, unless taken by intendment, furnish no foundation for such rude and previous remark as is made by the cold-blooded, grasshopper-eyed Argus man, repeated by the Legal Adviser, and wonderfully amplified by the latter. We hope our able, spicy and pleasant contemporary will take it all back, so as not to get trod upon. THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION which held its convention at Saratoga Aug. 8th-11th devoted a portion of its labors to a discussion of the relative merits of the reports of the committee appointed to devise plans for the relief of the dockets of the U. S. Supreme Court. It will be remembered that two reports-a majority and a minority report-were made and to these reports the Bar Association paid its respects. The majority of the committee reported substantially that the Davis Bill promised--all things considered--a more certain and speedy relief than any other plan suggested. The minority of the committee did not concur in this, and made a separate report. The American Bar Association by a vote of 37 to 29 accepted the report of the majority of the committee. This seems to be the usual and inevitable outcome of all attempts made by lawyers to agree upon some plan by which the action of the courts may be made to satisfy the requirements of justice with less delay. Lawyers meet in convention and haggle and quarrel over measures proposed, and fail to unite upon 3.00 anything. Law makers seeing the dissensions at the bar, very naturally refuse to lend their aid to a disentanglement of the "Knotted meshes of the law." We have seen to our sorrow the same disastrous ending to an attempt made 2.00 200 .75 2.00 U. S. Štats., 1873 to 75....... Stephens' Digest (Evidence).. 8.00 OHIO LAW JOURNAL. McVey's Digest, 2 vols, good as new. in this state to bring about a better order of things. There is but one thing to do; and that, to fully harmonize upon the recommendation of a plan" and then present a bold front and demand its adoption. Until this is done, nothing will be done. WE note with alarm the fact that the judges in Missouri are contemplating a convention. The ominous happening will eventuate on the 29th inst. at St. Louis. Now what do judges want to convene for? Is it to swap new and bewildering phrases with which to lunaticize the inoffensive juryman? Or to fulminate new and terrible remarks with which to blast the cheek of the fledgeling of the law? Or to devise original methods of dignity and unapproachableness? Seriously, however, the idea of a judges' convention is suggestive of a possible means of a wonderful accomplishment of good in this state at least. If all the honorable gentlemen occupying places on the woolsack, who are afflicted with crippled stomachs and lame digestive apparatuses generally, could be selected from the judicial army and placed in convention to agree upon a scale of punishments for the catalogue of crimes, much yeoman service would be done for poor suffering justice. As things now stand, we witness the harrowing sight of the severest penalties being imposed upon slight offenses and light punishments dealt out to scroundrels in high places, all because, in the one case a billious attack is upon the judge, or in the other a popular clamor overcomes the backbone of the same official. The records of the penitentiary show that men guilty of the stealing of a fifty-dollar mule are sentenced to a short life-time at hard labor, while men who betray trusts and appropriate dollars by the hundred thousand, get off with only a year or two. Burglary runs all the way from one to ten years, and all other crimes are as uncertain in their terms of punishment as though the matter were accomplished by a lottery. This brings justice into disrepute, and fills the souls of the convicts with disgust. A convention might remedy these things. The scale of crimes, with certain side conditions might be agreed upon : Embezzlement of $1,000, say by a deacon, might be given two years. Same by a cashier-unregenerated three years, Same by an insurance agent, four years. ures. The same plan followed in making up the scale of penalties would render the operations of justice, more uniform, and give to law-breakers an idea of what they might expect. As it now stands the thing is mighty uncertain. We wish it understood that no one who reads these lines is in any manner referred to, and no disparaging intent underlies any of our remarks. They are projected solely upon an earnest desire to serve our country as reformers. A NEW INDUSTRY. The recent eviction of the Jews from Russia, and their immigration to this country, has stimulated the production of pork in our western states to such an extent that the question of transportation has become a serious matter, the railroads being unable to accommodate the traffic. We have noticed, with regret, that the coaches of passenger trains have been used of late to some extent in such transportation, to the great discommoding of travelers. Each hog usually requires four seats-two double seats turned together for the convenience of it and its sample cases. Now, however, as we notice in the American Law Magazine, (Chicago), the rivers are being utilized for the moving of the droves of hogs. The porkers are driven into the water and floated down from boom to boom, much after the manner of driving saw logs. The important point is at last decided, that the hog drover is bound to pay all tolls and boom charges. The case from which we glean these facts is that of Johnston et al., v. Cranage, Jr. et al., American Law Magazine, page 236, and is as follows: "DRIVING HOGS. LIABILITY FOR TOLL, ETC." Where one contracts generally to drive hogs to a certain point for a definite and stated sum or rate, he is by the contract bound to discharge all liens for tolls imposed by booming and river improvement companies." It must be a sight at once novel and pleasing to see the hogs being floated down the murky rivers of the west, the drovers springing from back to back, rolling the stranded from the sand bars, breaking a jam where they are piled a score of feet in height, and then when in the booms, catching and branding each. one on th end after the manner of saw logs-with the known to succeeding generations would be a sure name of the owner. We hope the next issue of that enterprising journal will convey to us the pleasing intelligence that each hog is to be fitted out with a Boynton coat, or a life-preserver at least, and that the branding irons are to be used cold. pledge of immortality. We pause in wonder, and to admire, the skill and eloquence, the industry and perseverance of an attorney in the trial of a very difficult case, knowing, perhaps, that the effort we have just witnessed is almost super-human, yet we are hurried on and no note We wish to say, in this connection, that the is made upon, the tablets of history; and it is A. L. M. is an excellent law journal, and among only after scores of years have passed and the our most welcome exchanges. We believe, how-tale is told to generations whose wonder leads to ever, that the early death of one of the compositors of that office, or of the anonymous editor at Lansing, Mich., would be a sign of improvement. AN IOWA AMENDMENT At an election recently held in the State of Iowa, an amendment was adopted to their State Constitution prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. The following is the amendment: "Add as section 26 to article 2 of said constitution the following: Section 26. No person shall manufacture for sale, or keep for sale as a beverage, any intoxicating liquors whatever, including ale, wine and beer. The general assembly shall, by law, prescribe regulations for the enforcement of the prohibition herein contained, and shall thereby provide suitable penalties for the violation of the provisions hereof." The subject now agitating the public mind in that state is what provisions shall be made by the legislature to effectually enforce this amendment. NEW BOOKS. Modern Jury Trials and Advocates; a work on Jury Law Banks & Brothers, 1882. this work than a mere statement of the fact that the first edition, (a large one), was exhausted in ninety days; and this second edition is in fully as great demand. The secret of this hungry demand seems to be in that universal recognition of the absolute necessity of preserving to history the successes of great advocates; of erecting the monument of faithful narration at least, to the memory of these mighty men who have placed the profession of the Law at the top of the roster of learning, culture and genius. The onward march of time, and the hurrying, changing tide of human events ofttimes abandon to forgetfulness and oblivion the achievements of men, which to be a chronicling of the great event, that a proper effort is made, too often, alas! too late, to record its narration. Thus it is that the greatest efforts in the lives of some of the most powerful advocates of the last half century were left unreported and are now found in history only as garbled make-ups, which reveal too strongly the master hand of the man who makes many words from few facts. MODERN JURY TRIALS aims to preserve these gems of forensic advocacy and eloquence, and in that aim has well succeeded. We make no attempt to review the work. To review it properly would be to reproduce it. It is of so great and entrancing interest that we know of one learned judge who, in bold defiance of all hygienic laws, sat up till three o'clock in the morning, so absorbed was he in its pages. And we know that it will enchain the attention of almost any lawyer to nearly the same extent. The largest part of the matter consists of brilliant passages of eloquence and the subtle art of counsel. This literature is found in no other volume, especially in none with the counsel so graphically described. Without making any invidious distinctions, we must admit that the cost of the book is a bagatelle compared with the value of the "apples of gold in pictures of silver," found on page 83-the remarks of Hon. D. W. Voorhees in the defense of poor, crazed Mary Harris; of Chief Justice Ryan on page 550; of McReynolds on page 667, and of Lathrop on page 674. We heartily recommend the book to the profession and to the general reader as well. A peculiar system of mortgaging farms is used in Switzerland. A farmer may borrow of a dozen men successively, the simple record in an official book showing their order. If he fails to pay, a successor is found for him by beginning at the bottom of the list of debtors, and calling on each in his order to assume all debts and manage the farm, or step aside and lose his claim. SERGEANT BALLANTINE ON CROSS- produce startling effects, but to elicit facts EXAMINATION. It will not be out of place here to make some remarks upon cross-examination. The records of courts of justice through all time show that truth cannot in a great number of cases tried be reasonably expected. Even when witnesses are honest, and have no intention to deceive, there is a natural tendency to exaggerate the facts favorably to the cause for which they are appearing, and to ignore the opposite circumstances; and the only means known to English law by which testimony can be sifted is cross-examination. By this agent, if skillfully used, falsehood ought to be exposed, and exaggerated statements reduced to their true dimensions. An unskillful use of it, on the contrary, has a tendency to uphold rather than destroy. If the principles upon which cross-examination ought to be founded are not understood and acted upon, it is worse than useless, and it becomes an instrument against its employer. The reckless asking of a number of questions on the chance of getting at something is too often a plan adopted by unskillful advocates, and noise is mistaken for energy. Mr. Baron Alderson once remarked to a counsel of this type, "Mr., you seem to think that the art of cross-examination is to examine crossly." which will support the theory intended to be put forward. Sir William Follett asked the fewest questions of any counsel I ever knew; and I have heard many cross-examinations from others listened to with rapture from an admiring client, each question of which has been destruction to his case. What is called a severe cross-examination, when applied to a truthful witness, only makes the truth stand out more clearly; and unless counsel is able to arrive in his own mind at a satisfactory opinion, it is far better to ask nothing than to flounder on with the chance of getting out something by a crowd of questions. A truthful witness generally adheres to the dry statement of facts, and avoids diverting attention by introducing irrelevant matter; and I think a remark I made to a jury upon one occasion is a sound one. It was upon a trial before Chief Justice Erle. I had put a question to a witness as to what he was doing at a particular time, this being a matter important to the inquiry. "I was talking to a lady," was his answer; adding, "I will tell you who she was, if you like. You know her very well." I made no observation at the time, but when addressing the jury said that my experience led me to the conclusion that honest witnesses endeavored to keep themselves to the facts they came to prove, but that lying ones endeavored to distract the attention by introducing something irrelevant; and I think this remark is worth consideration, and points out one of the tests of truth or falsehood in the person under exanination. In order to attain success in this branch of advocacy, it is necessary for counsel to form in his own mind and opinion upon the facts of the case, and the character and probable motives of a witness, before asking a question. This, doubtless, requires experience; and the Some Judges upon the bench never shone success of his cross-examination must depend in this branch of advocacy, and scarcely ap upon the accuracy of the judgment he forms.preciate the value of it, and a refinement that Great discernment is needful to distinguish material from unimportant discrepancies, and never to dwell long upon immaterial matters; but if a witness intends to commit perjury, it is rarely useful to press him upon the salient points of the case, with which he probably has made himself thoroughly acquainted, but to seek for circumstances for which he would not be likely to prepare himself. And it ought, above all things, to be remembered by the advocate, that when he has succeeded in making a point, he should leave it alone until his turn comes to address the jury upon it. If a dishonest witness has inadvertently made an admission infurious to himself, and, by the counsel's dwelling upon it, becomes aware of the effect, he will endeavor to shuffle out of it, and perhaps succeed in doing so. The object of cross-examination is not to now attends trials, and contrasts in many respects favorably with the coarseness of a former period, occasionally interferes with the force and persistence required in dealing with some persons in the box. In the equity Courts, the notion of crossexamination is ludicrous; it has, however, the merit of being thoroughly inoffensive. I have heard two or three specimens of it. In these cases the witnesses had filed affidavits which the adverse counsel examined from, and made them repeat orally what they had already sworn to, as if the object of the process was to obtain from the mouth of the witness in Court what had already been put upon paper in the solicitor's office. An experienced equity Judge once said to me in relation to a question I had asked, "Really, this is a long way from the point." "I am aware of that, my lord," was my answer. “If |